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 This dissertation uses Iraqi poetry, memoirs, and newspapers alongside British and 
American archival documents to analyze the cultural dynamics of popular opposition to foreign 
political, economic, and cultural hegemony in the post-mandatory state. It argues that the varied 
instances of political, social, and cultural revolution during this period were rooted in a 
fundamental commitment to anti-colonialism and national liberation and illustrates the historical 
contingency of ideological conflict and sectarian commitments in nationalist narratives used by 
scholars to classify and categorize revolutionary movements as fragmentary expressions of local 
grievances and demonstrate the global dimensions of these revolutionary currents. By shifting 
attention from the domain of elite politics and the ideological debates of isolated intellectual 
circles toward the cultural arena of popular political poetry and the social dimensions of tribal 
disintegration, urban migration, and capitalist dislocation, the dissertation shows how popular 
poets appealed to diverse populations of peasants, workers, and students and helped to mobilize 
popular movements that transcended sectarian and class conflicts. 
 The dissertation shows that the Iraqi public overwhelmingly refused to consider 
colonialism as part of the historical past as long as power remained in the hands of foreign 
officials and the old colonial elite and virtually all revolutionary currents in this period were 
aimed at eradicating the vestiges of colonialism. It illustrates the ways in which social change 
and cultural politics contributed to the development of mass politics and the emergence of a 
public sphere and fundamentally shaped revolutionary anti-colonial movements and challenged 
competing loyalties to class, sect, and ideology. The dissertation analyzes the social role of 
popular poetry in shaping national political discourse and mobilizing mass political action and 
contends that the binary dichotomies of Iraqist and pan-Arabist nationalism or radical and 
reactionary social ideologies have obscured the national solidarities constructed through public 
protest and opposition to British and American policies in Iraq and the Arab world. By 
juxtaposing the testimony of immediate and retrospective historical texts, like poems and 
memoirs, the dissertation illustrates the extent to which these ideological narratives were applied 







'FOR I AM THEIR DEATH' 
 
 On the morning of July 4, 1949, the celebrated Iraqi poet Muhammad Mahdi al-Jawahiri 
(1899-1997) walked to the shop of his friend and comrade Ilyas, a prominent Armenian tailor in 
Baghdad, and asked him to sew a new suit. The unrivaled master of Iraqi poetry after the passing 
of Maʿruf al-Rusafi (1875-1945), Jawahiri had been invited to compose and deliver a lyrical ode 
to Hashim al-Witri, Dean of the College of Medicine, at a formal ceremony in Baghdad to honor 
the dean's acceptance of an honorary doctorate from the King's College School of Medicine in 
London. The ceremony would be attended by the political and social elite of Baghdad, including 
Crown Prince ʿAbd al-Ilah and then Prime Minister Nuri al-Saʿid, and Jawahiri wished to look as 
though he belonged. After Ilyas finished the poet's new suit, Jawahiri returned home and offered 
a tearful farewell to his wife and children before handing his wife the entirety of his financial 
savings, a sum large enough to sustain the family for more than three years. He then pocketed his 
ticket, an ostentatious object gilded with solid gold, and departed for the ceremony in a private 
car sent by the dean to collect and deliver him.
1
 
 Jawahiri, who had already been arrested for political sedition on several different 
occasions, had good reason to make these arrangements with his family. He had, after all, 
politely declined the dean's request for some lines of verse, pleading his inability to recover 
emotionally from the death of his brother Jaʿfar, who was gunned down by Iraqi police alongside 
hundreds of other young Iraqi students on al-Maʾmun Bridge while protesting the Portsmouth 
Treaty signed between the British and Iraqi governments in January 1948. Jawahiri had agreed to 
attend the ceremony as a guest only, but unbeknownst to the dean and his political allies, he had 
in fact composed a poem for the event, though it resembled an ode only in poetic form and in its 
eponymous title, "Hashim al-Witri." Jawahiri planned to seize the stage in the middle of the 
ceremony and to throw the event into turmoil and chaos with an unprecedented public assault on 
the political establishment. Despite his strong personal and familial ties to several prominent 
members of the political elite, including the royal family, Jawahiri had good reason to once again 
expect arrest and indefinite imprisonment for political sedition. 
                                                          
1
 The entire episode is recounted in Jawahiri's memoires. See Muhammad Mahdi al-Jawahiri, Dhikrayati 
(Damascus: Dar al-Rafidayn, 1991), 2:57-66. 
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 As the guests chatted idly with one another, Jawahiri surreptitiously walked on stage, 
grabbed hold of the microphone, and silenced the crowd with the memorable opening to a now 
famous poem: 
 
 O Dean of the Hospital, a complaint from a friend 
  If I shout it will overflow, so permit me to whisper to a pal 
 I was informed that you have still been inquiring 
  About my presence, pleading and imploring here and there 
 And you say, how does such a dazzling star persist 
  In staying away from gilded gatherings filled with notables? 
 But now certainty has appeared and overwhelmed you 
  As the light of morning removes the darkness from your eyes 
 For indeed I silenced my sermons when I could not find 
  One who deserved even the echo of my anguished complaint 
 But you were acquainted with the harm done to the masses 




These opening verses brought the crowd to an uncomfortable silence as Jawahiri drew attention 
to the uneasy social dynamics of political collaboration with the Iraqi regime in the aftermath of 
the wathba massacres of January 1948. Hashim al-Witri had famously resigned from his post as 
Dean of the College of Medicine to protest the brutal slaughter of student demonstrators actions 
by state security forces on hospital grounds. 
 Witri, though, soon squandered his newfound popularity with the political opposition by 
returning to his post after the immediate political crisis had passed and the Iraqi regime had 
succeeded in reestablishing political control through the implementation of martial law. For 
Jawahiri and many others on the Iraqi Left, Witri's acceptance of the King College's honorary 
degree signified a political rehabilitation organized by Nuri al-Saʿid and his cronies and signified 
a disgraceful abdication of the moral claims forged in the streets of Baghdad during the wathba 
uprising. Jawahiri now turned to publically condemn Witri for this betrayal: 
 
 You went out and composed thousands of articles 
  On how they now respect the generation of the wathba 
 But while you worked with the obstinacy of a poet 
  The state destroyed our homes and suppressed our writers 
 And the rotten Thamesians who grip hold of the soul 
  Of this nation are treated as dear lovers and close relatives 
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 Muhammad Mahdi al-Jawahiri, Diwan al-Jawahiri (Beirut: Bisan, 2000), 3:247-52. The translation of "Hashim al-
Witri" and all subsequent poems are my own, unless otherwise noted. 
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 For these tyrants bestow their bliss upon the white man 
  While leaving the poor brown one confined in the stable 
 
The stunned crowd sat in silence before this tidal wave of poetic fury, with politicians and state 
dignitaries paralyzed by the dilemma of either suffering through public humiliation or exposing 
the naked oppression of their dictatorship and disaffected students astonished by this new 
expression of political dissent.  As the poem wound to its end, meandering from the initial 
condemnation of the dean to a frontal assault on the state's blatant subservience to neo-colonial 
power, Jawahiri directed his final lines at the political elite, warning them that the power and 
fury of his verse could not be suppressed by ordinary means: 
 
 They boast that their towering tyrannical wave 
  Has obstructed from us every outlet and escape 
 But they lie, for my verses fill the mouth of time 
  Penetrating in perpetuity from the east to the west 
 Tearing them from their youth and dropping them 
  To their fate while destroying their grandeur of lies 
 For I am their death, bringing their houses down upon them 
  And inciting even the doorman and the baby to curse their names 
 
When he finished reciting the poem, Jawahiri stepped away from the microphone, defiantly 
ripped his notes into shreds and allowed the scraps to flutter to the ground, and then walked out 
of the garden.  
Jawahiri returned to his home after this spectacular act of public dissidence, apparently 
stunned that his exit had been unimpeded by security forces. He waited at home for three full 
days before police finally showed up at his house to demand a copy of the poem. Feigning 
surprise, Jawahiri calmly explained that he only had one copy, which he had very publicly 
destroyed, and that he couldn't recall much of the verse. Despite the stifling nature of censorship 
and repression in the country, Iraq remained at least nominally a constitutional monarchy with an 
independent judiciary, and the state was reluctant to pursue a high profile legal case against the 
poet without convincing evidence. Unfortunately for the poet, several of the medical students at 
the ceremony had managed to gather the scraps of paper from the ground and piece them back 
together. These young admirers of Jawahiri sent the reconstructed poem to a newspaper in 
Beirut, which enthusiastically published the poem and promoted the new political scandal. 
Jawahiri was arrested immediately after the poem's publication and detained for several weeks at 
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the Ministry of Defense. As Jawahiri has recalled, the state's efforts to intimidate him into silence 
were handicapped from the outset by the effusive praise heaped upon him by his interrogators. 
One particularly enthusiastic official offered the poet any room in the entire compound to use as 
his personal holding cell and apologized with considerable embarrassment for having to imprison 
him in the first place. Even Bahjat al-ʿAttiyah, the notorious head of Iraqi secret police, privately 
apologized to Jawahiri for his arrest and detention, explaining that the order had come directly 
from Nuri al-Saʿid and that he was powerless to overrule the directive. As the public clamor for 




 The "Hashim al-Witri" episode is neither the first nor the last example of the intimate 
connection between the poetic and the political in the history of modern Iraq. Several prominent 
poets were arrested and imprisoned for publicly supporting the Bakr Sidqi coup d'état of 1936, 
dozens were interned for endorsing the Rashid ʿAli coup d'état of 1941, and several more were 
arrested and imprisoned for their role in the popular uprisings of 1948, 1952, and 1956. This 
particular political scandal, furthermore, was neither the most important nor the most dramatic 
instance of poetic interventions in the burgeoning public sphere. Jawahiri himself had already 
publicly attacked the legitimacy of the political elite on several prior occasions, though never 
with such scathingly violent language. More strikingly, Jawahiri and his comrade Muhammad 
Salih Bahr al-ʿUlum, a factory worker and union activist whose poetry was equally celebrated by 
dissident leftists and radical nationalists, had nearly succeeded in upending the old political order 
during the wathba protests just over a year before. Bahr al-ʿUlum, who directed the movements 
and stoked the emotions of ebullient crowds from atop the shoulders of local workers in the days 
leading up to the massacre on al-Maʾmun Bride, was so brutally tortured for this activism by 
Bahjat al-ʿAttiyah's secret police that he was unable to stand for months. Jawahiri's public eulogy 
for his fallen brother Jaʿfar on the steps of the Haydarkhanah Mosque on al-Rashid Street in 
downtown Baghdad remains to this day the most emotional and memorable poem in the literary 
cannon of modern Iraq. 
 Jawahiri's act of public dissidence before Hashim al-Witri and the assembled Iraqi 
notables is instead most striking because of the historical context in which it emerged and the 
galvanizing effect of the ensuing public scandal on reawakening the dissident political currents 
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 Jawahiri, Dhikrayati, 2:60-66. 
5 
 
then suppressed by the stifling political atmosphere that reigned in Baghdad. It is neither 
particularly incisive nor particularly controversial to note that modern Iraqi poets repeatedly 
challenged political authorities in the Hashemite period and lent their verses to support popular 
social movements and revolutionary political currents. The narrower question of the causal 
impact of these poetic interventions in the public sphere on popular mobilization, however, 
offers a more intriguing avenue for historical exploration and analysis. When Jawahiri grabbed 
the microphone and recited "Hashim al-Witri," Baghdad was still reeling from the brutal 
suppression of the wathba uprising, the disastrous collapse of the Arab resistance in Palestine, 
and the terrifying spectacle of the public executions of Comrade Fahd and other leaders of the 
Iraqi Communist Party. As Jawahiri later recalled, “terror reigned in the skies over the entire 
nation, but especially the capital Baghdad, pervading the streets and cafes and even the houses 
and their whispered words.”
4
 
 The Palestinian poet and critic Salma Khadra Jayyusi broached the subject of this 
relationship in Jawahiri's own life and work in a passing comment on the poet's most important 
achievement: 
 
The emotional sweep of his verse was the final liberating force in a poetry that 
had long suffered from emotional insincerity. It was also a liberating force for the 
spirit of the generation, and served as a catharsis for the suffocating undercurrents 
of Arab life. Al-Jawahiri's poetry may even have played an important part in 
preparing the Iraqi people emotionally for the advent and the eruption of 




This dissertation is in large part an effort to take up this integral question from the vantage point 
of an historian, with a much broader examination of the role of popular Iraqi poets in general, 
rather than Jawahiri in particular. This exploration of the emotional catharsis provided by 
popular poetry in modern Iraq is deeply indebted to the historical concepts of social mobilization 
and moral economy. The project utilizes an integrative emphasis on the social and political 
context of cultural movements that makes poets and poetry the proper and deserving subjects of 
much broader historical dynamics. The political interventions of poets in the neo-colonial period 
of Iraqi history offer a critical revision of contemporary historical understandings of the period 
itself.  
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 Salma Khadra Jayyusi, Trends and Movements in Modern Arabic Poetry, Volume 1 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1977), 200. 
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The Problem of Anti-Colonialism in Iraq 
 The League of Nations' decision to terminate the British Mandate in Iraq on October 3, 
1932 - some eighteen years before it was set to expire - signaled the formal end of colonial rule 
in Iraq and the dawn of a new era of national independence. Despite the considerable celebratory 
fanfare and self-congratulatory rhetoric of the Iraqi political elite in both Geneva and Baghdad, 
popular responses to the decision were decidedly more cynical and caustic. The young poet 
Muhammad Salih Bahr al-ʿUlum bitterly expressed the disaffection of many young Iraqis in his 
poem "The False Independence of the Mandate's Wake": 
 
 Oh dancers to the prospect of a new era 
  That contains all the old and ragged things 
 What is the difference between the Mandate  




Bahr al-ʿUlum's political cynicism was certainly not unfounded. The early termination of the 
mandate had been carefully negotiated by British and Iraqi politicians several years earlier and 
codified in the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930, which was ratified by a carefully packed parliament 
in the face of massive public opposition. As in many other parts of the colonized world where 
colonial authority was not broken or decisively weakened by violent rebellion or sustained anti-
colonial political campaigns,
7
 "national independence" in Iraq was a preemptive move to retain 
colonial privileges and protect colonial interests under the custodianship of reliable members of 




 As Samira Haj has noted, British colonial authorities developed local political institutions 
within a nominally constitutional framework that constrained popular sovereignty by preserving 
in perpetuity the political dominance of a "monarchic oligarchy." The Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 
1930 guaranteed Britain's continual access to local military bases and codified abstract 
commitments to British supervision in foreign policy matters and Iraqi assistance to Britain 
under "threat of war" that would offer sufficient legal justification for virtually any future British 
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 Muhammad Salih Bahr al-ʿUlum, Diwan Bahr al-ʿUlum (Baghdad: Matbaʿat Dar al-Tadamun, 1968), 1:59. 
7
 See, for example, Jost Dülffer and Marc Frey, eds., Elites and Decolonization in the Twentieth Century (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). 
8
 Toby Dodge, Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and a History Denied (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2003), 5-42 and Susan Pedersen, "Getting Out of Iraq - in 1932: The League of Nations and the Road to 
Normative Statehood," American Historical Review 115:4 (2010), 975-1000. 
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intervention in Iraqi affairs. The institutional structures of electoral democracy in the post-
mandatory state ensured that parliamentary representatives would not be elected by popular 
majorities, but rather would effectively be selected by the Crown through a two stage process in 
which secondary electors to cast the final and decisive ballots. The inherent corruption of this 
political system was most apparent in its rural manifestations, where tribal shaykhs enjoyed 
virtually unchecked control of the entire electoral process. Where institutional apparatuses failed 
to prevent the emergence of viable political alternatives, the state relied on both informal powers 
of intimidation and coercion and the formal authority of courts-martial in the frequent periods of 
martial law to dissuade, discipline, and punish political challengers. This consolidation of 
political authority was accompanied by a dramatic expansion of landowner rights during and 
after the colonial period, resulting in the emergence of semi-feudal living and working conditions 
for the peasantry of southern Iraq.
9
 
 The relative monopolization of power and capital by this "monarchic oligarchy" has at 
times been obscured by the notable political turmoil and ostensible instability of the Iraqi regime 
during the "neo-colonial" period (1932-1958). In the twenty-six year period between formal 
independence and the fall of the monarchy, forty-five different cabinets rose and fell, with an 
average duration of just eight months.
10
 At least eight of these cabinet changes occurred through 
the direct intervention of the Iraqi Army in the political arena. Yet this apparent instability 
masked the fundamentally cosmetic nature of political change in the old regime. The constant 
rise and fall of cabinets reflected internal disputes and rivalries between members of an 
entrenched political elite that British officials affectionately dubbed "the Old Gang." Nuri al-
Saʿid himself headed fourteen different cabinets during the monarchy years and eleven other 
individuals headed multiple cabinets.
11
 The vast majority of military interventions, furthermore, 
merely reflected the degree to which rival members of the political elite could count on the 
support of their allies in the military leadership to forcibly support their claim to power.
12
 Iraqi 
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 Samira Haj, The Making of Iraq, 1900-1963: Capital, Power, and Ideology (Albany: State University of New York 
Press , 1997), 27-53. 
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 Majid Khadduri, Independent Iraq, 1932-1958: A Study in Iraqi Politics, 2nd Edition (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1960), 26-29. 
11
 Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq: A Study of Iraq's Old Landed and 
Commercial Classes and of its Communists, Baʿthists, and Free Officers (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1978), 180-84. 
12
 Before the July Revolution of 1958, which finally brought down the Hashemite monarchy, only the coup d'états 
of Bakr Sidqi in 1936 and Rashid ʿAli al-Kaylani in 1941 threatened the basic structure of the "monarchic oligarchy" 
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politics during the neo-colonial period, in short, was merely the political dalliance of the old 
colonial elite. 
 While the most prominent stalwarts of the literary and cultural intelligentsia had long 
since come to terms with the Hashemite monarchy established in the wake of the 1920 uprising, 
the younger generation of dissidents quickly concluded that Iraqi "independence" would not be 
complete without political revolution. Social democrats and leftist activists converged around the 
Ahali Group and the remnants of Jaʿfar Abu al-Timman's National Party and fatefully supported 
Bakr Sidqi's coup d'état of 1936 in the hope that a military regime would allow them to pursue an 
ambitious agenda of social and political reform.
13
 Radical nationalists, on the other hand, were 
contended that the liberation of neighboring Arab countries must take precedence over social and 
political reform and were instead drawn toward the aura of authoritarianism and militarism 
promoted by disaffected "Old Guard" politicians like Yasin al-Hashimi and Rashid ʿAli al-
Kaylani. Both the socialists and the radical nationalists enthusiastically supported the Rashid ʿAli 
coup d'état of 1941 as a means of enacting their own domestic agendas, but the rapid collapse of 
the movement and the resumption of British military occupation laid bare the difficulties of 
achieving revolutionary aims by colluding with prominent politicians and military officers. Some 
of the older and wealthier supporters of the Rashid ʿAli movement, including notable individuals 
like Naji Shawkat, ʿAli Mahmud al-Shaykh ʿAli, Khalil Kenna, and Musa Shahbandar, opted to 
abandon their commitment to anti-colonial revolution in exchange for political rehabilitation and 
the assurance that their own financial interests would not be compromised by popular revolution. 
The support of most of the younger rank-and-file of the radical nationalist movement, however, 
coalesced around the new Istiqlal Party, which articulated a decidedly more populist agenda for 




 The shifting landscape of national politics in Iraq in the post-war period fundamentally 
altered the nature of the demands and discourse of the anti-colonial movement. The 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
in any real sense. The threat posed by the first of these coup d'états evaporated after Bakr Sidqi and his political 
ally Hikmat Suleiman moved quickly to reassure the British Embassy, King Ghazi, and those member of the political 
elite who had not fled the country. The threat posed by the Rashid ʿAli coup d'état was promptly handled by a new 
British invasion and occupation of the country. 
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consolidation of state power in the aftermath of the Rashid ʿAli movement and the subsequent 
appropriation, elimination, or suppression of the variant political factions that questioned the 
nature of the independent state's relation to Britain forced both leftists and radical nationalists to 
reconsider the relationship between culture, society, and nation. The simultaneous defection of 
prominent political leaders from the anti-colonial to the pro-British camp and the emergence of 
new receptive audiences of peasants and workers displaced and disaffected by the social 
transformation of the countryside and the social alienation of capitalist expansion prompted 
many anti-colonial nationalists to reconsider their longstanding opposition toward the Iraqi Left. 
The political opposition movements of the late 1940s and 1950s increasingly insisted on drawing 
a strict dichotomy between collaborators and rebels. The old landed tribal shaykhs, alongside an 
emerging class of industrial capitalists who had once been courted by the rival currents of leftist 
and radical nationalist anti-colonialism, now joined Nuri al-Saʿid and the "Old Gang" as the 
principle symbols of neo-colonial hegemony in Iraq. The evolving discourse of anti-colonialism, 
which dramatically entered the public sphere with the emergence of urban mass politics and the 
popular uprisings of 1948, 1952, and 1956, was reconstituted as a revolutionary quest for popular 
democracy and social justice.
15
  
 The new affinities and solidarities forged between the Left and the Right during this 
period, however, were not strong enough to survive the definitive victory of the anti-colonial 
movement and the splintering of the national front into competing ideological camps dominated 
by the leftwing Iraqi Communist Party and the rightwing Baʿth Party. After the immediate 
euphoria of the July 1958 Revolution began to fade and the new radical government of ʿAbd al-
Karim Qasim began to run out of convenient political targets equally loathed by both Left and 
Right for the carnivalesque show trials of the Mahdawi Court, the two factions suddenly turned 
against one another in early 1959. While the moderate wings of each side struggled to resist the 
rising tide of rhetorical animosity and political violence, the enmity between the Communists 
and the Baʿthists would not be contained. Leftists now denounced the radical nationalists as 
reactionary obstacles to the realization of social justice and the radical nationalists increasingly 
attacked leftists as tools of the new Soviet imperialism. More alarming for the prospect of the 
nation's future, radical nationalists began to frame the conflict as a product of sectarian 
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attachments and cultural perversions that threatened their fundamental national identity. While it 
was the televised execution of ʿAbd al-Karim Qasim and the subsequent massacre of several 
thousand communists and communist sympathizers by Baʿthist officers and operatives in early 
February 1963 that permanently and definitively destroyed the tenuous national unity forged 
through decades of anti-colonial struggle, the transformation of ideological cleavages into social 
antagonisms was already apparent and irreversible by 1960, which is where this dissertation 
concludes. 
 Despite the relatively rapid collapse and fragmentation of the anti-colonial movement in 
the post-revolutionary period, it would be a grave mistake to conclude that the solidarities of 
national front politics were superficial and designed to fail. In a grotesque irony of history, the 
very popularity of the Baʿth Party among both Sunnis and Shiʿa in the 1950s and 1960s is a 
testament to the basic strength of these new discourses of national unity. The emerging Baʿthist 
ideology in Iraq was in many ways a compromise between the radical nationalism of the 1930s 
and 1940s and the socialist impulse of the Iraqi Left. In rejecting both the reactionary social 
interests of the older generation of pan-Arabists and the internationalist agenda of the Iraqi 
Communist Party, the Baʿthists sought to consummate a totalizing anti-colonial victory that 
promised national liberation from imperialism, capitalism, and communism.
16
 This deep 
yearning for a revolutionary catharsis was fueled by the increasingly nebulous nature of 
colonialism in local Iraqi experiences.
17
 Popular disaffection with the state's subservience to 
imperialist demands and dictates prompted many Iraqis to identify the state itself as an apparatus 
of colonial power, and the repeated failures of the anti-colonial movement to bring down the 
state fueled an ever increasing effort to identify the collaborators and traitors responsible for its 
perseverance.  
Historiographical Survey 
The historiography on modern Iraq has evolved significantly over the last several decades 
as historians have uncovered additional and unconventional archives and to apply new analytical 
and theoretical tools to entrenched historical narratives. Two recent works on British colonialism 
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and neo-colonialism have built upon the foundational historical narratives of Majid Khadduri and 
Peter Sluglett.
18
 Toby Dodge has effectively demonstrated the importance of ideology in shaping 
colonial policy and underscored the influence of Orientalist conceptions of Ottoman despotism 
and tribal romanticism in guiding the radical transformation of the Iraqi social landscape during 
the colonial period.
19
 Matthew Elliot, on the other hand, has elaborated on the British role in 
shaping the political institutions of the electoral process and the parliamentary system in the neo-
colonial period of "national independence."
20
 While Elliot's casual dismissal of Iraqi sources as 
less authoritative than colonial archival records and committed defense of British policy as the 
responsible stewardship of the "peaceful evolution" of the Iraqi monarchy compromise the 
historical value of his work, his empirical research convincingly establishes the extent and 
limitations of neo-colonial power in the period of formal independence. 
While there is still no authoritative history of Iraqi culture, politics, and society during the 
period of the British Mandate, two recent works on the history of the Iraqi Shiʿa during this 
period have complemented the historical narratives of colonial policy and ideology introduced by 
Sluglett and Dodge in a critically important manner. These works have provided a critical and 
definitive intervention in the broader historical debates about the nature of religious sectarianism 
and the strength of theocratic impulses in the colonial period.
21
 Yitzhak Nakash and Pierre-Jean 
Luizard have produced incisive historical studies of the Iraqi Shiʿa and highlighted both the 
oppositional and collaborative nature of interactions between the colonial state and the ʿulama.
22
 
Both works stand out, in particular, for their ability to build upon essential archival evidence 
with innovative local sources that broaden historical narratives previously confined to the 
experiences of the political elite.   
By far the most important historical intervention in the ongoing effort to reframe the 
focus of modern Iraqi history from elite politics toward a more comprehensive analysis of culture 
and society, however, is Hanna Batatu's magnum opus on class, social change, and revolutionary 
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political movements in modern Iraq.
23
 Batatu's work remains unrivalled, both for the breadth of 
its historical research and the scope of its critical inquiry, and no other historian of modern Iraq 
has managed to gain access to the secret Iraqi police files and documents of the Iraqi Communist 
Party utilized by Batatu or to replicate his integration of oral interviews and historical narrative.
24
 
Since the publication of Batatu's twelve hundred page tome, only Samira Haj has been brave 
enough to offer a new intervention in Iraqi social history.
25
 Haj responded to the daunting 
challenge of building upon Batatu's achievements by proposing a departure from Batatu's 
empiricism and "fetish for facts" and instead attempting a synthesis of data and documents into a 
coherent theoretical framework that situates capitalist expansion in Iraq within a broader global 
context. While the paucity of historical evidence for many of the book's argument weakens the 
book's impact, Haj's intervention raises critical questions about the insularity of much 
scholarship on modern Iraq. 
The general reluctance of contemporary scholars to deal directly with the empirical 
challenges of contesting or complementing Batatu's arguments about social transformations and 
class consciousness in modern Iraq led many to take up the comparatively less daunting task of 
elaborating upon Batatu's speculative suggestions about the formation of national identity. Reeva 
Simon and Peter Wien have explored the ideological foundations of Iraqi nationalism in the 
period before World War II and reached opposing conclusions about the comparative strength of 
fascist ideologies during the war years. Simon contends that fascism was in fact a formidable 
ideological influence on the military officers, politicians, and intellectuals who supported the 
Rashid ʿAli coup d'état of April 1941 and subsequent alliance with Nazi Germany and points to 
the shared cultural and ideological roots of both Nazism and Satiʿ al-Husri's brand of pan-
Arabism in the romantic nationalism of Herder, Fichte, and Arndt.
26
 Wien, in contrast, argues 
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that the Iraqi adoption of "fascist imagery" was a superficial expression of shared geo-political 
interests in the destruction of the British and French empires and that the popularity of 
authoritarian political movements in this period reflected a stronger identification with the 
politics and policies of Mustafa Kemal and Reza Shah than with Hitler or Mussolini.
27
  
Several other scholars have moved beyond this narrow chronological and thematic focus 
to discuss more broadly the ideological competition between romantic pan-Arab nationalism and 
cosmopolitan Iraqist nationalism. Drawing on Benedict Anderson's notion of imagined 
communities, Sami Zubaida builds upon Batatu's tentative thesis and argues forcefully that while 
pan-Arabism retained divisive elements of authoritarianism, communalism, and racialism, 
"Iraqism" developed as a leftist, secular, and anti-communitarian movement that allowed Iraq to 
be "imagined as a nation of all of its communities."
28
 Eric Davis takes up this argument in his 
own manuscript in order to illustrate the effect of these ideological divisions on the political 
movements of modern Iraq and, most importantly, to explain how the Iraqists failed to 
effectively challenge the pan-Arabist appropriation of nationalist imagery and historical 
memory.
29
 More recently, Orit Bashkin has used the political struggles of the ʿAbd al-Karim 
Qasim era (1958-1963) as a case study of the cultural politics at work in the ideological 
contestations of pan-Arabists and Iraqists.
30
 
While the turn towards nationalism as an ideological framework for the ethnic and 
sectarian tensions and social conflicts that emerged during the monarchal period significantly 
expanded the scope of political subjectivity represented in the historiography of modern Iraq, the 
structural limitations of nationalist political discourse ensured that these discussions would 
largely remain confined to an intellectual history of a particular class. Recent interventions in the 
cultural and literary history of modern Iraq by Muhsin al-Musawi and Orit Bashkin have helped 
to address this deficiency by exploring and analyzing the response of Iraqi artists, intellectuals, 
and politicians to the critical issues of imperialism and modernity.
31
 Both works broaden our 
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understanding of intellectual debates about memory and identity by moving beyond the narrow 
range of nationalist politics to incorporate new discussions about colonialism, capitalism, 
tribalism, art, education, and gender. These interventions offer a new horizon for an historical 
inquiry that seeks to integrate discussions of cultural politics and social history. 
The path forward in forging ever more complex, complete, and critical histories of 
modern Iraq, however, must reflect not only on the tremendous achievements of past and present 
scholars and the new avenues of exploration opened by their insights and questions but also the 
comparative analysis of other bodies of historical literature that might better reflect the particular 
deficiencies of the historiography of modern Iraq. This dissertation draws influence from five 
such bodies of literature in an effort to construct a more sophisticated and less insular narrative 
of the anti-colonial movement in modern Iraq. First, a growing body of historical literature 
analyzing anti-colonial discourses and the politics of anti-Westernism in the colonized world 
underscores the need for similarly complex and sophisticated analyses of local responses to 
colonialism and neo-colonialism in Iraq. The most obvious basis of this scholarship has been the 
heated ideological debates about Orientalism and the "Clash of Civilizations" that emphasize the 
singularity of Western colonialism and Islamic nativism.
32
 More recent theoretical work on the 
subject has moved beyond these arguments about cultural singularity toward an epistemological 
analysis of how Western categories of rationality and modernity have shaped and constrained 
historical analysis of the colonized world.
33
 At the empirical level, several scholars have taken up 
the challenge posed by the critics of Edward Said and, drawing upon Sadiq al-ʿAzm’s conception 
of “Orientalism in Reverse,” have begun to document the historical dynamics of anti-colonialism 
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and anti-Westernism in the Middle East.
34
 These new contributions to the historical debate about 
colonialism in the Middle East have notably centered upon the dynamics of anti-Westernism in 
Iran and Turkey, perhaps because the ambiguous and indirect nature of the "colonial encounter" 
in those countries offered a more fertile ground for moving beyond the superficial documentation 
of anti-colonial politics and violence in the colonized Arab world. Recent scholarship on anti-
colonial and anti-Western discourse in Iraq and Egypt, respectively, by Muhsin al-Musawi and 
Robbert Woltering, however, have underscored the relevance of these discussions in the Arab 
world by highlighting the complexity and sophistication of local responses to colonial and neo-
colonial discourse.
35
 These new critical interventions underscore the need for more integrative 
analysis of anti-colonial politics in the Arab world that foreground historical and social context 
and take into account cultural critiques of the hegemonic onslaught of Western capitalism and 
modernity. 
The continued constraint of these academic interrogations of anti-colonialism by the 
contours and boundaries of political and intellectual history demands a more innovative approach 
that engages more directly with social history. Here, the significant body of historical literature 
affiliated with or influenced by the subaltern studies collective's writings on South Asia 
constitutes the second major source of intellectual inspiration for this dissertation project. 
Because anti-colonialism in the Arab world has been studied largely from the vantage points of 
Islamic studies and political histories, little attempt has been made to explore the popular 
dimensions of anti-colonial movements and ideas.
36
 Batatu's discussion of popular opposition to 
colonialism and neo-colonialism in Iraq and the role of anti-colonialism in fueling the radical 
political movements of the political underground has inspired numerous scholars to complement 
his work by focusing on the development of anti-colonial discourse and thought among Iraqi 
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intellectuals. What remains to be done, however, is to explain how these intellectual 
engagements with and critiques of colonialism, capitalism, and Western modernity directly 
influenced (or, in some cases, failed to influence) the social movements of subaltern political 
actors. Since Batatu's pioneering achievements, there have, in fact, been virtually no academic 
attempts to address subaltern political movements in Iraq from beyond the vantage point of 
intellectual representations of subaltern culture and society.
37
 The pioneering work of the 
subaltern studies collective in excavating and analyzing the overlooked history of subaltern 
political movements through the critical interrogation of colonial archives and incorporation of 
unique and unconventional historical sources offers an essential theoretical framework and 
grounding for a project that analyzes anti-colonial movements  in Iraq in a manner that treats 
popular poetry, tribal rebellions, union strikes, and mass protests on the same plane as nationalist 
oratory and elite political programs.
38
 This theoretical and analytical grounding is perhaps most 
suggestive of a new approach to tribal and peasant politics in Iraq.  
Recent scholarship on colonialism and tribalism in the Middle East and broader Islamic 
world has highlighted both the new horizons of academic inquiry and the recurrent obstacles to 
comprehensive integrations of tribal and national histories. Historians of the British Empire have 
highlighted the severity of tribal resistance to colonial incursions and the colonial resort to air 
power in order to quell resistance in a manner that suggests the basic centrality of the tribal 
experience to any serious discussion of anti-colonial politics.
39
 Contemporary scholarship on the 
exploitations and deconstructions of tribal identities and clan loyalties in the Central Asian 
republics of the Soviet Union has underscored the uneven results of state-sponsored efforts at 
detribalization in a way that hints at the more singular experience of the colonial encounter by 
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 Several scholars have ignited a passionate academic debate in the past decade 
surrounding the role the colonial state in constructing and deconstructing tribal identities in 
Jordan that suggests a need for broader discussions about the place of tribes in both local and 
imperial constructions of modernity and supplemental account of these historical dynamics in 
other parts of the Arab world.
41
 Finally, a small number of scholars have turned their attention 
toward the political agency of tribes in modern Iraq and pointed to a certain resilience of tribal 
structures that belies Batatu's suggestion that colonialism inadvertently destroyed tribalism in 
Iraq.
42
 The work of the subaltern studies collective provides a new avenue for building upon 
these discussions in a manner that critically integrates the tribal uprisings of Iraq with the 
national narrative of anti-colonialism in Iraq. Such an approach would move beyond the 
narrative of the tribal elite by focusing on violence and dissent within tribal confederations, 
particularly peasant challenges to the authority of tribal shaykhs and to the social legitimacy of 
tribal structures and organizations of rural life. 
The interventions of the subaltern studies collective point more broadly to the need for a 
theoretical framework and foundation for further discussion of the relationship between politics 
and culture. Eric Davis has drawn heavily from the Gramscian conception of hegemony in his 
analysis of the state sponsorship of "organic intellectuals" in shaping and producing historical 
memory in modern Iraq. While this work constitutes an important intervention in recent 
intellectual debates about the collapse of secular cosmopolitanism and the dominance of an 
authoritarian and chauvinist vision of Baʿthist nationalism in Iraq, the invocation of Gramscian 
concepts also points toward the possibility of future interventions that foreground the role of 
culture in producing politics.
43
 Gramsci's influence on the theoretical formulations of cultural 
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politics and cultural studies by the principle intellectuals of the Birmingham School offers the 
third major body of academic literature shaping and guiding this research project.
44
 The 
influence of these and other contributions suggests a new horizon for thinking about cultural and 
social history as a discursive dynamic.
45
 Several recent historical studies on popular and mass 




The fourth body of historical literature that informs this dissertation is constituted by 
several older and more recent social histories of the Arab Middle East that underscore the 
viability of combing social and cultural analysis of the dynamics of anti-colonialism. The work 
of Joel Beinin and Zachary Lockman on the Egyptian working class points to the deep 
solidarities forged between nationalist political movements and working class social movements 
in an integrative manner that has yet to be taken up by scholars of other Arab countries.
47
 Juan 
Cole’s study of the ʿUrabi movement in late-nineteenth century Egypt offers a new template for 
the analysis of colonialism and anti-colonial movements that moves beyond the singular 
perspectives of the colonial state and the national political elite and instead constructs a broader 
picture of subaltern cultural responses to colonial domination.
48
 Robert Vitalis’ study of 
ARAMCO produces an important new paradigm for thinking about the social histories of local 
resistance to imperialism in the neo-colonial period and brings a new understanding of racial 
dynamics and cultural resentments into the study of capitalist expansion in the era of Arab oil.
49
 
Keith David Watenpaugh, finally, brings the Arab middle class into these new discussions of 
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local responses to colonialism and, in the process, critically challenges earlier understandings of 
Arab modernities. The cumulative effect of these innovative and original historical studies is to 
point to a notable gap in the historiography of modern Iraq and to suggest an opening for the 
reconsideration of Batatu's brilliant narrative of social change that incorporates new ways of 
thinking about nationalism, class consciousness, and popular culture. 
The body of historical writing on Iraq in Arabic constitutes the fifth and final body of 
work that shapes this dissertation. This valuable and underutilized corpus of scholarship 
underscores the extent to which particular individuals, events, and themes in the history of 
modern Iraq have drawn the concerted attention of Iraqi historians while eluding those scholars 
writing in French and English. In an incisive collection of essays framed as historical reflections, 
the late Saʿudi-Iraqi novelist ʿAbd al-Rahman Munif effectively challenges the hegemonic 
historical narrative drawn from colonial archives by instead emphasizing the role of tribes, 
peasants, workers, and students.
 50
 This project of reconstructing what Munif terms "the margins 
of history and resistance" provides an obvious parallel to Dipesh Chakrabarty's project of 
"provincializing Europe." Also influential have been the works of ʿAbd al-Amir Hadi ʿAkkam, 
Mudhaffar al-Amin, and ʿAbdullah al-Jizani on the histories of the middle class opposition 
parties, which point toward the utility of extending elements of Watenpaugh's project to Iraq.
51
 
While Iraqi and Arab historians have also generally lacked access to Iraqi state archives for 
political reasons - and, in fact, have seen this problem compounded by the problem of finding 
funding to access colonial archives - they have more effectively supplemented their use of the 
colonial archives with newspapers, memoirs, and poetry. It is this latter category of poetry that 
provides the single most important source for my own project. 
Poetry, Archives, and History 
 Iraqi scholars have long seized upon the unique position of poetry as public culture in 
both Iraq and the broader Arab world in order to shape and give substance to critical arguments 
about social developments and cultural politics in the modern era. A brief venture through the 
thematic discussions of poetry in history by contemporary Iraqi critics underscores the 
tremendous scope of popular poetry as an arena for social and cultural criticism. Ibrahim Waʾili 
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and ʿAbd al-Husayn Mubarak have pointed to the utility of poetry as both a tool for social 
mobilization and a venue for anti-colonial discourse in the Great Iraqi Revolution of 1920.
52
 
Raʾuf al-Waʿiz and Majid Ahmad al-Samarraʾi have both analyzed the dimensions of nationalist 
thought in modern Iraqi poetry as a means of elucidating the cultural and political dynamics of 
the ideological conflicts between pan-Arabists and Iraqist nationalists.
53
 Yusuf ʿIzz al-Din and 
Hilal Naji have explored poetic discourse on contemporary social problems and the development 
of socialist thought in modern Iraqi poetry.
54
 ʿIzz al-Din, indeed, has gone even further in several 
comprehensive surveys of modern Iraqi poetry that foreground the political and historical context 
of poetic production and consumption.
55
 There are, needless to say, countless other works that 
explore these and other themes in the work of individual poets. 
 The mere fact of poetry's popularity as an object of intellectual exploration and critical 
analysis, of course, is insufficient grounds for promoting its utility as a primary source of history. 
I argue instead that five distinct aspects of poetry as cultural production, political performance, 
and historical artifact attest to the viability, and in fact the necessity, of treating poetry seriously 
as an historical source. First, poetry represents the pinnacle of high culture in the Arab world and 
the symbolic significance of poetry as an art form provides the poet the unique opportunity to 
shape elite public opinion. Muhammad Badawi has noted that "the Arabs have always prided 
themselves on their poetry, which they regard as their greatest and most congenial mode of 
literary expression."
56
 Poetry in the modern Arab world, however, was not just a celebrated form 
of literary expression and achievement but also a symbol of social achievement, and this 
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achievement brought with it tangible political rewards. The two most prominent Iraqi poets of 
the late Ottoman and early colonial period, Jamil Sidqi al-Zahawi and Maʿruf al-Rusafi, held 
parliamentary positions and enjoyed tremendous social stature, which they used not infrequently 
to endorse progressive positions on women's rights and other basic issues of social justice. The 
same could be said of the next generation of poets to rise to national prominence, as Muhammad 
Mahdi al-Jawahiri, Muhammad Ridha al-Shabibi, and ʿAli al-Sharqi all enjoyed prominent 
positions in government at various times in the monarchal period in direct recognition of their 
poetic achievements. There were certainly exceptions to this, and the consolidation of state 
dictatorship in the 1950s helped to ensure that the new generation of poetic giants - most notably 
ʿAbd al-Wahhab al-Bayati, Nazik al-Malaʾika, and Badr Shakir al-Sayyab - belonged more 
properly to the class of avant-garde intellectuals and political radicals than to the social elite, but 
the official apparatus of state repression could scarcely tarnish the social significance of even this 
generation. The history of Iraqi poetry throughout much of this period, in short, is intimately 
bound to the history of the Iraqi state, and this connection needs to be noted in the contemporary 
historical record. 
 Second, poetry functions as the single most important register of popular culture in the 
history of modern Iraq and effectively bridges the gap between the intellectual elite and the 
masses in a manner that was virtually impossible for any other category of cultural production. In 
a warm and sympathetic reconsideration of Hanna Batatu's monumental historical achievement 
upon the advent of a new edition published some twenty-five years after the original, Peter 
Sluglett gently criticizes Batatu for his tendency to "overestimate the direct relationship between 
poverty and hardship and revolutionary consciousness."
57
 While this is certainly a valid critique 
of Batatu's argument, Sluglett's own explanation, which centers on the ability of communist 
leaders and ideologues like Fahd and Salam ʿAdil to successfully "merge the national with the 
social question in a unique manner," is scarcely more convincing. Both Fahd and ʿAdil were 
doctrinaire Stalinists and their writings read as loose translations of Soviet propaganda adapted 
for a local Iraqi context. The suggestion that these rather crude political tracts, published in 
underground newspapers that had to be smuggled from town to town, were principally 
responsible for the formation and development of revolutionary consciousness fails to take into 
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consideration the considerable obstacles impeding the dissemination of ideas in an era of 
widespread illiteracy.  
 The appeal of political poetry, which frequently embraced the ideological formulations of 
Fahd, ʿAdil, and other communist leaders, offers a much more convincing explanation for the 
spread of revolutionary consciousness. Poetry depended on neither mass literacy nor the 
technologies of production and transportation necessary to evade state censorship. Popular 
poems were frequently published on the front page of newspapers - in fact, the poems themselves 
were often the chief selling point for newspaper vendors - and could then be read aloud to wider 
(and largely illiterate) audiences in public cafes. Even the most incendiary political poems, 
which could not be openly published without provoking state security forces, could be easily 
memorized by those in the audience at the initial recitation due to the memorial rhythms and 
rhymes of verse poetry and then transmitted orally to much wider audiences.
58
 While the neo-
classical poetry produced by the most prominent poets of this period would eventually be 
supplanted by the Free Verse poetry popularized in the 1950s and later by colloquial poetry, it 
was still consumed and appreciated by diverse audiences that included both highly educated 
intellectuals and officials and illiterate peasants and workers.
59
 Poetry in many ways constituted 
an indigenous form of mass culture long before the technologies of capitalist modernity emerged 
in full force. 
 Third, the public performance of poetry offered a crucial venue for poets to move beyond 
the shaping of political and cultural mentalities and to influence the trajectory of social protest 
movements. This is an absolutely essential component of my own historical argument and 
constitutes the most explicit evidence of poetry's utility as a driving force of social history. As 
Muhsin al-Musawi has noted, Jawahiri's notorious acts of public political dissidence 
revolutionized the social role of popular poets in modern Iraq.
60
 In the post-war period, Jawahiri 
dramatically and repeatedly denounced the tyrannical forces of colonialism, capitalism, and 
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dictatorship in front of massive public gatherings. His attacks upon the politically and socially 
disengaged intellectuals milling about in cafés helped to inspire thousands of admiring youth to 
make the transition from revolutionary consciousness to revolutionary action. No less important 
in this respect was the role of Muhammad Salih Bahr al-ʿUlum, a factory worker, labor activist, 
and celebrated nationalist poet whose own revolutionary brand of poetic dissidence resulted in 
numerous arrests. Bahr al-ʿUlum, surprisingly, was the most visible leader of the popular protests 
in the early days of the wathba uprising of January 1948. As Batatu relates, the poet was carried 
atop the shoulders of cheering throngs of workers, stopping occasionally to recite some pithy 
verses against colonial authorities and their local puppets before his eventual apprehension, 
detention, and severe torture at the hands of state security forces.
61
 These and dozens of other 
tales underscore the fact that dissident political poetry in this period was not merely an artistic 
representation of revolution and revolutionary mentalities but in fact an act of revolution in and 
of itself. 
 Fourth, poetry offered a unique opportunity for the subversion of colonial repression and 
neo-colonial regimes of censorship. In a brilliant exposition of anti-colonial discourse in modern 
Arabic poetry, Hussein Kadhim has argued that the neo-classical qasidah, the primary poetic 
form considered in this study, took up the discourse of anti-colonialism in both its contrapuntal 
and "re-presentative" forms. The contrapuntal poem, according to Kadhim, was "argumentative, 
engaged, and times polemical," offering a perpetually unrequited discursive engagement with 
colonial arguments and justifications in a public forum. The "re-presentative" poem, on the other 
hand, was "largely demonstrative; it seeks to set forth the oppressiveness of colonial rule and the 
consequences thereof on the subject populace."
62
 Both formats offered poets the opportunity to 
directly tackle, satirize, and subvert colonial discourse in a manner rendered either impossible or 
impractical to other intellectuals due to the political dynamics of colonial and neo-colonial 
censorship and surveillance.  The subtlety, complexity, and frequent inscrutability - particularly 
in the case of Jawahiri - of Iraqi poetry functioned to impede the apprehension and 
comprehension of highly public forms of political dissidence.  
 While the British Embassy carefully monitored the Iraqi press, preparing daily press 
summaries that catalogued local criticism of British policy in Iraq and the broader Middle East 
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and recommended official demands for censorship and retributive punishment when this 
criticism surpassed acceptable boundaries, the solitary official responsible for these reports 
couldn't possibly read and translate published poems as part of his morning work, even if he 
were capable of performing such a task from a linguistic standpoint. Iraqi poets were therefore to 
attack Britain in any manner that they pleased, so long as they selected a sufficiently subtle or 
obscure title and employed clever enough pseudonyms and euphemisms to pass the cursory 
perusal of the British censor.
63
 The end result of this subversive possibility was to create an 
amusing mirror image of British and Iraqi approaches to the problem of press censorship. While 
British authorities vehemently protested at any serious criticism of British policy in Iraqi 
newspaper editorials and articles, demanding immediate fines, suspensions, and arrests, they 
entirely ignored far more incendiary poems. Iraqi authorities, on the other hand, largely 
dismissed serious criticism of the government's policies in editorials and articles with nominal 
warnings and fines but reacted viciously and vindictively to any substantial critique published in 
poetic verse. Assuming that the Iraqi government was better versed in the comparative dangers 
of poetry and prose than the British Embassy, this disparity in the regimes of censorship and 
retribution undoubtedly indicates an understudied capacity of popular poetry to shape popular 
opinion and mobilize revolutionary action.   
 Fifth and finally, as an historical source, poetry offers an invaluable window into the 
mentality of historical thought. Salma Jayyusi has argued that poetry, because of the historical 
circumstances of its development, symbolizes Arab cultural development more broadly and 
represents "the story of a resurrection and a thorough re-vitalization, of a gradual forging of links 
and of a steady evolution towards contemporaneousness within a comparatively short period of 
time."
64
 The utility of this form of cultural production as an historical snapshot of identities and 
mentalities at a particular historical moment is particularly apparent in a comparison between 
political poetry and political memoirs. Historians of modern Iraq have in recent years begun to 
move away from an earlier reliance on colonial archives and to embrace political memoirs as an 
alternative means of acknowledging the historical agency of those voices silenced by the archive. 
While these new sources provide valuable new insight into the historical processes of social 
                                                          
63
 The absence of capital letters in Arab undoubtedly made this task all the more easy for the poet, as the non-
native British reader could only scan the verses for common terms like "England," "Britain," and other variations. 
Still, Iraqi poets began to deploy the term "Thamesians" as a preferred euphemism for "the English," which was 
apparently never detected by British authorities.  
64
 Jayyusi, Trends and Movements, 1:9. 
25 
 
transformation, they present new historical problems as well, as their most prominent proponents 
readily acknowledge.
65
 Poetry bypasses these methodological limitations by providing 
documentation of ideas and mentalities in progress and formation.  
 Collections of poetry, particularly from the more prolific poets, functions more as 
journals and diaries, complete with chronological documentation, than autobiographies and 
memoires from the standpoint of the historian. Nowhere is this basic utility of poetry as an 
historical source more apparent than in the case of the "poetry of occasion" that dominated the 
Iraqi literary scene for much of the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s. These poems constituted immediate 
and visceral responses to contemporary political developments and did so while bypassing the 
formal restrictions of newspaper editorials and other products of intellectual thought. Unlike 
political memoirs and other narrative forms of retrospective historical recollection, poetry 
provides historical documentation of moments in time that cannot be otherwise excavated 
without risking the taint of memory and revision. As an independent, if unconventional, form of 
archival documentation, published or recorded poems cannot be purged in the interests of 
suppressing unpopular political ideas. This is a particularly useful feature for historians 
interested in studying controversial and politically charged historical events. The poetic record 
relating to the Rashid ʿAli movement, for example, offers definitive documentation of the 
strength and popularity of Nazi and fascist ideologies in Iraq, authoritatively substantiating the 
defiant claims of innocence by some poets while undercutting the artful pleas of others. 
 Though poetry constitutes the major archival basis of this project, it is not the sole 
foundation of my analysis of anti-colonial political, social, and cultural movements in Iraq. 
Indeed, in some places, the nature of historical inquiry cannot be adequately and 
comprehensively addressed by poetic archives, and so poetry recedes to the background as 
archival documents, newspaper accounts, and political memoirs are pushed to the fore. The 
particularities of intellectual culture in neo-colonial Iraq, for example, encouraged the emigration 
of virtually all prominent rural poets to urban centers, and above all to Baghdad, in the 1940s and 
1950s. This historical development, unfortunately, precludes an exhaustive cultural analysis of 
peasant responses to the social ruptures of economic development and the introduction of 
mechanized agricultural practices in the countryside and forces me instead to rely primarily upon 
                                                          
65
 See, for example Pierre-Jean Luizard, "Mémoires d'Irakiens: à la découverte d'une société vaincue...," Monde 
arabe: Maghreb Machrek 163 (1999), 5-23 and Wien, Iraqi Arab Nationalism, 1-13. 
26 
 
traditional archival records and the representations of these social ruptures in the work of 
displaced rural poets. Numerous other deficiencies and difficulties emerged in the course of this 
historical excavation. Nevertheless, this project is founded upon the contention that the history of 
Iraqi poetry and the history of Iraqi society during the neo-colonial period cannot and should not 
be partitioned from one another and that poetry as cultural production is not merely a product of 
politics but in facts produces politics. 
Chapter Outline 
 The first chapter, "'The Tomb Stirs': Anti-Colonialism and the Poetics of Resistance, 
1932-1938," analyzes the cultural politics of General Bakr Sidqi’s coup d’état of 1936. While 
this coup d'état has generally been treated as the opening salvo of a persistent conflict between 
adherents of pan-Arabist and Iraqist nationalism, my discussion moves beyond this ideological 
framework and toward a new understanding of popular euphoria in support of the coup as an 
expression of the widespread desire to finally and definitively dismantle the structures and 
institutions of the colonial state and to reclaim popular sovereignty. Sidqi's coup was dubbed the 
“populist revolution” by both supporters and detractors due to the vocal support lent to the 
movement by a small circle of progressive politicians and intellectuals who espoused an organic 
brand of political populism.  
 This chapter begins by examining the post-colonial malaise experienced by many Iraqi 
poets, activists, and intellectuals in response to the persistence of political corruption and social 
injustice following the formal transfer of political sovereignty to the Iraqi government in 1932. 
The chapter then turns to the eruption and suppression of massive tribal rebellions in the spring 
of 1935, which led young leftist democrats and radicals to conclude that the colonial successor 
state could not be reformed without revolution. In my analysis of popular support and criticism 
of the Bakr Sidqi-Hikmat Suleiman regime, I contend that supporters and critics of the new 
administration were moved primarily by judgments about the viability of new challenges to neo-
colonial power rather than ideological predilections in favor of Iraqist or pan-Arabist 
nationalism. The chapter closes with an examination of the populists’ disenchantment with the 
leadership of the revolutionary government and their political marginalization in the wake of 
Bakr Sidqi’s assassination and the return to power of the pan-Arab nationalists. The title refers to 
Muhammad Mahdi al-Jawahiri’s celebrated poem in praise of Bakr Sidqi’s revolution, which 
pined for the destruction of the old colonial elite and the reawakening of the Iraqi nation. 
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Jawahiri would be bitterly disappointed by the trajectory of the revolutionary government and 
wound up imprisoned for his public criticism of the administration. 
 The second chapter, "'When Did Nazism Enter This Shop?': Contesting Fascism in World 
War II, 1939-1945," analyzes the Iraqi nationalist movement of Rashid ʿAli that led to the re-
occupation of the country by British forces in 1941. My argument here demonstrates that 
historical analyses which interpret the movement as fascist or proto-fascist obscure the historical 
context of anti-British sentiment in Iraq and greatly exaggerate the popular influence of an 
isolated group of Nazi supporters. This chapter opens with an analysis of the resurgent politics of 
anti-colonialism in the years leading up to Rashid ʿAli’s coup d’état and the eruption of war 
between Iraq and Britain. The rhetorical domain of poetry underscores the significance of Iraqi 
sympathy with anti-colonial movements in Palestine and Syria to the supporters of Rashid ʿAli. I 
demonstrate here that prominent supporters of the movement included not only pan-Arabist 
ideologues, as is commonly noted, but also prominent and vocal anti-fascist critics and poets on 
the Iraqi Left, including many former supporters of the Bakr Sidqi coup d'état. The chapter then 
examines the significance of this resurgent anti-colonialism to the nationalist movement of 1941. 
Eschewing historical paradigms that focus on the ideological similarities between the Iraqi 
nationalist leadership and their fascist allies in Europe, I argue that popular support for Rashid 
ʿAli in newspapers and poetry reflects the centrality of the anti-colonial politics of national 
liberation.  
 While most discussions of the Rashid ʿAli movement close with the movement's collapse 
at the climax of the Anglo-Iraqi War of 1941, I press forward with an analysis of British efforts 
to suppress former supporters of the movement by forcing public recantations, conducting public 
executions, and imprisoning prominent intellectuals in newly constructed internment camps. The 
chapter closes with an analysis of the efforts by progressive and leftist Iraqis to reclaim a vision 
of anti-colonial utopia in the aftermath of the nationalist failure and under the shadow of British 
occupation. In the historical context of the renewed British occupation and the entrance of the 
Soviet Union to the Allied camp, public support for the Soviets suddenly emerged as a viable 
venue for legally and openly articulating a progressive vision of national liberation. The chapter 
title refers to a satirical poem penned by the anti-fascist leftist poet Muhammad Salih Bahr al-
ʿUlum, a prominent supporter of the Rashid ʿAli movement later interned for his poetry, who 
bitterly denounced British efforts to castigate anti-colonial nationalists as "Nazis." Bahr al-ʿUlum 
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maintained a staunchly anti-Nazi stance during his years in the internment camps and emerged 
after the war as one of the most prominent and vocal supporters of the Soviet Union in Iraq.  
 The third chapter, "'A Horizon Lit With Blood': Public Poetry and Mass Politics, 1946-
1952," analyzes the role of poetry in mobilizing social protest movements against the Anglo-
Iraqi alliance. I show how the public interventions of prominent poets like Muhammad Salih 
Bahr al-ʿUlum and Muhammad Mahdi al-Jawahiri helped to galvanize a disaffected population 
to rise against the oppressive apparatus of the increasingly dictatorial state. This chapter 
documents in detail the popular uprisings of 1948 and 1952 and the revolutionary appropriation 
and reconstruction of public space in the service of mass resistance to British and American 
mutual defense agreements. My analysis underscores the social developments of this period that 
paved the way for the emergence of mass political movements but contends that the eruption of 
popular revolt would have been far more difficult and far less successful without the critical 
intervention of poets.  
 I devote particular attention to the use of poetry in the public sphere during these cycles 
of protest and to the deployment of poetry as both an impetus for popular mobilization and a 
summation of popular demands. The title refers to a famous line from Jawahiri’s poem “My 
Brother Jaʿfar,” a eulogy for his brother, who was martyred along with hundreds of his 
compatriots while protesting the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. Jawahiri recited the poem before a crowd of 
tens of thousands of Iraqi protestors on the steps of the Haydarkhanah Mosque on Rashid Street 
in downtown Baghdad. The poem remains a landmark in the cultural history of modern Iraq and 
the poem's vivid and violent imagery foreshadows the bloodshed that would follow in the wake 
of the state's repression of the popular protest movements. 
The fourth chapter, "'Leave Your Fields and Throw Away Your Sickle': Urban Migration, 
1932-1958," outlines the extent to which colonial policies transformed tribesmen into peasants 
and demonstrates that rural suspicion and opposition to U.S. economic development initiatives 
helped to propel the mass migration of landless peasants to urban areas in conjunction with 
noticeable shifts from peasant to worker and from village to city as symbols of the national anti-
colonial struggle in popular poetry. This chapter opens with an analysis of the transition of tribes 
and tribal shaykhs from symbols of anti-colonial resistance to pillars of British interests in the 
post-colonial state in order to show how colonial manipulations contributed to the deterioration 
of the old tribal order. The chapter highlights the numerous tribal uprisings and rebellions of the 
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late 1940s and early 1950s and shows how direct colonial interference in the structures of tribal 
authority along with legal changes that dramatically enhanced the political power of tribal 
shaykhs between 1914 and 1932 contributed to the erosion of consent in the relationship between 
the shaykh and his tribal subject. My analysis shows that the massive rural exodus and urban 
migration movements of the late 1940s and early 1950s was a geographically and 
chronologically uneven process that cannot be fully explained by technological development, 
urban industrialization, or the alienation of tribal land. I argue that social justice was an essential 
concern of peasant laborers seeking to flee the despotism of tribal society for a sometimes even 
more insecure existence in the urban landscape. 
These processes of social disintegration were instead contingent on the cultural 
transformations of tribal life and the symbolic positioning of tribal shaykhs as anti-colonial 
rebels and colonial clients and collaborators. The most rebellious tribes, which suffered the brunt 
of government repression, proved most resilient to the allure of the cities due to the shaykh’s 
ability to maintain the consensus of leadership through his sponsorship of resistance movements. 
Ultimately, though, the peasant experience of economic exploitation and social alienation as a 
result of colonial policies led to the startling collapse of tribal organizations in rural Iraq. When 
the theoretically incoherent and administratively incompetent introduction of U.S. development 
initiatives began to replicate the worst features of British colonial policy, hundreds of thousands 
of tribal peasants simply moved to the cities. My analysis demonstrates the crucial role of 
popular poetry in underscoring and emphasizing the nefarious connections between colonialism 
and feudalism and the seductive allure of urban working class resistance to colonial authority 
that ultimately pushed many peasants toward emigration. The chapter title comes from a poem 
by Muhammad Salih Bahr al-ʿUlum urging peasants to abandon their exploitative conditions of 
feudal labor and to join the worker vanguard of the anti-colonial movement now centered in 
Baghdad. 
 The fifth and final chapter, "'This Is the Crowing of the Roosters': Culture, Ideology, and 
the Construction of Sectarian Politics, 1952-1960," analyzes the events preceding and following 
the military coup d’état of ʿAbd al-Karim Qasim that overthrew the Iraqi monarchy in 1958. This 
chapter serves as a post-mortem for the anti-colonial movement, using the conflicts of cultural 
politics waged in national newspapers, courtrooms, and in the public sphere, to illustrate the 
retroactive ideological and cultural maneuvers used by Communists and pan-Arabists to 
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construct one another as national traitors and to politicize, moralize, and sexualize personal and 
ideological disputes. I analyze popular participation in the revolutionary movement and its 
aftermath in order to show the extent to which demands for a clean break from the colonial and 
neo-colonial past animated Iraqi antipathy toward the old regime and helped to shape the course 
of the post-revolutionary era. More importantly, I argue that the eruption of new conflicts in 
cultural politics points toward the fundamental deficiencies and failings of the anti-colonial 
movement in Iraq.  
 The chapter begins by analyzing the ways in which national campaigns against Zionism 
and in support of oil nationalization helped to shape the mutual transformation of Anglo-
American and Iraqi Leftist policy in the context of the global Cold War. The partition of 
Palestine and the catastrophic collapse of Palestinian resistance in 1948 and the nationalization 
of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1951 both functioned as crucial demarcations of a newly 
expansive anti-colonialism that brought together opposition political parties from both the Left 
and the Right in a "national front" political coalition. I show that popular poetry helped to build 
popular support for both the Iraqi Communist Party and the Baʿth Party by constructing a new 
revolutionary poetics that integrated national and social concerns. This new cultural discourse 
was fueled by popular disaffection stemming from the rising tide of economic inequality that 
accompanied ballooning oil revenues and the stories of economic exploitation, racial 
discrimination, and cultural humiliation of workers in both the petroleum fields and other 
industrial sectors controlled by foreign capital. This chapter also draws heavily from the memoirs 
of popular poets to illustrate the cultural dynamics that forced the rupture of the old anti-colonial 
"national front." Particularly instructive here is a series of articles penned by Badr Shakir al-
Sayyab explaining his conversion from Communist to Baʿthist in a language that foregrounds  
the new emergence of sectarian politics and constructs a vision of national sovereignty and 
cultural authenticity as part of a highly gendered moral discourse. The chapter title refers to a 
line from Sayyab's famous poem "Return to Jaykur," which conveys the sense of both revival 
and terror that dominated the post-revolutionary landscape. 
 This dissertation underscore the centrality of poetic discourse and poetic interventions to 
the construction of an Iraqi public sphere and the evolution of a radical brand of anti-colonial 
politics that transformed the basic contours of cultural politics in the country. Collectively, these  
five chapter studies illustrate the interconnectivity of poetry and politics in modern Iraqi history. 
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On the one hand, poetry constituted a critical cultural domain for the translation and 
dissemination of radical political ideas to mass audiences. Iraqi poetry, whether published or 
unpublished, thus serves as an invaluable archive that significantly alters contemporary historical 
conceptions of political thought and conflict in this period. On the other hand, the movement of 
radical poets into public spaces and their dramatic endorsement of revolutionary political 
stances, coupled with the corresponding efforts of an increasingly unpopular and dictatorial 
ruling class to silence their voices, highlights the contributions of poets as political agents to 
radical social movements. Iraqi poetry is not merely a documentary archive of political attitudes 
and the discourse of cultural politics at a particularly historical moment, but rather functions as a 






‘THE TOMB STIRS’ 
ANTI-COLONIALISM AND THE POETICS OF RESISTANCE, 1932-38 
 
On October 3, 1932, the League of Nations voted unanimously to terminate the British 
Mandate and to formally recognize Iraq as an independent member state. While the vote marked 
the end of the colonial period in Iraqi history, it neither recognized nor precipitated an essential 
historical rupture nor inspired the political and cultural illusions of national liberation that have 
characterized the "post-mandatory condition."
1
 British control of Iraqi foreign policy and 
military affairs was formally enshrined in the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930, a necessary 
precondition for the early termination of the mandate, and informal British control over Iraqi 
political and economic affairs was assured by a carefully managed political transition that 
centralized power in the hands of a pro-British oligarchy. It was instead the military coup d'état 
conducted by General Bakr Sidqi on October 29, 1936, with the crucial political support of 
Hikmat Sulayman and the social democrats of the Ahali Group, that marked a fundamental shift 
in the social and political landscape. The coup fractured the relative unity of the national political 
elite, heretofore primarily focused on the twin objectives of appropriating colonial power, 
privilege, and prestige and consolidating government authority over the rebellious tribes and the 
recalcitrant Assyrian and Kurdish communities. After the coup, Iraqi politics were dominated by 
sectarian and ideological factionalism as competing parties waged an increasingly caustic and 
violent struggle against one another over questions of political legitimacy, national identity, 
social justice, and cultural authenticity. 
Contemporary historical analyses have tended to situate the coup within a teleological 
narrative foreshadowing political crisis and social conflict and illuminating the historical 
tragedies of post-mandatory Iraq. Majid Khadduri argues that coup d'état "introduced the army as 
a new factor in politics and tended to transform the Government into a military dictatorship," 
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setting a precedent that "became impossible to stop" until British military intervention restored 
some semblance of constitutional order.
2
 Hanna Batatu contends that the episode symbolized the 
overly cautious tactics of the Left, noting that "the Communists had exaggerated the popular 
character of the army officers who were the real backbone of the new regime" and that the 
People's Reformists failed to adequately defend their social agenda as "counsels of supineness 
ultimately prevailed."
3
 Eric Davis chides the Iraqist intellectuals who supported the coup d'état 
for their failure to properly counter their pan-Arabist opponents and to articulate their own 
ideological commitment to a cosmopolitan nationalism.
4
 Orit Bashkin, finally, has noted the 
irony of the Ahali Group's support for the coup d'état in light of its general commitment to social 
democracy, contending that this collaboration "turned ineffective and eventually destructive, as 
Sidqi and Sulayman manipulated the political vocabulary popularized in the group's newspaper 




These historical narratives share the common assumption that the decision of social 
democrats to support the coup d'état was a tactical mistake or ideological error. The Ahali Group 
misjudged the political convictions of Hikmat Sulayman and Bakr Sidqi, betrayed their own 
ideological commitment to constitutional democracy, failed to adequately articulate and defend 
their motives, and unwittingly provided ammunition for pan-Arabist assaults on the national 
loyalty of progressive parties and entire ethnic communities.
6
 While the obvious interest of 
liberal reformers and leftist radicals in supporting a political regime ostensibly committed to 
social reform has been duly noted and analyzed, significantly less attention has been paid to the 
historical factors that compelled these groups to abandon an apparently sincere commitment to 
democracy. This relative inattention to political motivation can be largely explained by two 
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crucial features of the primary source material available to contemporary historians. First, the 
historical memoirs of the primary participants in these events have been dominated by blanket 
disavowals rather than apologetics for the decision to support the coup d'état, offering historians 
little incentive to continue probing incentives and motivations.
7
 Second, contemporaneous 
evidence of Ahali Group motives has been circumscribed by the fact that British attention during 
the period preceding the coup d'état was overwhelmingly focused on elite and tribal politics and 
the decision of the Yasin al-Hashimi regime to shut down all opposition newspapers, which has 
lead to the general absence of relevant archival records. These factors have contributed to the 
production of an historical narrative that begins with the coup d'état and proceeds to traces its 
consequences. 
The central problem with this historical ontology, which assumes the existence of 
ideological conflict between the supporters and opponents of the coup d'état rather than tracing 
its origins, is that it allows consequences and retrospectives to fundamentally shape an 
understanding of past events. An expansion of both the chronological and methodological scope 
of historical inquiry provides sufficient grounds for the reinterpretation of these historical events 
beyond the traditional binary framework of nationalist conflict. The relative unity of the anti-
colonial nationalist movement was not fractured by the emergence of a pivotal ideological 
conflict between Iraqist social democrats and pan-Arabist conservatives. Instead, the central 
division between the two camps emerged as a consequence of practical and tactical disputes 
about the most effective means of eradicating the vestiges of colonial power in the post-
mandatory state. The ideological dimensions of this dispute emerged retrospectively in a 
conservative pan-Arabist discourse designed to tarnish the political reputation of the Iraqi Left 
and to diminish the possibility of an effective and vibrant political opposition.
8
 
The cultural dimensions of political conflict in this period are dramatically enhanced by 
the interrogation of popular poetry as an undiscovered historical archive. Poets played a central 
role in the political history of modern Iraq, helping to inspire, organize, and lead the national 
resistance to the British invasion in 1914 and the national uprising of 1920,
 
serving as respected 
parliamentarians, journalists, and political advisors, and later played outsized roles in political 
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protests and opposition politics.
9
 Perhaps more importantly from the standpoint of the historian, 
the most prominent poets left behind an archival record of poetry replete with dates of 
composition that intervened directly in the major political and cultural debates of the period.
10
 As 
the poet, novelist, and critic Jabra Ibrahim Jabra has written, modern Arabic poetry was public 
and political, "oratorical, militant, and of an instantaneous effect." Jabra rejected the contention 
of Amin al-Rihani, an early theorist of Arab nationalism and advocate of pan-Arab national 
unity, that he "would willingly barter the poetry of the East for the planes of the West": 
 
Poetry might be condemned as too weak a toy against guns, but in actual fact it 
was often as good as dynamite. It gave point to a whole nation’s suffering and 
wrath. It crystallized political positions in telling lines which, memorised by old 
and young, stiffened popular resistance and provided rallying slogans. Arabi’s 
revolt in Egypt, Palestine’s continual revolt from 1919 on, Syria’s Battle of 
Maysalun, Iraq’s struggle for independence in the twenties were all made vivid in 





In the context of the Bakr Sidqi coup d'état, the use of poetry as an historical archive provides 
evidence of shifting cultural attitudes beyond the domain of elite politics. 
  Independence and Disaffection: The Persistence of Colonialism 
The Kingdom of Iraq attained formal independence on October 3, 1932, when the League 
of Nations voted unanimously to recognize the nation as a member state. ʿAli al-Yaʿqubi hailed 
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the achievements in a poem, "Faysal and His Efforts for the Arabs," recited in front of the king at 
a celebratory banquet in Najaf: 
 
Aspirations distracted her for a while 
Like the mirage beckons the thirsty 
 But today Iraq has triumphed by your effort 
  Coupled with the assistance of the Divine 
 You liberated her from slavery to another 
  And unfastened the chains of her imprisonment 
 A victory for the voice and name of Arabism 
  And the noble deeds that brought joy to our eyes 
 So rise before your people when you desire 
  For they are at the service of your command
12
   
 
Yaʿqubi’s poem heralded independence as the end of one era and the dawn of a new one. This 
sentiment was echoed by Mahmud al-Habbubi, who recited his own poem, "Faysal the Great," at 
the same banquet: 
 
 The Arab nation has rejoiced since the victory  
  And upon you lie the pride and hopes of the Arabs 
 So rise to unite them and to gather her citizens 




Habbubi’s invocation of Faysal’s father recalls the mythology of the Arab Revolt lead by the 
Sharif Husayn to liberate the Arab nation from the yoke of Turkish imperialism. Like Yaʿqubi, 
he describes independence as a victory for the entire Arab nation. Both poets looked forward to 
the liberation of Palestine and Syria and saw Faysal and Iraq at the vanguard of that struggle. 
For all of the jubilation of the celebratory banquets and speeches that greeted Faysal in 
Geneva, London, and Baghdad, the League of Nations vote was little more than a symbolic 
gesture acknowledging the end of mandatory rule negotiated between Britain and Iraq under the 
Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930. The British decision to prematurely terminate the mandate awarded 
to Britain in 1920 and later extended for an additional twenty-five years as a condition of the 
concession of Mosul to Iraq in 1925 was motivated by both domestic and imperial concerns. The 
Labour Party, which came to power in the general election of 1929, was eager to mollify public 
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disenchantment with the financial burdens of empire by reducing the administrative apparatus 
and military presence in Iraq to minimal levels. That this goal could be achieved by declaring the 
civilizing processes of the mandates system a success and granting early independence only 
strengthened the British position in Iraq. By preemptively awarding the Iraqis the coveted prize 
of formal independence, Britain could forestall the radical nationalist demands that generally 
accompanied anti-colonial movements and secure far more favorable terms for imperial interests 
inside of Iraq.
14
   
While Britain was confident enough in the loyalty of Iraqi leadership to justify sacrificing 
formal authority, the decision provoked resistance from other colonial powers, who feared that 
the abbreviation of imperial rule would lead to demands for similar arrangements from their own 
colonies.
15
 For most Iraqis, of course, the twelve year duration of the mandate was twelve years 
too long, and the generosity of the British gesture was neither recognized nor appreciated.
16
 
Jaʿfar al-ʿAskari, who followed Faysal from Damascus to Baghdad, warned Gertrude Bell in 
1920 that "complete independence is never given – always taken."
17
 Jaʿfar’s stark appraisal of 
the requirements of national liberation would prove prescient, although he himself would 
abandon the goal of complete liberation in exchange for the seductive allure of a share in the 
spoils of power.
 
By the time that Jaʿfar was assassinated by forces loyal to General Bakr Sidqi in 
the desert outside of Baghdad, he was widely reviled along with his brother-in-law Nuri al-Saʿid 
as Britain’s principle collaborators in Iraq.
18
 For the next quarter of a century, internal power 
struggles and popular protest movements in Iraq would be increasingly defined by the 
opposition’s central demand for the complete independence that they felt was denied by the 
terms of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930. 
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Independence did not fundamentally alter the nature of the Anglo-Iraqi alliance but 
instead merely traded formal imperial authority for informal hegemony backed by a permanent 
military presence. The British Air Ministry was reluctant to abandon airbases at Mosul, Hinaydi, 
and Shaybah that they viewed as essential to the defense of imperial interests in India, Egypt, and 
Iran. In the end, Britain maintained the base at Shaybah but agreed to give up the one at Hinaydi, 
which lay a mere five miles from Baghdad and loomed as a vivid reminder of the specter of 
colonialism, in exchange for a much larger tract of land at Lake Habbaniyah, some fifty miles 
west of Baghdad.
19
 British military officials did not coordinate or share plans to suppress internal 
disorder or external invasion but instead sought to reconcile the natives by "molding Iraqi 
military thought on the lines of our schemes."
20
 The retention of military bases and presence of 
foreign troops would goad Iraqi nationalists for the next decade, until Rashid ʿAli’s attempt to 
circumscribe the movement of British troops in 1941 became the casus belli for the British 
invasion of the country.
21
 
In addition to the permanent military presence in Iraq, the parliamentary system inherited 
by the "monarchic-oligarchic" post-mandatory state proved a reliable instrument for enforcing 
the more ambiguous provisions of the treaty that privileged the British position in Iraq.
22
 The 
Iraqi parliament was packed with obsequious tribal shaykhs and other loyalists who owed their 
position to their support for Britain during the national uprising of 1920 and the electoral boycott 
of 1924.
23
 The tortured and convoluted nature of the electoral system, which entailed multiple 
phases each susceptible to fraud, virtually ensured the victory of the government’s chosen 
candidates, thus limiting the potential for radical reform. The two-year period between the 
ratification of the treaty and the formal acknowledgement of independence by the League of 
Nations provided a sufficient opportunity for Britain to manage the transition to the post-
mandatory era by supporting the efforts of Nuri and Jaʿfar, then Prime Minister and Minister of 
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Defense, to rig elections and "purify" government ministries of anti-British agitators.
24
 The 
dissident poet Muhammad Salih Bahr al-ʿUlum was blunt in his assessment of this transition in 
"The False Independence after the Mandate":  
 
 I disrobed the Mandate and it returned to me 
  Disguised in my cap and headband 
 It astonished me that my eyes were deceived 
  By it like a rain cloud from a mirage 
 Oh dancers to the prospect of a new era 
  That contains all the old and ragged things 
 What is the difference between the Mandate  




Formal independence, to Bahr al-ʿUlum as to so many of his compatriots, was meaningless so 
long as sovereignty remained in the same hands. 
Both Britain and her clients had an interest in obscuring the extent of collaboration in the 
transition to national independence, and press criticism of Britain was duly monitored and 
censored. Repeat offenders were penalized with fines and suspensions, which led the papers to 
change titles and apply new licenses, sometimes repeating the process to comical effect. The 
daily newspaper al-Ahali received a ten-day suspension in March 1933 for criticizing Britain, 
rechristened itself Sawt al-Ahali and continued to attack Britain, which provoked a second 
intervention by the British Ambassador and a stern warning from the foreign ministry in April. 
When the paper refused to modify its tone, the Iraqi government suspended its license for one 
year, but the paper once again reemerged under the name al-Hali, only to be suspended again in 
September.
26
 The Assyrian uprising in 1933 provoked a particularly virulent campaign against 
Britain in the Iraqi press, as many Iraqis resented the role played by Assyrians as a mercenary 
militia in the Iraqi Levies.
27
 The nationalist paper al-Istiqlal provoked the ire of Britain by 
attacking the presence of foreign spies, whom the paper accused of distributing money among 
the tribes and urban mobs in order to provoke riots and embarrass the Iraqi government.
28
   
The brunt of the anti-colonial assault in the early post-mandatory era did not, however, 
fall upon the British military presence or the provisions of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty but was instead 
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directed towards the national politicians and institutions seen as responsible for circumscribing 
national liberation. The remarkably fluid transition from colonialism to independence 
underscored the unrealized hopes and aspirations of the anti-colonial movement. The self-
congratulatory declarations and celebrations of victory by those who took the place of the 
foreigners infuriated those who found themselves no better off than before. Mahmud al-Habbubi, 
who had earlier feted Faysal’s glorious achievement, took a much bleaker view of post-
mandatory Iraq several months later. In "Baghdad as I Saw Her," he bitterly noted the unrealized 
dreams of independence and castigated those Iraqis who replicated colonial exploitation: 
 
Baghdad, it pains us to see the rabble throng 
 Inside of you without avenging or dispersing… 
Noble Arabs are left standing at the doors  
 While hated infidels sit upon the throne 
Every pulsing and inflamed jugular vein  seethes 
 Ignorant, careless and by the people despised 
The traitor who knows nothing of his office  




For the next twenty-six years, the military coup d’états, national uprisings, local rebellions, and 
demonstrations that roiled Iraqi politics were organized around a shared opposition to the empty 
nationalism of the local leadership bequeathed to them by the colonial state.   
It was no coincidence that all of the major political parties and organizations that played 
significant roles in the enduring anti-colonial struggle, from the pan-Arabist Muthanna Club to 
the social democratic Ahali Group to the Iraqi Communist Party, emerged from Jaʿfar Abu al-
Timman’s National Party (al-Hizb al-Watani), which never accepted the legitimacy of the post-
mandatory state.
30
 Abu al-Timman, a merchant from Baghdad whom Batatu credits for bringing 
Sunnis and Shiʿis together in the national uprising of 1920, refused an overture from Ayatollah 
Muhammad Husayn Kashif al-Ghita to head the government in the mandatory period and chose 
instead to labor in opposition until national liberation was realized.
31
 He remained the leader of 
the nationalist opposition for a full year after independence until he finally despaired of the 
corruption and hypocrisy permeating the post-mandatory state and announced his retirement 
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 The editors of al-Ahali lauded the decision and denounced "those who exploited 
nationalist slogans and party platforms to achieve personal gain while they in truth served 
foreign interests and enforced colonial projects."
33
 
 The political frustrations of Abu al-Timman and his supporters found eloquent expression 
in the work of Iraqi poets Muhammad Salih Bahr al-ʿUlum and Muhammad Mahdi al-Jawahiri. 
Both poets were political dissidents who hailed from conservative clerical backgrounds. Bahr al-
ʿUlum left the seminary to work in a cigarette factory in Baghdad, where his involvement with 
the labor movement and poetic diatribes against the state landed him in prison repeatedly, the 
first time as a teenager in 1928.
34
 Jawahiri, on the other hand, endured a much more public fall 
from grace, losing his teaching position in 1926 after a public spat with Satiʿ al-Husri, the 
Minister of Education and nationalist ideologue, who accused Jawahiri of "expressing Persian 
inclinations" and disparaging the Arab nation in his poem "The Coldness of Exile." The 
influence of Muhammad al-Sadr, a nationalist icon with close ties to Jawahiri’s family, helped 
land the poet a position at the royal palace, but Jawahiri was dismissed after composing a poem 
that included a thinly veiled attack on Faysal's close relationship with Britain.
35
 
The most obvious object of criticism of the post-mandatory state was the role played by 
Britain in guiding the political transition to independence.  While the principled refusal of Abu 
al-Timman and the National Party to participate in the machinery of colonial governance was 
widely respected and admired, the often-oppositional engagement of Yasin al-Hashimi and other 
nationalist politicians with the colonial state was not necessarily derided and dismissed as 
collaboration.  The servile support lent to colonial authorities by Nuri and Jaʿfar, on the other 
hand, was widely denounced.  Bahr al-ʿUlum denounced the very nature of the state bequeathed 
to Iraq by the colonial state in "The Prelude": 
 
 An administration nominated by the occupation 
  But the craftsmen erred in its formation 
 Is there a symmetry to the warped torso 
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This depiction of the post-mandatory state as deformed, deficient, and thus perpetually reliant on 
imperial assistance for sustenance, symbolizes the poet’s radical stance towards the state.  Bahr 
al-ʿUlum directs his anger at those responsible for betraying the utopian vision of national 
liberation: 
 
 Where is this new era today, with 
  Wisdom gone, succeeded by injustice and evil 
 These are the sins of Nuri al-Saʿid 




As the title of the poem indicates, Bahr al-ʿUlum did not view the promise of a new era as lost 
and gone forever, but instead saw this mangled and deformed state as a transient prelude to true 
national liberation. 
Jawahiri, who at that time still harbored political ambitions despite his public quarrels 
with Faysal and Satiʿ al-Husri and who had not yet gravitated toward the militant leftwing 
politics of Bahr al-ʿUlum, adopted the more oblique strategy of criticizing government policies 
and their effects on the poor in more general terms in "Game of Tribulations": 
 
 It is the regime that set up this game 
  That the wretched call tribulations 
 For a tribulation to the regime is the work of a functionary 
  But a tribulation to the people is an exegesis of a deputy
38
 
    
The "tribulations" that Jawahiri denounces refer to the new regime’s land policies, which 
radically accelerated the colonial concentration of land among an oligarchy of tribal shaykhs and 
urban speculators after the passage of the Law of the Settlement of Land Rights in 1933.
39
 He 
attacks the regime’s blithe evasion of responsibility for the resulting poverty, which he contends 
is the logical product of the policy or the "exegesis of a deputy."  
Jawahiri’s bleak depiction of the struggles of the common people and especially the 
oppressive burden of regressive taxation in this poem highlights the gravity of the problem: 
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 The people march, tired, weary, and weak 
  Their backs overburdened with taxes and levies 
 Denied what lies between life and them 
  The death that stands between the eye and the brow 
 
His reference to taxes and levies alludes to the radical redistribution of the tax burden from the 
landowner to the peasant during this period. Land revenue, which produced as much as 27.6 
percent of total state revenue during the mandatory period, never produced more than 10.5 
percent of total revenue between 1933 and 1941, and the reduction of the tax on land ownership 
was exacerbated by the conversion of the land tax to a consumption tax, which passed the tax 
burden on to the consumer through higher prices.
40
  
Jawahiri maintained optimism that the state could be reformed and injustice effaced 
through critical engagement with the political establishment. He saw the poet as the voice and 
conscience of the nation and yet found that his colleagues were abandoning their social 
responsibilities for a share in the spoils of power: 
 
 From the darkness comes the verse of a poet 
  To fix this condition, or the article of a writer 
 As long as the regime stands facing tribulation 
  There is nothing for us to do but await the consequences 
 But the poets persist in quarreling and meddling 
  And the writers are so often creatures of hardship 
 They call the "free" nation to fulfill their duties 
  And not to reckon easy this fulfillment of duty 
 And not to reckon easy the building of institutions 
  And signing of papers and distribution of salaries 
 
Jawahiri demonstrates here his appreciation of the poetics of commitment by castigating those 
who have abandoned the responsibilities of their craft in order to serve as apologists for the state. 
While Jawahiri clung at this stage in his career to a traditional model of political reform 
in which noble critics and virtuous poets could shame politicians into reform, Bahr al-ʿUlum 
appealed directly to the people in the incendiary "Country of Knowledge and the Bell Button": 
 
 After the dedication of the martyrs of the Euphrates 
  Will we be slaughtered by the tyrant and oppressor? 
 Or will the unshod workers of Iraq 
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  Be hauled back to their penal colony? 
 O People, Mercy upon our weariness with life 
  Under the power and might of this cruel ordeal 
 We complain to the constitution of the tyrant’s oppression 




The poem’s reference to the "dedication of the martyrs of the Euphrates" alludes to official 
commemorations of the 1920 uprising and the government’s cynical appropriation of its legacy. 
The government ordered Bahr al-ʿUlum’s arrest after he recited the poem in public at Kufa on 
April 12, 1934 and a Najafi court quickly sentenced him to two months imprisonment at Hillah.   
Popular demonstrations erupted in Hillah after the verdict was announced, with peasants 
surrounding the lorry transporting the poet from prison to his court hearing and shouting slogans 
in support of the poet and calling for the downfall of imperialists and traitors.  An appellate court 
rescinded the sentence eighteen days later after a sustained protest by a delegation of some forty 
lawyers from Baghdad, Najaf, and Hillah.  After his release, Bahr al-ʿUlum joined the nationalist 
political opposition in agitating for the downfall of the regime.
42
 He inveighed against the 
tyranny and treachery of the state in the poem "The Wretched": 
 
Where is the balance between the pans of the scale? 
 And are they who measure our rights blind to its visage? 
For darkness spreads and justice is effaced 
 Deviance prevails and truth is oppressed 
What is our national dignity in the hands of the traitor 




The glimmer of optimism for constitutional reform evinced at the end of "Country of Knowledge 
and the Bell Button" had now gone, and Bahr al-ʿUlum made clear his absolute alienation from 
the state: 
 
This Iraq and this state of tribulation 
 No regime can fix her condition 
Her sons under the rule of base tyranny 
 Intruders among them rule in her name 
The innocent are pursued by the guilty 
 And the righteous persecuted by the wicked 
The desire of the individual is sanctified as law 
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An Alliance Betrayed: Yasin al-Hashimi and the Euphrates Rebellion 
ʿAli Jawdat al-Ayyubi, an ex-Sharifian officer of relatively humble origin who had set 
aside his past agitation against the mandate and the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty in favor of more cordial 
relations with Britain, was invited by King Ghazi to head a new government on August 27, 
1934.
45
 ʿAli Jawdat quickly succeeded in convincing Ghazi to approve his request to dissolve 
parliament and hold new elections, a concession that had been denied to Rashid ʿAli al-Kaylani, 
a close ally of Yasin al-Hashimi in the National Brotherhood Party (Hizb al-Ikhaʾ’ al-Watani) 
whose premiership had run aground in September 1933 in the face of stiff parliamentary 
opposition.
46
 The new elections, which ʿAli Jawdat claimed rather defensively had followed "the 
same procedure as in former elections," broke with past precedent by failing to concede a 
significant number of seats to leading members of the opposition. Of the eighty-eight 
representatives elected, just twelve were National Brotherhood members, while the remainder 
professed allegiance to ʿAli Jawdat's Party of National Unity (Hizb al-Wahda al-Watani), which 
had no political platform except for loyalty to the cabinet.
47
 Most deputies attained their 
positions by virtue of bribes, a practice which ʿAli Jawdat continued to defend long after his 
resignation, describing it in a conversation to the historian ʿAbd al-Razzaq al-Hasani as a 
necessary measure to distinguish between the thousands of aspirants.
48
  Bahr al-ʿUlum 
denounced this corruption in the poem "Thieves":  
 
 A country in which inferior men play their roles 
  And disguised sinners frolic and rejoice 
 Thieves of my decaying house publicly conspiring 
  And gathering to exterminate my right 
 If they strengthen my chains, my patience is thin 




His defiant stance in the closing line of the poem would foreshadow the uprising to come. 
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Widespread public hostility to the terms of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty succeeded in uniting 
for the first time since 1920 the several disparate factions of the political opposition in Iraq. The 
oppositional bloc was lead by the radical nationalists of the National Brotherhood Party.
50
 The 
brand of pan-Arabism espoused by Yasin and his principle ally Rashid ʿAli al-Kaylani demanded 
the immediate liberation of Palestine and Syria and endorsed the authoritarian republicanism of 
Mustafa Kemal, which brought them into conflict with both the state and the monarchy. While 
ʿAli Jawdat sought to stifle dissent outside of parliamentary chambers by including the owners of 
the leading nationalist newspapers al-Istiqlal, al-Bilad, and al-ʿAlam al-ʿArabi on his electoral 
slate, he could not prevent the spurned leaders of the National Brotherhood from coordinating 
political opposition with tribal and clerical leaders of the marginalized Shiʿa of southern Iraq.
51
 
As Jaʿfar Abu al-Timman noted with simplicity, "there are no supporters of this administration 
except for those ‘elected’ to parliament by prior arrangement."
52
 Al-Ahali, which had been 
complaining about the fraudulent electoral process since 1932, now openly denounced the 
system for transforming politicians from public servants to tools of the state.
53
  
The National Brotherhood leaders sent emissaries to the tribal and religious leadership of 
southern Iraq, where the Shiʿi leadership of the anti-colonial uprising of 1920 had been largely 
excluded from power. Yasin and Rashid ʿAli managed to revive the unrealized promises of 1920, 
when urban nationalists secured the crucial support of tribal shaykhs and Shiʿi clerics by 
promising them national unity and equality. Abu al-Timman, the essential link between urban 
nationalists and rural leaders in 1920, had bitterly broken with the National Brotherhood and 
announced his retirement from politics in 1933 after the National Brotherhood broke their 
promise to never recognize the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. After several restless years outside of 
politics, he reluctantly decided to renew his alliance with Yasin.
54
 Jaʿfar founded the daily 
newspaper al-Mabda’ in early January 1935 and the paper quickly supplanted the suspended al-
Ahali as the central organ of the Ahali Group (Jamaʿat al-Ahali).
55
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The various factions of the opposition bloc were motivated to different degrees by 
distinct goals. The radical nationalists agitated for the disavowal of the Anglo-Iraqi treaty, the 
tribal shaykhs for a greater share in the spoils of power, and the progressive intellectuals for a 
more equitable distribution of political power and national wealth.  They coalesced, however, 
around a shared sentiment that national liberation had been denied by the carefully planned 
transition that transferred political sovereignty to a coterie of loyalists who had privately pledged 
to safeguard British interests in the country. Just months before the eruption of the massive tribal 
rebellion that paralyzed the country, Mahmud al-Mallah published "The Obstacle" in the 
National Brotherhood’s daily newspaper, al-Ikhaʾ al-Watani: 
 
 A project established by the mandate 
  In a country they called mandated 
 They sowed rancor and spite in her soil 
  And made her taste its varieties of dust 
 Then they said here is your independence 
  And thanked God for what He granted 
 And so we threw a wedding feast 
  Devoid of all the stolen jewels 
 They bound our feet in shackles 




Mallah’s caustic metaphor for the Anglo-Iraqi alliance, which cast the conditions of the treaty as 
shackles in spite of the efforts of the post-mandatory leaders to depict them as "gilded anklets," 
blamed colonialism not only for the restrictions placed on Iraq’s military, foreign policy and 
finances, but also for the internal social divisions that sprung from the "rancor and spite" 
bequeathed to the country by the colonial state. 
 Abu al-Timman echoed these themes in the editorials he penned for al-Mabdaʾ. He 
attributed the rising sectarian strife to the institutions of the colonial state and the selfishness of 
Iraq’s post-mandatory leadership and called instead for national unity and solidarity in the face 
of an oppressive regime. The paper debuted with a front-page editorial titled simply "A 
Declaration to the Iraqi People," in which Jaʿfar countered the government’s allegations that the 
disaffected tribes, clerics, and political activists were merely sectarian opportunists by stressing 
equality over particular grievances.
57
 One article, titled "The Subjugation of Iraq and the Tricks 
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of the Colonizers: A River of Blood in Search of a River of Oil," recast the history of the fall of 
Baghdad in World War I as a consequence of the collusion and collaboration of Iraqi elites with 
British forces in a bid to appropriate Ottoman power and privilege.
58
 Jaʿfar denounced the state’s 
failure to even address the governmental deficiencies, national divisions, and the moral void 
bequeathed by the colonial state in "Some of the Evils of the Present State." He accused political 
leaders of setting the people against one another in order to distract from their own power grab.
59
 
Jaʿfar attributed this failure of the state to the legacy of colonialism, arguing that colonial states 




Yasin, Rashid ʿAli, and Hikmat Sulayman, the core leaders of the National Brotherhood, 
seized the opportunity presented by the release of electoral slates by ʿAli Jawdat in late 1934 to 
recruit those tribal shaykhs who found themselves excluded. Opposition conferences were 
convened first in Baghdad, Kadhimiyah, Karbala, and Najaf, and then spread across the 
Euphrates valley in December. The conferences pledged absolute loyalty to King Ghazi, 
devotion to the Iraqi constitution, commitment to the principle of customary law for the tribes, 
and opposition to any participation in the government without the approval of the alliance. In 
January, a delegation of tribal shaykhs meeting at the home of ʿAbd al-Wahid composed an 
appeal to Kashif Al Ghita and other leading clerics, imploring the ʿulama to publicly call for the 
establishment of a new government that would benefit the entire nation.
61
 ʿAbd al-Wahid quickly 
emerged as the locus of the movement, as his reputation as a hero of the 1920 uprising and 
leadership of the powerful Fatla tribes made him a particularly powerful symbol of those 
marginalized by the political favoritism of ʿAli Jawdat’s government.
62
 Kashif al-Ghita 
responded to ʿAbd al-Wahid’s letter by convening a conference of tribal shaykhs in Najaf on 
January 11
th
, 1935, where they agreed to demand the immediate resignation of ʿAli Jawdat and 
the dissolution of Parliament.  
When the government moved to prevent and disrupt these meetings of opposition figures, 
Abu al-Timman took on a leading role in defending the constitutional legitimacy of the 
gatherings. On February 9
th
 he denounced the events under the headline "Violated Liberties." 
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This prompted the Minister of Interior to issue an official warning, which Jaʿfar published in full 
two days later under the headline "Who is in Violation of the Law?" The article called on the 
Iraqi people to "defend their rights, even in the face of repression from those who seek to exploit 
this country."
63
 When Ghazi still refused to meet the demands of the opposition, tribal war 
dances against the government spread throughout the Middle Euphrates region. ʿAli Jawdat 
considered deploying the army against the tribes, but General Bakr Sidqi, a close friend and ally 
of Hikmat, refused to intervene. When more than half of the senators, who were not elected and 
therefore not comprised of political loyalists, began to boycott parliamentary sessions in support 
of the tribal leaders, ʿAli Jawdat was compelled to resign.
64
   
Ghazi, still reluctant to meet the full demands of the insurgents, refused to dissolve the 
ʿAli Jawdat Parliament and instead appointed Jamil al-Midfaʿi to lead a new government on 
March 4
th
. Midfaʿi appealed to the National Brotherhood for political conciliation, but the party 
leadership declined to denounce ʿAbd al-Wahid and his fellow insurgents. Abu al-Timman began 
to advance a more specific agenda beyond the dissolution of parliament, calling for the 
establishment of labor unions and peasant cooperatives, the formation of elected municipal 
assemblies, and the creation of a national industrial-agricultural bank to fund development.
65
 
Like his predecessor, Midfaʿi came to the conclusion that the problem could only be resolved 
with force and attempted to sidestep Bakr Sidqi and instead appeal directly to General Taha al-
Hashimi. Taha, however, was Yasin’s brother, and also refused to intervene, arguing that the 
uprising was political rather than military in nature and should be dealt with accordingly. Midfaʿi 
was forced to admit defeat and resign on March 16. With no other recourse, Ghazi reluctantly 
appointed Yasin al-Hashimi to lead the new government.
66
   
When ʿAbd al-Wahid, the leader of the tribal rebellion and a National Brotherhood 
loyalist, regained his seat in parliament, he announced that the uprising had been successful and 
ended his opposition to the government. Bahr al-ʿUlum denounced this selfish hypocrisy in "The 
Danger of the Opportunists": 
 
The opportunists are always more dangerous 
 Than others in their hypocrisy and fickleness… 
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For them there is no intellect or conscience 
 Or anything with a fixed countenance 
Instead they are selfish when they catch sight 




Indeed, once the genie of tribal rebellion was out of the bottle it could not be easily replaced, and 
rival shaykhs were quick to denounce ʿAbd al-Wahid as a hypocrite and traitor. Violence erupted 
at Rumaytha in early May when Shaykh Khawwam of the Banu Izrayj directed his tribe to 
destroy the railway line and various government buildings in the area.
68
 Bakr Sidqi and Taha al-
Hashimi, suddenly amenable to the idea of crushing the rebellion, declared martial law 
throughout much of southern Iraq and spent much of the early spring and late summer directing 
the work of military tribunals, which levied fines, confiscated weapons, imprisoned hundreds of 
rebels, and executed dozens of tribal leaders.
69
 The Iraqi Royal Air Force made great use of the 
planes and bombs acquired from Britain, and Iraqi pilots dropped thousands of bombs during the 
course of the month long assault.
70
 While British R.A.F. pilots did not participate in the bombing 
raids, they did conduct reconnaissance missions, and two British airmen were killed when their 
plane was shot down over Rumaytha. The British Ambassador did, however, refuse Yasin’s 
request for British demonstration flights over the disturbed areas to frighten the tribes into 




Government retribution only reinforced the disparities of power that had provoked the 
rebellion in the first place. The participation and abstention of particular tribal leaders and 
sections in the uprisings can be directly traced to their financial stake in preserving the status 
quo. Those tribal leaders like the Gharraf of the Muntafiq whose political connections had 
secured them the legal title to land refrained from participating in the rebellion, while the smaller 
shaykhs marginalized by these legal maneuvers took on leading roles among the rebels.
72
 The 
communal property of rebel tribes was confiscated and redistributed to rival members of the kin 
networks more amenable to accepting the legitimacy of governmental authority. These new 
leaders owed their power to the state and not to the tribe, and their willingness to exploit their 
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power further eroded the relationship of consent between tribe and shaykh. Those tribal leaders 
who sought to reclaim their land with the help of sympathetic tribesmen were arrested, 
imprisoned, and tortured.
73
   
While most of the fighting took place in May and June, violence persisted throughout the 
year. Frustrated by his inability to crush the protests, Yasin pursued a more conciliatory path by 
remitting the prison sentences of convicted rebels and issuing a general pardon to all those who 
took up arms against the government, including those who managed to evade capture in Kirkuk 
and Sulaymani.
74
 These efforts did little more than demonstrate the government’s weakness, and 
tribal unrest spread to the borders of the Qurna oil fields by September, resulting in the deaths of 
several hundred rebels.
75
 The Iraqi government bombed the tribes again in the spring of 1936, 
targeting rebels but also villages, crops, and livestock. As always, British military officers 
provided thorough logistical advice and strategic intelligence to the Iraqi pilots conducting the 
raids.
76
 Jamil Midfaʿi and Hikmat Sulayman, the first forced to resign due to Yasin’s collusion 
with the military and the second excluded from power after helping to orchestrate the uprising, 
led the parliamentary opposition to the violent repression of the tribes.
77
 
By the end of the year, Yasin had completed a total volte-face with respect to Britain and 
the imperial alliance. The old champion of the political opposition to the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty and 
fierce critic of Britain began this "happy transmutation" from the moment he accepted office. 
Archibald Clark Kerr, the British Ambassador in Baghdad, celebrated the change: 
 
But of late a metamorphosis has taken him.  It has been sudden and it seems to be 
complete. It has not only left him frank enough to confess, with some sadness, his 
old mistakes and to declare his faith in a hand-to-hand association of his country 
with ours; it has also brought with it something not far off confidence in the 
disinterestedness of the policy of His Majesty’s Government, and, with all this, a 
growing freedom from black bile, indeed, a geniality and mellowness of temper 




Yasin’s principle opposition to the imperial alliance seems to have been the British failure to 
entrust him with its safekeeping, and his long rivalry with Nuri and Jaʿfar, whom he derided as 
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collaborators and traitors, quickly evaporated when Clark Kerr suggested that he include the pair 
in his administration. 
Yasin’s betrayal infuriated those who had brought him to power, and the growing 
frustrations of these marginalized groups reflected residual anxiety over the betrayal of the last 
national uprising, the Great Iraqi Revolution of 1920. While the chief participants of that failed 
uprising endured political exile, imprisonment, and punitive financial measures meant to deter 
future involvement in politics, Faysal and his followers eagerly wrapped themselves in its mantle 
and appropriated its legacy. While the majority of the rebels were left outside of the machinery 
of power under the monarchy, the Hashemite interlopers embraced both pro-British tribal 
shaykhs and select rebels, mostly Sunni Arabs like Jamil al-Madfaʿi, who was responsible for the 
ambush and slaughter of a British unit at Tal ʿAfar in 1920.
79
 The new political elite lost no time 
in appropriating the spoils of power, enriching themselves with expensive houses and 
automobiles while buying the loyalty of tribal shaykhs with massive grants of state land. Nuri 
constructed an opulent palace in the capital with state money, and the National Brotherhood 
followed his example when they too came to power.  Yasin, for example, acquired over 
1,500,000 acres of state land and Rashid ʿAli secured substantial land tracts and monetary 
considerations by appointing himself trustee of the Kaylani family waqf.
80
  
Abu al-Timman grew increasingly disillusioned with the political establishment with 
which he had fitfully and unsuccessfully engaged for nearly a decade. Hikmat, who had helped 
to orchestrate the tribal rebellions, was inexplicably excluded from Yasin’s administration and 
joined the opposition. Bahr al-ʿUlum lead a delegation from Najaf to Baghdad after Midfaʿi’s 
resignation to warn Ghazi against permitting Yasin’s administration to remain in power without 
instituting real reform: 
 
We have not come here to congratulate or bless, for this is the job of people other 
than us.  We have instead come to appeal to you of the necessity of dealing with 
these rotten conditions that the people can longer no bear.  If you do well by the 
people, then we shall be with you, but if not, we will hold you to account more 
strongly than others.  We represent the nation who wishes to live a happy life, and 
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It was, however, possible for Yasin to order his arrest and to arrange for a military court to 
sentence him to death.  While awaiting his execution, Bahr al-ʿUlum composed "A Revolution 
since My Creation": 
 
Do not request from me tranquility for I 
 Cannot reckon a day when I was tranquil 
I am a revolution since my creation and my revolution 
 Is like a fire that burns the cities of tyrants 
In my own view and those of my supporters  




Yasin, the traitor, was unmoved by the poet’s militant stance but popular pressure again secured 
his freedom. The capital sentence was soon commuted to twenty years hard labor, and the poet 
would eventually be released under the weight of popular opposition after serving just five 
months.   
Jawahiri was particularly affected by the failed uprising and raged against both the 
nationalist leaders who abandoned the tribes they had incited to rebellion and shaykhs like ʿAbd 
al-Wahid who "rented out for slaughter scores of their sons for the gratification of the ruling 
class and the satiation of their appetites."
83
 After learning of the mass execution of the defeated 
rebels and the destruction of tribal villages across the south, Jawahiri denounced the cynical 
manipulation of the tribes by the nationalist politicians for their own ends as part of a broader 
historical claim about the cynical appropriation of popular resistance movements: 
 
It was natural for the tribes to dread 
 For even their nature had been polluted 
They had been merely a weapon for us but 




The last lines cast an allusion to the appropriation of the political dividends and historical 
memory of the national uprising of 1920.
85
  Jawahiri closes the poem with a thinly veiled attack 
on Yasin: 
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 Are you deep in your loins a true leader 
  Empowered by the nation after these crimes 
 For what to you are those losses to loot and spoil  
  From the people who risked everything and dared 
 Turn to face to this life that sated your temptations 
  And do not savor from her the seat of the coward 
 How grotesque that you advance and surmount 
  The encompassing evil replete with hypocrisy  
 
The poem was published on the front page of al-Islah on October 12, 1935 and infuriated Yasin, 
who ordered the immediate suspension of the paper’s license for one year and Jawahiri’s 
expulsion from his teaching position. 
 Jawahiri’s disillusionment with the political establishment was largely personal; in spite 
of his well-publicized disputes with Satiʿ al-Husri and Faysal, his social and political connections 
with well-placed Shiʿi politicians like Rustam Haydar and Muhammad al-Sadr enabled him to 
continue dreaming of political office. When Jawahiri was finally offered a parliamentary seat by 
Yasin, under the condition of not causing any more trouble, Salih Jabr, a young protégé of Nuri 
al-Saʿid, thwarted his election at the last minute. As Jawahiri later recounted, the episode 
permanently poisoned his attitude towards the political order and the fraudulent electoral process 
and led him to support "a coup or revolution or wathba or intifada or any of their other 
synonyms" as a means of destroying the corrupt post-mandatory state.  He would eventually 
come to consider the episode a blessing in disguise because his distance from official office 
enabled him to remain close to the masses.
86
  Like Bahr al-ʿUlum, Jawahiri remained bitterly 
resentful at Yasin’s betrayal and ready to support any revolution. 
The Bakr Sidqi Coup and the Populist Moment in Iraq 
Iraqi airplanes flew over Baghdad on the morning on October 29, 1936, dropping leaflets 
signed by General Bakr Sidqi announcing that he had been "called upon" to overthrow Yasin’s 
government. Hikmat Sulayman, who had abandoned the National Brotherhood after Yasin 
excluded him from the new administration, appeared at the palace shortly afterwards with a letter 
signed by Bakr that carried an ultimatum for King Ghazi to dismiss Yasin’s government within 
three hours and allow Hikmat to form the successor administration or to face the prospect of an 
army advance on the capital.
87
 Yasin was taken completely by surprise, largely because he had 
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been plotting his own military intervention to establish a republic.
88
 The poet Nuʿman Mahir al-
Kanʿani celebrated the coup as the end of an era in "The Revelation of the Revolution," 
published just three weeks later: 
 
A coterie of despots ruled our people 
 Following the method of the brutal tyrant 
Their aim to live a salubrious life 
 Unconcerned with the great misfortunes 
 
Kanʿani reflected the views of many Iraqis who believed that the coup d’état was not merely 
another rotation of political power but instead heralded the dawn of a new era: 
 
 Justice appeared and broke forth, smiling mouths 
  Proclaiming in the wilderness the end of injustice 
 The clouds of deception were dispelled and pursued 
  For the cunning light of truth launched its attack 
 
The poet’s exuberance for the revolution and his optimism for the future it foreshadowed attest 
to an overwhelming confidence that the moment of national liberation had finally arrived: 
 
 How lovely the moment when tyranny fell 
  Thrown bloody to the ground without resistance 
 So praise life, O People of Iraq, and enjoy 




Bakr Sidqi’s intervention came as the culmination of a series of secret meetings of the 
Ahali Group, which had recruited the disgruntled Jaʿfar Abu al-Timman and Hikmat Sulayman 
in 1935.
90
 The group’s decision to suspend their commitment to democracy provoked an 
onslaught of criticism from the group’s opponents for years afterward. Kamil al-Chadirchi, an 
Ahali intellectual, defended the decision by contending that the resort to violence became 
necessary when "people confront the obstruction of all democratic methods."
91
 Hikmat likewise 
argued that constitutional opposition was meaningless, "for parliament is a creation of the 
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administration, fashioned from the ranks of confidants, partisans, and protégés." He also pointed 
out that military intervention was not exactly unprecedented, for "in less than two years, the 
army has been involved in six revolutions in Iraq," but reminded his critics that "the army is also 
part of the nation and soldiers are brothers of the millions of wronged and persecuted citizens."
92
   
The ideological diversity of the Ahali members, who ranged from liberals to social 
democrats to Communists, led them to embrace the principles of "populism" (shaʿbiyyah). ʿAbd 
al-Fattah Ibrahim, the intellectual leader of the group, defined populism as "a social and political 
movement that believes in the power of democracy to improve the general conditions of the 
population and that seeks to attain some form of national power that will insure the realization of 
Iraq’s national and economic liberation."
93
 Husayn Jamil, a Baghdadi lawyer, emphasized that 
the "national liberation" sought by the group was a democratic emancipation from both 
colonialism and feudalism.  The populist platform articulated a desire for "total liberation" that 
was predicated on a shared opposition to colonialism and feudalism and a vague aspiration for 
democracy, modernity, and social justice.
94
 
Hikmat’s platform reflected the influence of this populist doctrine and was specifically 
designed to appeal to the interests of the marginalized peasants and workers. He called for the 
division of large estates and the distribution of reclaimed land to the peasantry. Britain 
strenuously objected to the proposals, with one official opining that "this sort of advanced 
agrarianism is unnecessary in Iraq and foreign to the traditional Iraqi mentality" and another 
noting that the proposals were "so rich in promise of antagonism from vested interests that the 
very programme itself might well be the undoing of Hikmat." Nevertheless, the ambassador 
concluded that support for Hikmat was "our only present hope of escaping a military 
dictatorship," and admitted that the populist agenda enjoyed tremendous popular support with the 
"air of spontaneous enthusiasm."
95
 The revolution did indeed enjoy considerable popular 
support, particularly in the poorer neighborhoods of Baghdad like Bab al-Shaykh and Shaykh 
ʿAmr.
96
 Huge street demonstrations of peasants and workers were lead by the poet Muhammad 
Mahdi al-Jawahiri and labor leader Muhammad Salih al-Qazzaz from al-Haydarkhanah mosque 
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 and November 3
rd
, 1936, with the crowds banging drums and chanting, "Long 
Live the People’s Administration!"
 97
 When the crowds approached the homes of Yasin and 
Rashid ʿAli on Rashid Street, they began to chant instead, "Death to Fascism!," "Bread for the 
Hungry!," and "Land for the Peasants!"
98
 Bahr al-ʿUlum penned "The Revolution of the Coup 
D’état," to express his optimism that the military intervention would introduce radical reform: 
 
 If evil grows rampant within the nation 
  Open for her benefit a thousand doors 
 These the sins of hundreds of years 
  Will beget for the people righteousness 
 If not for the swell of the tyrant’s insolence 
  Inducing our souls to anxiety and agitation 
 When the wrath of the rebels burst forth 




The poem writes the nation into the clandestine revolution, simultaneously asserting the 
significance of popular support and reminding the new government of its power.   
The popular enthusiasm for the revolution was driven largely by public support for the 
populist platform of the Ahali Group. Hikmat rewarded the group's support by including three of 
their number in his new administration: Abu al-Timman became Minister of Finance, Chadirchi 
became Minister of Economics and Communication, and Yusuf ʿIzz al-Din Ibrahim became 
Minister of Education. Abu al-Timman contended that the old regime had transgressed all legal 
and constitutional boundaries: "They disdained the blood that they shed and became experts in 
the persecution of liberties, they strangled free newspaper before they could publish and pursued 
the free sons of the nation wherever they tread. An era passed over this country, the likes of 
which had not been seen before, an era of martial law that filled the prisons with the sons of the 
country, your brothers, for but the slightest suspicion." Jaʿfar points to the venal pursuit of self-
interest and the manipulation of the machinery of government to transfer wealth and power to 
political patrons and clients as the proximate cause for the "increase in general indignation and 
the resentment of the Iraqi masses and the acceleration of the hour of eruption and rupture."
100
 
The poet ʿAbd al-Qadir al-Zahawi alluded to this indignation in the poem "O Self": 
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 With the sword of justice the heavens appointed   
  An avenger for every enemy and pharaoh 
 He is the leader whose decree dictates 
  A noble end to previous sanctioned assault 
 As well as the tax collector’s excessive demands 
  Which have mired the people in their mud and clay 
 He generously declines all lofty effects 




The poet’s praise for Bakr Sidqi’s reputed asceticism offers a pointed contrast to the corruption 
of the political class and underscores the optimistic portrayal of the general as national savior. 
British officials, shaken from the outset by the unprecedented violence of the coup, which 
included the murder of their close ally Jaʿfar al-ʿAskari, and the radical tenor of its supporters, 
who expressed a desire to go beyond "the usual 'rotativist' re-casting of the Cabinet," were 
further disturbed by the inclusion of several figures in the new government drawn from beyond 
the sphere of those associated with the British Empire.
102
 Abu al-Timman, who "has had a long 
record of unscrupulous and selfish nationalist intrigue," and Chadirchi, "a young man of extreme 
nationalist tendency," were seen by Clark Kerr as particularly pernicious influences.
103
 Yusuf 
Ibrahim, on the other hand was generally ignored, as Britain showed little interest in the Iraqi 
education system until the end of decade when it became apparent that the pan-Arabists were 
cultivating an anti-British curriculum.
104
 This initial uncertainty and distrust of the intentions of 
the new government caused the British War Office to order two infantry battalions in Cairo to 
stand by in case British military intervention was deemed necessary. Just two days later, 
however, Clark Kerr had received private assurances from Hikmat to the effect that the new 
regime, in spite of the more radical statements of its partisans, intended no harm towards British 
interests in Iraq.
105
 Bakr Sidqi likewise lost no time in privately assuring the British Military 
Mission that he was not anti-British and sought no change in Anglo-Iraqi relations.
106
 
The partisans of the revolution lost no time in establishing a new political society, called 
the Popular Reform League, which promoted the Ahali Group’s populist ideas. Chadirchi headed 
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the group, which included more radical figures like the labor activist Muhammad Salih al-
Qazzaz, already considered a dangerous radical by Britain because of his efforts to organize 
workers at British companies, the Communist activist ʿAbd al-Qadir Ismaʿil, as well as radical 
poets like Bahr al-ʿUlum. Abu al-Timman joined the group as well, but opted not to publicly 
announce his affiliation lest he give the impression that the group constituted an official political 
party.
107
 While the Popular Reform League avoided publicly denouncing imperialism so as to 
prevent British intervention, its platform savaged the professional politicians, tribal shaykhs, and 
capitalists who had benefitted most from the imperial alliance. The party also called for massive 
land reform and the legalization of trade unions and peasant organizations, in addition to a more 
subtle call for relations with foreign powers "on the basis of mutual equality."
108
  
The hesitance of the Ahali Group and the Popular Reform League to fully and forcefully 
condemn the colonial legacy in Iraq may have prevented British intervention, but it would also 
open the door to attacks from the right as the economic populism of the revolution began to lose 
steam.  In any case, the supporters of the revolution made no secret of their own appreciation of 
the anti-colonial implications of the revolution. In the poem "Memory of a Blackened Past," 
Muhammad Ridha al-Khatib decries the exploitation of the country’s wealth by foreign interests:  
 
 The people denied a share in the country’s blessing 
  Her wealth consecrated and dedicated to the foreigners 
 The Tigris and Euphrates shower their bliss upon them 
  And as for our share from them, a torrent of misfortunes 
 Our government, a home whose structure we built up 




The poet directs his ire at the national political elite whom he holds responsible for this 
submission to imperialism and betrayal of the nationalist legacy: 
 
 The senators and parliamentary deputies say 
  They work for the people’s right in every task 
 But when we test them we discover a farce 
  Like a doll or a toy in the paw of a playful cat  
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After presenting a vision of redress and retribution that promised divine justice to those who 
thought they had escaped notice and consequence, Khatib compares Yasin to Genghis Khan and 
arguing that his rule was more oppressive than that of some of the great tyrants of Islamic 
history, like al-Hajjaj and Ibn Ziyad: 
 
 What are you but an affliction on the people 
  Or rather an archer raining arrows of affliction 
 Killing and burning and exiling and accusing 
  And scattering their wealth with no accounting 
 The great defender stuffing his belly full of treasure 
  And what is left over goes to the appropriate relative 
 
Khatib, like many others, saw the populists as national saviors from this degradation and 
exploitation. 
Writing from exile in Damascus, Ahmad al-Safi al-Najafi likewise condemned both 
Britain and her client regime in "A Country on the Ruins of the Past," which closed with the 
poet’s expression of his desire to throw off the yoke of imperialism and to liberate the country 
politically and intellectually.
110
  Safi al-Najafi condemns Yasin and his allies for throwing 
themselves and their country’s resources into the lap of the imperialists with a metaphorical 
allusion to national regeneration: 
 
 She craved the medicine of the West to recover 
  But they fed her poison and she reckoned it honey… 
 The drugs of Western medicine destroy her foundations 
  So that nothing remained except bone bereft of its skin 
 More becoming of this medicine’s weakness is death 




Iraq, Safi al-Najafi argues, has suffered from the disease of colonialism and yet her leaders 
continue to seek the cure from the colonizers. He denounces the enervation of the nation and 
urges the path of resistance even if it leads to early death. 
These poems did not arouse fear or suspicion from the British Embassy, where officials 
had neither the time nor the expertise to pay serious attention to poetry, even when it appeared on 
the front page of newspapers.  Officials were, however, concerned with the economic platform of 
the populists, and Clark Kerr noted with some trepidation the "noticeably Red tinge" of the 
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group’s leadership and platform but noted that the party’s support of the government did not 
necessarily entail the government’s devotion to the party line. Indeed, Hikmat’s private 
assurances to the ambassador that land reform would initially be limited to a small area around 
the Abu Ghraib Canal seemed to indicate that the populist agenda would play a relatively 
marginal role in the policies of the new administration.
112
  The supporters of the populist agenda, 
however, continued to dream of social revolution. Bahr al-ʿUlum offered a striking defense of 
land reform in the poem "The Lord of the Palace in His Sleep":  
 
The lord of the castle prolongs his sleep 
 In order to dream of a return to parliament 
The dog and the peasant are at his door 
 Until the break of dawn they do not sleep 
The one is barking at all his guests 
 While the other cries for his trifled right 
Perhaps justice pretends not to see the deputy 
 Relieved of representing the Land of the Two Rivers
113
   
 
While the poet’s cautious optimism that justice had finally turned its back on the tyrants and 
feudalists reflects his fundamental confidence in the new regime, the poem underscores the 
essential fragility of revolution.  The peasant has not gained his rightful share but instead remains 
deprived in the figurative darkness, and the feudal lord has been neither punished nor 
dispossessed but remains to dream of redemption.   
Like his predecessors, Hikmat convinced Ghazi to dissolve parliament and permit new 
elections in light of the dramatic changes in the national situation. The Ahali Group threw itself 
into supporting the new elections, advocating for direct elections and urging candidates to 
publish their platforms. The latter call was particularly significant given the notable absence of 
political platforms, or for that matter anything resembling political campaigns in prior elections, 
and signaled the group’s support for "making the elections run on the basis of principles instead 
of personalities." The editors of al-Ahali noted that most Iraqis regarded participation in the 
electoral process as "wasted effort" but urged them to take advantage of the "relative freedom" of 
the new elections.
114
 This call was seconded by al-Haras, which denounced the electoral fraud of 
the previous fourteen years and announced that Iraq had entered a "new era," calling on voters to 
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"shame" politicians into conducting open and honest elections devoid of fraud.
115
 Bahr al-ʿUlum 
likewise hoped that the new elections would fulfill the hitherto unrealized promise of democracy, 
as he wrote in "A Law for Repairing Ideas": 
 
 The parliamentary era offered the means 
  To silence the appointed and convince another 
 The very idea of elections in its entirety 
  Was meant to enforce a law for repairing ideas 
 Indeed these administrations spared no effort 
  In removing lords, inhibition and conscience 
 Have they left among the seats just one seat 




The last line presents a challenge to Hikmat's administration to offer artists and craftsmen, the 
social conscience of the nation a voice among the technocrats, bureaucrats, and professional 
politicians.  
Less than a month after Hikmat assumed office, Jawahiri founded al-Inqilab, a 
newspaper that aimed to support the radical demands of the populist agenda and to counter the 
criticisms directed against it.
117
 Jawahiri’s support for the revolution was largely based on his 
assessment of the character of its partisans and foes; he defended his support of the revolution 
based on his belief in the "good intentions of its members" and castigated the former regime as 
"opportunists" who clung to power by "stirring up bitter feelings" between the various ethnic 
groups and religious sects of Iraq.
118
 The only poem that Jawahiri composed in praise of the 
revolution, "The Grave Stirs," celebrates the end of an era and the dawn of a new one: 
 
Leave to the void what fate has brought forth 
 And greet your day with determination and haste 
Trust the herald of the boon of this inversion 
 And aid him so perhaps the news will prove true 
Do not permit despair to plunge into your souls 
 Nor languor and impotence to take you to the depths… 
Remember yesterday and be inspired by its evil 
 For perhaps there is enclosed for you a warning 
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Cognizant of attempts by the deposed politicians and their supporters to disrupt the course of the 
revolution, Jawahiri reminds his audience that danger still looms and calls upon Hikmat to deal 
firmly – violently if necessary – with the opponents of the populist agenda: 
 
So tighten the rope and pull taught around their necks 
For perhaps your error was in permitting it to fall slack 
  
Yet despite this foreboding sense of the danger to come, Jawahiri remains optimistic in the 
promise of the revolution as the poem concludes: 
 
 I have taking to warning people expressing  
  Their fear of seeing these hopes effaced 
 The grave stirs and bursting forth restored 




This vision of a nation raised from the dead paralleled the romantic nationalism of pan-Arabism 
and its utopian promise of an idyllic past restored.
120
 
 Like Jawahiri, Bahr al-ʿUlum wavered between optimism and pessimism, affirming his 
hope in the promise of the revolution while warning of lurking danger and the work to be done.  
This theme of an incomplete revolution is echoed in "Rural Dawn," which opens with a 
metaphorical ode to nature that underscores the celebratory inauguration of a new era: 
 
 The beauty of the rural dawn is a gospel 
  Urging and exhorting all creatures to unveil 
 The east wind spreads it, wordy by word 
  And the fields of flowers eagerly drink it in 
 The birds sing with joy and glee so as to cast 
  On the listeners the extolment of the birds 
 If I could only attain a hut in the countryside 




The startling conclusion to the poem shatters the blithe optimism of its opening refrain, calling 
for vengeance and retribution rather than passive celebration as a means to preserve the gains 
achieved by revolution and realize the promise the new era. 
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Marginalization of the Populists 
The utopian promises of the new regime began to unravel rather quickly, and Hikmat’s 
second thoughts about the populist platform of the Popular Reform League became apparent 
when the government finally published its official platform on December 9
th
, 1936. The partisans 
of the new regime were divided from the beginning into two competing factions, an authoritarian 
rightwing bloc led by Bakr Sidqi and supported by Minster of Interior ʿAbd al-Latif Nuri and 
Minister of Justice Salih Jabr and a progressive leftwing bloc led by Abu al-Timman, the Ahali 
Group, and the partisans of the Popular Reform League.
 
 For his part, Hikmat remained 
uncomfortably in between the two factions, though his admiration of Mustafa Kemal led him to 
side increasingly with the authoritarian wing in spite of his relatively progressive policy 
inclinations. Despite the fact that Bakr Sidqi and his fellow officers ʿAbd al-Latif Nuri, Baha al-
Din Nuri, and Shakir al-Wadi had, at least according to what Hikmat informed his collaborators 
among the Ahali Group, sworn an oath to rule the country in accordance with the principles of 




In spite of the push by the Ahali Group and the Popular Reform League for direct 
elections, their initiative was blocked and the elections were held according to tradition in late 
February 1937. In accordance with the electoral law shaped by Britain in 1924, the elections 
were divided into stages that entailed indirect votes liable to the usual fraud. Thirteen members 
of the populist bloc were elected, a number that was not insignificant but certainly did not afford 
the progressives the opportunity to make a real legislative impact in a parliamentary body 
consisting of 105 members, particularly after Jaʿfar Abu al-Timman, elected as a deputy from 




Those marginalized by the revolution never lost sight of the stakes of the fight and 
immediately embarked on a plan to minimize the damage threatened by the ambitious program 
of social reform outlined by Hikmat and the Popular Reform League. From his exile in Beirut, 
Yasin al-Hashimi told one British official that the text of the government’s platform had 
convinced him that it was the work of Kamil al-Chadirchi, whom he called "somewhat of a 
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 and declared that the entire plan "was pure bunk, where it was not out and out 
communism."  Yasin was in private contact with Hikmat and urged the Prime Minister to 
dispense with the progressive advice offered by Chadirchi and Abu al-Timman and to instead 
hew a more moderate line.
125
 Nationalist politicians like Salman al-Shaykh Daʾud, ʿArif Qaftan, 
Mustafa ʿAli, Rafaʾil Butti, and ʿAli Mahmud al-Shaykh ʿAli persistently lobbied Hikmat and 




While Hikmat had fulfilled his promise to promote freedom of the press in Iraq by 
immediately voiding all newspaper suspensions issued by the last regime, the new policy of 
tolerance lasted less than three weeks before the government ordered a ten day suspension of the 
pan-Arabist paper al-Istiqlal in response to the paper’s spirited defense of the Yasin 
administration and open criticism of Hikmat’s government.
127
  As the populists were gradually 
marginalized, though, al-Istiqlal was allowed to publish freely and took a much more favorable 
line towards the government.
128
 This was in spite of the fact that Hikmat was growing noticeably 
closer to Britain, the ostensible enemy of the pan-Arabists. The government abandoned the call 
for an Anglo-Iraqi relationship based on "mutual equality" and instead announced simply the 
intention to "strengthen co-operation" between the two countries, while the ambitious plans for 
land reform were watered down to a vague call for a settlement based "on principles of equity 
and public interest," with only uncultivated land subject to prospective redistribution.
129
 Under 
pressure from Britain, Hikmat reluctantly announced that none of the land wrested from the state 
by previous ministers would be confiscated.
130
 The British Ambassador, one year after 
delightedly recounting Yasin’s "happy transmutation" from anti-colonial agitator to pro-British 
stalwart, was even more satisfied with Hikmat, observing that he "seemed to wish to give things 
a new shape and to put into his relationship with ourselves an eagerness which was as gratifying 
as it was novel." He noted with obvious approval that unlike Yasin, who consulted frequently 
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Undeterred by the counterrevolutionary attempts to derail the populist agenda, the 
progressive ministers and deputies set about their work. Jaʿfar Abu al-Timman, Minister of 
Finance, sought to obtain a loan of three million sterling pounds from abroad to fund public 
works projects and an ambitious program of industrialization. Jaʿfar first sought financial 
assistance from Britain, offering future revenue from Iraqi oil as collateral for the loan, but the 
Iraqi Petroleum Company refused to back the proposal unless it was rewarded with a concession 
for the southern oil fields.
132
 Insulted by the suggestion, Jaʿfar sought the assistance of Germany, 
but soon found that the political conditions of the Nazi government were even more onerous than 
those stipulated by Britain. His entreaties to foreign countries infuriated British officials, who 
saw the maneuver as an attempt to escape complete economic dependence on the imperial 
alliance.
133
 Depressed, Jaʿfar concluded that there was little hope of a financial solution as long 
as British political influence prevented the opening of serious economic relations with foreign 
countries and obstructed the attempt at industrialization.
134
 Denied the necessary foreign loans to 
finance economic reforms and development, Jaʿfar attempted to raise internal revenue by 
introducing a progressive income and estate tax, but when Hikmat and Bakr withheld support for 
the measure it was voted down by parliament.
135
 
The populist deputies fared little better in advancing their agenda in parliament, but 
nevertheless took advantage of the opportunity to publicly state their case. Muhammad Hadid 
denounced the abject poverty suffered by so many Iraqis in both urban and rural areas since the 
end of the colonial era. ʿAziz Sharif called for fundamental reforms that would introduce the 
"tools of modernity" to the Iraqi countryside, which was largely bereft of electricity, clean water, 
and medical centers. ʿAbd al-Qadir Ismaʿil pushed for a general works program as part of an 
economic stimulus measure that would fight illiteracy, ignorance, poverty, and disease, arguing 
that the revolution must continue and reminding the administration of its earlier radical 
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statements. Sadiq Kammunah called for special attention to the educational system in the 
countryside, where illiteracy was rampant. Makki Jamil complained bitterly that Hikmat’s 
administration failed to increase funding to combat illiteracy, in spite of his earlier promise to do 
so. Hadid demanded tax reform, denouncing the government’s reliance on indirect excise taxes 
on commercial products like sugar, coffee, tea, and cotton textiles, which he argued, "were levied 
upon the poor classes not according to their ability to pay, but instead according to their 
consumption of these essentials."
136
 
While calls for eradicating illiteracy and alleviating poverty aroused little opposition 
from the conservative opponents of the populists, who were confident that the reforms would not 
be implemented, the subject of land reform provoked angry and violent resistance. Some fifty 
percent of Iraqis were directly engaged in agricultural work, and nearly eighty percent of the 
country’s inhabitants were financially dependent on agricultural production either directly or 
indirectly.
137
 Immediately after taking office, Jaʿfar Abu al-Timman called for the redistribution 
of state-owned land to landless peasants.
138
 Hikmat, though, dismissed suggestions to transfer 
land from feudal landholders to peasants as "out of the question," though he did promise in 
March to void the massive transfers of tribal land to urban landlords conducted by Yasin’s 
administration. ʿAziz Sharif drew parliament’s attention back to the problem of "the hut and the 
palace," and the danger posed to the nation by the massive inequalities in the distribution of land 
and wealth. Sadiq Kammunah argued for the introduction of collective farms, which provoked an 




The calls for land reform drew Bakr Sidqi and the conservative opposition closer 
together, and the conservatives were delighted when Bakr Sidqi denounced the populists as 
Communists and tools of foreign powers.
140
 The campaign to denigrate the populist agenda as 
"Communist" was lead by Muhsin Abu Tabikh, a wealthy landlord who controlled vast tracts of 
Khazaʿil tribal land. Muhsin inherited the land from his father, who had attained the title deed 
from the Ottomans, and finally succeeded in convincing Britain to drive the tribesmen from the 
land in 1918. Muhsin gained another huge grant of land in Diwaniyah for supporting Yasin in 
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1935 and deeply resented efforts to return control of that land to its inhabitants.
141
 In March, 
Bakr Sidqi declared that "the soil of Iraq is not suitable for communism… and those who try to 
implant communism in Iraqi soil are bound to fail just as those who try to implant the date palms 
of Basrah in the mountains of Norway."
142
 Jaʿfar denied the charges of communism but refused 
to relent in the campaign for social justice and equality: "If our efforts in reforming the country, 
helping the poor, and applying justice are Communist dictates, then I ask God the Almighty and 
All-Powerful to place us on the same level as communism."
143
 Labor strikes in support of the 
populist agenda erupted across the country several days later, organized by Communist activists 
and encompassing as many as 20,000 workers, but the strikes fizzled out after the labor leader 
Qazzaz was banished to the north.
144
 
Chadirchi, always uncomfortable with the radical wing of the Ahali Group, contended 
that the backlash resulted from the irresponsible agitation of the radicals. He singled out for 
blame the "leftwing extremism" of ʿAbd al-Qadir Ismaʿil, editor of al-Ahali, and Yusuf Matti, a 
junior member of the group and clandestine Communist who penned inflammatory articles for 
the paper under a pseudonym. These activities, Chadirchi argued, incited Bakr Sidqi, who was 
already preoccupied with Communist penetration in the army, against the Popular Reform 
League in particular and the progressives in general. Bakr Sidqi objected to the very idea of the 
Popular Reform League, arguing that the independent group should be converted into a general 




Chadirchi’s frustration with the gradual marginalization of the populist bloc pushed him 
to draft a letter of resignation in the spring of 1937, but the intervention of Jaʿfar Abu al-Timman 
and others convinced him not to submit the letter to Hikmat. In the abandoned letter, Chadirchi 
recounted his motivation for participating in the movement for political reform and supporting 
the military intervention of Bakr Sidqi before complaining that "some six months have passed 
since the formation of the new regime, and these hopes have not been realized, nor has the 
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previous state of chairs undergone a fundamental transformation." He denied that he was a naïve 
optimist who expected all of his efforts to bear immediate fruit but contended, "My hopes in the 
future would not be dashed in this respect if I found the prevailing trends proceeding towards an 
annihilation of past behavior and if I felt that we were on the verge of beginning our work." 
Rather sarcastically, he assured Hikmat that he bore him no ill will, for "perhaps your capacity 
for hope is what sustains your persistence in power."
146
  
The poets too soon fell afoul of the revolutionary government. Jawahiri angered Hikmat 
by publicly denouncing the Amin al-Rihani and provoking the anger of the Iraqi pan-Arabists. 
Rihani’s account of Jawahiri’s dispute with Satiʿ al-Husri in the book Qalb al-ʿIraq supported 
Husri’s depiction of Jawahiri as champion of a sectarian fitna and infuriated the poet. Jawahiri 
penned an attack on Rihani in al-Inqilab while the latter was visiting Baghdad, titled "A 
Dangerous Spy in the Tigris Palace Hotel." Husayn Jamil, Director of Propaganda and an Ahali 
stalwart, was forced to intervene when Rihani complained to the government that Jawahiri was 
repeatedly calling the hotel to taunt him. Shortly after the Rihani affair, Jawahiri allowed his 
paper to publish an unsigned article penned by Salih Shamsah that accused British intelligence 
officers of infiltrating several tribes in the Middle Euphrates valley. Hikmat summoned Jawahiri 
and explained that he was under British pressure to stifle the allegation but declined to punish the 
poet. Jawahiri shortly thereafter published the poem "After Six Months, What?," which alienated 
him further from the administration.
 147
  
Jawahiri was eventually arrested on March 28
th
 under the pretense of defaming the 
government by publishing an article titled "Kosher and Non-Kosher," which denounced the 
excessive tariffs that impoverished Iraqi Jews were forced to pay to kosher butchers. The poem 
provoked the Chief Rabbi of Baghdad to file a grievance against the government, and Jawahiri 
was found guilty of inciting the masses and sentenced to one month in prison, with an additional 
month tacked on for insulting the government.
148
 His poem "In Prison" addressed the affair: 
 
O Dalliance, for the good of the dear country and her safety 
Dividing the faction of Jews and dishonoring the entire sect 
What is it to you, "kosher and non-kosher," it’s all beef and lamb 
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Other sources, however, allege that the kosher issue was merely a pretense to punish Jawahiri’s 
intervention in the Middle Euphrates troubles.
150
 Jawahiri’s arrest divided the political supporters 
of the revolutionary regime. When a group of populist deputies protested the persecution of 
Jawahiri in parliament the remaining supporters of Hikmat and Bakr Sidqi attacked them with 
insults and abuse. The episode ended with Hikmat declaring that Jawahiri was merely "an 
agitator – nothing more and nothing less."
151
 
The three Ahali deputies finally resigned on June 19
th
, 1938 in protest to the 
government’s massacre of tribal forces at Samawah, a district of Diwaniyah, where rival clans 
played their role in the political rivalry between forces loyal to Hikmat and Yasin.  Khawwam al-
ʿAbbas, leader of the Bani Zurayj, had been dispossessed of his land as punishment for opposing 
Yasin in 1935. When Hikmat took power, Khawwam was pardoned and the land that had been 
transferred to his cousin Shanshul was ordered returned. Shanshul refused to return the land and 
was supported by ʿAbd al-Wahid and Muhsin Abu Tabikh, both allies of Yasin and the National 
Brotherhood. The three rebel leaders were arrested at the end of April under the pretense of 
distributing weapons, and when fighting broke out in protest against the arrests, government 
forces massacred the rebel tribes, including large numbers of captive prisoners.
152
 The 
resignations of the Ahali ministers reflected their principled opposition to the politicization of 
tribal rivalries and their protest against Hikmat’s hypocritical exploitation of the tactic. Not only 
were the arrested tribal shaykhs opponents of the revolutionary alliance from the outset, but 




Abu al-Timman saw to the distribution of the resignation letter among the tribes of the 
Middle Euphrates and in the shrine cities of Najaf and Karbala. Together with Chadirchi, he 
sought to incite a general strike in the urban areas in order to bring down the government of 
Hikmat and Bakr.
154
 Their efforts failed for several reasons, not least of which was the self-
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interest of the tribes. The supporters of ʿAbd al-Wahid, Shanshul, and Muhsin Abu Tabikh may 
have pined for the fall of Hikmat and Bakr, but they were reactionaries who loathed the populist 
bloc, and while Khawwam and his supporters may have been sympathetic to the progressive 
ideals of the populists, they enjoyed the considerable political favor and economic benefit of 
their warm relations with the state. The Shiʿi clerics of Najaf and Karbala had come to rely on 
the tribal shaykhs as vehicles for political intervention and consequently became increasingly 
distant and divorced from anti-statist political movements. The Iraqi military, which had 
increased in size from just 7,500 men at the moment of independence to 19,500 by 1936, was 
much stronger than they had been when Jaʿfar led an electoral boycott in 1924 and a national 
strike in 1930 and much more capable of intimidating the populace against resistance.
155
 The 
Ahali Group and Popular Reform League were never able to organize their supporters after 
Jawahiri was imprisoned and Qazzaz banished.
156
  
When the Ahali minister resigned, their replacements, lead by ʿAli Mahmud al-Shaykh 
ʿAli, agreed to join Hikmat’s government on the condition that he pursue an Arab nationalist 
agenda in foreign affairs and an anti-Communist agenda in domestic matters.
157
 That ʿAli 
Mahmud could describe the Ahali agenda as "Communist" suggest the reactionary nature of the 
intended anti-Communist turn. Rafaʾil Butti, the editor of the nationalist paper al-Istiqlal and a 
parliamentary deputy from Mosul, denounced al-Ahali in front of parliament when the 
resignation of the Ahali ministers was announced, declaring that the populist movement "could 
only be described by one word, and that word is conspiracy."
158
 Salman Shaykh Da’ud, a deputy 
from Diwaniyah, seconded Butti’s accusations, declaring that the Ahali members, like leftists in 
every other country, were unwilling and incapable of constructive work in the interest of one 
nation, but instead insisted on "inciting the masses to chaos and rioting, and when they found no 
willing to riot, they rioted against themselves."
159
  
Seeing an opportunity to deal a fatal blow to the populist revolution and to continue 
pushing Hikmat and Bakr Sidqi in the direction of the conservative pan-Arabists, the nationalist 
newspapers began organizing a campaign to dissolve parliament and call for new elections. 
Butti’s paper al-Istiqlal demanded the dissolution of parliament in a front-page editorial, arguing 
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that the current chamber did not reflect the wishes of the nation, particularly after they 
demonstrated "animosity and aversion to no minor extent to the traditions of the country and its 
character and sacred things."
160
 The editors of al-ʿAlam al-ʿArabi argued that past elections were 
not conducted freely but instead were merely "the means for the destructive organizations to 
exploit this opportunity" to force their destructive and divisive ideas on the nation, later 
clarifying that the intended target of the barb was "that bloc dubbed the populist front."
161
  
ʿAbd al-Qadir Ismaʿil and ʿAbd al-Fattah Ibrahim, two of the most prominent and most 
radical members of the Ahali circle, rejected the legitimacy of the revolution and denounced the 
military's interference in political affairs. Ibrahim severed his relationship with his comrades, 
warning them that they would "pay a price" for facilitating the army’s entry into the political 
arena.
162
 Bahr al-ʿUlum too soon turned against the revolutionary government, blaming its 
failures on politicians like Hikmat whose lust for power caused them to abandon their ideals in 
his poem "In the Next Parliament": 
 
I saw in the market some bulls being lead 
Their destination offices and portfolios 
I went to ask my comrades were their trough lay 
And discovered that it was in the next parliament 
Despair shattered the victory cup of their resolutions 
Sediments of misgiving in some men of distinction 
I ran to search for a grave to bury in it 




Triumph of the Counter-Revolution 
 Bakr Sidqi was assassinated by an Iraqi soldier at Mosul on August 11, 1937, just ten 
months after assuming power. Naji Shawkat and Taha al-Hashimi celebrated the news in 
Istanbul, convinced that Bakr’s death would prevent any future attempt of wresting power from 
the "Old Guard."
164
 Muhammad Salih Bahr al-ʿUlum, embittered by the betrayal of the 
revolution, celebrated the assassination, writing in "The Fate of the Tyrant": 
 
 Haughtily he oppressed and tyrannized 
                                                          
160
 Al-Istiqlal, August 5, 1937. 
161
 Al-ʿAlam al-ʿArabi, August 7, 1937. 
162
 Al-Tamimi, Muhammad Jaʿfar Abu al-Timman, 397. 
163
 Bahr al-ʿUlum, Diwan, 1:126. 
164
 Al-Hashimi, Mudhakkirat, 208-9. 
73 
 
  His people, and so the reckoning has come 
 Death was poured for him in his chalice 
  The death of the idols, yes, this is the sanction 
 If the head is afflicted by the disease of conceit 
  There is nothing that can contain it except the earth 
 And whoever asks the people to worship him 




Amin al-ʿUmari, commander of the Mosul Forces, refused to transfer the ringleaders of the plot 
to Baghdad, and when his decision was supported by Saʿid al-Tikriti, commander of Camp 
Washshash outside of Baghdad, Hikmat was forced to resign. Jamil al-Midfaʿi was invited by 
Ghazi to form a new government in hopes of restoring a reasonable compromise between the 
nationalist and progressive camps.   
Midfaʿi heeded Hikmat’s departing advice, which warned him against including his old 
allies, Nuri al-Saʿid and Taha al-Hashimi, in the new administration. Hikmat was ready to 
concede defeat but knew that Nuri would seek vengeance for the death of his brother-in-law 
Jaʿfar al-ʿAskari and that Taha would seek redress for the humiliation suffered by his late brother 
Yasin.
166
 Midfaʿi announced the dissolution of parliament on August 26
th
, 1937. The Ahali 
members who had resigned their seats in protest against the right-wing turn of Hikmat’s 
administration refused to participate in the new elections, citing the blatant corruption of the 
electoral process. The nationalist press continued their campaign of posthumously exaggerating 
the transgressions of the populists, with al-Istiqlal alleging that the thirteen deputies from al-
Ahali had sworn allegiance to communism and that some of their number had actively sought to 
replace religious feasts with nationalist holidays as part of a campaign to "abolish religions."
167
 
Midfaʿi’s policy of "closing the curtain" on the misdeeds of the past precluded the 
possibility of investigating and prosecuting the principle allies and associates of Hikmat and 
Bakr Sidqi. Hikmat’s government had issued a general pardon for all those involved in the coup 
d’état and rescinding the pardon would have threatened civil tranquility in the country. Those 
collaborators who remained in positions of power, like Lt. General ʿAbd al-Latif Nuri were 
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however quickly forced into retirement.
168
 The Ahali Group’s newspaper (al-Ahali), which was 
shut down by Hikmat’s regime after the resignation of Abu al-Timman, Chadirchi, and Yusuf 
Ibrahim in June, 1937, would remain in a state of abeyance until the anti-fascist stance of the 
Iraqi left convinced British officials to renew the paper’s license, this time under the name Sawt 
al-Ahali, in September, 1942.
169
 
Hikmat’s regime had already begun to seek retribution from its erstwhile supporters and 
fiercest critics among the progressive bloc. In April, labor leader Muhammad Salih al-Qazzaz 
was banished to ʿAnah in northwestern Iraq.
170
 Kamil al-Chadirchi was exiled to Cyprus shortly 
after his resignation, and ʿAbd al-Qadir Ismaʿil and his brother, who had already been sent off 
into foreign exile, were stripped of their citizenship on August 10
th
, 1938 because of their Indian 
origins.
 171
 Even the remaining members of the progressive bloc, with Jaʿfar Abu al-Timman the 
most prominent, were forced to withdraw from public life in the face of relentless criticism from 
the pan-Arabists. Resurgent nationalist papers like al-Istiqlal, al-Bilad, al-Difaʿ, and al-ʿIqab 
spearheaded attacks on the deposed progressives and refused to print Abu al-Timman’s response. 
Chadirchi was allowed to return to the country some time after Bakr Sidqi’s assassination and 
while he would remain removed from political life in the country until after the collapse of the 
Rashid ʿAli movement, he continued to meet weekly with Husayn Jamil, Muhammad Hadid and 
ʿAbd al-Fattah Ibrahim at Jaʿfar’s home in Baghdad to discuss politics and culture.
172
   
The Ahali members would face numerous queries and accusations regarding their support 
for the coup d’état. Ten years after the events, Chadirchi and Sami Shawkat, the former Director 
General of Education and a staunch supporter of the Rashid ʿAli movement, engaged in a fierce 
argument over the subject on the pages of al-Ahali and al-Zaman. After Chadirchi branded his 
opponent the "Oswald Mosley of Iraq," Shawkat retorted by deriding Ahali’s hypocritical 
support for Bakr Sidqi in light of their ostensible commitment to democracy.
173
 Chadirchi 
followed with a long justification that portrayed his support for the military coup as a failed 
attempt to disrupt the inexorable descent into fascism. He rejected the view that democracy was 
constrained by a commitment to non-violence and parliamentary elections, arguing instead that it 
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not only permitted but indeed obligated revolutionary insurrection in the face of despotism. 
Chadirchi contended that the supporters of the revolution sought only the collapse of the 
dictatorial regime and that the subsequent developments were the result of the populists’ 
marginalization.
174
 His comrade, Husayn Jamil, justified the legality of revolution with reference 
to the writings of John Locke, the United States Declaration of Independence, the constitutions 




These justifications, however, emerged decades later and only after the immediate danger 
of retribution had passed. In the immediate aftermath of their failure, the populists were not 
permitted to defend their position. Most of the poets who had previously supported Yasin’s 
regime remained silent after Bakr Sidqi announced that Yasin’s supporters had three days to 
leave the country.
176
 After the fall of Bakr and Hikmat, however, those poets lost no time in 
expressing their disdain for the erstwhile revolutionaries and professing their loyalty to the late 
Yasin and his legacy.  ʿAli al-Sharqi, a cousin of Jawahiri who did not share his enthusiasm for 
the revolution, wrote "The Tribulation of Loyalty" in the wake of Bakr Sidqi’s assault on 
Baghdad and published soon after his assassination: 
 
 Where are the fellows of moral distinction 
  To finally rid the world of these writhing snakes 
 I feel sorry for the diver who found some pebbles 
  The same size and shape of the pearl he sought 
 An error of the notables whose echo multiplied 
  Until the commoners resembled those notables 
 O People, these loaves of barley will sustain you 
  Misery will tussle with you over those same loaves 
 Your role will come against the desperate tyrant 




Like the diver who mistook some pebbles for pearls, Sharqi argues that the people have mistaken 
Bakr Sidqi for a national savoir and that the mistakes of the ruling class have caused them to 
falsely reckon that they could be easily replaced. He warns his fellow nationals that their poverty 
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will only be exacerbated by the misery to come and confidently predicts their conversion by the 
time the moment of truth arrives.  
Yet Sharqi was no conservative and he did not oppose the particulars of the populist 
agenda.  As early as 1925, in the poem "The Peasant’s Sickle," Sharqi had passionately argued 
for land reform and denounced the tax burden on the peasantry, which had only worsened 
since.
178
 His animosity towards the revolution instead reflects, as the title indicates, his animosity 
towards the methods of the revolution and his feeling that the ruling class, whatever their faults 
and failures, deserved better. The poet reflects bitterly on the great wave of joy that erupted in 
the streets of Baghdad after Yasin’s fall from power: 
 
 Baghdad bid farewell to the regime and its people 
  For the nation rushed to greet the regime of bullets 
 The founders and shepherds of the country shook 
  For relatives and kin were exchanged for strangers 
 The shaking of foundations was hard on the guards 
  And despair forbidden to the loyal and obedient 
 Where are the men who heed and obey 
  For I found their ranks devoid of members 
 
This sentiment conveys Sharqi’s sense of isolation and loneliness in the midst of the 
revolutionary fervor and again reflects his anger at the treachery and perfidy of the Iraqi people. 
 Not all of the opponents of the revolution, however, were as dismissive of the 
movement’s popular support and the widespread opposition to the corruption of the political 
establishment as ʿAli al-Sharqi.  Maʿruf al-Rusafi, an older poet whose commitment to anti-
colonial politics led him to defiantly support the Ottoman Empire until the moment of its demise, 
was neither politically conservative nor personally invested in the fortunes of the politicians 
deposed by the revolution.  Rusafi’s deep concern for the poor is attested by poems like "The 
Rich and the Poor," "The Orphan on the Day of the Festival," and "Poverty and Illness," his 
devotion to progressive social causes like the liberation of women in poems like "Women in the 
East," "Our Women," "Our Freedom of Marriage," and "Education and Mothers," and his 
political marginalization was so extreme that this "national poet" of Iraq, once a notable and a 
former parliamentary deputy, would eventually be reduced to selling cigarettes on the streets of 
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Baghdad in order to afford liquor.
179
 Yet despite the apparent affinities between Rusafi and 
younger poets like Jawahiri and Bahr al-ʿUlum, Rusafi passionately denounced the revolution in 
"The Day the al-Hashimi Cabinet Fell."  
Typical of his frustration and disdain for those in power, Rusafi first denounced Yasin’s 
regime for capitulating so quickly to the rebels: 
 
This is the world and her sons 
 In our day and the bygone era 
Useless are the efforts of the people 
 If the elders fall down stumbling 
 
If he blamed Yasin for relinquishing power so easily and without a fight, though, he maintained a 
much harsher attitude towards Bakr Sidqi and his supporters. In a rather oblique passage, Rusafi 
writes: 
 
 If it were said to me that in the army 
  There is one ordered by his commander 
 I would say, ask in al-Karkh, his orders 
  Are there in that crafty department 
 For in Palestine and among her rebels 
  They have a hand well-known to Cairo 
 From there the conspiracy was hatched 




These metaphors and allusions would have been clear to his Iraqi audience: al-Karkh refers to 
the western half of Baghdad; the "crafty department" refers to the British Embassy located there; 
the reference to Palestine alludes to the Arab Revolt that erupted just months prior; the pronoun 
"they" refers to Yasin and his well-known support for the Palestinian rebels; and "Cairo" refers 
to the Middle East Office in Cairo that served as the base for British intelligence and operations 
in the Arab Middle East.  The poem, then, accuses Britain of engineering the revolution because 
of Yasin’s support for the Palestinian uprising.  
Rusafi’s suspicion of British support for Bakr Sidqi’s military intervention, though 
baseless, was common enough among pan-Arabists, who regarded both Hikmat and Bakr Sidqi 
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with suspicion. Hikmat was an ethnic Turkmen while Bakr was ethnically Kurdish, and the 
affinity of both for Turkey was well-known. The populists were likewise distrusted by the pan-
Arabists because of their well-known criticism of the platform of Arab unity and embrace of the 
slogan of "Iraq for the Iraqis."
181
 Rusafi may have been socially progressive, but his politics had 
always been primarily driven by anti-colonialism.
182
 His celebration of Yasin’s Palestinian 
agenda underscores a critical failure of the populist agenda. While Jawahiri expressed his support 
for the rebels in "Palestine Day" and Bahr al-ʿUlum composed anti-colonial poems like "The 
Palestinian Revolution," "Tortured Palestine: Where Is Your Treaty, League of Nations?" "The 
Italian Assault on Ethiopia," the populists bowed to pressure from Hikmat and Bakr Sidqi and 
remained silent.
183
 Ironically, after the populist estrangement Hikmat and Bakr abruptly changed 
course, sensing that the danger of British intervention had passed. Bakr actively sought to 




Even more damning than the silence of the populists on the Palestinian issue was their 
lack of empathy towards Yasin’s sudden death in exile. The Syrian National Bloc organized a 
republican funeral for Yasin in Damascus on January 22, 1937, but the transfer of his body to 
Baghdad was delayed by the Iraqi refusal to allow Taha and the Syrian delegation to accompany 
the procession. Frustrated by the obstructions and delays, Taha finally approved his brother’s 
interment in the mausoleum of Salah al-Din next to the Umayyad Mosque in the old town of 
Damascus. The refusal of the Iraqi government to permit the repatriation of the corpse for burial 
in Baghdad shocked and appalled Arab nationalists in Egypt and Syria.
 185
 The Iraqi government 
finally convened a commemorative ceremony for Yasin in Baghdad on February 18, 1938, which 
became a venue for the critics and opponents of Bakr Sidqi and the populists to denounce the 
betrayal of the nation. Just as the National Bloc had exploited Yasin’s funeral to bolster their 
own political position, conservative forces used the ceremony to further demonize the populists. 
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The poet Muhammad Bahjat al-ʿAthari seized the occasion to denounce the sins of the 
populists by reciting his acerbic and biting "Epic of the Populist Revolution."
 186
 ʿAthari, a 
reactionary Salafi poet known for his fierce opposition to progressive social and political causes 
as well as his later support for Rashid ʿAli, which led to his internment as a prisoner-of-war at 
Fao for several years, drew from heritage of Arab and Islamic history to denounce the supporters 
of the revolution.
187
 He opened his poem, which was indeed an epic of some one hundred and 
twenty verses, with an attack on the populist rhetoric of al-Ahali and the Popular Reform League 
rather than the singular tyranny of Bakr Sidqi: 
 
Come to your senses and awaken the sentry! 
We have slept, but our hatred has not 
That rotten and putrid populism clothed 
The body of the nation as lecherous traitors 
Vile creatures, deniers of the race, penetrated 
With injustice the noblest of the nations 
For the aim of domineering and aspiring to pursue 
Tyrannical rule behind the blackness of night 
Inciting the rabble in their fleeting greed 
Lowly born and their temerity violent and insolent 
 
In contrast to the treachery of the populists who conspired with Bakr Sidqi, the officers and 
soldiers who supported and participated in the coup d’état are portrayed as victims of trickery 
and cunning.  
ʿAthari spends a considerable portion of the poem elegizing Jaʿfar al-ʿAskari and 
denouncing Bakr Sidqi for the murder, an indication that even those politicians most tarred by 
allegations of collaboration and subservience to Britain could be rehabilitated by the pan-
Arabists in death.  The great bulk of ʿAthari’s venom, however, is reserved for the populist 
betrayal of Yasin in refusing to permit the repatriation of his corpse. The poet directly addresses 
the deceased Yasin: 
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 They renounced you after the friendship, no covenants 
  Did they observe and no goodwill in their actions and effects 
 They banished you and so retained a mark of disgrace 
  Repugnant as though cretins could even be ashamed 
 You did not depart from the homeland except to find another  
  Like a lion who roams in the night from one den the next 
 All of the capitals of ʿAdnan are a kingdom 
  Sharing a king with the sons of Qaydhar 
 They feared you alive, and so we say, keen leader 
  They fear he who wields neither sword nor spear 
 A corpse terrifies them, so their leader must quake 
  At the sight of an unfurled banner or unsheathed sword 
 This is their courage and not what the Arabs relate 
  Of ʿAntar Bin Shaddad who toppled a massive force 
 Do not apologize, for you gave to them bountifully while 
To you they showed disloyalty and wickedness of the lowly 
 You rose like the sun in the radiant heavens 
  From the dust challenging the horizon with exuberance 
 
Like Jawahiri, Bahr al-ʿUlum, Rusafi, Sharqi and others, ʿAthari wrote in a neo-classical style, 
but his use of imagery and metaphor contrasts sharply with that of his opponents. The references 
to ʿAdnan and Qaydhar, mythical ancestors of the Arabs, and ʿAntar Bin Shaddad, a famous poet 
and warrior of pre-Islamic Arab history, parallel the romantic nostalgia of Arab nationalism, 
which set him apart even from Rusafi, whose support for the pan-Arab cause was always 
politically rooted in the politics of anti-colonialism. He extends the metaphor linking Yasin to 
this bygone romantic past: 
 
 From the descendents of Salah al-Din, what a man 
  He protected the sanctuary from treacherous Crusaders 
 
Unlike Rusafi, who berated Yasin's lack of resistance, ʿAthari lauds his decision to go peacefully 
into exile as the act of man interested only in the salvation of the nation: 
 
 If you willed to confront them with fire 
  Burning flames upon the rash and disloyal 
 Resembling the catastrophic battle for Spain 
  Burning as kindling our kin and our homes 
 But your fidelity to the nation pushed aside 
  The fire of discord and the burning betrayal 
 Who do I have like you with loyal intentions 




 It was not only archconservatives like ʿAthari who eulogized Yasin. Even Jawahiri, 
chastened by the failure of the revolution, travelled to Basrah to commemorate the life of Yasin. 
The poem, "In Memory of al-Hashimi," offered an apparently sincere appreciation of Yasin’s 
role in Iraqi politics, choosing to overlook the events that followed Yasin’s ascension to power in 
1935 and focusing instead on the symbolism of national unity that Yasin provided the nation in 
opposition to the post-mandatory state: 
 
 Yasin, what a pity that you’ve gone early 
  Your unique and noble mind gone to decay 
 And what a disaster now that we seek you 
  No wonder the sunny weather has grown cloudy 
 O Shield of the Kingdom of strongest iron 
  The sword of your rule has not been blunted 
 Even if Iraq found fault with the empowered 
  Encumbered with those both crippled and healthy 
 Indeed they day we lost you we lost a star 




After reading his eulogy, the poet launched into an attack on Britain for dividing Iraqis into 
parties and factions that grappled with one another over priorities of position in the pointless 
games of power politics, indicating his own evolving awareness of the importance of anti-
colonial rhetoric on the local scene.
189
 
 Jawahiri’s late attempt to come to terms with the strength of the pan-Arabists and create 
some distance between the issue of social justice and the issue of Arab unity was not enough to 
prevent the reactionary backlash.  Mustafa al-ʿUmari, the new Minister of Interior and the most 
ardent anti-Communist in Iraq, had dozens of Iraqi youths arrested and imprisoned on November 
18, 1937 under the vague accusation of engaging in Communist activities.
190
 On December 29, 
1937, Daʾud al-Saʿdi, a representative from Kut, stood before parliament and delivered a 
blistering attack on Midfaʿi's professed intention to close the curtain on the past. Saʿdi 
denounced Hikmat and his supporters as Communists and accused anyone who disagreed with 
this assessment of supporting communism themselves: "It is necessary to obliterate everyone 
who embraces the Communist agenda. Where are the actions of the government in the path of 
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resisting this Communist inclination? I, on the other hand, see that this idea is supported before 
the present government!"
191
 Saʿdi’s rant was so violent that he was censured and expelled for the 
remainder of the parliamentary session.
192
 By February, parliament had voted to strip the 
participants of the coup d’état of the legal immunity accorded them by Hikmat.
193
 
 Jawahiri sunk into depression as his vision of social justice receded further into the 
horizon. The normally prolific poet composed a trilogy of paeans to pan-Arab nationalism in the 
summer of 1938 and two odes to the beauty of Lebanon, where he spent considerable time in 
exile. Otherwise, he composed just two elegies for his late wife and the late King Ghazi and one 
final attack on feudalism in 1939 before entering a two year period of silence.
194
 Only 
Muhammad Salih Bahr al-ʿUlum, who had gone back to work in a cigarette factory in Baghdad, 
was left to defend the revolutionary course, angry and recalcitrant as always. He composed the 
poem "Where Were You?" in response to the attack on the progressive bloc by the new 
parliament. The poem’s title refers to Jaʿfar Abu al-Timman's angry and defiant critique of the 
old guard one year prior: 
 
 Where were you when he delivered his statement to the people yesterday? 
 Indignantly the one who patronizes and betrays the idols cursed and yelled 
 If we could only stop him from howling at the people like a bitch in heat 





The populist effort to link feudalism and colonial exploitation as the dual impediments to 
national liberation was a victim of its own success. Anticipating the pitfalls of what Frantz Fanon 
called the "sterile formalism" of post-colonial nationalism,
196
 the Ahali Group and Popular 
Reform League imbued their brand of anti-colonial nationalism with a commitment to social 
justice and economic equality. Despite the abuse that the movement took from the Iraqi 
Communist Party for rejecting doctrinal class struggle and deferring the looming cultural 
conflicts over religion and gender to a later date, the populists avoided the proto-fascist trap of 
                                                          
191
 Al-Hasani, Tarikh al-Wizarat al-ʿIraqiyah, 5:20. 
192
 Khadduri, Independent Iraq, 128. 
193
 Iraq: Annual Report for 1938, FO 371/23214 E 932/932/93. 
194
 Jawahiri, Diwan, 2:305-338 and Dhikrayati 1:341-51. 
195
 Bahr al-ʿUlum, Diwan, 1:140. 
196
 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York, Grove Press, 1963), 204. 
83 
 
populism outlined by Slavoj Žižek.
197
 The populist attacks on feudalists and landowners neither 
displaced social antagonism nor externalized the enemy. In fact, the failure of the populists to 
consistently and thoroughly explicate the fundamental relationship between internal and external 
enemies – feudalism and colonialism – left the movement open to attack from the right. For 
Iraqis, the lingering legacy of colonialism and the pervasive influence of Britain on the politics 
and policies of the post-mandatory state were real and visible threats, and if the conservative 
nationalist could only succeed in stymieing the populist attack on feudalism, the "immanent 
social antagonism" could indeed be displaced on the external enemy. 
The populist platform offered too subtle an association between colonialism and 
feudalism and thus failed to convince many of its critics of the connection. There are several 
possible explanations for this failure. The most obvious is that Hikmat Sulayman and Bakr Sidqi 
prevented the populists from openly denouncing Britain and accusing their conservative 
opponents of benefitting from the imperial alliance because they feared British reprisals. Another 
is that the populists gambled that by harnessing the charismatic leadership of Jaʿfar Abu al-
Timman, a nationalist icon with impeccable anti-colonial credentials, they could convince the 
Iraqi people of their intentions without making their anti-colonial background explicit. This 
strategy, unfortunately, depended on the power of democratic institutions to circulate ideas and 
harness popular sentiment, and the interference of Hikmat and Bakr in the populist agenda for 
electoral reform and political agitation left the populists silenced and isolated. Finally, the failure 
of the progressive coalition to challenge public conceptions of the new regime as an obstacle to 
pan-Arab unity deprived the populists of the opportunity to exploit popular grievances over the 
crises in Syria and Palestine. 
The conflation of feudalism and colonialism as dual impediments to national liberation 
was accomplished much more effectively by the leftist poets who supported the populist 
revolution. Neither Jawahiri nor Bahr al-ʿUlum were formally affiliated with the intellectual 
circles of the Ahali Group before or during the revolutionary year, but their support for the 
group's populist agenda was clear, even when they pushed for more radical interpretations. The 
poetics of resistance in the work of Jawahiri and especially Bahr al-ʿUlum galvanized the Iraqi 
public to such an extent that it could not possibly be satisfied by the tepid reforms endorsed by 
Hikmat and Bakr.  Their verses, as Jabra Ibrahim Jabra has argued "gave point to a whole 
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nation’s suffering and wrath,"
198
 and aside from isolated reactionaries like Muhammad Bahjat al-
ʿAthari, even their critics sympathized with their rallying cries. Sympathetic opponents like ʿAli 
al-Sharqi and Maʿruf al-Rusafi did not reject the populist revolution because of an inherent 
ideological conflict with the supporters of the new regime, but rather because they distrusted its 
leadership and felt that the young rebels had made too hasty a decision in hitching their star to 
professional politicians and soldiers.
 199
 The radicals vowed to avoid the same mistake and 
instead began to look directly to the people, especially students, workers, and peasants, to 
continue the struggle toward national liberation.  
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‘WHEN DID NAZISM ENTER THIS SHOP?’ 
CONTESTING FASCISM IN IRAQ, 1939-1945 
 
Reflecting on the anti-fascist debates of the Egyptian press in the 1930s, Israel Gershoni 
has argued that “the acid test of every liberal intellectual in this decade was whether he raised a 
clear cry against fascist totalitarianism and Nazi racism.”
1
 While historians have generally 
heeded the spirit of this dictum and adopted a critical stance toward those anti-colonial 
movements and leaders who remained sympathetic or ambivalent to the fascist menace in 
Europe, most nuanced analyses have refrained from the summary conflation of anti-colonialism 
and fascism where moral and material collaboration between Nazis and colonized peoples did 
occur. In Africa, for example, the stubborn calls for neutrality in the face of the “imperialist war” 
by anti-colonial leaders like Jomo Kenyatta, George Padmore, Emile Faure, and Wallace 
Johnson have been criticized as excessive and provocative but still fundamentally illustrative of 
realpolitik principles rather than ideological affinities.
2
 Even in India, where the alliance of 
Subhas Chandra Bose and the Indian National Army with the Axis powers went far beyond that 
of Rashid ʿAli, the dalliance with fascism has been criticized as unfortunate and mistaken but 
rarely as evidence of moral failure.
3
 Sugata Bose, for example, has written both critically and 
defensively of the alliance: “A pact with the devil: such was the terrible price of freedom.”
4
  
These critical reservations have been less apparent in the historical analysis of fascism in 
the Arab world. The dominant narrative in the historiography of Arab nationalism in Iraq traces 
the nationalist movement that culminated in the Anglo-Iraqi War and the subsequent anti-Jewish 
farhud of 1941 backwards to its roots in German romantic nationalism. Numerous historians 
have emphasized the ideological influence of German nationalists like Arndt, Fichte, Herder, and 
von Schönerer on the thought of the Arab nationalist ideologue Satiʿ al-Husri. As Director-
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General of Education in Iraq, Husri oversaw the institutionalization of a romantic nationalist 
narrative that looked to the national unification of Italy and Germany as an historical template 
for Arab unity.
5
 Other scholars have argued that the pervasive Germanophilia of this ideological 
framework developed by Husri enveloped the educational system, the military officer corps, and 
the cultural associations that dominated Iraqi civil society in the 1930s to such an extent that the 
Nazi propaganda campaign spearheaded by Fritz Grobba, the German Ambassador in Iraq, 
lubricated the descent into fascism and political violence.
6
 In this narrative, war and violence 
appear as the inevitable result of a pan-Arabist ideological agenda that glorified fascism and 
trafficked in the anti-Semitism of the Nazis.  
As Basheer M. Nafi and Peter Wien have noted, this historical narrative of ideological 
affinity between Germany and the Arabs has lent legitimacy to academic and non-academic 
efforts to denigrate Arab nationalism as a co-conspirator with fascism in World War II.
7
 The 
flight of Rashid ʿAli and Hajj Amin al-Husayni to Nazi Germany and the eruption of violence 
against the Jewish community of Baghdad have been emphasized as indisputable evidence of 
Arab complicity in the crimes of the Holocaust and deployed as justification for partisan policy 
prescriptions.
8
 Several recent historical studies of popular reactions to fascism and  Nazism in 
the Arab world have helped to complicate this narrative by analyzing the conditional nature of 
the Arab reception of fascism and demonstrating the existence of an anti-fascist and pro-
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democratic bloc of activists and intellectuals in Arab civil society.
9
 Arab support for the Axis 
powers, according to these revisionist accounts, is better explained by realpolitik commitments 
to anti-imperialism than by the dubious parallels of racialism and authoritarianism inherent in 
both fascism and the Arab-Islamic historical tradition. The ideological support that did exist for 
fascism and Nazism in the Arab world can moreover be readily contrasted with the vocal anti-
fascism of many Arab intellectuals. 
This revisionist assessment of authoritarianism and fascism in the Arab world has been 
buttressed and extended by the work of Peter Wien and Orit Bashkin on the intellectual history 
of Iraq. Wien has challenged the facile reduction of Iraqi nationalist politics in this period to 
fascism, emphasizing the rejection of imperialism and the absence of racialism in the slogans, 
platforms, and writings of Iraqi nationalist intellectuals and politicians. While Wien 
acknowledges the overt support for fascism and Nazi Germany by a handful of Iraqis – most 
notably Yunis al-Sabʿawi, the translator of Mein Kampf, and Yunis Bahri, the Arab voice of 
Radio Berlin – he argues that most of the nationalist ideologues and activists designated as pro-
Nazi fascists in colonial archival documents and the historiographical tradition derived from 
them in fact embraced a vision of political authoritarianism that looked more towards the 
example of Mustafa Kemal and Reza Pahlavi than to Mussolini or Hitler and embraced “fascist 
imagery” rather than “fascist ideology.”
10
 Bashkin has shown that local support for fascism was 
not as monolithic or uncontested as has been previously implied and that numerous artists and 
intellectuals vocally opposed fascism and its local proponents. Bashkin demonstrates that leftist 
intellectuals and activists like Dhu Nun Ayyub, Kamil al-Chadirchi, ʿAbd al-Fattah Ibrahim, and 
Yusuf Salman Yusuf, Jewish journalists like Ezra Haddad and Anwar Sha’ul, clerics like Hibat 
al-Din al-Shahrastani, and Egyptian teachers working in Baghdad like Ahmad Hassan al-Zayyat, 
ʿAbd al-Razzaq al-Sanhuri, and ʿAbd al-Munʿam Khallaf all wrote vocally and publicly against 
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fascism, authoritarianism, and militarism before the Rashid ʿAli coup d’état and the Anglo-Iraqi 
War of May 1941.
11
  
Most recent studies of political conflict in post-colonial Iraq have emphasized the 
ideological chasm between the supporters of pan-Arab nationalism and Iraqist nationalism, with 
the Rashid ʿAli movement functioning as the prime symbol of the former.
 12
 This historical 
analysis, however, ignores the constant flux of political orientations and alliances in the interwar 
years and in doing so obscures the anti-colonial sentiments undergirding popular support for the 
Rashid ʿAli movement. Political divisions of this period might be more fruitfully analyzed across 
three distinct axes: pan-Arabist/Iraqist, Left/Right, and anti-colonial/pro-British. The Leftist-
Iraqist alliance that took control of government in the wake of Bakr Sidqi’s coup d’état soon 
gave way as the progressives were marginalized and replaced by conservatives and pan-Arabists. 
The brief rapprochement between the pan-Arabists and Iraqists was forgotten after Bakr Sidqi’s 
assassination, as conservatives and pan-Arabists rekindled their longstanding alliance in power. 
The upheavals of the European war, however, soon fractured this alliance, as radical anti-
colonial nationalists were unable to countenance the accommodationist policies of the pro-
British conservatives. When Rashid ʿAli returned to power on April 1, 1941, he did so with the 
backing of radical anti-colonialists of both the Left and the Right, including both pan-Arabist and 
Iraqist nationalists. Any serious attempt to understand the motivations of the movement’s 
supporters must therefore look beyond the writings of pan-Arabists and consider the stance of the 
anti-colonial Left. 
While the revisionist accounts of Wien and Bashkin have offered much-needed 
complexity to the superficial reduction of pan-Arab nationalism to fascism, the historical picture 
remains incomplete. Taken together, the two arguments show that many Iraqis opposed fascism 
and Nazism and that even those who remained ambivalent or sympathetic to those ideologies 
tended to reject their most deplorable features, racialism and imperialism. The methodological 
turn of Wien and Bashkin away from colonial archives and toward newspapers and memoirs, 
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however, has created new blind spots even as it opens additional avenues for exploration.
13
 The 
new emphasis on experience and ideology has tended to reify the artificial divisions between the 
Left and Right and the pan-Arabist and Iraqist nationalists in the struggle against colonialism. In 
clarifying the foundations of local anti-fascist and pro-fascist ideologies, Bashkin and Wien have 
tended to obscure the historical events and developments that drove individuals and groups 
towards particular political positions. Sympathy and antipathy toward Germany and the Axis war 
effort were in many cases much less conditional on ideology than on historical and political 
developments. 
This chapter reframes the historical debate on the relationship between nationalism, anti-
colonialism, and fascism in Iraq by focusing on public reactions to local and international 
developments. This historical project is built upon three different methodological interventions: 
the “return” to archival sources, the use of poetry as an historical source, and the expansion of 
chronological focus. The consideration of archival evidence in conjunction with 
contemporaneous newspaper articles and retrospective memoirs offers essential historical 
context for abrupt shifts in political orientation. The use of poetry as an historical source helps to 
capture emotional responses to historical events in a manner precluded by the formulaic structure 
of newspaper articles and the chronological distance of memoirs from the event and 
demonstrates the complexities of the relationship between anti-colonialism and fascism in this 
period. The expansion of chronological scope serves to distance historical analysis from the 
teleological framework depicting a rising tide of fascism and culminating in the slaughter of Iraqi 
Jews. A detailed analysis of the aftermath of the climactic events of 1941 in the often forgotten 
years of the re-occupation broadens historical understanding by depicting not only the 
development of pro-fascist or pro-Nazi sentiment in Iraq but also its unraveling. The 
retrenchment of popular opinion in support of the Soviet Union during these years underscores 
the centrality of anti-colonialism as the dominant factor shaping attitudes and emotions, and the 
rising influence of the Iraqi Communist Party heralds the dawn of mass politics in Iraq. 
Conspiracy & Recrimination: The Death of Ghazi 
King Ghazi, the young monarch of Iraq, was killed instantly in the early morning hours 
of April 4, 1939, when his car collided with an electric pole on the grounds of the Zuhur Palace. 
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Despite the fact that Ghazi’s love for liquor and fast cars was well-known to the general public, 
whispers and rumors of a conspiracy orchestrated by Prime Minister Nuri al-Saʿid in collusion 
with British agents quickly spread throughout the capital, with some individuals alleging that 
ʿAbd al-Ilah, the uncle of the late king, had avenged his nephew’s death by killing Nuri. An 
outpouring of public sympathy for the departed monarch erupted immediately and 
spontaneously, along with an explosion of popular anger directed against Nuri and Britain. An 
incredulous British Ambassador described the emotional gravity of the funeral procession, noting 
that women “abandoned themselves to hysterical grief, rending their garments and covering their 
heads and breasts with mud from the gutters” while policemen and soldiers were observed 
“sobbing like children.” Crowds of mourners chanted in the streets of Baghdad, “You shall 
answer for the blood of Ghazi, O Nuri!”
14
 
Whispers of a foreign conspiracy were stoked by secondary students in Baghdad, who 
distributed fliers accusing Britain of conspiring with not only Nuri, but also the nationalist leader 
Rashid ʿAli al-Kaylani, to engineer Ghazi’s death. In Mosul, crowds of mourners stormed the 
British Consulate and murdered the British Consul, Mr. Monck-Mason, with a pick-axe blow to 
the head. The Iraqi government quickly declared martial law and dozens of individuals were 
arrested. In Mosul, those arrested were ordered to provide substantial sums of cash as collateral 
for good behavior in the hopes that the cash sureties could be traced back to foreign agents or 
nationalist agitators and establish a deeper dimension to the crime.
15
 Two youths were sentenced 
to death by court-martial, though the sentences were quickly commuted to lengthy prison terms 
because the two were underage and ineligible for the death penalty. A number of other 
defendants were sentenced to varying terms of imprisonment, none exceeding fifteen years and 
some including hard labor. British officials complained that no one would be put to death and 
bemoaned the absence of capitulations in the country.
16
  
Once the national furor was temporarily pacified and order was restored, nationalist 
intellectuals and activists set out to ensure that Ghazi’s death would not be in vain, but rather 
would stand as a rallying cry for the nationalist causes to which the late king had devoted his 
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energies. Ghazi had initially been viewed with suspicion and distrust by pan-Arab nationalists 
due to his complicity in the Bakr Sidqi coup d’état of 1936, but he gradually emerged as a 
genuinely popular political figure with both the pan-Arabists and the Iraqi public due to his vocal 
support for the Palestinian and Syrian struggles for independence and his public calls for the 
annexation of Kuwait. British officials grew increasingly vexed with Ghazi’s efforts to mobilize 
public support behind these nationalist causes through his impassioned broadcasts over his 
private radio transmitter at the royal palace, particularly after he reportedly ordered military 
advisers to prepare for an immediate invasion of Kuwait one drunken night shortly before his 
death.
17
 At Ghazi’s funeral, delegates from across the Arab world paid tribute to Ghazi’s legacy 
and urged a redoubling of efforts to achieve Arab unity. The Palestinian nationalist Akram 
Zuʿaytar, among others, urged the Arabs to seize the opportunity presented by European crisis to 
press their demands for the liberation of Palestine.
18
 
Despite the absence of unequivocal evidence implicating Nuri and Britain in Ghazi’s 
death, the profusion of conspiracy theories surrounding the event fueled anti-British sentiment 
and reinforced popular perceptions of neo-colonial perfidy that fueled the Rashid ʿAli 
movement.
19
 These conspiracy theories were sustained by a series of irregularities and 
contradictions surrounding the circumstances of the accident and its explanation. The scene of 
the accident left numerous observers, including some otherwise favorably disposed toward Nuri 
and Britain, skeptical of the official explanation. According to various eyewitness accounts, the 
soil around the fallen electric pole was left relatively intact, the path bore no evidence of skid 
marks, and the car was virtually unscathed except for the collapsed windshield. An African 
servant who was a passenger in the car and broke his hand during the crash vanished 
immediately afterwards and Nuri refused all attempts to conduct an official investigation. 
Ghazi’s wife ʿAliyah, the sister of ʿAbd al-Ilah testified that Ghazi told her of his wish to have 
his powers transferred to her brother, with whom Ghazi was known to be at odds, in the event of 
                                                          
17
 Mahmud al-Durrah, al-Harb al-ʿIraqiyah al-Britaniyah (Cairo: Dar al-Maʿrifa, 1982), 84. 
18
 Al-Bilad, May 17, 1939 and Houstoun Boswell to Foreign Office, May 18, 1939, FO 371/23201 E 3782/72/93. 
19
 The allegation that Ghazi was assassinated by Nuri in collaboration with Britain remains uncontroversial in Iraqi 
historiography today. See for example Ahmad Fawzi, Ashhar al-Ightiyalat al-Siyasiyah  fi al-Ahd al-Malaki 
(Baghdad: Matbaʿat al-Diwani, 1987), 131-73, Raja Husayn Husni al-Khattab, al-Masʾuliyah al-Tarikhiyah fi Maqtal 
al-Malik Ghazi (Baghdad: Maktabat Afaq ʿArabiyah, 1985), ʿAbd al-Rahman al-Jalili, al-Malik Ghazi wa Qatiluhu: 
Britaniyah, ʿAbd al-Ilah, Nuri al-Saʿid (London: Dar al-Hikmah, 1993), and ʿAbd al-Rahman al-Munif, al-ʿIraq: 
Hawamish min al-Tarikh wa al-Muqawamah (al-Dar al-Baydah: al-Markaz al-ʿArabiyah al-Thaqafi, 2003), 101-14. 
92 
 
his death, and his uncle Zayd was overheard after the crash muttering cryptically, “Ghazi was 
stubborn and took advice from no one.”
20
  
These suspicious details would take on deeper meaning as public personalities recounted 
ominous warnings about Ghazi’s activities and their consequences from both Nuri and various 
British officials. Colonel Salah al-Din al-Sabbagh recalled Nuri’s eldest son Sabah broaching the 
idea of assassinating Ghazi in retaliation for his complicity in Bakr Sidqi's coup d’état. Tawfiq 
al-Suwaydi, a pro-British politician, recounted Rab Butler, the British Under-Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affairs, fulminating against Ghazi’s agitation for the annexation of Kuwait and 
warning that “the king does not know that he is playing with fire, and I fear that he will burn his 
fingers one day!” While Tawfiq, unlike Salah al-Din, never explicitly endorsed the conspiracy 
theories, he admitted that the disappearance of the servant provoked considerable skepticism and 
admonished Nuri for refusing to convene an official investigation to lay bare the facts of the 
case, arguing that this failure encouraged further military interventions in politics.
21
 For their 
part, British officials were highly sensitive to the whispers of conspiracy and alerted all embassy 
staff members to avoid any actions or statements that might lend credence to these rumors. They 
understood that Nuri’s decision to suppress rather than to address specific rumors and allegations 
would undoubtedly lead to the entrenchment of conspiracy theories and urged Nuri to publicly 
deny British involvement in the affair. British officials had privately encouraged Nuri’s efforts to 
marginalize Ghazi, but British officials had always opposed any attempt to dethrone Ghazi, 
partly because such an action would “split this country in a way which would be inconvenient 
and dangerous” and “provide a rallying-ground” for those opposed to Nuri.
22 
 
Mystified by the explosion of public anger in the aftermath of the accident, many British 
officials grew convinced that Nazi secret agents had been responsible for circulating rumors and 
inciting crowds to violence. This counter conspiracy theory, though, was perhaps even less 
convincing than the whispers of British involvement and no evidence of foreign involvement in 
exciting the crowds was ever uncovered. The crowds that gathered to protest at the British 
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Embassy in Baghdad and at the Consulate in Mosul formed spontaneously and immediately 
following the announcement of Ghazi’s death, leaving scarcely any time for hypothetical foreign 
agents to organize a whisper campaign. The popular reception of conspiracy theories is better 
explained by the historical events preceding the accident, most notably Nuri’s “discovery” of a 
secret plot to assassinate Ghazi just one month prior. Nuri exploited the opportunity to purge the 
army of dissident officers and to settle personal scores with old rivals like Hikmat Sulayman, 
whom he held responsible for the murder of his brother-in-law Jaʿfar al-ʿAskari during the Bakr 
Sidqi coup d’état. Eight individuals were found guilty of participation in the plot and seven were 
sentenced to death, including Hikmat, who was spared only by British intervention.
23
 The long 
history of British collusion with Nuri in subverting nationalist efforts to undermine the Anglo-
Iraqi alliance led many Iraqis to conflate the political interests of the two parties. Tensions over 
British policy in Palestine and French policy in Syria further fueled popular suspicions that 
Britain intended to consolidate neo-colonial power in Iraq and the entire affair appeared to many 
as “nothing more than one of the steps taken by Britain to prepare for war.”
24
 
Anti-Colonialism and Fascism at the Ministry of Education 
 The rising tide of anti-British sentiment that helped to fuel conspiracy theories of British 
involvement in Ghazi’s death and to underscore the conflict at the heart of the Anglo-Iraqi 
alliance between pan-Arab nationalist goals and colonial ambitions in Syria and Palestine was 
crucially shaped by the ideological agenda of the Ministry of Education. Under the guidance of 
Satiʿ al-Husri, who served as Director-General of Education from 1921 until 1927 and occupied 
other key posts until 1937, the carefully constructed historical narrative of Anglo-Iraqi friendship 
and collaboration assiduously cultivated by the British Embassy was undermined in favor of a 
counter-narrative emphasizing colonial tyranny and treachery. This trend was further cemented 
by the continued influx of secondary school teachers from Syria and Palestine who naturally 
emphasized British perfidy in the ongoing colonization of their home countries.
25
 By the end of 
the 1930s, the open conflict between the anti-colonialism of leading educators and civic leaders 
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and the collaborationist agenda of the political establishment precipitated an erosion of trust 
between the British Embassy and the Iraqi government. 
The British Embassy, which tended to ignore the cultural dimensions of anti-colonial 
politics earlier in the decade, soon found the problem impossible to overlook. C.J. Edmonds, the 
advisor to the Ministry of Interior, warned that Britain risked losing influence in the country due 
to younger generations’ “complete and profound ignorance of the real history of Iraq.” His 
description of the imperial alliance as “the haqiqa of the Iraqi tariqa” constructed colonialism as 
a secular religion, and his advocacy for a governmental apparatus along the lines of the U.S. 
House Committee on Un-American Activities that would identify and repress anti-colonial 
activity as “un-Iraqi activities” underscored the maintenance of colonial relations. Kinahan 
Cornwallis supported Edmonds’ assessment, arguing that British neglect of the educational 
system meant that only the “older men of standing” were cognizant of the benefits of the 
imperial alliance.
26
  Basil Newton, the British Ambassador in Baghdad, complained to ʿAli 
Jawdat, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, that the Iraqi educational establishment was failing to 
impress upon the youth “the fundamental importance of friendship and co-operation with Great 
Britain” and that the history of Anglo-Iraqi relations was being “deliberately distorted.” Iraqi 
students were taught that independence was achieved by “a triumphant struggle against British 
oppression” and that “only British imperialism stood in the way of the rapid progress and 
development of the new Iraqi State.” Stunned at the ingratitude of Iraqis for the British role in 
liberating and civilizing their country, Newton bitterly complained that “not even the merest lip-
service” was paid to British sacrifices and that “the generosity and, in fact, indulgence” displayed 
by Britain towards Iraq “have secured little recognition amongst the present generation, and none 




The British perception that anti-colonial sentiment was much stronger among the younger 
generation reinforced their suspicions about the pernicious influence on the youth of Syrian and 
Palestinian teachers. This impression was strengthened by comparisons between urban youth and 
rural youth, with the latter evincing few signs of the generational upheaval in the cities.  One 
British official noted that the older generation maintained a monopoly of power in the 
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countryside and therefore very few tribal youths were subject to the negative influence of 
modern education.
28
 In the cities, by contrast, the establishment of the Futuwa, a paramilitary 
youth movement that emphasized chivalry, discipline and sacrifice, challenged the ideological 
hegemony of the older generation. While Basil Newton welcomed the program because of its 
disciplinary objectives, other British officials warned that Sami Shawkat, then Director-General 
of Education, was fostering pan-Arabism with “Nazi methods” and warned against “the 
dangerous absurdity of encouraging school-boys to believe that their military training has a 
political object just at the time when responsible Iraqi statesmen are doing their utmost to keep 
the army out of politics.”
29
 
While the militarism of the youth movement and the concerted efforts of German 
officials to cultivate relations between the Futuwa and the Hitler Youth have prompted repeated 
historical comparisons with the fascist youth movements in Europe, civic leaders and educators 
in Iraq were much more liable to look to Mustapha Kemal’s Turkey and Reza Pahlavi’s Iran than 
to Mussolini’s Italy and Hitler’s Germany as models of authoritarian rule and militant 
nationalism. Many assessments of fascist “trappings” in Iraq were predicated on superficial 
interpretations of visual imagery that imputed fascist motives to even notoriously pro-British 
leaders like Salih Jabr.
30
 Military leaders like Salah al-Din al-Sabbagh, who was highly 
supportive of the Futuwa movement, looked to Turkey and Iran as Eastern models of an anti-
colonial modernity that could be crafted by an authoritarian nationalist movement. After visiting 
the two countries, Salah al-Din pointedly asked, “Where is this complete and enduring 
independence enjoyed by Turkey and Iran to be found in the limited and false independence of 
Iraq? Iraq crawls while they run, because they are free to choose their course without guidance 
and free to arm themselves as they please.”
31
  
This enthusiasm for alternative models of national modernity rooted in the politics of 
anti-colonialism was shared by the educational establishment. Yasin al-Hashimi was adored by 
the teachers, who contended that he would make himself into a “benevolent dictator” like 
Mustafa Kemal, while Nuri al-Saʿid and the late Jaʿfar al-ʿAskari were openly denounced in 
class as traitors in the pay of the British Intelligence Service who forced Iraq into an unequal and 
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unjust treaty. Students were encouraged by their teachers to compose letters to Yasin and to 
everyone’s surprise even received lengthy replies in return. By contrast, Britain was portrayed as 
a band of treacherous liars who resorted to bribery as the chief instrument of a divide-and-rule 
strategy, and students were encouraged to deliver anti-British speeches in front of the class 
commemorating the Arab Revolt, which was depicted not as anti-Ottoman but anti-British.
 32
   
Zionism, Colonialism, and Violence 
Mussolini’s evident colonial agenda undermined any potential support for Italian fascism 
as a political model, and what sympathy did exist for Nazism was rooted in the politics of anti-
Zionism. Popular campaigns against Zionism in Iraq emerged as early as 1928, when teachers 
and students led popular demonstrations against the visit of Alfred Mond to Baghdad, though 
this early event seems to have been guided by the mistaken impression that Mond sought to 
establish a Zionist colony in Iraq and marred by the inability of the demonstrators to pronounced 
the word “Zionism” in Arabic.
33
 The rapid development of a modern curriculum rooted in an 
Arab nationalist vision of history dramatically increased public awareness of the issue, and the 
eruption of a popular rebellion in Palestine in 1936 spurred both demonstrations of national 
sympathy and violent acts of reprisal inside of Iraq. While anti-colonial politics had previously 
been rooted in an opposition to the lingering British presence in Iraq, the new politics of pan-
Arabism placed greater emphasis on the ongoing colonization of Syria and Palestine. 
While earlier denunciations of Zionism largely steered clear of classical anti-Semitic 
tropes and refrained from demonizing the Iraqi Jewish population, the situation worsened 
considerably after the outbreak of the rebellion in Palestine and the publication of Zionist 
atrocities against Arab civilians.  Several newspapers were rumored to have accepted financial 
subsidies from Fritz Grobba, the Nazi envoy in Baghdad, and began to reproduce the anti-
Semitic propaganda of the Nazi regime. Yunis al-Sabʿawi published an Arabic translation of 
Hitler’s Mein Kampf in al-ʿAlam al-ʿArabi, the daily newspaper with the closest ties to Grobba. 
Prominent clerics like Nuʿman al-Aʿdhamy and Kamal al-Ta’i also appear to have accepted Nazi 
subsidies, and Ta’i relied heavily on anti-Semitic propaganda to market his weekly paper al-
                                                          
32
 "Nazi Propaganda in Iraq," enclosed in secret dispatch from C.J. Edmonds to Kinahan Cornwallis, July 26, 1941, 
"Germany: Propaganda," FO 624/24 
33
 "Nazi Propaganda in Iraq," enclosed in secret dispatch from C.J. Edmonds to Kinahan Cornwallis, July 26, 1941, 
"Germany: Propaganda," FO 624/24 and Michael Eppel, The Palestine Conflict in the History of Modern Iraq: The 





 Even the more prominent nationalist newspaper, like al-Bilad and al-
Istiqlal, adopted increasingly uncritical attitudes towards Nazi policies.
35
 
Although most Iraqi Jews remained either indifferent or hostile to Zionism, several 
individuals were deported for disseminating Zionist propaganda and encouraging Jewish 
emigration to Palestine.
36
 When Irgun terrorist attacks killed dozens of Palestinian civilians in 
Jaffa in July and August of 1938, Iraqi groups retaliated by hurling bombs at Jewish targets in 
Baghdad in August and October, killing one (Muslim) and injuring several more.
37
 The 
perpetrators were never identified, but the Iraqi government seized the occasion to arrest anyone 
with three or more criminal convictions and demanded large securities for good behavior. Over 
sixty individuals were imprisoned because they were unable to raise the required cash. Provincial 
governors were so impressed that they began asking whether their own “bad men” could be dealt 
with in a similar manner. While the British Ambassador welcomed the procedure as “well-timed 
and well-directed,” the government’s actions further inflamed anti-British sentiment in Iraq.
38
 In 
November 1938, a student demonstration in support of Palestine descended into chaos when 
local workers and inhabitants joined the protesting students and began attacking British and 
Jewish owned stores on Rashid Street. Only five individuals were arrested, and several of them 
were Jewish youths accused of breaching the Public Security Law by spreading panic in warning 
shopkeepers to close their shops. Official censorship of news reports and religious sermons and a 
prohibition on popular demonstrations could not contain popular anger, and one Iraqi politician 
warned the British Embassy that he feared demands for the expulsion of Iraqi Jews would 
emerge if Zionist aggression continued.
39
  
 Dismayed by the deterioration of relations with the Arabs, Britain sought to stem the 
bleeding by offering serious concessions on Palestine. The British government released the 
White Paper in May 1939, but the concessions met a cool reception in Iraq due to widespread 
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skepticism that its provisions would be put into effect.
40
 While Nuri al-Saʿid and other pro-
British politicians were privately delighted by the scope of concessions, public pressure from 
pan-Arabist newspapers and organizations forced the government to publicly reject the 
proposals. Hajj Amin al-Husayni, the Mufti of Jerusalem who took up residence in Baghdad in 
October 1939, would later direct his representatives to seek a firmer commitment from Britain on 
implementing the recommendations after entertaining offers from Germany and Italy, but the 
request came too late and the British Ambassador refused to address it until after the war.
41
 
 While British policy in Palestine received the brunt of anti-colonial anger due to close 
official ties between Britain and Iraq, French colonial policy in Syria was equally troubling to 
Iraqi nationalists. Iraqi journalists proved adept at appropriating the liberal language deployed by 
Britain against Nazi Germany to point out the hypocrisy of colonial policy in Palestine and Syria, 
as was evident in the critique of a French military tribunal’s announcement of death sentences 
for seven Syrian nationalists in April 1940.  Al-Bilad pointed to the uneven distribution of power 
in the imperial alliance, complaining that Iraq was simultaneously expected to assist the French 
war effort and to tolerate the oppression of their Arab brethren “for no fault other than struggling 
to secure their freedom and defend their existence.”  The paper expressed hope that the Allies 
would “straighten this crooked policy and grant to the Arabs their legitimate rights in their 
various countries.”
42
 Al-Istiqlal likewise pointed to the hypocrisy of colonialism, declaring that 
“the Allies are persisting in their acts of violence and persecution” and concluding that Iraq must 
not be blamed for adopting “at attitude of hesitation and suspicion, attaching no value to honeyed 
words and the policy of sweet promises.”
 43
 Al-Raʿi al-ʿAmm denounced the anti-liberal nature of 
the trial, pointing out that the accused were only permitted to appoint lawyers cleared by the 
prosecution and could not provide full and detailed answers in defense to the charges levied 
against them.
44
   
 Anti-colonial attacks directed against Britain were not limited to the rhetorical realm, but 
instead motivated a wave of violence against British nationals in Iraq even before outbreak of 
World War II. A series of attacks on R.A.F. personnel underscores the deterioration of relations 
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between Britain and Iraq at the local level long before the emergence of the Rashid ʿAli 
movement. Petty Officer George William Jones was stabbed to death and left in a ditch near 
Habbaniyah by three local tribesmen on December 12, 1937, and local relations suffered from 
the fact that British military police arrested and detained, beat and tortured several local 
fisherman, shepherds, and workers for lengthy periods of time before releasing them on account 
of a lack of evidence and honing in on the real culprits.
45
 Two officers were detained on May 7, 
1939 after photographing rural life in the countryside by local citizens who were particularly 
sensitive to the foreign publication of fact photographs illustrating the “backwardness” of their 
country. The officers were so enraged by their subsequent interrogation that they assaulted 
several local police officers, which provoked a brawl with Iraqi soldiers.
 46
 Several months later, 
three airmen brawled with local police outside of the Piccadilly Hotel, an upscale cabaret 
frequented by British airmen, and the next night a fourth airman was whipped by a crowd of 
locals outside of the hotel. Local officials and newspapers condemned the behavior of the 
military personnel, which caused Britain to demand that local police and officials “adopt a more 
friendly attitude toward members of the Royal Air Force, to practice greater restraint, and above 
all to regard the British forces as guests in Iraq who were to be treated as such.”
47
  
Violent tensions were not limited to relations between military personnel and the local 
population, but rather extended to the expatriate business community. On June 23, 1939 A.D. 
Timpson, a British engineer employed in Basra struck ʿAbbas Khalil, a disgruntled employee, 
and was subsequently “subjected to a brutal and humiliating treatment” at the local police station 
during which ʿAbbas and the soldiers beat Timpson with their belts while a local crowd threw 
stones and beat him with sticks.  The supervising Iraqi officer observed the beating and remarked 
simply, “These Englishmen do not know how to behave.”  Timpson was later tried by a local 
court, convicted, and fined a paltry sum.  Nuri assured the British Ambassador that the soldiers 
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intervened not as representatives of the Iraqi Army but instead as personal friends of ʿAbbas 
Khalil.  
Iraqi Views on World War II 
While British officials tended to attribute the rising tensions and the eruption of violence 
as manifestations of pro-Nazi trends in Iraqi public opinion, the truth was more complex. The 
fiercely anti-colonial poet Muhammad Salih Bahr al-ʿUlum denounced Hitler in an eponymous 
poem as early as 1934: 
 
 Belligerent monster, drenched in sin 
  Hitler revels in his disdain for the people 
 He alleges things whose lies we see 
  Ugliness in the face of the deceitful leader 
 If Satan proceeds in his seductions 
  And war erupts there shall be no return 
 Do not entrust peace to him in retreat 




In the wake of the Second Italo-Ethiopian War in 1936, Bahr al-ʿUlum denounced the 
appeasement of fascist colonialism in his poem “The Italian Assault on Ethiopia,” praising the 
principled stand of the Soviet Ambassador Maxim Litvinov and ridiculing British and French 
hypocrisy: 
 
 I saw the Fascism of Italy, the Fascism of Tyranny, propped up by the League of Nations 
 Litvinov told the truth and was denounced 
  By the heads of governments without conscience 
 They cry with hypocrisy over the fate of the Ethiopians 
  While going to court and woo the ravenous conquering victor 
 There is no good in the League whose nature ignites 




While his repeated attacks on colonial policy in Syria and Palestine and the appeasement of 
fascist aggression in Ethiopia and Libya underscore his lack of faith in the European anti-fascist 
coalition, Bahr al-ʿUlum nevertheless articulated his yearning for the destruction of Nazism after 
the war finally erupted:  
 
 War erupted and her poison terrified the earth 
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  Stars fell down eclipsing and concealing her martyrs  
 Both the living and the dead burned in her flame 




The fundamental difficulty of the Arab stance, as the poetry of Bahr al-ʿUlum illustrates, 
lay in the apparent colonial ambitions of both sides in the war. While leftists like Bahr al-ʿUlum 
were repulsed by the domestic implications of fascism and radical nationalists were prone to 
admire its authoritarian model of political leadership, anti-colonial activists on both sides of the 
political divide condemned the colonial implications of both Axis and Allies. Neville 
Chamberlain’s infamous concession of Czechoslovakia in Munich lent support to popular 
perceptions that British anti-fascism was merely cover for self-interest, and nationalist 
newspapers contrasted the firm stand of Germany with the weak appeals of the Arab state en 
route to the conclusion that Britain respected only strength.
51
 The British Ambassador warned 
that if war broke out before the Palestine issue was resolved, Britain could expect at best half-




In the early years of the war, Nazi influence in Iraq was probably aided more by practical 
matters than ideological affinities. At least fourteen members of the German Legation were 
conversant in Arabic, a number significantly larger than their British counterparts. Even pro-
British politicians like ʿAli Jawdat al-Ayyubi were seduced by the German offer to provide 
genetically superior German rams to breed with Iraqi sheep.
53
 The inclination of the press to use 
the German Transocean wire service instead of Reuters was largely driven by the fact that 
Transocean was both cheaper and longer than Reuters, largely devoid of complicated 
abbreviations that plagued Reuters, focused on international news, and was “generally regarded 
as being more interesting and snappy.”
54
 In a similar vein, British intelligence officials 
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complained that Iraqis preferred the “bombastic and insulting type of radio propaganda” put out 
by the Nazis to the “‘straight’ news and moderate tones” of the B.B.C.”
55
  
In any case, the enthusiastic consumption of Nazi propaganda was not necessarily an 
indication of rising pro-Nazi sentiment. Some British intelligence reports indicated that Iraqis 
had a rather sophisticated understanding of Nazi propaganda and used Radio Berlin broadcasts as 
a benchmark for comparison with the pro-British propaganda of the Iraqi government.
56
 While 
little effort was made to bridge the propaganda gap over the radio, Britain did begin to import 
copies of al-Harb wa al-Siyasah, a periodical produced by the British administration in Palestine 
and punctuated with snappy cartoons emphasizing the colonial dimensions of fascism by 
depicting Hitler and Mussolini as monstrous caricatures brutalizing the populations of Libya, 
Ethiopia, and Albania.
57
 Aside from the cartoons, though, British propaganda was crude and 
unconvincing, relying on fictional dialogue to illustrate the folly of opposing Britain: “By God, 
had I realized that England would put up such resistance, I would have struck a bargain with her 
and entered the war on her side instead of Germany’s!” In case the point was lost amidst the 
successive Axis military victors, the editorialists warned against underestimating Britain’s 
capacity for vengeance: “English scientists, experts in chemistry and agriculture, have not left 
any wheat, barley or potato plantations in Europe undestroyed by phosphorus and cellulose leaf-
packets and plant-devouring insects dropped from the air over plantations in Europe.”
58
  
 Perhaps the greatest obstacle to British propaganda efforts in Iraq was the comparative 
weakness of British concessions on Syria and Palestine.  By 1939, some British officials believed 
that anti-British sentiment was too powerful to counter directly, though most argued for more 
comprehensive bribery campaigns in lieu of rebutting anti-colonial critiques.
59
 British 
propaganda increasingly focused on projecting power so as to “impress the Arab world with the 
strength and vast resources of the British and French Empires” with comparison to “Germany’s 
ill-founded claims to might.”
60
 Dozens of propaganda films were imported into Iraq in order to 
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visually convey to the local population that which could not be properly articulated over the 
airwaves and on the pages of newspapers. As one British official remarked, films would be used 
“for the purpose of bringing home to the Iraqis, more graphically than any written propaganda 
could do, the power of Britain and the civilizing ends to which that power is directed.”
61
   
Despite the dire predictions of many British officials, the eruption of war in Europe 
evinced no serious indication of pro-Nazi sentiment in Iraq.  The daily al-Nahar condemned the 
Nazi invasion of Poland as “greedy and rapacious conduct” and even the radical nationalist al-
Istiqlal qualified its anti-colonial declaration that Britain was “pretending to fight for the cause of 
civilization and the deliverance of small nations” by praising British resistance to Nazi 
aggression.
62
 Nazi propaganda efforts in the region were initially futile, as the eastern nations 
held in contempt by the fascist racialism were not easily deluded by Nazi entreaties. The only 
real inroads made by Nazis propaganda in Iraq came through anti-colonial attacks on Allied 
policy in Palestine and Syria, which led Iraqis to increasingly “look forward to the day when 
both Germany and the Allies will be so weakened in a long drawn-out struggle that foreign 
influence in the East must relax its grip.”
63
 The prescience of that assessment was apparent in 
Salah al-Din al-Sabbagh's later recollection that Iraqis hoped that “both sides emerge from the 
war on equal footing, so that Germany remains eternally capable of checking British ambition.”
64
 
Like Salah al-Din, many Iraqi intellectuals could scarcely contain their glee over the 
looming destruction of European colonialism. The renowned poet Maʿruf al-Rusafi described his 
astonishment with the rapid collapse of Europe in apocalyptic terms in the poem “The State of 
the World and Us”: 
 
I discern in the vicissitudes of time 
 A revolution sweeping every land 
It will appear close at hand when it is far 
 And will appear far away when it is close 
The consoler will cease to console 
 And the disparager will not disparage 
The right of the weak will be respected 
 While the oppressor suffers destruction 
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Pleiades will rise above in peace and security 
 From the aggression of Capella and Aldebaran  
The Milky Way will appear tender and affectionate 
 While the stars of Ursa Minor come together 
The Lord of the Heavens and of the Earth 
 Will be known to us by his justice and mercy 
For the colonizers will retreat in destruction 




Rusafi warns his fellow nationalists not to watch the unprecedented destruction passively but to 
exploit the circumstances in order to achieve their national liberation: 
 
 Band of Arabs, are you truly a nation if you 
  Do not consummate this revolution of the ages?... 
 Britain violated your treaty even before this 
  And scornfully stashed it away in the cupboard 
 
Virtually all newspapers drew a sharp moral equivalence between the colonial aims of 
both sides, a task made easier after one British paper suggested that the government make 
contingency plans to destroy Iraqi oil wells.
66
 The editor of al-Sijil complained that the major 
powers were “inspired by greed and by the desire to subjugate peoples and rob them of their 
wealth,” while the poet Muhammad Mahdi al-Jawahiri argued in al-Raʿi al-ʿAmm that both sides 
sought “either to defend colonies already forcibly acquired or to obtain colonial territories which 
have long been coveted.”
67
  Al-Istiqlal urged the government to “exploit all opportunities” by 
demanding a strict quid-pro-quo attitude toward the European conflict, offering support for the 
Allied cause only in exchange for concessions in Palestine and Syria. The paper argued that if 
Britain were truly fighting Germany in defense of liberty, “Britain should rather first deal with 
the Palestine question in the light of these sacred objects for which she has gone to war” and 
warned that the Arab attitude toward the Allied war effort would remain lukewarm and 
conflicted as long as the Palestine problem remained unaddressed.
68
 Even the staunchly pro-
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 Britain, however, was not prepared to accept neutrality from such a strategically integral 
client regime. At the insistence of the British Embassy, plainclothes police officers monitored 
cafes and arrested anyone criticizing Britain or expressing sympathy for the Axis cause. The 
British Ambassador reminded Prime Minister Nuri al-Saʿid that Iraq “owed its creation, 
independence, and its preservation to Great Britain” and warned that the example set by al-
Istiqlal “was incidentally a very poor argument for its own thesis that we should hasten to follow 
in Palestine the precedent of Iraq.” Nuri was instructed to warn ʿAbd al-Ghafur Badri, the 
paper’s editor, that he had transgressed “the limits of political decorum” and to moderate his tone 
or face the legal consequences.
70
 When the nationalist paper al-Sijil demanded a similar quid-
pro-quo, the Iraqi government acted quickly and suspended the paper’s license.
71
 British efforts 
to cultivate the support of prominent politicians through bribes and other inducements did pay 
limited dividends. The staunchly nationalist Al-Bilad was still considered to be “well-disposed to 
the Allied cause” in the fall of 1939.
72
 Sami Shawkat, the Director-General of Education who has 
been frequently described as one of the leading proponents of Nazism in Iraq, wrote three articles 
under a pseudonym in al-Iraq in October 1939 praising democracy and warning against an 
uncritical acceptance of Nazi propaganda and another the following year offering qualified 
support for the Allies.
73
 Propaganda articles circulated by the British Embassy increasingly 
offered lip-service to the ideal of isolation and neutrality before pivoting to expose the futility of 
trusting Axis promises to respect the neutrality of small nations.
74
 
 By the fall of 1940, however, pan-Arabists were increasingly frustrated by the absolute 
refusal of Britain to negotiate the future independence of Palestine and Syria and progressively 
more receptive to Axis proposals. Both Naji Shawkat and ʿUthman Kamal Haddad met secretly 
with German representatives in Ankara, the former as an authorized representative of the newly 
appointed Rashid ʿAli and the latter as the personal emissary of Hajj Amin al-Husayni. While 
Haddad promised access to Iraqi oil resources and assistance in organizing armed rebellions in 
Iraq, Syria, and Palestine in exchange for German recognition of Arab independence, Shawkat 
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would only agree to restore diplomatic relations and warned his German contact that Iraq would 
continue to oppose German and Italian colonial ambitions.
75
 It was largely in response to 
Haddad’s far more extensive promises that the Nazis finally agreed to broadcast a declaration 
promising full Axis support for Arab independence on October 23, 1940.
76
  
The Nazi declaration of sympathy made an immediate and noticeable impact on the Iraqi 
government, which began to censor criticism of Nazism in the press. The British-subsidized al-
ʿIraq saw articles rejected for expressing doubt about the sincerity of the Nazi promises and even 
for denouncing the extraordinarily unpopular Italian occupation of Libya.
77
 Rashid ʿAli’s 
declaration of “absolute neutrality” in the war met with great acclaim in the nationalist press and 
overwhelming popular approval.
78
 The press argued that it would be a grave mistake for Iraq to 
accept the promises of the colonial powers on either side and pointed to the lesson of the last 
war, “as a result of which certain Arab territories continue under foreign domination.”
79
 Even 
Nuri, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, sought to negotiate his own concessions with Italian 
representatives. Rebuffed by both the Italians and the radical pan-Arabists in Rashid ʿAli’s 
administration, Nuri exposed the secret negotiations to the British Embassy. Forced to resign on 
January 31, 1941 after Britain suspended the supply of dollars and halted all food and arms 
shipments, Rashid ʿAli angrily vowed to C.J. Edmonds, the British Adviser to the Ministry of 
Interior, that he would “rake up the whole past and tell the story of British interference” in Iraq.
80
 
The Rashid ʿAli Movement  
 On April 1, 1941, military officers delivered an ultimatum demanding that Prime 
Minister Taha al-Husayn resign and allow Rashid ʿAli to return to power. Acting on British 
advice, Nuri al-Saʿid and ʿAbd al-Ilah fled to Jordan along with a number of other minor 
political figures. While the military engineered virtually every change in government since Yasin 
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al-Hashimi came to power in 1935, British opposition to Rashid ʿAli ensured an immediate 
erosion of relations between the two countries. Britain had always distrusted Rashid ʿAli, 
regarding him as “an arch-intriguer and in politics a ‘wild man’” who behaved like “untutored 
tribesmen who have never seen a town or had contact with civilized humanity.”
81
 While Rashid 
ʿAli offered to retract his prior support for complete neutrality in exchange for British 
recognition of his government, British officials were already resigned to the inevitability of 
war.
82
 British Ambassador Kinahan Cornwallis proposed a trap “to put Rashid ʿAli’s sincerity to 
the test,” informing him that troops needed to pass through the country en route to Palestine in 
accordance with treaty obligations. If Rashid ʿAli refused the request, Cornwallis noted, Britain 
would have “a perfect right to take any action we think fit” and if he accepted, British troops 
would “gain military foothold in the country and be in much better position to recover the vast 
amount of ground which he have lost.”
83
 
Rashid ʿAli readily agreed to the British request and a large British force landed at 
Basrah on April 13 without resistance. When Cornwallis announced that further troops would 
arrive by air on April 17 and by sea on April 18, Rashid ʿAli inferred that Britain meant to again 
remove him from power and declared that the new troops would be permitted to land only after 
those currently in the country had passed through. Unwilling to risk a precipitous break with 
Britain, he quickly backed down and over military objections approved the new deployments, 
but continued to press for the troop’s rapid transit and to appeal for formal recognition and some 
sympathetic statement on Syria and Palestine.
84
 Rashid ʿAli and Cornwallis met numerous times 
at the house of C.J. Edmonds and at one point seem to have reached an agreement, but British 
military officers remained convinced that Britain was merely buying time. By the end of the 
month, an increasingly frantic Rashid ʿAli met with Tawfiq al-Suwaydi, a veteran diplomat with 
close ties to Britain, and complained that Britain was “searching for an avenue of collision” 
before imploring him to use his influence to help negotiate a solution to the crisis.
85
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When it became apparent that British troops would remain at Basrah, Rashid ʿAli angrily 
denounced Britain’s violation of the treaty and rejected Cornwallis’ dismissive reply that “it was 
absurd to think that His Majesty’s Government in bringing troops had designs on the 
independence of the country.”
86
 General Wavell urged a negotiated solution, warning that he 
could ill afford to sacrifice troops unnecessarily, but was overruled by Churchill and Cornwallis, 
who were obsessed with the humiliating reversal of imperial relations.
87
 British forces initiated 
the attack on May 2 after Iraqi troops surrounded Habbaniyah airbase. Poets rallied the nation 
behind their government and military, with Muhammad Bahjat al-ʿAthari’s “The Funeral 
Procession of Britain” offering something of an anthem for war: 
 
The Allies felt your rejection and began to burn 
As you began to claim your earth, air, and water 
They desired you for permanent servility  
They reckoned you a slave they bought for ransom 
Woe unto they who overcome their nerves 




In stark contrast to many of his contemporaries on the left, ʿAthari openly voiced his approval of 
Nazism and offered praise for Hitler as a divine agent sent to punish Britain: 
 
 Judgment descended upon them in the guise of the savior  
  Who crushed and destroyed their courage as he willed 
 He cornered the unwanted tenants and terrified them 
  In the East and West leaving annihilation and extinction 
 
In comparison to Nazi strength, ʿAthari mocked British weakness by ridiculing entreaties for an 
American entrance into the war and utilizing the metaphor of Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s 
lameness: 
 
 The blows of the noble, an assault they could not bear 
  So they cried for help from one who could not heed their call 
The indulged their hopes in the one who was feeble and lame 
  As though one weak like him could be of some avail 
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He concluded the poem with a metaphorical allusion to the Iraqi triumph as the moment of the 
long-delayed national liberation: 
 
 O Hour of Liberation! Your wedding feast draws near 
  Good tidings and omens are sung by the heralds 
 Paving way for your day, historic in time, for it 
  Since Laylat al-Qadr has been the shining beacon 
 
When British planes dropped leaflets over the Middle Euphrates containing a call from 
Kinahan Cornwallis urging loyalty from the Iraqi tribes, a group of nationalist shaykhs led by 
Fariq al-Firʿawn of the al-Fatlah tribe issued an indignant response mocking the British position: 
“It is worthwhile to note the collapse of reason, for your self-reliance, foolish Englishman, has 
fallen so low that you yearn for victory through the treachery of your adversaries towards their 
sovereign leaders.”
89
 Fatwas in support of the movement were secured by Siddiq Shanshal, 
Director-General of Propaganda, mostly without recourse to bribery. The Shiʿi clerics were 
somewhat more hesitant than their Sunni counterparts to lend public support to the movement, 
but most nevertheless issued the requested support. Shaykh Abu al-Hasan al-Musawi al-Isfahani, 
the leading Shiʿi mujtahid in Iraq, was said to be particularly hesitant but went along because, as 
a Persian, he was obliged to support the lead of the most prominent Arab mujtahid, Shaykh ʿAbd 
al-Karim al-Jazaʾiri, in all matters of national importance.
90
 
Intellectuals on the left supported the Rashid ʿAli movement out of a shared opposition to 
British imperialism and loyalty to Soviet policy.
91
 The staunchly anti-fascist poet Muhammad 
Salih Bahr al-ʿUlum celebrated the “declaration of revolution” in an eponymous improvised 
poem: 
 
 Najaf gathered ferocious in resistance and defiance 
  The people heralded the declaration of revolution 
 There is surprise in this, for their souls are resentful 
  And the strength of the soul emerges from its wrath 
 As for their sentiments, they burn with indignation 
  And the people depart from the past with resolution 
 The sword thirsty in its sheath implores us 
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  In the name of liberation to assuage his thirst
92
 
   
In “The May Revolution,” Bahr al-ʿUlum denounced the British decision to divert resources 
from the anti-fascist struggle in Europe in order to protect colonial interests in the Arab world, 
imploring Iraqis to counter British cowardice with courage: 
 
 What do the English want, for their property 
  They do not protect, and Hitler persists 
 Berlin terrorizes London with her eagles 
  While London’s flies feign to us as eagles 
 Yes, more vile than these flies is the baseness 
  Of fleeing the revolution that its people deny 




Bahr al-ʿUlum’s most important contribution to the revolutionary cause, however, was 
his epic “O History, Record!” He recited the poem on the radio on May 20, opening with a 
defiant cry: 
 
 O History, record how the faithful rebelled 




At the very outset of the poem, Bahr al-ʿUlum takes pains to situate the Iraqi effort within the 
context of the global anti-colonial struggle: 
 
 We considered what descended upon Egypt of dreadful affliction 
 And we had enough of what befell the Balkans of evil deeds 
  
Throughout the poem he emphasizes the significance of Palestine, first commemorating the 
betrayal of the Husayn-McMahon conventions that lead to the occupation of both Jerusalem 
(“the first of the two kiblahs”) and Iraq (“the valley of the two rivers”): 
 
 O History Record, Where is the covenant of Husayn? 
 What hand has been left, with the traces out of sight? 
 It is the hand that reached for the first of the two kiblahs 
 And then came anew to occupy the valley of the two rivers 
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The current struggle, the poet argues, is part of an historical lineage extending back to the 
national uprising of 1920: 
 
 O History Record, the incidents of the Euphrates Valley 
 What we did in 1920 with the forefathers of the tyrants 
 When we made the corpses of the slaughtered impede the trains 
 
In case the point was lost on his audience, Bahr al-ʿUlum ends the poem with a flat rejection of 
further diplomacy and negotiation, contending that colonialism can only be vanquished with 
violence: 
 
 O Airplanes, O Protectors of the beloved people 
 Deliver the world from the tyranny of these English monsters 
 Converse with them with the mouth of a machine gun for time is brief 
 And they do not hear the voice of truth except when it speaks with a rat-a-tat-tat 
 
As successive British military victories laid bare the increasing likelihood of a British 
victory, poets again struggled to rally the nation. ʿAbd al-Karim al-ʿAllaf praised the historic 
achievements of the movement and warned against retreat in “After Twenty Years I Stand in the 
Face of the British Beast”: 
 
Do we safeguard the rights of the English and these 
Designs of theirs whose veil has been drawn away 
We have been silenced forever to the wrongs of our nation 




ʿAbd al-Sahib al-Dujayli reminded his fellow nationals of the litany of British sins: 
 
She violated the treaty and persisted in blindness 
Never stopping to follow the path of reason… 
She humiliated the Arabs until they could not bear 




Ahmad al-Safi al-Najafi, writing from exile in Damascus, praised his native country in “Iraq’s 
Leap” and reminded Iraqis of their movement’s significance to other colonized peoples:  
 
Truly you are the aspiration of the hopes 
Of the nations of the East and West
97
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The aerial bombardment of Fallujah marked the climax of the war, with hundreds of 
civilians killed by bombs and hundreds more raped and murdered by Assyrian mercenaries. One 
elderly man complained bitterly that not even the Turks had ever bombed a city full of women 
and children.
98
 Maʿruf al-Rusafi commemorated the massacre in his poem, “Day of Fallujah,” 
which served as a paean to the tragedy of national defeat and despair: 
 
O England, we will not pretend to forget 
 Your injustices in the homes of Fallujah 
Such atrocity God will not avenge except 




Rusafi denounced the divide-and-rule politics of colonialism that pitted ethnic and religious 
groups against one another: 
 
 Your army encamped in pursuit of vengeance 
  The infidels seduced by pursuit of the inhabitants 
 That day the Assyrian wolves came to ravage 
  The harem enduring a most monstrous disgrace  
 You derided and scorned the Muslims as fools 
  While making of the Jews advisors and confidants 
 
In line with the rich heritage of the contrapuntal anti-colonial qasidah, Rusafi addressed Britain 
directly, turning the civilizing discourse of liberal colonialism against the empire: 
 
 Is this the civilization and loftiness 
  That your people profess to aspire? 
 Or were you drunk when you went to war 
  Leaping headstrong before conditions were ripe? 
 
Even in defeat, though, Rusafi offers praise for the national sacrifice and points to the destruction 
of Fallujah as a symbol not of national disgrace but rather national pride: 
 
 What is human life in humiliation except 
  Bitterness to spit out upon the first taste 
 So praise and honor to the Tigris and Euphrates 
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  And thanks and peace be upon you, O Fallujah   
 
The Aftermath of War: Chaos and Violence in the Farhud 
Rashid ʿAli, Hajj Amin al-Husayni, and leading military leaders fled the country on May 
29, 1941. Yunis al-Sabʿawi, furious at the cowardice of his comrades, declared himself military 
governor and distributed arms to his student “death squads” in preparation for the final battle, but 
hours later the Committee for Internal Security hastily formed by Arshad al-ʿUmari, the Mayor 
of Baghdad, arrested Sabʿawi and sent him to exile after his comrades.
100
 The collapse of the 
Iraqi army led to the horrific events of the farhud, an anti-Jewish pogrom that erupted on June 1 
when a group of Jews chanting in support of Britain and ʿAbd al-Ilah clashed with the retreating 
Iraqi soldiers on Ghazi Street in downtown Baghdad.
 101
 General panic ensued as the Jewish 
community barricaded themselves in their homes in fear of rampaging mobs bent on looting, 
raping, and murdering. The slaughter lasted until midnight and then resumed the following 
morning. ʿAbd al-Ilah’s delay in appointing Jamil al-Midfaʿi the new Prime Minister left those in 
power with no clear sense of the chain of command. Arshad pleaded with the Director-General 
of Police to order his officers to fire on the rioters, but the latter was unwilling to take such a 
drastic measure without direct orders from ʿAbd al-Ilah. When the Regent finally sent written 
orders, Iraqi police opened fire on the rioters and cleared the streets immediately.
102
 At least one 




While recent accounts have depicted the pogrom as either the fruition of Rashid ʿAli’ 
anti-Jewish agenda or the inevitable product of swelling support for Nazism, relations between 
Jews and the nationalist government during the two months of Rashid ʿAli’s tenure, though 
tense, did not suggest an imminent crisis. Government representatives did solicit financial 
“contributions” from the Jewish community on several occasions, but the only real threat of 
violence came from Yunis Sabʿawi’s declaration on May 30 that Jews should prepare food and 
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remain in their homes for three days.
104
 While many Jews feared that the warning was a 
harbinger of an impending massacre, the swift arrest and exile of Sabʿawi convinced most that 
the danger had now passed, and the next day Jews filled the synagogues to celebrate the Festival 
of Shavuot in peace. Increasingly confident that security had been restored, hundreds of Jews 




Arshad al-ʿUmari, horrified by the events and his impotence in stopping them, accepted 
full responsibility for the collapse of security in front of a gathering of Jewish community 
leaders, though most  refused to blame him. Many noted that Muslims risked their own lives to 
protect those of their Jewish friends and neighbors while British troops stood by idly.
106
 One 
elder argued that “all signs showed” that ʿAbd al-Ilah and Cornwallis “wanted to let the Iraqi 
people find an outlet for themselves in riots against the Jews, and not fight the British.” Another 
bluntly declared that “only the British are responsible in this matter” and recounted a popular 
rumor that five days after the violence an Iraqi Muslim surrendered a revolver that had been 
given to him by an official at the British Embassy on May 1 for use against the Jews.
107
 Senator 
Ezra Daniel complained that Britain was prepared to use the Jews in both Iraq and Palestine as 
pawns in their political negotiations without consideration of the effect on the Jews themselves. 
Daniel remained opposed to Zionism and complained bitterly that Britain had introduced the 
alien ideology to the region, allowed it to pit Arabs against Jews, and then finally decided to 
abandon Zionism, leaving local Jews to suffer the fruit of colonial policy.
108
  
Iraqi Jews remained overwhelmingly opposed to Zionism even after the events of the 
farhud, with many continuing to condemn Zionist propaganda campaigns as provocations and 
assisting Iraqi police in identifying agitators.
109
 Jewish radicals and intellectuals grew 
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progressively more alienated from both British and Zionist leadership and were drawn 
increasingly closer to the Iraqi Communist Party. Many Jewish Communists imprisoned for 
supporting the Rashid ʿAli movement developed close personal and political ties with their 
fellow prisoners.
110
 The Jewish Agency in Jerusalem, meanwhile complained that the farhud had 
not led Iraqi Jews to embrace Zionism, blaming the fatalism and passivity of notables “as in all 
Oriental Jewish communities.” One confidential report, which praised the “positive results” of 
Arab-Jewish enmity in the aftermath of the farhud, suggested that Zionist propaganda efforts 
bypass notables and instead appeal directly to the masses.
111
 The fruits of that strategy, however, 
would not be realized until the post-war period, when the creation of the state of Israel unleashed 
a new wave of anti-Jewish sentiment in Iraq. 
Post-War: Nazi Hunting in Baghdad 
As Iraqi soldiers finally abandoned the fight against Britain in the wake of the flight of 
the political and military leadership to Tehran and violence erupted in the Jewish quarters of 
Baghdad, Muhammad Salih Bahr al-ʿUlum reflected on the catastrophic defeat in his poem 
“Bloody Procession”: 
 
 ʿAmman has become a refuge for wolves thanks to Abu Hunayk and his entourage 
 And from there the Two Rivers grew tender for the fangs of your repulsive treachery 
 For Fallujah was drowned in blood and her noble breath stifled and smothered 
 And the English returned to dance with the whores and harlots at Habbaniyah… 
 And now the blood and tears have come to swallow Baghdad in a bloody procession 
 And we along the banks of the Tigris and Euphrates bestow our dear souls 




The poem was a bitter attack on British colonialism and its symbolic representative, John Glubb, 
nicknamed “Abu Hunayk” because of his abnormally small jaw and “foundling of the Bedouin” 
for his success in recruiting Jordan tribesmen into his Arab Legion forces. Glubb was widely 
seen as the true power behind the Hashemite throne in Jordan and the decision of the Jordanian 
state to provide refuge to the pro-British politicians infuriated Arab nationalists. The entry of the 
Arab Legion onto Iraqi soil under Glubb’s leadership signaled to Bahr al-ʿUlum the dawn of a 
resurgent colonial era. 
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Once acquainted with the horrific events of the farhud, Bahr al-ʿUlum paid respect to the 
memory of the slaughtered Jews, whose death he blamed squarely on the colonial politics of 
divide-and-rule and the collaborationist politicians who sanctioned it in the poem “The Wolves 
of Colonialism”: 
 
 You divided the people into sects and parties 
  Until you opened a door to their colonization 
 And you suppressed and ignored the spirit of truth 
  A politics which distorted and transformed enemies into lovers… 
 You permitted the arrival of tyranny in this nation 
  That has suffered from tyranny for ages and eras 
 O Vilest of Creation, your character so depraved 




As he witnessed his nationalist comrades systematically accused of Nazism and sent to 
internment camps over the following weeks, Bahr al-ʿUlum turned his focus to the absurdity of 
the witch hunt in the allegorical poem “Fatumah the Baker”: 
 
 The inspector asked Fatumah the baker, 
  When did Nazism arrive at the shop? 
 She moaned over her deplorable fortune 
  And wailed in the face of horror and dread 
 Do you not know my name or occupation? 
  For your food comes from my delicious bread! 
 We see ourselves in the example of this simpleton 




The poor nationalist baker, so ignorant of the ideological principles of Nazism that she confused 
the term for a name and assumed the police were accosting her in a case of mistaken identity, 
stood as a metaphor for the coordinated efforts of Britain and her clients to conflate nationalism 
and Nazism. 
 The campaign to identify “Nazis” began with an effort to round up the exiled political 
and military leadership of the Rashid ʿAli movement. The process of identification was relatively 
simple, as all but Yunis al-Sabʿawi had fled to Iran of their own accord. While the exiles had 
initially been promised sanctuary in Tehran in exchange for a promise not to intervene in internal 
politics or to cause the Iranian government any embarrassment, they were soon turned over to the 
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British army by Iranian authorities, a betrayal which many nationalists never forgave.
115
 Only 
Rashid ʿAli, Hajj Amin al-Husayni, and Salah al-Din al-Sabbagh managed to elude their captors 
and escape to Turkey. Salah al-Din was later arrested, deported, tried, and executed in Baghdad, 
but the other two remained safely in exile long after the end of the war. While the circumstances 
of exile certainly turned the exiled politicians into enthusiastic partisans of the Axis war effort, if 
they had not already held such commitments, most remained fiercely resistant to charges of 
ideological affinity with Nazism. ʿAli Mahmud al-Shaykh ʿAli dismissed the accusations as an 
irresponsible conflation of anti-colonialism with Nazism: “Every Iraqi and every Englishman 
living in Iraq knows that I have opposed British policies since their introduction, and if this 
opposition of mine is interpreted as Nazism, then I won’t object to it, but the charge still wounds 
me deeply.”
116
 The British Embassy delayed the execution of the condemned leaders until they 
could be joined by others, for “a row of dangling bodies would impress the public more than the 
same number displayed singly at intervals.”
117
 
While the criminal conviction of the nationalist leadership was preordained, the case 
against junior officers and civilian partisans of the nationalist movement was less self-evident 
and therefore required the careful manipulation of the legal process. Several dozen students 
charged with membership in nationalist militias found that no lawyers were willing to represent 
them for fear of political reprisals from the central government, until Talib al-Mushtaq finally 
agreed to represent them. Talib was not allowed to consult directly with his clients or to review 
the evidence used by the military court against them, and when his vigorous defense offended the 
prosecution, he too was charged as a Nazi sympathizer.
118
 Talib would later recall the irony of 
finding himself accused as an enemy of democracy for the crime of insisting on the duty and 
obligation of an attorney to mount a vigorous defense for his clients, regardless of the nature of 
the accusations. Not even acquittal spared the defendants from internment, and virtually all of the 
accused were eventually sent to internment camps at Fao and ʿAmarah, where they suffered from 
disease spread by overcrowding and polluted water and were subjected to regular torture sessions 
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in a tiny room with iron walls referred to as the “recreation room” and meant to simulate a live 
burial. Many prisoners emerged from internment without ever discovering the nature of the 
charges against them, let alone undergoing any sort of political or moral rehabilitation.
119
 
The punishment of rural Iraqis implicated in attacks on British troops during the war 
proved more complicated. Efforts to prosecute tribesmen for the murder of a downed British 
pilot were thwarted by the divergent testimonies of eyewitnesses. Several peasants accused their 
foremen of leading the attack, while the brother of one of the accused foremen testified that the 
pilot was killed by an ex-lover.
120
 Where prosecution was not deliberately thwarted by witnesses 
seeking to settle personal scores, a general reluctance to testify against the accused or even speak 
with prosecutors marred the ability to establish guilt. In cases devoid of physical evidence or 
collaborating witnesses, defendants were often dismissed from their jobs and blacklisted, while 
others were convicted and executed in spite of conflicting eyewitness testimonies.
121
  
Perhaps more problematic to the eradication of “Nazism” in the countryside was the 
resistance provoked by clashes between imperial troops and local citizens. Sikh troops quickly 
garnered a reputation for violence and sexual depravity after several well-publicized cases in 
which Iraqi women were abducted and gang-raped. Clumsy court-martial efforts, which forced 
the reluctant victims to publicly recount their ordeal and their male relatives to testify to their 
own inability to defend family honor, only further enraged the local population when the accused 
soldiers were either acquitted or sentenced to nominal terms of imprisonment.
122
 Armed bedouin 
were sometimes killed when they fled from British troops in fear of having their rifles 
confiscated and both British and Indian troops were repeatedly accused of looting alcohol and 
tobacco from local merchants and randomly attacking both civilians and local police.
123
 As the 
severity of conflict accelerated, local residents retaliated by pelting foreign troops with stones, 
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garbage, and rotten tomatoes, vandalizing army property, and spitting at passing troops. Several 
offenders, primarily local children, were sentenced to public lashing as punishment.  
After settling scores with those directly implicated in the violence and treason of the 
Anglo-Iraqi War, the British Embassy turned its attention to the intellectual partisans of the 
nationalist movement. Iraqi authorities scoured back editions of newspapers, especially al-
Istiqlal and al-Bilad, in order to identify “Nazis.”
124
 Rafaʾil Butti, the editor of al-Bilad, was 
arrested and interned after refusing to resume publication and commit to promoting British 
propaganda. While Butti’s support for the Rashid ʿAli movement was uncontested, several pro-
British informants defended his reputation by describing al-Bilad as “the most moderate journal 
in Baghdad” and contending that as a Christian, Butti did what he had to do to spare his own 
life.
125
 Nationalist poets like Muhammad Bahjat al-ʿAthari, Ahmad Safi al-Najafi, and 
Muhammad Salih Bahr al-ʿUlum were arrested along with hundreds of nationalist politicians, 
journalists, teachers, and students. Maʿruf al-Rusafi’s caustic poem “Between the Mandate and 
Independence,” which opened with a denunciation of the role of C.J. Edmonds, the British 
Adviser to the Ministry of Interior, in coordinating the post-war purges, attested to the popular 
indignation at the neo-colonial intrusion: 
 
 Ask the Englishman who still enjoys 
  A place of honor next to the Minister Interior 
 Are you a minister or just an advisor? 
  For we see you visiting the ministry every day 
 There you are with our affairs thrown before you 
  Approving and vetoing our lives according to your will 
 You take from us a salary as an employee 
  And this, by God, is the most painful part 
 Today we bear the burden of your tyranny 
  And pay for the privilege your wages in cash… 
 You had during the Mandate the power of advising 
  That terminated and yet your surveillance persisted 
 You replaced your Mandate with our independence 
  But as we see it, this independence is merely slavery 
 You created for us from every diluted treaty 
  Shackles with which to bind our independence 
 Until our liberty turned into the laughingstock 
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Rusafi escaped arrest due to his iconic public stature, but political patronage and 
subsidies were withdrawn and he was left to suffer in poverty for the final three years of his 
life.
127
 His poem “The English in Their Colonial Policies” nearly brought down the post-war 
government when Ahmad Zaki Khayyat, Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs, aroused the 
ire of the British Embassy by publicly praising the poem. Jalal Baban, Minister of Transportation 
and Public Works, refused to dismiss Khayyat, and the other cabinet ministers quickly seized the 
opportunity to protect their own friends and clients.
128
 The poem drew a broad connection 
between the Rashid ʿAli movement and the politics of global anti-colonialism: 
 
Repel the blame and listen to what I say   
For I have mastered the nature of the Thamesians 
As if they and the Iraqis were moths and wool  
For can the wool persevere in the clutches of moths? 
How often have they plowed in colonized land  
Black injustices hidden in the depths of fertile soil? 
How often have they roused the people from slumber 
  Disturbance like dark clouds erupting over the arduous road? 
They feast on the produce of their machinations   
And throw to the inhabitants some of the scraps 
They take from the land the gem deprived of them  
And give back to the nation only rubbish and junk 
Visit India and cast a glance around in order to see  




Rusafi concluded the poem by reiterating British culpability in provoking war with Iraq and 
underlining his fundamental critique of colonial violations of national sovereignty:  
 
They say: “We are working for your interest”  
But they producing nothing but catastrophe 
For they provoked in the east an ill-favored war  
Resembling in its terror the Hour of Resurrection… 
 It seems our sovereignty is nothing but a game 
That the Yankees regard like mere child’s play 
 
                                                          
126
 Maʿruf al-Rusafi, Diwan al-Rusafi (Beirut: Dar al-Muntazar, 1999), 3:244-47. 
127
 Muhammad Mahdi al-Jawahiri, Dhikrayati (Damascus: Dar al-Rafidayn, 1988), 1:382. 
128
 C.J. Edmonds to Kinahan Cornwallis, July 2, 1941, "Political Situation," FO 624/60. 
129
 Maʿruf al-Rusafi, Diwan al-Rusafi (Beirut: Dar al-Muntazar, 1999), 3:340-43. 
121 
 
 By the end of 1941, there were one hundred and seventy political prisoners interned at 
Fao, and by the end of the following year nearly three hundred prisoners between Fao and the 
newly constructed camps at ʿAmarah and Nuqrat Salman.
130
 The British Embassy and the 
Ministry of Interior clashed repeatedly over the release of the internees, with Britain fiercely (but 
ineffectively) resisting the attempts of prominent politicians and ministers to secure the release 
of their friends and relatives.
131
 One British official, praising the Iraqi government’s efforts in 
purging the government of Rashid ʿAli supporters complained only that it was “becoming 
difficult to provide the victims” for the new camps, but expressed confidence that they would be 
found.
132
 Ordinary Iraqis began writing to the British Embassy to inform on their neighbors’ 
support for the Rashid ʿAli movement, usually without any sort of corroborating evidence.
133
 
Those who had been imprisoned as collaborators by the Rashid ʿAli administration, meanwhile, 
seized the opportunity to seek compensation from Britain in recognition of their sacrifice.
134
 
The arbitrary nature of the internment process is exemplified by the case of Muhammad 
Mahdi al-Jawahiri, the iconic poet of the anti-colonial left who boasted that his newspaper al-
Raʿi al-ʿAmm was “the prickly thorn in the face of the Nazis” and accused Rashid ʿAli of “acting 
in accordance, whether he wanted to or not, with the designs of Hitler, that butcher of men.” 
Jawahiri spent the duration of the crisis in hiding in Najaf in order to evade Rashid ʿAli’s 
personal request for a poem celebrating the nationalist resistance. After the war, Jawahiri found 
himself caught up in the politics of national retribution when the new government implored him 
to resume publication of his newspaper in support of the new propaganda line. Jawahiri later 
reflected bitterly, “Rashid ʿAli wanted poetry from me, and his adversaries wanted a newspaper. 
The one wanted me to indirectly bless the Nazis by exploiting my hatred of Britain, and the other 
wanted me to praise him in the shadow of the British lance by exploiting my hatred of the 
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Nazis.” Unwilling to opportunistically back the new government while the people were still in 
mourning, Jawahiri left the country for Tehran.
 135
 
 Upon his return to Baghdad several months later, Jawahiri discovered from a friend 
working in the Ministry of Interior that he had been blacklisted and designated for internment, 
despite his numerous public denunciations of Nazism and fascism. Suspecting that he had been 
targeted for political revenge by “that old hag Britain” in retaliation for resuming his attacks on 
colonial policies in Syria and Palestine, Jawahiri appealed to his old family friend Muhammad 
al-Sadr for intercession. Sadr arranged a meeting between Jawahiri and Minister of Interior Salih 
Jabr, who informed the poet that he had been blacklisted because Yunis Bahri had recited his 
poetry on Radio Berlin during the Anglo-Iraqi War. Jawahiri protested that Bahri was merely 
recycling an old anti-British poem written some twenty years earlier in praise of the Great Iraqi 
Revolution of 1920 and defended his denunciations of Nazism while refusing to renounce the 
anti-colonial message of the poem. Jabr reluctantly agreed to dismiss the charges only after he 
consulted his own collection of Jawahiri’s poetry and confirmed the veracity of the story. 
136
 
Those poets, journalists, and intellectuals who lacked political connections with the 
ruling oligarchy, however, were not spared the ignominy of internment. The radical socialist 
Muhammad Salih Bahr al-ʿUlum was arrested at the cigarette factory in Baghdad where he 
worked and imprisoned at the notorious desert prison at Nuqrat al-Salman. He continued to 
attack Nuri al-Saʿid and other collaborationist politicians in prison, most notably in “The Crimes 
of Parliament”: 
 
 Our representatives?! These are the crimes of parliament 
  Composed by nature of scoundrels, rascals, and rogues… 
 You and whoever declare yourselves our representatives 
  Showering the demonic ministers with flattery and praise 
 You came with plans and projects enacted by whips 
  The hands of criminals given power over my skin 
 While here I am, far from the Euphrates and thirsty, 




In “The First Anniversary of the May Revolution,” Bahr al-ʿUlum continued to rail against the 
fundamental illegitimacy of the post-colonial state:  
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 They sold their nation to the motherland of Cornwallis 
  And rushed to spend the bounty of sale on themselves 
 They suppressed every freedom in their citadels 
  Liberty shackled with neither crime nor conviction 
 Here in Nuqrat al-Salman, we see our tribulation 
  More puzzling than any ordeal that came before it 
 The slave governs our every waking second 
  A governing apart from custom and convention 
 This is our government!! This tyranny set up 




Bahr al-ʿUlum continued to catalogue the suffering of the people through his poetry, addressing 
the litany of false accusations and convictions in the poem “I Am Not a Leader”: 
 
 I felt sorry for the shaykh who entered the jail sullen 
  And sat near me, absentminded and morose 
 I said to him, “Have they leveled at you a charge?” 
  And he replied, “To be sure, I am not a leader, 
 But I have a daughter and someone came to rape her 
  And so I found for my land and family a guard 
 And after this trial can you really blame me 




Defiant as ever, Bahr al-ʿUlum continued to vigorously defend his support of the 
nationalist movement and to denounce colonial culpability for the descent to war. His poem 
“Martyrs of the Struggle,” written in internment at ʿAmara, starkly juxtaposed national patriots 
and traitors: 
 
 A faction pursued their fancy and went to serve the English in their endeavors 
 Obstructing the dreaded revolution by imprisoning the patriots at Fao and Salman  
 Trying to forget that the climax of tragedy  
Awoke the people to vigilance and attention 
 Announce to them that morning is near  




He depicted the war as an anti-colonial struggle for national liberation, provoked by imperial 
excess and suppressed only with violence: 
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 Our spirits seethed under the pressure 
  Unable to endure the deception of politics 
 While the colonizers persisted in choosing 
  The path of severity, prohibition, and wile 
 Their policy of dealing with the people failed 
  Its pretense shattered with violence and ferocity 
 For they erected the gallows of tyranny and terror with fervor and enthusiasm 
 
While historiographical narratives tend to emphasize an indelible struggle between Iraqis and 
pan-Arabist nationalism, Bahr al-ʿUlum’s fealty to pan-Arab concerns underscores the national 
solidarities of anti-colonial alliances in this period: 
 
 We were not created to live to live in disgrace as if we were ignoble souls 
 Rather we were created to liberate the people of the daad from all foreign power 
 And we were sent off to raise the lofty flag to establish an Arab state 
 To gather all speakers of the language of the daad and to build a free life 
 
Yet in spite of his relentless commitment to anti-colonial politics, Bahr al-ʿUlum never wavered 
in his long-standing opposition to fascism and continued to side with the Allies everywhere 
outside of the colonized world. While still interned at ʿAmarah, he mourned the British setback 
at the First Battle of al-ʿAlamayn in “The Sun of Righteousness Will Rise”: 
 
 Whoever imagines the black night as morning 
  Slow down, for your morning is not to be found 
 Do not rejoice at the triumph of barbarity, but observe 
  The trampling of peoples by this barbarity in the desert 
 Tomorrow the sun of righteousness will rise in purity 
  And evil will sink and fade in its blackened tatters 
 The earth and moons will grow strong and swallow up 




Ahmad Safi al-Najafi, interned in Beirut for his poems praising the Rashid ʿAli 
movement, offered perhaps the most powerful evidence of the counterproductive effects of the 
interment policy in his collection of prison poetry. In “The Noble Crime,” he responded to the 
charges leveled against him: 
 
He finished explaining that my sin was that I 
 Served my country; I said woe unto you, you scoundrel 
For you have adorned me with a crown of honor 
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 And invested me with a throne of glory without knowing 
Oh you generous rascal, you have upgraded me 
 With a shining lofty crown that renews and invigorates me 
When I saw the crime was service to my homeland 




In the poem, “A Declaration of War,” Najafi warned that his internment had transformed his 
opposition to Britain from mere verbal criticism: 
 
 England was driven away, by God! 
  She was blinded in both of her eyes 
 Her grave was dug in every land 
  Excavated by her own two hands 
 She imprisoned for no crime 
  Other than cursing her paternalism 
 My war is faithful and my imprisonment 




While he would later strenuously deny accusations of Nazism,
 144
 Najafi declared in the poem 
“Half a Muslim” that he only feared a Nazi victory because it would deprive him the opportunity 
for revenge: 
 
  I fear that if they die, Satan himself will perish 
  And I will remain without my curses half a Muslim 
 My soul, my hand, and my mind wage war upon them 




Muhammad Bahjat al-ʿAthari, one of the few vocal supporters of Nazism despite his 
apparent disinterest in the political dimensions of anti-Semitism, likewise addressed the 
humiliation of internment in his poem “Welcome to Exile”: 
 
 We were vividly acquainted with our lowliness in the shadow 




In “Among the Reasons for the Setback,” ʿAthari continued to defiantly justify anti-colonial 
violence in the name of national dignity and honor: 
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 They cornered us, for we had not taken 
  The preparations for war in arms and munitions 
 They cornered us and then expelled us 
  So welcome to adversity and severity… 
 There is no escape from national defense 
  Even if it throws us under the raging hounds 
 The honor of man is his nation and sanctuary 
  Whose mere name he lives to honor and proclaim 
 What is free, even on the verge of extermination, 




His nihilistic commitment to watching his country burn before submitting to colonial rule 
underscores the failure of internment policy to reshape political opinions. 
ʿAthari’s most surprising post-war contribution to the legacy of anti-colonialism, 
however, was his subversive and satirical poem, “The Tragic Tale of the Rooster of Fao,” 
composed in the winter of 1941 in the internment camp at Fao. A prisoner living in the dormitory 
next door to ʿAthari managed to acquire a pet rooster, which escaped from its cage in the middle 
of the night and defecated on the head of his roommate, who killed the rooster in his state of 
terror. The entire prison camp convened in the courtyard the next day for a mock trial of the 
rooster, convicting of it treason and sentencing it to death. The already dead body of the rooster 
was hung from a makeshift miniature gallows before ʿAthari stepped forward to offer a eulogy: 
 
 My heart is saddened and my tears are shed 
  Woe upon your blackened day, O Rooster! 
 The fortress trembles from top to bottom 
  With sorrow for you as the people cry, “Cock-a-doodle-doo!” 
 
ʿAthari turned the rooster into a symbolic metaphor for the Axis powers – and by extension, in 
his view, for the anti-colonial struggle in Iraq: 
 
 You roamed freely among us, merry and gay 
  And upon your head lay a crafted royal crown 
 Your dominion stretched from China at one end 
  And the far end stretched to Jaghbub and Tabruk! 
 
Alluding to the absurdity and inconsistency of the post-war purges, ʿAthari used the rooster to 
symbolize the confusion of the nationalists in the face of various accusations of treason:  
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Is this real freedom or is it utter anarchy? 
  Or are you, O Rooster, a Bolshevik in this world? 
 I cannot say, but the people are divided in their views 
  Between truth and falsehood, faith and misgiving 
 What is the substance of your sin to the people? 
  Is it incitement or zeal, or slander and agitation? 
 They say you shat upon al-Karkhi in his sleep 
  And he startled awake, terrified and confused 
 So he slit your throat in a swift motion of fury 
  You became, poor rooster, a laughingstock to the world! 
    
The poet concluded with a subtle explication of the metaphor, juxtaposing the absurdity of the 
prison yard spectacle with the post-war campaign against the nationalists: 
 
How did you sanction the death of the unfortunate, 
  O oppressed nation? The rope of tyranny is severed  
 We rose against it and with the sword beheaded it 
  For how could the rooster tyrannize our courtyard? 
 But how could we ask from the tyrant moderation 
  When we treat the guiltless rooster with such misgiving? 
 When we took up residence in the marshes of al-Fao 
  Vanity seized us as if we were Saxons and Sikhs! 
 How vile is man! Even if he is oppressed, 
  His head stricken by the palms of tyranny  
 Look at the foolishness that the government has done  
  For how does one hope for reform when people are such fools? 
 Rationality was lost, so is darkness expected at dawn? 




When Nuri al-Saʿid and Salih Jabr, then Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior, heard the 
poem, they vowed publicly to lengthen ʿAthari’s period of incarceration.  
 It was not only the nationalist poets, of course, who were capable of resistance and 
subversion in the face of imprisonment. While Britain exerted a considerable degree of influence 
over the political prisoners in internment camps, administrative control of the central prison 
system remained firmly in the hands of the central government. The Baghdad Central Jail was 
said to be controlled by three prostitutes, and gambling, drinking, and sodomy were unregulated. 
The prison director in Basrah, Sayyid ʿAbbas Hilmi, himself a prominent supporter of Rashid 
ʿAli, ate and socialized with political prisoners, offering preferential treatment in exchange for 
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future considerations should Germany win the war. Those prisoners accused of crimes against 
Britain, including the murder of British citizens and soldiers, were treated as a political prisoners 
and awarded private rooms and servants, as well as unfettered access to female visitors.
149
 ʿAbd 
al-Rahman Shahib, the father of Yunis al-Sabʿawi’s personal secretary ʿAbd al-Razzaq Shahib, 
was transferred from the Baʿqubah Jail to Baghdad in order to personally tend to ʿAbd al-Qadir 
al-Husayni, the nephew of Hajj Amin al-Husayni.
150
  
Reconstructing the Alliance: Poetry and Propaganda after the War 
While all agreed on the necessity of interning anyone suspected of harboring anti-British 
views, British officials differed sharply over proposed political reforms to ensure the long-term 
stability of the imperial alliance. Britain came under increasing pressure from Shiʿi politicians 
like Muhammad al-Sadr, who argued that fascism was the logical consequence of a colonial 
policy that empowered an unrepresentative minority. In the few spheres where the Shiʿa enjoyed 
numeric equality with Sunnis – still unreflective of their demographic majority – like the Senate, 
many of the seats reserved for Shiʿi politicians were allocated to illiterate tribal representatives 
unable to fully understand legal proceedings. Sadr’s argument was countered by the fact that the 
Ministry of Education, a locus of anti-colonial nationalism, had been controlled for years by 
Shiʿi ministers.
151
 The situation of the Kurds was scarcely better; while each cabinet reserved 
one or two portfolios for Kurds, these were as a rule monopolized by the “pseudo-Kurds” of the 
Baban family in Baghdad, none of whom were connected in any real sense to the Kurdish 
populations of northern Iraq and all of whom carried reputations of personal corruption.
152
 
While elements of both strategies were central to the reform agenda, British policy during 
the war years centered on the dramatic expansion of the Embassy’s power. British officials were 
obsessed with the role of propaganda in the incitement of public opinion against Britain and 
identified radio broadcasts, newspaper editorials, public speeches, poetry recitations, and 
demonstrations as the primary conduit for the spread of “Nazism” in the country.
153
 The 
Embassy began its propaganda campaign by revamping the process of press censorship. The 
radical nationalist al-Istiqlal was immediately banned, and the refusal of Rafaʾil al-Butti to 
resume publishing al-Bilad led to his designation as an “unrepentant pro-Axis die-hard” and 
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internment. The other papers were initially ordered to run pro-British propaganda without 
distinction, but Iraqi officials in the Ministry of Interior complained that this blanket policy 
defied public credibility. While those papers with historical pro-British reputations, like al-ʿIraq 
and Sawt al-Shaʿb, could dive headstrong into an explicitly pro-British stance, the nationalist 
papers could not be expected to entertain such an immediate and dramatic shift without losing all 
propaganda value. 
The coordination of press propaganda was carefully negotiated between the British 
Embassy and the Ministry of Interior to maintain “certain subtlety” through the regulated 
rotation of pro-British, pro-Regent, and anti-Rashid ʿAli articles between newspapers to ensure 
that propaganda articles would be “sandwiched in between the mud-slinging which really 
attracted the newspaper-reading public and sent up the sales.”
154
 The most noteworthy points of 
contention were not about the recent conflict but rather the reframing of colonial history. When 
the Ministry of Interior altered the text of a Sawt al-Shaʿb editorial on the national uprising of 
1920 from the original “the rebellion hastened the birth (ʿajallat tawlidiha) of the independent 
Iraqi state” to “the rebellion gave birth (qad waladat) to the independent Iraqi state,” the 
Embassy condemned the alteration as a “wicked falsification of history” because of the 
implication that independence was taken rather than given. When Sawt al-Shaʿb defiantly 




While all press discussion of Palestine was initially forbidden, Nuri eventually permitted 
the nationalist press to resume discussion of the issue, but only in the context of encouraging 
Anglo-Iraqi reconciliation.
156
 After acknowledging that “Nazi propaganda has fully exploited 
Arab sentiment and played on sensitive nerves, built intrigues, made full use of the weak and 
faithless by deceiving them to serve its own ends and encouraged them to play with fire,” the 
editor of al-ʿAlam al-ʿArabi contended that it was in the best interests of both Britain and Iraq to 
“reconsider and solve the Palestinian Problem in the shortest possible time for the main purpose 
of destroying Nazi propaganda and effacing its effects by calming the Arabs and Muslims and 
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winning them over to the side of the democracies.”
157
 The editor of al-Zaman likewise urged a 
swift resolution to the Palestinian conflict as a means of restoring Anglo-Iraqi friendship, 
appealing to “the cause of liberty for which the Allies are fighting and sacrificing wealth and 
souls.”
158
 Britain began to more directly subsidize the Iraqi press, experimenting first with the 
practice of purchasing bulk quantities of pro-British papers and distributing them for free before 
settling on a payment scheme that rewarded newspaper editors in proportion to the friendliness 
of their editorial line.
159
  
After the initial contraction of the press, the number of newspapers in the country 
increased from five to twelve by the end of 1944, with a corresponding liberalization of 
censorship policies. The Ministry of Interior continued to prohibit direct attacks on Britain but 
began permitting journalists to denounce American support for Zionism after Roosevelt’s 
reelection.
160
 While rightwing papers like al-Nida and al-ʿAlam al-ʿArabi denounced Zionism as 
American imperialism without reservation, even liberal papers like
 
 Sawt al-Ahali, which 
welcomed the reelection of Roosevelt and praised his longstanding anti-fascist stance, 
condemned Roosevelt’s support for Zionism and urged a return to the spirit of the Fourteen 
Points.
161
 Even the pro-British paper al-Saʿa criticized the “shameful” prostration of American 
politicians to Zionist interests during the electoral season, appealing cleverly to the Allied 
propaganda claims to defending democracy and urging the United States not to sacrifice 
principles for the sake of a “local victory.”
162
 Al-Nida complained that the Arabs had always 
regarded the United States as “the champion of human rights and justice” and were therefore 
“bitter disappointed” by the eruption of pro-Zionist declarations from prominent American 
politicians.
163
 At the same time, most of the independent Iraqi papers expressed their full 
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Press censorship, of course, could not fully suppress anti-colonial resistance, as a 
confiscated pamphlet produced by the cartoonist Fadhil Qasim Raji reveals. One cartoon 
featured an ominous bedouin looming over the desert dunes with an outstretched hand 
threatening a snake labeled “Zionism” and a fox labeled “England” and a caption asking, “It is 
well known that the symbolic banner of the English is the lion, so what turned it into a fox?” The 
answer followed: “Nature prevailed, for their artifice, guile, and trickery tarnished even the fox.” 
Another cartoon features a horse labeled “Iraq” angrily throwing its British jockey to the ground, 
while a spectator representing global opinion laughed derisively and taunted Britain, “Are you 
crazy?! This horse is not for riding, even if it is a horse…” Another showed John Bull falling to 
his death after the Iraqi army cut a chord labeled “the oil pipeline of Iraq” that merged into his 
entrails. Another showed John Bull reeling from Iraqi blows while a figure labeled “Zionism” 
drawn with obvious anti-Semitic references begged Britain for more of Iraq’s wealth.
165
 Raji 
later authored “What Is Said and What Is Rumored,” an anti-colonial political gossip column that 
appeared in al-Zaman and al-Hawadith before its censorship
166
 
Mustafa al-ʿUmari, the archconservative Mayor of Baghdad, argued that nationalist 
propaganda could only be countered by mimicking the methods of its leaders and arranged for 
prominent poets to compose and publish qasidahs in praise of the monarchy.
167
 Some of those 
who had supported the Rashid ʿAli movement were all too eager to lend their services to the new 
government. ʿAbd al-Husayn al-Huwayzi had earlier praised the nationalist movement in his 
poem “The Kaylani Administration”: 
 
You supported the people of Iraq and spared them 
 From the politics of the Left and the politics of the Right 
You made for them a sanctuary with your resolution 
 You preserved her residents from all dangers and perils 
Your radiant brow poured forth its brilliant light  




After the failure of the movement, however, Huwayzi rapidly shifted course. In the poem “A 
Lofty Smile,” he condemned both the cowardice and deception of the nationalists: 
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 The parties deluded the nation and misled the wise 
  For in the morning they crept away like shirkers 
 For he said in preaching, all of you shall die as martyrs  
But those of you who stayed among us are fortunate 




More startling, and certainly more counter-productive, was Huwayzi’s celebration of Britain 
aerial bombardment of the country as a sort of colonial national salvation. 
 
 O Fitnah, you deceived the people with upheaval 
  Those with confused minds transfixed by seduction 
 And when the frenzied fire of rage erupted 
  It was extinguished by airplanes from above 
 Throwing their blazing bombs at the brilliant blaze  
 
 Like Huwayzi, Muhammad ʿAli al-Yaʿqubi displayed a similar change of tenor and tone 
after the war. At the heat of the Rashid ʿAli movement, Yaʿqubi denounced British colonialism 
and praised the nationalist resistance in his poem, “The Ringing Cry of Iraq”: 
 
 Britain came to occupy the country 
  That sacrificed to her our dear souls 
 She betrayed the treaties that we fulfilled 
  And revealed to all her furtive treachery 
 She is assaulted today by enemy lands 
  For how could our people launch an attack 
 London did not protect and defend her own sons 
  For how can they defend them from Habbaniyah 
 Today there is no defender and so she faces 
  A deluge of waves of overwhelming destruction 
 Tyranny led her to the banks of obliteration 
  For this is the fate of domineering nations 
 Have you forgotten what befall her army 




After the war, however, Yaʿqubi quickly pivoted to praise the new regime in his poem “You 
Returned to Baghdad Drawn by Her Beauty,” which commemorated ʿAbd al-Ilah’s return from 
exile in ʿAmman: 
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 You returned to Baghdad drawn by her beauty 
  And cast off the robe of pilgrimage and adornment 
 Though conditions of the city had changed 
  Your love – such love – had remained unchanged 
 And when misfortune grew dark you dispelled it 
  And the moon glistened from your radiant face 
 You were distant, and so we said hardship will expire 
  You were absent and so we said adversity will vanish 
 But you were scarcely gone before the pillars of morning 
  Cracked under the misfortune and calamity of blackened night 
 And when you were gone the country and people were left 




Yaʿqubi closed the poem with a plea for clemency from ʿAbd al-Ilah for his prior lack of faith in 
the beneficence of the monarchy: 
 
 I have come to implore from you forgiveness  
  And to offer a penitent apology and renunciation 
 Yes, I have lowered my hopes and expectations 
  In the nobility I expected and the good I hoped 
 And I, despite those begrudging souls who flatter 
  You with praise, stand in categorical deference 
 I pay no heed to obtaining from you favor 
  If the critic rages against you with blame and reproach 
 
The framing of political conversion from nationalist to monarchist as a lowering of expectations 
underscores the lingering distrust of the monarchy after the death of Ghazi and the Anglo-Iraqi 
war. Dozens of lesser poets likewise capitalized on patronage opportunities by publishing poems 
flattering ʿAbd al-Ilah and denouncing Rashid ʿAli in the pages of the pro-British al-Akhbar.
172
 
While journalists could be censored and poets silenced or co-opted, the rehabilitation of 
Iraqi civil society required a far more concerted and extensive propaganda campaign. Under the 
influence of Freya Stark, the British Embassy oversaw the formation of a group called the 
Brotherhood of Freedom (Ikhwan al-Hurriyah), a counter-propaganda organization designed to 
counter anti-British and pro-Nazi rumors and conspiracies. The group promoted an “education in 
citizenship” based on “democratic principles” by striving to “prepare the public mind” for 
“responsible public opinion.” Members were urged to spread British propaganda in 
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conversations with their fellow citizens. The society was divided into local groups – there were 
over six hundred cells and nearly seven thousand member in Iraq – which met weekly to discuss 
the contents of the weekly bulletin and the best means of disseminating that information. 
Members were required to pay an entrance fee and an annual subscription fee, which was meant 
to ensure the personal investment of members in the movement but tended to be viewed locally 
as a fee-for-service arrangement guaranteeing future political favors from the British Embassy.
173
  
As the war drew to a close, the Brotherhood was transformed from a counter-propaganda 
organization to a civic society based in the old headquarters of the Muthanna Club in Baghdad in 
1944. In his inaugural speech, Major Scaife noted the poetic justice of the requisitioning of the 
old center of nationalist activity and argued that while propaganda had become a “very much 
discredited word” due to totalitarian abuses, the Brotherhood espoused “another kind of 
propaganda which is inseparable from vigorous faith.”
174
 Muhammad Mahdi Kubba, the ex-vice 
president of the Muthanna Club, penned a furious rebuttal to Scaife’s allegations of Nazi 
influence to the editors of al-Bilad, but the press censor refused to run the rebuttal. Kubba 
protested that enforcing the silence of the Muthanna leaders and members would imply an 
admission of guilt and sarcastically dismissed the new club, which was met by the general public 
with a mixture of contempt and bemusement, as the “Brotherhood (of Servitude).”
175
 
New Horizons: The Red Utopia 
Much like the internment policy, the British propaganda campaign made scarcely any 
impact on the general public and only exacerbated the alienation of journalists, poets, and 
intellectuals. Sympathy for the Axis powers, driven initially by the political considerations of 
anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism and later buttressed by popular hopes of reversing the national 
humiliation of the Anglo-Iraqi war, remained dominant for several months but declined 
markedly after Rommel’s defeat in the Libyan desert.
176
 More importantly, the Nazi invasion of 
the Soviet Union impelled Iraqi Communists to mobilize their supporters behind an anti-fascist 
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 Students, poets, and intellectuals, previously trapped in the unenviable position of 
tacitly supporting Axis fascism or Allied colonialism, enthusiastically organized in support of the 
Soviet Union, taking advantage of a colonial policy that permitted Communist agitation in the 
interests of an anti-fascist alliance in order to articulate their sympathy for a brand of global 
politics that was at once anti-fascist and anti-colonial. 
Iraqi Communists, of course, had suffered severe political repression since at least 1936, 
when the British Embassy and the Nazi Legation in Baghdad began sharing intelligence on 
Communist activists with the Ministry of Interior.
178
 Official repression of communism escalated 
sharply after the fall of the Bakr Sidqi-Hikmat Sulayman regime, as known Communists were 
systematically arrested and condemned to imprisonment, exile, or even loss of citizenship. Amin 
al-ʿUmari actually made an attempt to outlaw communism but ran into difficulty defining the 
term, opting in the end to outlaw the distribution of all “harmful propaganda.”
179
 The prominent 
leftist support for the Rashid ʿAli movement left some British officials committed to the belief 
that communism was merely a variant of “anti-Britainism” and led some to dismiss any 
politician known for an opposition to Britain as “Communist sympathizers,” including such 
notorious reactionaries as Yasin al-Hashimi and Rashid ʿAli. Popular sympathy for Communist 
objectives, meanwhile, was contemptuously dismissed as the foolishness of the “rag-tag and bob-
tail” masses who saw communism merely as a means “to be openly anti-British and ‘agin 
th’guv’ment’.” Not even Rashid ʿAli’s defection to Germany was accepted as proof of the 
divergence between Nazism and communism, for as one official alleged, Rashid Ali’s 
“communism” was simply “not the ‘dyed in the wool’ genuine Russian article.” “Is there any 
real difference,” he asked, between “National Socialism” and “National Communism”?
180
  
Other British officials, however, noted with amazement the abrupt transformation of the 
Communists into ardent anti-fascists who openly challenged and fought Nazi sympathizers in the 
streets and cafes of Baghdad. One intelligence report described the Communists as “a ‘sixth 
column’ operating to good effect against the Nazi fifth column in this country.” By the beginning 
of 1942, British officials noted that communism was replacing Nazism as the dominant political 
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current among Iraqi youth, who were observed painting over swastikas chalked on the walls of 
university buildings. These striking developments occurred despite the total lack of dialogue 
between Communists and the British Embassy. The Iraqi Criminal Investigations Division, as 
one British official readily admitted, had virtually no intelligence on either the membership or 
leadership of the Iraqi Communist Party and could only identify some twenty-eight party 
members by the end of 1948 – the vast majority of whom, like Kamil al-Chadirchi and Jaʿfar 




While intellectual support for communism was driven largely by ideological 
commitments to social justice and anti-colonialism, popular sympathy with the Communist 
agenda resonated at least in part due to the deterioration of economic conditions in the wake of 
the British occupation. Inflation, already a problem in the months following the Anglo-Iraqi War, 
reached unprecedented levels after Japan attacked Pearl Harbor in December 1941. The price of 
some essential goods, which had nearly tripled over the preceding six months, reached nearly ten 
times their pre-war value by the end of the year.
182
 Initial anger over inflation, which left many 
essential goods outside the price range of many Iraqis, was directed with significant 
encouragement from official sources at Jewish merchants but began to subside as the 
Communists succeeded in redirecting anger towards politicians and landowners. Both British and 




By the end of 1943, a combination of factors contributed to unprecedented levels of 
inflation and pushed corruption to an “all-time high.” The combination of dramatically 
strengthened domestic purchasing power driven by the presence of occupation forces and the 
export revenue from a particularly strong harvest and contraction of consumer markets due to 
strict import limitations sent the quantity of currency in circulation soaring from six million 
dinars in 1941 to thirty-four million by the end of 1943. Popular dissatisfaction with the state of 
the economy was exacerbated by the decision of Colonel Bayliss, who enjoyed virtually 
dictatorial powers over the Iraqi economy, to stringently ration even coffee and tea, which were 
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not all in shortage.
184
 Bayliss clashed openly with Iraqi officials and local politicians and 
merchants denounced his policies as transparent attempts to corner the Iraqi market by 
eliminating American and Soviet competition.
185
 The government’s subservience to powerful 
agricultural interests militated against any serious intervention in lowering prices and sullen 
bread lines soon formed in the poorer districts of Baghdad. An increase of cigarette prices 
likewise spurred popular unrest and provoked allegations of political corruption due to the fact 
that prominent politicians Tawfiq al-Suwaydi, ʿAli Mumtaz al-Daftari, and Jamil al-Midfaʿi 
owned a major cigarette factory in Baghdad.
186
 
Economic troubles were compounded by political stagnation, as successive 
administrations continued to be drawn entirely from the members of the old ruling class. Even 
the British Embassy grew concerned about the lack of progressive voices in government and the 
potential for future revolution.
187
 “Democracy” somehow grew even more dysfunctional as Tariq 
al-ʿAskari, the nephew of Nui al-Saʿid, explained to the British Ambassador. While in the past 
the monarch had personally nominated - in effect appointed – the vast majority of parliamentary 
deputies, the delegation of power to provincial governors and tribal shaykhs left deputies 
confused about the sources of political patronage: “Things have become so ridiculous that some 
people even think they got in on their own merits. Why, Najib al-Rawi said to me the other day, 
‘Of course I’m a deputy; it is only right. I’m one of the leading Democrats. That is how I got 
here.’ When it comes to people saying that kind of thing, you can see how rotten things have 
become. They all think they’re independent!”
188
 
The economic and political circumstances created by the occupation provided fertile 
ground for leftist agitation. The Ahali Group reformed and launched their daily newspaper, now 
called Sawt al-Ahali, on September 23, 1942 with a call to legalize political parties, end press 
censorship and intimidation, and convene free and fair elections. The paper publicly supported 
the Allied war effort as a counter to the “grave danger” of Nazi occupation.
189
 The paper’s 
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inaugural editorial demanded “government of the people, from the people, and for the people.”
190
 
The paper rejected free market economics, contrasting the resilience of the planned Soviet 
economy with the collapse of market economies during the depression and advocating a radical 
shift in tax policy from consumption to excise taxes.
191
 While some conservative nationalists 
derided the Ahali Group and other leftists as “sycophants and opportunists” and accused them 
without evidence of membership in the Brotherhood of Freedom Society, most leftists justified 
their decision to back the Allied war effort as a temporary tactical necessity in the struggle 
against fascism.
192
 Kamal al-Chadirchi later recalled that while the second British occupation 
was distinguished by political despotism, “nevertheless the progressive movement found for 
itself something of a respite after the period of fascist tyranny that followed the coup of 1936 and 
continued until the April 1941 movement.” Jawahiri likewise recalled this period with nostalgia, 
conceding that in spite of the severe economic distress caused by the war and occupation, the 
freedom of association and expression accorded to the Iraqi left in recognition of its anti-fascist 
ideology was unprecedented. Both Chadirchi and Jawahiri took great pains to distinguish their 
own stance from that of both the Communists, who embraced the politics of anti-fascism only 
after the collapse of the Nazi-Soviet alliance, and the “Old Guard,” who struggled against 
fascism not because of principle but instead “for the sake of British and American interests.”
193
 
In late 1941, Muhammad Mahdi al-Jawahiri’s poem “Democracy in the Eastern Front” 
drew the attention of British intelligence with its candidly effusive praise for the Soviet army. 
Poems and cartoons celebrating Soviet resistance to Nazi aggression dominated the pages of 
Jawahiri’s newspaper, al-Raʿi al-ʿAmm, though conservative local politicians continued to press 
the British Embassy to cancel the paper’s publishing license, arguing disingenuously that the 
pro-Soviet slant was intended to mask “Nazi” subversion.
194
 Jawahiri’s most celebrated wartime 
poem was his ode to “Stalingrad,” which celebrated Stalin’s stubborn refusal to submit to Nazi 
tyranny: 
 
O Stalin, what is more important than 
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 Signing characters is refusing to sign 
Existence persists in the characters  




Jawahiri closed the poem with a frank assessment of his own inspiration from the Soviet 
resistance and a prophetic hint of his radical post-war activism: 
  
 And from the darkness and its eulogy 
  The poets vie with one another in eloquence 
 Sympathies and affections hover over   
  Seas of poetry sought by the thirsty… 
 It did not foment personal whims and fancies 
  Nor did it vaunt vanity or let flow hypocrisy 
 What salvaged me was lofty and sublime and  
  In my poetry my mouth responds to the spirit of the call   
 
ʿAli al-Sharqi, a progressive nationalist poet who nevertheless opposed the Bakr Sadiq 
coup d’état out of a commitment to traditional politics, captured the spirit of the era with his 
dramatic embrace of Communist revolution. Sharqi’s poem “The Tempest” offered a stark 
contrast between the oppression and violence of capitalism and the redemptive possibilities 
offered by communism. He opened the poem with a vivid depiction of the destruction of the 
“capitalist war”: 
 
 Workers sacrificed by their country 
  For life is death and benefit is loss 
 The factory explodes into its machines 
  And the capitalist sees in it his destruction 
 The plowman sows his fields with mines 
  Burning the crops and uprooting the trees 
 The house that he erected is razed to the ground 
  And every precious safekeeping is destroyed 
 He reckons the destruction among his goals 
  And sees the annihilation from a distance 
 The homeland of the peasants so dear 
  The adversary will not escape with his object 
 He sowed arrogance in the countryside 
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Juxtaposed to this critique was an idyllic view of the Soviet Union and a hagiographic depiction 
of Stalin: 
 
 A system of collective merits 
  For each and every one of her people 
 A sentry stood watch by her side 
  Protecting a country best in all respects   
 A country in which all people share 
  For it is not a kingdom but a congress 
 An inclusive union and brotherhood 
  With equality between man and woman 
 A union that rejects all distinction 
  Between the wealthy and the wretched 
 Guided by a cool and collected leader 
  His character crafted from iron and stone 
  
While poets like Sharqi and Jawahiri had no affiliation with any party apparatus during 
this period, the Iraqi Communist Party began to coalesce under the leadership of Yusuf Salman 
Yusuf, best known as Comrade Fahd, and held its first Party Conference in March 1944 at the 
home of the locomotive driver ʿAli Shukur in Baghdad. Fahd denounced the British exploitation 
of the anti-fascist front, criticizing with particular animosity the transparently collaborationist 
Brotherhood of Freedom. He argued that the Najafi branch of the Brotherhood promoted 
reactionary beliefs by distributing burial shrouds and encouraging members to cut their heads in 
the taʿziyahs. He singled out Kinahan Cornwallis, arguing that the style of colonialism was so 
entrenched in the ambassador’s character that he was “perhaps unable” to speak honestly, and 
attacked Nuri al-Saʿid for sanctioning the British monopolization of the Iraqi sugar and date 
markets and encouraging the expansion of foreign spy networks.
197
  
Fahd redefined the character of the anti-fascist struggle in Iraq, minimizing the 
significance of the Iraqi contribution to the Allied war effort and emphasizing instead the 
struggle against a philosophical, political, and social ideology:  
 
Our declaration of war against Nazism means a declaration of war against Nazi 
ideas that oppose our national goals and our national honor.  It means a 
declaration of war against those who carry and circulate these ideas in our great 
land and among the citizens of our good people.  It means combating the fifth 
column and uprooting it. 
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He argued that fascism fed on poverty and despair and denounced both British and Iraqi officials 
for failing to address the foundations of cultural despair and choosing instead to exploit war 
conditions in order to “tighten the noose around the people and their liberty.” Fahd also attacked 
government bureaucrats for cooperating with their imperial masters to exploit the people and 
enrich themselves through bribes and stolen rations, arguing that the practice was a colonial 
innovation far worse than anything that occurred during the Ottoman era. Even moderate 
progressives like Kamil al-Chadirchi were condemned for succumbing to governmental pressure 
to publicly condemn the Communists.
 
His approach closely paralleled the populist platform of 
the Bakr Sidqi era. It opened with a call for “true” national liberation and free and fair 
democratic elections before proceeding to demand an end to feudalism and monopolies and to 
articulate the need for land reform and the necessity of labor unions. Unlike the populists a 
decade earlier, however, the Communist platform explicitly called for the liberation of women 
and the full equality of ethnic minorities. The platform denounced the army’s intervention in 
politics and complicity in the practices of arbitrary detention and torture. Fahd also denounced 
Zionism as colonialism and called for the liberation of Palestine.
198
 
By the time that Fahd convened the First Party Congress in March 1945 at the home of 
Yahuda Siddiq in Baghdad, new issues had emerged. Fahd pointed to the emergence of 
American imperialism in the region over the preceding year, denouncing U.S. designs on Saʿudi 
Arabian oil, the increasingly vocal support for Zionism expressed by American politicians, and 
clandestine American attempts to forge an American-Kurdish alliance in order to splinter the 
nation and appropriate northern oil.
199
 He linked the anti-colonial struggle with the struggle for 
social justice and labor rights, briefly acknowledging Prime Minister Hamdi al-Pachachi’s 
approval of unionization in certain public sectors before denouncing the denial of labor rights to 
the thousands of Iraqi workers directly employed by Britain at military bases, railways, ports, 
and electric companies. The vast majority of parliamentary deputies, Fahd argued, were mere 
colonial tools and their opposition to the Pachachi government was dismissed as “the stirring of 
corpses and filth piled up in the stables of the Iraqi nation” by Britain. Fahd was well aware that 
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The growing strength of the Iraqi Communist Party inspired numerous demonstrations of 
party loyalty. One Communist was caught distributing pamphlets in Mosul calling for a popular 
uprising, while a female Communist provoked an uproar by interrupting the grand opening of a 
new thoroughfare in Baghdad with the unfurling of a banner reading, “The government should 
seize the produce of the capitalists and landowners and safeguard the food of the people!” The 
question of prosecution was complicated by the Allied alliance with the Soviet Union and 
prompted British officials to privately urge Iraqi officials to avoid reference to political ideology 
and instead charge the offenders with disturbing the peace.
201
 Despite their willingness to 
dispense advice on dealing with Communist agitators, British officials grew increasingly 
frustrated with the Iraqi government’s obsession with communism. One exasperated official 
declared, “It seems to me that it is the Russian Communists who have saved our bacon, whereas 




The liberalization of political and intellectual life presented new problems for British and 
Iraqi officials. Even conservative politicians appreciated the gravity of change, as Mustafa al-
ʿUmari and Jamil al-Midfaʿi, two of the most reactionary politicians in the country, informed 
their astounded British advisers that they were thinking of forming a political party and branding 
themselves as Democratic Socialists.
203
 Al-Zaman provoked a furious response from the British 
Ambassador after it complained about the lingering imperial presence: “The East lived in peace 
for generations before these Western ravens came along and lured the ignorant with their croaks, 
thus creating the rancor and discord that we witness today.”
204
 The leading leftist newspapers, al-
Shaʿb and al-Raʿi al-ʿAmm, once viewed by both the Iraqi government and the British Embassy 
as obscure curiosities in a journalism landscape dominated by conservative and nationalist 
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Iraqis were increasingly attuned to the currents of global politics, with Greek civil war 
emerging as a particularly controversial topic in the public sphere. Leftist papers like Sawt al-
Ahali publicly backed the left-wing Greek People’s Liberation Army, while the reactionary al-
Nida, controlled by the reactionary Minister of Interior Mustafa al-ʿUmari, denounced the 
ideological stance of Sawt al-Ahali as communism and argued that the Iraqi leftists aimed to 
monopolize political power in Iraq just as their counterparts had accomplished or attempted in 
Yugoslavia and Greece. Less than a month after liberalization, al-Nida was already complaining 
that the leftist papers ought to be censored, though even its editors began to complain about 
British monetary policy in the country.
206
 The publication of an anti-colonial poem by the late 
Maʿruf al-Rusafi in al-Bilad on May 4, 1945, which attacked the Allies for betraying promises 
made to Sharif Husayn and the Arabs after World War I, was so popular among the youth that it 




By the time the war ended, the old ideological divisions between left and right had either 
broken down or been subsumed by the all-encompassing struggle against colonialism. The 
Rashid ʿAli movement finalized the rupture between the old alliance of radical anti-colonial 
nationalists and conservative nationalists who saw the British Empire as a legitimate ally in 
securing pan-Arab unity. At the same time, the participation of radical leftists like the poet 
Muhammad Salih Bahr al-ʿUlum in the anti-colonial movement underscored the shifting 
contours of wartime politics. The socialization of radical nationalists and Communists inside of 
the internment camps left both sides more appreciative of the anti-colonial credentials of their 
erstwhile enemies and helped to pave the way for the popular front alliances of the coming 
decade. The collapse of Nazism as either a viable political alternative or a credible political 
bogey that could be used to splinter the opposing ideological wings of the radical anti-colonial 
movement left the edifice of the post-colonial state isolated and vulnerable to attack from an 
increasingly united population. The caustic anti-colonialism of the war years, propagated under 
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the guise of pro-Soviet ebullience and sanctioned by the politics of the anti-fascist alliance, did 
not fade away into post-war oblivion but rather erupted from the constraints of colonial 
censorship into open calls for national liberation.  
Perhaps more alarming to both British and Iraqi officials was the total collapse in popular 
legitimacy of the old networks of political patronage and domestic electioneering. The dominant 
figures of the old political elite who could have commanded some level of popular support were 
now either dead, or in exile, while those who remained had sacrificed their reputations by fleeing 
to ʿAmman in disgrace and returning only on the coattails of British occupation forces. Iraqi 
politics would no longer be dominated by the rotation of power between rival elites vying for 
their share of the spoils of national wealth. Instead, the entire fabric of the post-colonial political 
arrangement was challenged by new political actors increasingly willing to contemplate 
revolution, whether in whispers or shouts. 
The rise of mass politics was guided, as with so many other developments in Iraqi 
politics, by the public intervention of poets. No longer content to recite their poems at literary 
salons and publish their poems in newspapers and allow the verses to circulate via word of 
mouth, radical poets began to recite their poetry in public, daring the regime to intervene.
208
 
When Jaʿfar Abu al-Timman, an elder statesman and icon of the anti-colonial nationalist 
movement, died in late 1945, Muhammad Mahdi al-Jawahiri seized the occasion of an official 
ceremony commemorating Jaʿfar’s life and service to denounce the hypocritical appropriation of 
the nationalist legacy by collaborationist politicians in the poem, “In Memory of Abu al-
Timman.” As Jawahiri later recalled, “The poem was unyielding fury and a violent challenge… I 
said in it what Moses did not say to the Pharoah!” Indeed, the poem was so caustic and 
venomous that an outraged Nuri al-Saʿid stood up and stormed away from the gathering as 
Jawahiri reached the climax: 
 
Twenty-five years have passed as if they were 
 With their personalities an item from the news 
We tired of them like a prisoner tires of his shackles 
 In excess of the burdens that they bore… 
Who could reckon that it would last so long 
 A government founded on such a flawed basis?! 
After all the atrocities that the people have faced 
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 In the shadow of their constitution and slogans 
The captive is obliged to demand from his captor: 




When Jawahiri published the poem on the front page of al-Raʿi al-ʿAmm the next morning, he 
expected to be arrested. The police never came, but he was eventually sued for slander and 
defamation by the government. The moment nevertheless marked a watershed in the modern 
political history of the country, and Jawahiri resolved to further push the limits of what the 
government would bear.
210
 The next decade would be dominated by the recurring themes of anti-
colonialism and national liberation and marked by the eruption of popular protests challenging 
the fundamental legitimacy of the post-colonial state. 
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"LEAVE YOUR FIELDS AND THROW AWAY YOUR SICKLE" 
URBAN MIGRATION, 1932-1958 
 
 In his landmark study of Iraqi social history, Hanna Batatu provided the authoritative 
account of the impact of the colonial nation building project on the political and social structures 
of tribalism in Iraq.
1
 Batatu demonstrates that administrative expediency and political necessity 
drove colonial officials to reverse the tribal disintegration of the late Ottoman era. By 
strengthening the power of the major tribal shaykhs, British officials maintained a balance of 
power at both the regional and national level that reduced the administrative costs of empire and 
ensured a measure of political loyalty and stability in the carefully managed transition to 
independence. Colonial interventions in the tribal sphere thus fundamentally altered the historical 
trajectory of modernity and reified ideological distinctions between rural and urban society as 
spheres of "traditional" and "modern" Iraqi society. Alongside an emerging urban modernity 
characterized by the rise of transportation and communication infrastructures, modern education, 
middle class commerce, and mass politics, an artificial brand of feudalism distinguished by the 
progressive development of commercial agriculture and the regressive entrenchment of 
oppressive serfdom emerged in the rural south. These structural transformations of rural society 
mirrored the disruptive and alienating fruits of colonial rule in rural Africa and South Asia, as 
scholars like Mahmood Mamdani and Karuna Mantena have cogently documented.
2
 
For Batatu, though, this contradiction was a mere interregnum in the unfolding process of 
tribal disintegration outlined by Peter Sluglett as the logical outcome of “natural forces arising 
from the process of sedentarisation.”
3
 When the military modernization of the 1930s definitively 
broke the cycle of tribal rebellions and thereby restricted the sphere of the shaykh’s power to his 
control of traditional tribal lands, the results were not difficult to predict: 
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In the tribal countryside, only small local risings broke from time to time the 
reigning uneasy quiescence – risings not under the shaikhs, as in the previous 
decades, but against them. In this urban and rural popular unrest, the monarchy 
and the shaikhs discovered their common interests, and coalesced in the hope of 
withstanding the mounting threat to their position and privileges. Their close 
alliance made all the more certain that the 1958 Revolution, by destroying the 




It was only with the mass politics of the post-war period that “the history of Iraq became 
henceforth largely the history of Baghdad.”
5
 
 If Batatu’s narrative of modern tribal history underscores the integral impact of colonial 
intervention in disrupting the historical trajectory of Iraqi modernity, it does not escape the 
inevitable conclusions of its teleological determinism. The internal contradictions of an emergent 
urban modernity and a resurgent tribal feudalism, Batatu argues, could only delay the processes 
of tribal disintegration. The striking confidence of this conclusion, however, has been implicitly 
challenged by recent historical interventions addressing the salience of tribal identities and 
solidarities in the post-revolutionary era. Amatzia Baram has illustrated the substantial effects of 
Baʿthist state policy under Saddam Husayn in the late 1980s and early 1990s to reconstruct tribal 
shaykhs as rural pillars of the regime’s authority and to “tribalize” the Baʿth Party itself through 
the ideological and rhetorical recourse to tribal notions of kinship and honor.
6
 Hosham Dawood 
and Faleh Abdul-Jabar, meanwhile, have complicated Baram’s emphasis on the role of the state 
and the shaykh in the re-tribalization of the countryside by instead focusing attention on the 
persistence of lineage solidarities and cultures of communal politics.
7
 These critical interventions 
have helped to incorporate the problem of tribalism in modern Iraq into a broader corpus of 
historical literature analyzing the failure of state modernization agendas to eradicate traditional 
modes of social organization based on tribal solidarities.
8
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The contradictions implied by a comparison of Batatu’s narrative of tribal decline under 
the monarchy and more recent scholarship on the persistence of tribalism in the post-
revolutionary period demand a more exhaustive analysis of the impact of political modernization 
on social relations in the countryside. While the detailed particulars of the descent into feudalism 
and the alienation of the tribal peasantry excavated in Batatu’s narrative cannot be denied, 
neither can the confidence of his conclusions be uncritically accepted. Samira Haj has offered 
one path forward from this historical impasse in her call to move beyond essentialist narratives 
of tribal and urban conflict. Drawing on Talal Asad’s critique of tribal essentialism, Haj rejects 
the conceptualization of the conflict between tribes and state as the central pivot of modern Iraqi 
history.
9
 She argues that social conflict within and between tribes must not be reduced to 
essential and inherent functions and features of tribalism but rather reflect the social ruptures 
caused by the expansion of modern political structures into the countryside.
10
 In order to 
properly understand the historical context of tribal conflict, Haj argues for a concerted effort to 
“identity and analyze the larger formations within which these tribes reproduced themselves as 
‘tribes.’”
11
 Along these lines, an integration of tribal and urban histories in an analysis of anti-
colonial cultures, practices, and politics under the monarchy promises to undercut monolithic 
narratives of tribal conflict and decline and to expose the historical processes by which colonial 
and post-colonial policies unmade certain aspects of tribal society while leaving other aspects of 
kinship solidarity intact. 
 The effort to problematize the trajectories of tribal history in modern Iraq must begin 
with a clarification of regional disparities in tribal power and authority. In the course of 
demonstrating that “the structural novelty that characterizes the contemporary Iraqi tribe is its 
dependence on the State to reproduce itself, and hence a relative loss in its larger political and 
territorial sovereignty,” Hosham Dawood notes that the neo-tribal policies of Saddam Husayn 
posited a stark distinction between the honor and nobility of the nomadic tribes of western Iraq 
and the poverty and shame of the tribal peasants of southern Iraq.
12
 While this distinction was 
certainly predicated upon ideological preferences with roots in the sectarian dynamics of later 
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Baʿthist politics, it also reflects the stark reality that tribal decline in the preceding period was 
not a fluid and even process. The stability and persistence of tribal structures was instead 
contingent upon the interrelated facts of sedentism and land tenure, on the one hand, and the 
political interference of colonial and post-colonial officials in tribal matters on the other. 
Sedentary tribes tended to disintegrate more rapidly and more completely due to the twin factors 
of a land tenure system that converted shaykhs and landlords and tribesmen into peasants and a 
diminished capacity for armed resistance that lubricated the transition of power relations between 
shaykh and tribe from consent to coercion. These factors were compounded by the measure of 
state interference in tribal relations, which was itself conditioned on the recent past of tribal 
resistance to the colonial state. The rebel tribes who led maintained their structural integrity and 
cultural solidarity in large part because colonial intervention militated against the economic and 
political empowerment of the rebels, while those tribes of collaborationist shaykhs tended 
towards disintegration precisely because colonial policies designed to reward their complicity 
created the necessary conditions for feudal despotism and social alienation.
13
 
 This chapter analyzes the incomplete and uneven unmaking of the sedentary tribes of the 
irrigated estates in southern Iraq with some comparative reference to the armed nomadic tribes of 
the western desert and the settled Kurdish tribes of the rain-fed northern plains. While I have 
endeavored to build upon Batatu’s excavation of archival evidence in order to illustrate the 
economic impact of colonial and neo-colonial policies on the rural and tribal peasantry, my point 
of departure from the materialist narrative is an insistence on the crucial cultural impact of anti-
colonial politics in shaping and inspiring peasant resistance and urban flight. The conditions of 
tribal feudalism were codified by colonial policies during the British Mandate and solidified by 
the parliamentary initiatives pursued by the landed elite entrusted with control of the post-
colonial state, but the waves of peasant uprisings and migrations that characterized tribal decline 
and disintegration did not erupt until after nationalist anti-colonial politics penetrated the 
countryside through the medium of compulsory education and clandestine Communist activism. 
Timothy Mitchell’s notion of a “culture of fear” that impeded peasant resistance to the “symbolic 
violence” of rural landowners in Egypt offers a useful foundation for understanding the 
                                                          
13
 On the role of the tribes in the 1920 Revolt, see Pierre-Jean Luizard, La formation de l’Irak Contemporain: Le role 
politique des ulémas chiites à la fine de la domination ottoman et au moment de la creation de l’État irakien (Paris: 
CNRS Éditions, 2002), 383-422, Yitzhak Nakash, The Shiʿis of Iraq (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 66-
72, and Amal Vinogradov, "The 1920 Revolt in Iraq Reconsidered: The Role of Tribes in National Politics," 
International Journal of Middle East Studies 3 (April 1972), 123-39. 
150 
 
significance of peasant apathy in the face of feudal oppression.
14
 Orit Bashkin’s discussion of 
tribalism’s place in urban intellectual thought likewise provides a narrative framework of 
detribalization that demands more exhaustive attention to the impact of nationalist political 
movements in the countryside.
15
 
 Peasant voices, unfortunately, have proven impossible to recover, and so this chapter 
employs a broader reading of archival sources. Poetry provides one crucial resource for 
understanding the social transformations and dislocations of rural life in this period. The striking 
shift in the attention of prominent poets from village to city over the course of the 1940s helps to 
confirm the general marginalization of rural experiences in national cultural experience and to 
explain the irrepressible longing of peasant youth to escape the stifling atmosphere of village life 
for the hope and promise of the city. While many poets began to write about rural life from an 
academic vantage point, abandoning the radical invocations and exhortations of the 1930s and 
instead speaking about rather than to tribal peasants, other prominent poets simply ceased to talk 
about peasants at all. As I demonstrate in this chapter and the one that follows, peasants, tribes, 
and villages were gradually replaced by students, workers, and cities as symbols of the Iraqi 
nation and its resistance to colonial domination. I argue here that the unmaking of the tribes of 
southern Iraq and the incorporation of the detribalized peasantry into the radical politics of urban 
anti-colonialism proceeded in three distinct phases. In the first phase (1920-1935), histories and 
memories of tribal resistance to the incursions of the colonial state coincided with colonial 
policies that marked certain tribes as rebels and others as collaborators, strengthening the social 
and cultural solidarities of the one group while weakening those of the other. In the second phase 
(1935-1950), the failed tribal uprising of 1935 eradicated lingering hopes of a return to the pre-
colonial past and entrenched the economic conditions of feudalism in southern Iraq. Only the 
third and final phase (1950-1958) witnessed the politicization of the tribal peasantry as rival 
purveyors of political modernity – most notably nationalist educators, Communist activists, and 
Western development experts – penetrated the tribal countryside. It was the conjunction of 
colonial history and the discourse and experience of “development,” I argue, that drove the 
proverbial final nail into the coffin of southern tribalism.  
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Colonial Interventions and the Construction of Tribal Feudalism 
Tribes and Tribalism before the British Occupation 
British colonial policy in the tribal regions of southern Iraq was fundamentally shaped by 
the subtle misreading of pre-colonial tribal histories. While British administrators drew upon a 
remarkably nuanced and accurate body of evidence on tribal histories collected by distinguished 
Orientalists like Gertrude Bell and David Hogarth, an overarching emphasis on Ottoman 
despotism tended to obscure the historical significance of social change. Once the early patterns 
of tribal disintegration that accompanied sedentism and market integration were identified as 
artificial consequences of Ottoman misrule, British officials moved to arrest the process by 
reinforcing the political and judicial boundaries between tribe and town. This ambitious effort to 
reverse decades of historical change and to resurrect or recreate the social structure of the 
idealized Arab tribe was rooted in the romantic nostalgia for “martial races” and “noble savages” 
that dominated colonial imaginations at the time.
16
 This critical colonial intervention in the 
countryside, though, fundamentally transformed the nature of tribal power and authority by 
transforming the tribal shaykh into an effective ally of the colonial state. As the shaykhs came to 
view the state as the guarantor of land revenue rather than an economic rival, they forged an 
increasingly intimate alliance with national officials that presaged an era of anachronistic 
feudalism. 
The colonial understanding of the historical processes of tribal migration and settlement 
closely conformed to Ibn Khaldun’s cyclical theory of dynastic power. Ibn Khaldun argued that 
dynasties always rise from the desert bedouin and then evolve in to a “sedentary stage,” because 
“royal authority is always followed by a life of ease.” The transition to the sedentary stage 
always carries the roots of the dynasty’s impending end, as the luxury of sedentary life leads 
successively to “leisure and tranquility… contentment and peacefulness… waste and 
squandering” before the final destruction.
17
 Gertrude Bell described the migration and 
fragmentation of Arabian tribes into subsections aligned with various tribal confederations as the 
“inevitable process” of sedentism: 
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In their progress northward the tribes found themselves ultimately upon the limits of the 
desert; the wide spaces essential to nomadic existence no longer stretched before them, 
while the pressure of those behind forbade any return. They were obliged to look to 




As new tribes arrived, those recently settled were “split up and thrust apart” so that “the old 
tribes are often widely scattered along the edges of the cultivated land.” Just as sedentism was 
the inevitable result of the “irresistible attractions” of fertile frontiers, the new wealth and 
luxuries of agricultural exploitation led to decadence, corruption, and ultimately defeat by new 
waves of bedouin warriors. The policy implications of this historical interpretation rested upon a 
dubious distinction between settlement and urbanization that allowed colonial administrators to 
embrace the political and economic stability of the former process while avoiding the social 
pathologies of the latter. 
 This sweeping categorization of the entire rural populace of southern Iraq as “tribal,” 
though, did not reflect colonial ignorance or indifference to social difference and historical 
chance but rather underscored the imperial project of restoring tribal authority and solidarity 
where it had already begun to decay. The archaeologist D.G. Hogarth pointed to the variety of 
tribal structures in several intelligence reports contrasting the ʿAnizah and Muntafiq tribes, 
noting that while the ʿAnizah brand “connotes, theoretically, a racial whole, which in practice 
includes several constituent units, politically independent of one another,” the Muntafiq 
appellation referred to a political confederation of tribes with “the most mixed origin in blood.”
19
 
Each modular form of tribal configuration presented its own unique problem for colonial 
administrators – the historical patterns of migration and settlement had left the ʿAnizah tribe too 
physically fragmented to permit an effective coordination of policy by the leading shaykhs while 
misguided Ottoman land reform had enriched the Saʿdun shaykhs of the Muntafiq to such an 
extent that the tribes rejected their authority and forced them off of the tribal land. Effective 
colonial rule, then, required administrators to thread the needle between the consolidation of 
tribal authority and the development of exploitative economic practices.  
Where strong structures of tribal authority and traditions of social solidarity did not exist, 
they had to be refashioned or recreated before their incorporation into political apparatus of 
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indirect colonial rule. British officials and administrators were satisfied that the pervasive 
traditions of tribal culture would facilitate this reformation even where tribal organization and 
authority had begun to collapse.
20
 This does not, however, mean that British authorities 
“invented” tribes in order to facilitate their project of colonial rule or to suggest that “tribal 
culture” was a fantasy of the Orientalist imagination.
21
 The writings of Bell and Hogarth 
underscore the impressive breadth of knowledge about social and political difference between 
tribal groups and confederation and the remarkable stability of tribal cultures and solidarities 
across time and space through the waves of migration from Kut and ʿAmarah attests to the 
relative significance of these fundamental social and cultural distinctions. The more important 
significance of this manner of identifying and classifying tribal groups was the underlying 
assumption that the persistence of tribal culture offered sufficient grounds for reconstructing 
tribal authority within the contours of the colonial state. Colonial administrators assumed that 
proper governance and effective support for local tribal shaykhs would restore the natural 
balance of power and authority in traditional tribal cultures.
22
 
 Despite their general awareness of a spectrum of social difference within the tribal 
sphere, however, colonial officials drew a sharp distinction between the urban populations of 
towns and villages and the rural tribal population. At the level of political policy, historical and 
ethnographic distinctions between tribal structures were effaced in a totalizing narrative of tribal 
culture. T.E. Lawrence prefaced a list of military instructions for dealing with the local 
                                                          
20
 Both Gertrude Bell and Arnold Wilson averred that the essential characteristics of tribal culture remained largely 
unaffected by the diminished power of local shaykhs and the extension of governmental authority. See Gertrude 
Bell, "Note on the Tribal Authority of the Sheikhs of Muhammarah and Kuwait in the Occupied Territories," The 
Arab Bulletin Vol. 1: 1916, no. 25, October 7, 1916 and A.T. Wilson, Loyalties, Mesopotamia, Vol. 1: 1917-1920: A 
Personal and Historical Record (London: Oxford University Press, 1930), 266. 
21
 Although there is no clear or easy parallel with what Terence Ranger and Nicholas Dirks have described as the 
invention of tribe and caste in colonial Africa and India, Paul Dresch’s argument that Orientalist observations of 
Arabian modes of segmentary lineage came to dominate colonial ethnographies conducted elsewhere suggests 
that the ethnographic work conducted by the Arab Bureau during World War I tended to shape official conceptions 
of the "ideal tribe" and to mold official policy toward the restoration of that ideal in Iraq. Nicholas B. Dirks, The 
Invention of Caste: Civil Society in Colonial India (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1988), Paul Dresch, 
"Segmentation: Its Roots in Arabia and Its Flowering Elsewhere," Cultural Anthropology 3:1 (Feb. 1988), 50-67, 
Terence Ranger, "The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa," in The Invention of Tradition, ed. Eric Hobsbawm 
and Terence Ranger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 211-262. 
22
 Samira Haj’s critique of "tribal essentialism" in both colonial discourse and modern historical analysis is an 
instructive ideological intervention here but perhaps misdirected as a critique of social history. The fundamental 
problem with colonial and post-colonial tribal policies was not insufficient awareness of the spectrum of difference 
between various tribal groupings but rather a basic misconception about how official interference in tribal affairs 
would mediate the estranged relations of power between shaykhs and tribes. Haj, "The Problems of Tribalism" and 
The Making of Iraq, 13-22. 
154 
 
population with the caveat that his notes were only relevant for interactions with the tribal 
population. Noting that the tribesmen and townspeople “hate each other,” Lawrence declared that 
urban populations “require totally different treatment.”
23
 Kinahan Cornwallis, who would remain 
an influential voice in Iraqi politics until the end of World War II, likewise insisted that 
animosity between tribes and towns was rooted in an intrinsic incompatibility of tribal and urban 
culture rather than political and economic rivalries between tribal and urban elites. Writing from 
Najaf after the collapse of Ottoman rule in 1916, Cornwallis noted that while “the Mujtahids 
were jealous of the Sheikhs, who were jealous of one another… still more acute was the rivalry 
between the towns and the tribes outside the towns.”
24
 Arnold Wilson, the British Civil 
Commissioner in Iraq between 1918 and 1920, illustrated the curious contradictions of the 
colonial narratives of tribal romanticism and Ottoman despotism in his own conclusions about 
the hostility between towns and tribes. Wilson blamed the “jealous hostility” between tribes and 
towns on Ottoman policy, which, “on the principle of playing off faction against faction, did 
nothing to allay” such sentiments.
25
 
Given the presumption of natural hostility between towns and tribes, British 
administrators endeavored to break with what they saw as a malicious Ottoman policy pitting the 
two social blocs against one another by reformulating a divide and rule strategy that emphasized 
structural segregation over physical confrontation. Cornwallis viewed the hostility between tribes 
and towns as an opportunity for expanding colonial power and cultivating local loyalties, arguing 
that urban notables and religious clerics were clamoring for British protection from the tribes.
26
 
While he acknowledged that many of the local complaints appeared on closer inspection as 
exaggerations or fabrications concocted as demands for financial compensation, Cornwallis and 
his colleagues never questioned the underlying reality of social antithesis.
27
 This perception of an 
insurmountable gulf between the tribal and urban populations would eventually lead to the 
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adoption of different criminal codes, military conscription policies, electoral procedures, and 
land settlement policies in tribal and urban regions during the mandatory period. 
This logic of tribal difference likewise underscored the alien nature of modern urban 
politics to tribal conceptions of power and authority. The colonial thesis of Oriental despotism 
did not apply to the shaykhs and their tribes, who were viewed as ignorant, unsophisticated, and 
inevitably prone to anarchy.
28
 This inclination towards anarchy, though, carried the beneficial 
inclination that the tribes were by nature apolitical and anti-nationalist and therefore far more 
readily influenced by colonial alliances at the local level. Arnold Wilson insisted that tribal 
disorders “had little political significance” but were instead “the blind protests of ignorant men 
who desired better things which they knew not how to attain” and even composed a nostalgic 
couplet memorializing this political ambivalence:  
 
Perhaps their loves, or else their sheep 




This fundamental denial of political agency to tribal nomads and cultivators would help shape 
British policy towards the tribes throughout the mandatory period in a manner that laid down the 
essential foundations for an anachronistic rural feudalism. 
Social Order and the Rule of Law in Colonial Tribal Policy 
British conceptions of the ideal tribal society and the essential social and cultural 
differences between tribe and town had profound implications for the development of rural 
policies. Alongside the establishment of the monarchy and the introduction of an indirect 
electoral process that ensured the parliamentary dominance of what Samira Haj has branded the 
“monarchic-oligarchic regime,” colonial tribal and land settlement policy would leave behind the 
most significant structural impact on the development of the post-mandatory state.
30
 British 
administrators were forced to confront a fundamental contradiction of colonial ideology in 
weighing the respective consequences of reversing the deleterious effects of Ottoman despotism 
                                                          
28
 See, for example, Kinahan Cornwallis, "Museiyib, Kerbela, Nejef and Hillah," The Arab Bulletin, Vol. 2: 1917, no. 
55, June 28, 1917, T.E. Lawrence, "Nationalism among the Tribesmen," The Arab Bulletin, Vol. 1: 1916, no. 32, 
November 26, 1916, and A.T. Wilson, Loyalties, Mesopotamia, Vol. 1: 1917-1920: A Personal and Historical Record 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1930), 295. 
29
 A.T. Wilson, Loyalties, Mesopotamia, Vol. 1: 1917-1920: A Personal and Historical Record (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1930), 2. 
30
 Haj, The Making of Iraq, 27-38. 
156 
 
and misrule through a more just and effective land reform regime and demonstrating the stability 
and superiority of British rule to local notables by vigorously upholding the rule of law and 
existing legal contracts.
31
 It was this central ideological contradiction that ultimately shaped the 
development of feudalism as an unintended consequence of tribal policy. Initial conflicts 
between an Orientalist romanticism that looked to reconstruct the noble traditions of tribal 
culture and a civic rationalism that sought to transform the anarchic tribes into loyal citizens 
through the incentives of free markets and the rule of law evaporated as proponents of the latter 
view realized that they could not simply ignore or revoke established title claims.  
The entire colonial approach to the land problem in southern Iraq was shaped to a 
considerable extent by historical interpretations of the Ottoman land reform efforts. In an effort 
to limit the power of the dominant tribal shaykhs and to stabilize land revenue receipts, the 
Ottoman Land Code of 1858 abolished the iltizam tax farming system and granted tapu sanad 
title deeds to individual cultivators.
32
 While acknowledging the judicious civic intentions of the 
reforms, Gertrude Bell concluded that the measure was “like all things Turkish, a theory rather 
than a fact.” The estate boundaries listed on title deeds were ambiguous or undefined, the 
confirmation of customary claims to land tenancy was distorted by endemic bribery and 
corruption, and the inability of tribal cultivators to understand the alien concept of land 
ownership led to the concentration of registered titles in the hands of tribal shaykhs and 
enterprising urban speculators. In ʿAmarah, Kut, and Nasiriyah, Ottoman authorities never made 
an effort to stabilize land holdings, but instead auctioned off five year leases at exorbitant rates, 
pitting rival tribal shaykhs against one another in a bid for social prestige guaranteed by large 
land holdings. The policy encouraged a cyclical trajectory of debt and destruction as shaykh 
lessees “would pass from rebellion to imprisonment and exile, the lands and houses of the surety 
would be confiscated, and the estate would be put up afresh for auction and farmed for a still 
higher and more impossible rent to the rivals of the supplanted man.”
33
 For Bell, Ottoman 
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misrule thus created two distinct problems of land settlement and tribal policy along the Tigris 
and the Euphrates. Tribal anarchy in the Euphrates valley was a product of the conversion of the 
Saʿdun shaykhs to landlords and the Muntafiq tribes to tenants, while conflicts along the Tigris 
were the consequence of divide and rule policies that discouraged both profit and stability. 
Particularly significant in this interpretation was the fact that ʿAmarah shaykhs were viewed by 
colonial administrators as victims of Ottoman despotism – in stark contrast to the enterprising 
Saʿdun shaykhs – with “just grievances” against excessive government demands. 
This historical logic of victors and victims influenced the trajectory of British tribal 
policy in southern Iraq. Along the Tigris, British administrators moved quickly to demonstrate 
the financial benefits of colonial rule by stabilizing lease arrangements and dramatically 
curtailing revenue demands. Relieved by their liberation from the economic cycle of auction, 
debt, and dispossession, the ʿAmarah shaykhs quickly emerged as the most ardent supporters of 
British rule in Iraq. As Gertrude Bell proudly noted in a review of colonial tribal policy, “We 
have never experienced any serious disturbances on the Tigris.”
34
 On the Euphrates, where land 
tenure had already been stabilized to the benefit of leading shaykhs, British efforts to leave their 
own mark of colonial stability on the tribes produced far more serious repercussions. In the 
Muntafiq, colonial administrators eventually moved to collect a limited share of land revenue on 
behalf of the Saʿdun shaykhs, who had already been forced out of the region by the rebellious 
clans in the late nineteenth century. While this intervention won Britain the enduring support of 
the Saʿduns, it provoked fierce enmity from the now independent clans who chafed against the 
re-imposition of previously severed bonds.
35
 Along the middle Euphrates, a bid to correct what 
was seen as Ottoman favoritism of certain tribes led to changes in the regulations of water from 
the Hindiyyah Barrage in favor of the Hillah tribes and to the detriment of the Shamiyyah 
confederations.
36
 While cultural and ideological factors governing the relationship between the 
Euphrates tribes and influential Shiʿi clerics from Najaf and Karbala, it is not surprising that the 
new losers of the colonial tribal reforms in the Muntafiq, Shamiyyah, and Diwaniyyah regions 
formed the backbone of the anti-colonial insurrection of 1920 and that the grateful shaykhs of 
ʿAmarah, Kut, and Hillah either actively colluded with the British army against the rebel tribes, 
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stood aside with passive indifference, or reluctantly and unwillingly allowed their tribes to drag 
them into the conflict.
37
 
The tribal insurrection of 1920 underscored the considerable costs of maintaining 
colonial control of Iraq in the face of mass resistance to the occupation. While the arrival of 
Indian reinforcements ensured that the British army would decisively defeat the rebel tribes and 
reassert colonial authority in the rural regions where it had been cast off, British officials were 
chastened by the experience and moved quickly to promote a form of acceptable national 
governance and to rapidly transition to less visible and more indirect form of colonial rule. For 
the tribes of southern Iraq, this meant that resistance to British authority was increasingly dealt 
with by dispatching squadrons of airplanes to bomb rebels into submission and that political 
authority and economic obligations were overwhelmingly delegated to the tribal shaykhs. The 
use of air power against the tribes decisively broke the pattern of tribal resistance to colonial rule 
but tended to leave the political and economic grievances of the rebel shaykhs and tribes intact 
and festering, which ensured that the eventual end to colonial rule would entail an historic 
reckoning between the tribes and the central government as the interested parties sought to 
reverse or maintain the losses and gains of the colonial era.
38
 The delegation of authority to the 
tribal shaykhs, on the other hand, tended to reinforce preconceived notions of essential tribal 
difference by reversing historical processes that saw traditional notions of the tribal domain 
gradually replaced by conceptions of individual private property and the authority of the tribal 
shaykh gradually undermined by that of the central government.  
In the aftermath of the tribal rebellion, colonial officials were forced to reassess the 
consequences of tribal policies and to consider the most appropriate path forward. The question 
of how to best confront the distinct challenges of land tenure in the Tigris and Euphrates regions 
pitted administrators into two distinct camps. On one side stood officials like Henry Dobbs, John 
Glubb, and Stephen Longrigg, who were influenced by romantic conceptions of tribal society, 
infuriated by the obstruction and resistance they faced from urban elites, and seduced by the 
possibilities of integrating the tribes into the structure of colonial patriarchy. On the other side 
stood a minority opposition influenced by Lord Cromer’s political philosophy in Egypt and led 
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in Iraq by Ernest Dowson which embraced an individualist ethos of capitalist modernity in 
urging the creation of a local class of small landowners.
39
 Dowson, whose experience working 
for Lord Cromer in Egypt made him the British Empire’s most respected land expert, argued that 
extant land codes and registered titles were so fraudulent, defective, and ambiguous that colonial 
officials should use their own discretion in settling claims for the benefit of social order. Like 
Bell and Hogarth, he was acutely aware of the vast differences in economic conditions and 
modes of distribution and exploitation between various tribal groupings and urged the careful 
study of these differences as a foundation for future policy. Where traditional tribal order and 
solidarity remained relatively intact and the shaykhs continued to derive their power from the 
consent of their tribe and distribute tribal resources equitably, the colonial administration should 
uphold their power. On the other hand, where tribal solidarities had already begun to break down 
and shaykhs owed their power and authority to dubious legal documents and governmental 
intervention, the administration should prevent the further descent into feudal conditions by 
upholding the rights of individual cultivators.
40
 
The confluence of ideological and pragmatic concerns of indirect colonial rule insured 
the marginalization of Dowson and his allies and the gradual consolidation of a tribal policy that 
ceased to differentiate between the political and economic conditions of the Tigris and Euphrates 
valleys. The British need to reward old tribal allies and to ensure consistent support for colonial 
policies under the veneer of electoral democracy led to the packing of parliament with tribal 
shaykhs.
41
 The introduction of a consumption tax capped the radical revision of land revenue 
policies throughout the colonial period and ensured that agricultural landowners were almost 
completely exempt from taxation.
42
 The impact of this policy on the tribal peasants of southern 
Iraq may be traced through the poetry of the region, which began to reflect the increasingly 
oppressive conditions of peasant life during the 1920s and 1930s. Already by 1925, the Najafi 
poet ʿAli Sharqi would condemn the shaykhs' oppression of their peasants in his celebrated poem 
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"The Peasant's Sickle." The poem opened with a stirring depiction of the Iraqi peasant as arbiters 
of not only the nation's agriculture produce, but in fact the national destiny: 
 
Do you see me, between the village and the fields 
 With my lamp in my hand, roaming in the afternoon 
Searching for means to reinvigorate the homeland 
 And inspecting her affairs from every side and angle 
For if this land is ever satisfied there will then appear 




Sharqi's correlation of soil and homeland clearly yoked the destiny of the peasantry with that of 
the nation and drew an implicit metaphor between the foreign occupation and the peasant's 
plight. After a vivid depiction of an idyllic rural lifestyle that was meant to symbolize the pre-
colonial past, Sharqi turned to address the imposition of the consumption tax and the wholesale 
theft of peasant labor: 
 
 O meek and poor one, the official counseled you 
  But you turned away from the advice of these counselors 
 Your sword did not acquit you for he is a lion 
  But you stood before him armed only with patience 
 If you we penetrate the heart of that meaning 
  We find that we was stricken with grievous injuries 
 
Despite the peasant's steadfast resistance to the new regimes of agricultural commoditization, he 
remained powerless to prevent his already meager resources from being siphoned toward the 
repayment of new debts.  
 The introduction of usurious interest rates to the old equation of debts guaranteed by 
tribal shaykhs ensured that peasants without access to land titles or capital were left without the 
means to escape from under the increasingly onerous burden of repayment schedules. In a more 
caustic and sarcastic passage, Sharqi drew a sharper contrast between this new economic burden 
on the peasant and the richness of the soil: 
 
 From his river and his canals has been bestowed 
  Some base and lowly pasturage and shallow water 
 While in the surrounding meadows a gentle babble 
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  From the mouth of every gay beast to his fellow 
 And is it any wonder that these beasts sing with joy 
  While the peasant and his people are reduced to wail?  
   
This depiction of wretched peasant and sated beast emerged as a regular trope in the rural poetry 
composed by the Najafi poets during this period, the juxtaposition of images serving to confirm 
the continued fertility of the soil and blessing of nature while pointing instead to the injustice of 
colonial agrarian arrangements. Sharqi closed the poem with a metaphor comparing the 
inundation of the peasant's home and land by the floodwaters of the Euphrates to the colonization 
of Iraq: 
 
 The rafters now rose above the sinking walls 
  As the home floated away on drunken timbers 
 And I happened to see his furnishings afloat 
  Nothing but a straw mat and some shabby clothes  
 
While colonial officials, whether romanticists or modernists, had frequently maneuvered to 
prevent the worst abuses of power by the landowning shaykhs, colonial policy ensured that the 
power of the shaykhs would remain unchecked after the nominal conferral of independence in 
1932. Scarcely one year later, tribal shaykhs succeeded in forcing a bill through parliament that 
legally bound peasant cultivators to the land and virtually enshrined feudal practices as realities. 
Post-Colonial Anachronisms: Tribalism and Nationalism in Anti-Colonial Politics 
The 1935 Rebellion and the Legacy of Tribal Anti-Colonialism 
 Less than three years after the official end of colonial rule in Iraq, a tribal rebellion along 
the middle Euphrates valley brought down two successive governments and resurrected the long 
dormant hopes for a return to the pre-colonial state of affairs that had been crushed with the 
defeat of the tribal insurrection of 1920.
44
 The depth of popular resentment toward the privileged 
tribal shaykhs who capitalized on the marginal victories of the 1920 Revolution by 
demonstrating their utility as loyal clients of the colonial state and consolidating control of the 
region's lucrative land titles was passionately expressed by the radical Najafi poet Muhammad 
Salih Bahr al-ʿUlum. In "The Peasant's Revolution," one of the most memorable of several dozen 
poems composed by Bahr al-ʿUlum in support of the new rebellion, the poet excoriated those 
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opportunistic landed shaykhs and directly addressed the oppression and exploitation of the rural 
peasants: 
 
 You, O Peasant, have endured this affliction 
  While others have reaped the fruits of your labor 
 You toil through the night to provide the wealthy 




For Bahr al-ʿUlum, armed revolution was the only possible means of restoring the promise of 
1920 and returning to the peasant's their rightful share of the national produce and wealth: 
 
 Leave your fields and throw away your sickle 
  And drench this fertile soil in ruin and blood 
 Hold the government to account with your sword 
  For among them your right has turned to plunder 
 
Like Bahr al-ʿUlum, many young reformers and radicals hoped that the old tribal heroes of the 
1920 Revolution would lead the peasants toward this promised redemption and salvation. The 
eventual collapse of the tribal rebellion and the defection of the rebel shaykhs to the government 
camp, however, would convince both peasant and poet alike that further resistance in search of 
the lapsed rural utopia was futile. As Bahr al-ʿUlum and the other young Najafi poets moved on 
to Baghdad to participate in the burgeoning nationalist political struggle, the haunting imagery of 
"The Peasant's Revolution" would prove only partially prescient.
46
 The oppressed and 
increasingly disillusioned peasants of southern Iraq would indeed leave their fields and tribes and 
abandon agricultural production, but they would do in search of a new opportunities in the new 
urban utopia. 
 Rural poetry produced after 1935 took on an increasingly pessimistic - sometimes 
bordering upon nihilistic - stance towards agrarian problems and peasant suffering until it 
eventually faded away as a poetic genre. This tendency is perhaps most apparent in the writing of 
Ahmad al-Safi al-Najafi, a prominent poet from Najaf who expressed a keen and passionate 
interest in peasant life before going into exile in Lebanon and Syria in the late 1930s.
47
 Safi's 
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celebrated poem "The Peasant" opened with a sympathetic expression of solidarity and 
understanding with the peasant's plight: 
 
 Be kind and gentle to yourself, O Peasant 




The poem proceeds with a vivid depiction of peasant poverty and misery found in most works of 
this genre but includes a far more complete depiction of the ruinous financial burden placed upon 
the peasant by colonial land settlement reforms: 
 
 Here are your doubts, and some have not been paid, 
  For you are unable, so how can you pay the interests? 
 The wrinkles of your face are a canvas of hardships 
  And the creases of your forehead are tablets of misery 
 The sweet sweat of life pours from you like pearls 
  Only to become adornments for the sash of the wealthy man 
 But can you dare confront this army of greedy men 
  When you have nothing to defend you but your cries? 
 
Perhaps in response to the radicalism of Bahr al-ʿUlum, al-Safi details the impossibility of both 
revolution and reform before reaching his sad conclusion: 
 
 O planter of fruit, full of hope for reward 
  Abandon your effort for its fruit is sadness 
 Uproot it, for the delicious fruit is forbidden 
  For the planter and permissible only for the strong  
 
Like Bahr al-ʿUlum, al-Safi could not have failed to leave an indelible impression upon his 
peasant audience. The collapse of the tribal rebellions removed the last vestige of hope for either 
revolution or reform and lead many peasants to begin contemplating escape and emigration. 
 While the historical significance of the uprising has been relatively marginalized over the 
past several decades as historians have turned their attention to the development of nationalist 
and radical political ideologies and movements that would dominate the history of Iraq after the 
1940s, the rebellion and its aftermath marked several fundamental shifts in the social and 
political structures of the post-mandatory state. At the level of national politics, the uprising 
marked the first time that opposition political parties managed to use military intervention to 
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facilitate their rise to power. Bakr Sidqi’s coup d’état offers a much more violent example of the 
military’s intervention in politics, but the refusal of Army Chief of Staff Taha al-Hashimi to heed 
orders from Prime Minister ʿAli Jawdat al-Ayyubi and his successor Jamil al-Midfaʿi to crush 
the tribal uprising was the crucial factor in bringing down those two administrations and securing 
the rise to power of his brother, Yasin al-Hashimi. On a sectarian level, the aftermath of the 
uprising ensured the final retreat of the Shiʿi mujtahids from the political arena as a result of the 
simultaneous weakening of their authority over the leading tribal shaykhs and the incorporation 
of the shaykhs into the political apparatus of the central government. 
 For the tribes, though, the ramifications of the uprising were even more dramatic, 
underscoring both the end of the historical legacy of tribal anti-colonialism and the segregation 
of political and tribal politics. While the rebellions initially assumed an implicitly anti-colonial 
character, with tribal and clerical representatives demanding fundamental political reforms to the 
post-mandatory state and aligning themselves closely with the anti-colonial politicians of the 
National Brotherhood Party and with rebellious and loyal tribes almost exactly replicating their 
roles in the uprising of 1920, the development of events laid bare the superficial nature of those 
similarities.
49
 Leading rebel shaykhs like ʿAbd al-Wahid al-Hajj al-Sikkar received favorable 
land settlements and readily accepted parliamentary posts in Yasin al-Hashimi’s regime, and 
those who held out for similar terms or more fundamental structural reforms were brutally 
crushed by Bakr Sidqi and the Iraqi Army. As Hanna Batatu has noted, the “ease and grim 
rapidity” of the military assault presaged the end of the “tribal era” in Iraq and ensured that any 
future tribal rebellions would now erupt as local “risings not under the shaikhs, as in the previous 
decades, but against them.”
50
 This historical shift was accompanied by a corresponding 
severance of tribal and national politics as the army’s military superiority undermined the logic 
of political alliances based on the threat of tribal violence. When prominent rebel shaykhs like 
ʿAbd al-Wahid rejoined the political apparatus of the modern state and the Bakr Sidqi coup 
d’état of the following year further cemented the new political alliance of the old anti-colonial 
politicians of the National Brotherhood Party and the pro-British stalwarts of the old regime, the 
transition to a new political framework of the post-mandatory period was completed. The most 
                                                          
49
 Muhsin Abu Tabikh's recollection of events emphasized the "sectarian bigotry" of the Sunni political elite but 
quickly devolves into an attack on the "effendis who lacked the racial stock and sentiment to speak in the name of 
the Iraqi people." Muhsin Abu Tabikh, Mudhakkirat al-Sayyid Muhsin Abu Tabikh, 1910-1960: Khamsun ʿAmman 
min Tarikh al-ʿIraq al-Siyasi al-Hadith (Bayrut: al-Muʾassassah al-ʿArabiyah li al-Dirasat wa al-Nashr, 2001), 312-18. 
50
 Batatu, The Old Social Classes, 118-19. 
165 
 
prominent landed shaykhs now found it more politically expedient and financially profitable to 
acquiesce to their new position as feudal allies of the monarchy than to openly challenge the 
sovereignty of the central government and the lesser shaykhs simply receded from the political 
landscape. 
 The historical trajectory of ʿAbd al-Wahid’s relationship with the Iraqi anti-colonial 
movement offers a particularly instructive illustration of the long decline of tribal anti-
colonialism.
51
  As a prominent shaykh of the al-Fatlah tribe, ʿAbd al-Wahid rose to national 
prominence for his role in coordinating tribal insurrections in the Euphrates valley during the 
anti-British uprising of 1920. After the uprising was successfully put down, colonial authorities 
confiscated ʿAbd al-Wahid’s profitable Rak al-Haswah estate and the shaykh subsequently 
forged a political alliance with National Brotherhood politicians Yasin al-Hashimi and Rashid 
ʿAli al-Kaylani in the hope of recovering his estate. His instrumental role in leading the tribal 
uprisings that brought Yasin to power in 1935 was rewarded by the new administration’s 
decision to return to him control of the estate, but the Bakr Sidqi coup d’état of the following 
year brought to power political opponents of the National Brotherhood Party who once again 
confiscated the estate and transferred the title to rival shaykhs. Unfortunately for ʿAbd al-Wahid, 
the assassination of Bakr Sidqi and the return to power of the exiled conservative politicians did 
not bring forth a similar reversal of fortune. While tribal rivalries and land disputes had 
previously played out as a function of national anti-colonial politics, with rival tribal shaykhs 
alternately identifying as pro-British or anti-British, new political developments broke this cycle. 
The alliance of leftwing intellectuals and non-Arab politicians in support of the Bakr Sidqi coup 
d’état thrust together a new and short-lived political alliance of the pro-British and anti-British 
political factions of the nascent pan-Arabist movement. The anti-colonial tribal shaykhs, who 
were never particularly interested in the national politics of pan-Arabism, found that they had 
lost their political utility and been abandoned by their old political allies.  
As Batatu has noted, “this background of resentment and disappointed hopes” made ʿAbd 
al-Wahid a natural ally of the radical nationalists who came to power in the coup d’état 
organized by Rashid ʿAli and the Four Colonels in April 1941. With ʿAbd al-Wahid’s assistance, 
the Rashid ʿAli administration moved against the pro-British tribal shaykhs, confiscating the 
properties of any who were known to be on familiar terms with local British officials and 
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distributing them to their rivals.
52
 In the aftermath of the Rashid ʿAli movement, British officials 
ordered Salih Jabr, the new Minister of Interior, to arrest ʿAbd al-Wahid and send him to the new 
internment camp at Fao. ʿAbd al-Wahid not only lost any hope of recovering the Rak al-Haswah 
estate but now watched as British officials at the Ministry of Interior transferred control of his 
Abu Wawiyah estate to a rival shaykh of the al-Fatlah tribe.
53
 While old nationalist allies like 
Minister of Justice Sadiq al-Bassam agitated for ʿAbd al-Wahid’s release, the British Embassy 
was now committed to decisively breaking the power of the anti-colonial shaykhs and 
permanently pacifying the tribal south. With the able assistance of their staunch allies Nuri al-
Saʿid and Salih Jabr, British officials succeeded in stifling tribal dissent by arresting and 
interning any shaykhs who publicly supported ʿAbd al-Wahid.
54
 After his eventual release from 
internment, ʿAbd al-Wahid found that the center of gravity in the anti-colonial movement had 
shifted from the conservative nationalism of the National Brotherhood Party to the leftist politics 
of the National Democratic Party and the Iraqi Communist Party. Now recognizing that the old 
convergence of nationalist politics and economic self-interest had been permanently ruptured, 
ʿAbd al-Wahid made his peace with the new political order and “ended as an undistinguished 
supporter of the policies of Nuri al-Saʿid.
55
 
In the midst of these structural transformations of the political order, rank and file 
tribesmen saw their own material prospects deteriorate as rural political stability reinforced the 
feudal laws and practices developed during the colonial era. The Law of the Settlement of Land 
Rights passed in 1933 had effectively codified the conversion of tribal cultivators to peasant serfs 
legally tied to the land, but the end of tribal feuds and the relative stabilization of land titles to 
the major agricultural estates now solidified in practice the total political and economic 
dominance of the major landowners. In the past, economic exploitation had been held in check to 
a certain extent by the necessity of tribal solidarity under threat of war, which forced rebel tribal 
shaykhs to maintain a reasonably consensual relationship with their tribal subjects. The end of 
anti-governmental tribal rebellions effectively reduced the economic leverage of tribal cultivators 
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by removing obligations of war from their job descriptions. The al-Fatlah tribal cultivators who 
worked the Abu Wawiyah estate thus bitterly fought the transfer of the estate title from ʿAbd al-
Wahid to the sons of his rival, Hassan al-Sikkar, who had no interest in the cultivators’ martial 
capabilities and therefore considerable leverage over the new terms of employment. Only the 
introduction of a massive police force by the Ministry of Interior succeeded in forcing the 
cultivators to either vacate their land or to accept the considerably worse terms.
56
   
With the possibility of the type of violent revolution against oppressive landowners 
advocated by Muhammad Salih Bahr al-ʿUlum effaced by Yasin al-Hashimi's brutal repression 
of the 1935 tribal rebellions and the possibility of radical land reform and redistribution 
forestalled by the collapse of the Bakr Sidqi regime, some sympathetic poets sought to further 
the cause of a more moderate vision of rural reform by representing the peasant's plight in stark 
language but without incendiary political commentary.
57
 The best known of these works was 
Muhammad Mahdi al-Jawahiri's "Feudalism," which bluntly underscored what many Iraqis saw 
as the regressive transformation of social life in the countryside: 
 
Is there no power capable of repelling injustices 
 And reviving the people from the this degradation? 
Is there no notable willing to receive the people 
 Falling into this mire of poverty with a glance of pity? 
Is what brings hope to the reformers now narrating 
 The very opposite of reality or some chimera of dreams? 
For the hand of feudalism rises until it paralyzes 




Jawahiri then turns to illustrate the plight of the peasant in vivid poetic language: 
 
 The beams of the huts receive their shadows 
  As the murky well transforms light into darkness 
 The whips writhe above the back of the beasts 
  A wickedness borne from commensurate flagellation 
 The stomachs of the famished go to sleep in hunger  
  While others are gorged in the most splendid restaurants 
 Have these citizens of our nation become prepared 
  To receive the world with the resolve of the assailant?! 
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Jawahiri closed the poem not with a call to violent revolution, but instead with a plea for 
government intercession and reform: 
 
 Are these empty souls a prayer and supplication 
  That we take pride in as equals on the day of collision? 
 Or is it from the languid, weak, and weary arm  
  Of an old woman that we seek property to steady our hold?! 
 
The poet here sought to shame both government officials and the landed shaykhs into taking 
some pity on the impoverished peasants, but the call would go unheeded. 
In the post-war period, the political power of prominent shaykhs was increasingly 
contingent on his relations with the national political elite rather than his local tribal influence. In 
ʿAmarah, local land disputes were settled in favor of pro-government shaykhs and rival 
claimants were in several cases arrested and imprisoned as a political demonstration of the 
central government’s power.
59
 Shaykhs who enjoyed seats in parliament, like Muhan al-
Khayrallah of the al-Shuwaylat and Sagban al-ʿAli of the al-Khafaja, exploited their power and 
influence in Baghdad to expand their land holdings. While both shaykhs were considered anti-
British because of prior political alliances with ʿAbd al-Wahid and Rashid ʿAli, their willingness 
to accept the post-war political order underscored the new anachronistic nature of tribal anti-
colonialism. British efforts to oust the pair from parliament were firmly rebuffed by Nuri al-
Saʿid, who was convinced that financial interests were paramount for the shaykhs and that their 
lack of any national political ambition rendered them particularly effective political allies. 
Muhan and Sagban coordinated propaganda for Nuri among local shaykhs in ʿAmarah and the 
Muntafiq and eventually joined Nuri’s Constitutional Union Party in 1949.
60
 Muhan used his 
influence in Baghdad to increase his personal wealth, digging a small channel through barren 
lands to the east of his Muntafiq estate into ʿAmarah and sowing an acre of crops every mile or 
so in order to construct new facts on the ground in anticipation of an eventual legal battle. The 
local provincial governors attempted to put a stop to these unauthorized encroachments on 
government land, but Muhan was able to convince his allies in Baghdad to remand their orders. 
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His own tribal cultivators complained to local officials of their “considerable dissatisfaction” 
with his oppressive practices of exploitation.
61
  
By the end of the 1940s, the process was complete, and there were no longer any 
prominent rebel shaykhs in southern Iraq. The elimination of rivals allowed the victorious 
shaykhs to amplify and accelerate the processes of title consolidation. As Salih Haider has 
described in vivid detail, the landed shaykhs' reliance on government forces to enforce rent 
payments reduced the need to cultivate tribal consent and thus served to transform the hegemonic 
nature of tribal society into something more closely resembling an amalgamation of antiquated 
feudalist and modern capitalist means of agricultural production and social organization. The 
increasing use of agricultural machinery, coupled with the utter exhaustion of peasant resources, 
led many landed shaykhs to reconsider the utility of binding their peasants to the land and 
prompted many to evict those who could not pay their debts. This flagrant disregard for tribal 
conventions led to a startlingly rapid disintegration of tribal solidarities and identities in many 
parts of southern Iraq.
62
 While the communal bonds of tribal confederations were severely 
weakened, solidarities between members of various social units within the old confederations 
were strengthened. It was the tribal or "sub-tribal" chiefs of these families and clans who now 
began to challenge the authority of the paramount shaykh and, in many cases, to lead their 
members toward the more promising horizon of Baghdad.
63
 The landed shaykhs, meanwhile, 
began to seize the opportunity to fully exploit colonial conceptions of “tribal democracy.” 
Tribal Democracy in the Neo-Colonial Political Order 
The same political impulses and historical processes that contributed to the gradual 
decline of tribal anti-colonialism laid the foundations for an increasingly autonomous form of 
“tribal democracy” in the countryside. The Rashid ʿAli movement and the Anglo-Iraqi War of 
May 1941 prompted a serious political crisis that forced British officials to reevaluate the utility 
of existing political alliances in the interest of future stability. The return of an older generation 
of colonial officials like Kinahan Cornwallis and John Glubb helped to revive romantic 
conceptions of tribalism that viewed tribal autonomy as an apolitical ideal for local justice and 
imperial cooperation. The proportion of tribal shaykhs in parliament increased dramatically in 
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the post-war period – reversing the political trends of the past two decades that saw the 
consolidation of the central government’s authority under Faysal and Ghazi – as the monarchy, 
the British Embassy, and the landed shaykhs arrived at a political consensus that traded tribal 
support for Britain and the monarchy in exchange for the tacit promise of non-interference in 
tribal affairs.
64
 These neo-colonial efforts to reform the political structures of the modern state 
ignored the vast social changes of the previous decades and thus further cemented the oppressive 
relations of tribal feudalism. 
While many younger British officials urged democratic reforms to thwart the future 
development of “fascist” ideologies, the older generation of officials returning to Iraq to oversee 
the new military occupation drew upon their experiences in the colonial period and argued that 
the appearance of fascism in the Arab world was the product of colonial experiments in 
democratic governance. Foremost among these officials was John Glubb, commander of the 
Jordanian Arab Legion, whose own success in forging an alliance between the tribes, the 
monarchy, and the British Embassy in Jordan lent his advice on the internal dynamics of Iraqi 
politics an air imperial authority.
65
 After speaking with numerous disgruntled tribal shaykhs in 
southwestern Iraq en route to Fallujah and Baghdad, Glubb concluded that despite the similarity 
in form between constitutional democracy in Britain and Iraq, “nothing could be more 
undemocratic than the result.” For the past two decades, political power in Iraq had been 
monopolized by “the same old crowd” of politicians who “all became very rich, and most of 
them became owners of great landed estates, at the expense of the fellaheen and the small 
farmer.” Glubb argued that “electoral machinery” perverted democracy in the Arab world and 
urged reforms modeled on tribal society, where “the ordinary cultivators and tribesmen live on 
terms of social equality with their sheikhs and leaders.”  Britain must accept that “the Arabs were 
freer and more democratic before we presented them with a model of the British constitution,” 
and accordingly encourage a dramatic increase in the representation of shaykhs in parliament and 
a dramatic expansion of power for the King and the British Ambassador.
66
  
These efforts to restructure local relations of power and authority paid immediate 
dividends, as landed shaykhs began appealing for a more vocal and visible British presence in 
                                                          
64
 Batatu, The Old Social Classes, 99-110. 
65
 On Glubb’s role in Jordan, see Yoav Alon, The Making of Jordan: Tribes, Colonialism and the Modern State 
(London: I.B. Tauris, 2007), 84-109. 
66
 John Glubb, "A Report on the Role Played by the Arab Legion in Connection with the Recent Operations in Iraq," 





 By the end of the war, one prominent tribal shaykh and senator 
privately assured the British Ambassador that the tribes “were first loyal to the British and then 
to the regent.”
68
 Some shaykhs exploited their new influence with British officials occupying key 
advisory positions at the Ministry of Interior in order to extend their own landholdings. Shaykh 
Muhammad al-ʿAraybi of the Albu Muhammad managed to reverse the losses he suffered during 
the mandatory period when colonial officials transferred nearly half of his profitable Shahalah 
estate to his rival Shaykh Falih al-Sayhud.
69
 ʿAraybi reported frequently on the anti-British 
activities of his rivals and in return secured control of a critical plot of land controlling the 
crucial water resources of the Shahalah through the intervention of his British contacts.
70
 The 
loss of access to water forced the heirs to Falih al-Sayhud’s portion of the Shahalah to drop their 
claims in exchange for a nominal sum and ensured ʿAraybi’s total control of the estate.
71
 The 
national political elite quickly followed the example set by British officials in trading economic 
favors for political support, though many politicians demanded access to the spoils of wealth. By 
the end of the decade, after approving a favorable land deal for ʿAraybi, Nuri al-Saʿid dispatched 




At the level of electoral politics, increased representation for tribal shaykhs was achieved 
by offering the most prominent shaykhs direct control over the electoral process, without even 
superficial recourse to the practices and protocol of rigged elections in urban areas. When an 
official from the ʿAmarah Consulate asked Shaykh Mutlaq al-Salman how many of “his” 
peasants voted in the September 1943 elections, the shaykh, “obviously preserving patience at 
my stupidity, explained that of course none of them went or heard about the matter.” Mutlaq, like 
other tribal shaykhs across the Iraqi countryside, merely presented the provincial governor with a 
list of secondary electors who were supposed to have been elected by the males of his tribe. 
Despite the official’s bemusement at the open “breach and defiance of the written electoral law,” 
he noted that such practices of electoral fraud were “to some extent made necessary by the 
ignorance of the majority” and suggested that the country would be better served by an electoral 
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law “not produced in the abstract from the ideal of democracy but shaped from the tested basis of 
the living facts of education, developments, and the requirements of the people.” His chief 
complaint was not the betrayal of democratic ideals but rather the open betrayal of electoral law, 
which he feared would only inhibit the government’s ability to enforce the rule of law in other 
arenas. When the governor of ʿAmarah declared that Iraqi elections “were free of course, free as 
they had ever been before” at a local meeting of the Brotherhood of Freedom, an organization 
ostensibly devoted to the cultivation of democratic ideals, the gathered shaykhs and notables 
erupted in laughter and applause.
73
  
In the southern provinces of ʿAmarah and the Muntafiq, the collusion of the British 
Embassy, the national political elite, and the rural shaykhs in the electoral process caused a sharp 
reduction in the number of non-tribal parliamentary deputies.
74
 Both British officials and the 
national political elite somehow managed to convince themselves that this delegation of power 
and authority to the shaykhs was a necessary element of political reform. Patriarchal conceptions 
of the authority of tribal shaykhs led urban politicians and foreign officials to conclude that tribal 
peasants would invariably back their own shaykhs in free and fair elections. The fact that the 
rural tribes, defined in the broadest possible sense, constituted a demographic majority of the 
national population meant that true democracy would inevitably produce a tribal dictatorship. By 
carefully dividing secondary electors in the rural provinces between the loyal sirkals nominated 
by the most prominent shaykhs and the urban notables nominated by provincial governors, the 
central government could insure an equitable division of power between the cities and the tribes. 
This reduction of peasant politics to tribal hierarchies thereby served as justification for the 




This conception of the empowerment of landowning shaykhs in national politics as a 
progressive political reform was echoed at the local level, where tribal policies that consolidated 
land ownership in the hands of the most prominent shaykhs were seen as necessary initiatives to 
promote general economic welfare by introducing a measure of political and financial stability. 
Ignoring the historical evidence that pointed to the startling enrichment of the major shaykhs 
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since the dawn of the colonial era, British officials viewed tribal policy in the post-mandatory 
period as part of an historical continuum of enlightened colonial practices and policies designed 
to balance the interests of rival shaykhs and to support peasant claims to the land. As one British 
official argued, if local peasants failed to appreciate the material benefits of these efforts to 
construct “a new order of things,” it was due to the “fatuous” inability of local officials to 
properly articulate and publicize the aims of those policies.
76
 The complaints of provincial 
officials that constant British interference in local and tribal matters was functioning as a pretext 
for a national “policy of stagnation” were likewise dismissed by British officials, who contended 
that they merely offered advice and carefully refrained from infringing on national sovereignty.
77
 
The rise of mass political protests in Baghdad and other urban areas in response to the 
Anglo-Iraqi Treaty signed at Portsmouth in January 1948 only strengthened the alliance between 
Britain, Nuri al-Saʿid, and the shaykhs. While some British officials expressed concern about the 
long-term danger of maintaining an alliance with “the protagonists of reaction” and contemplated 
the idea of a “moderate” political reform party, the need for reliable parliamentary votes 
precluded the immediate adoption of such a scheme.
78
 Both tribal shaykhs and the urban political 
elite rejected the prospect of any alliance with the “new blood” of the reformists “with a 
steadfastness which would be laudable if it were not so stupid.”
79
 Leading tribal shaykhs assured 
the British Embassy that they were deeply embarrassed by the nationalist opposition and averred 
that “whichever was good enough for His Majesty’s Government was good enough for them.” 
Some shaykhs even privately offered to rally their tribes and march on Baghdad to crush the 
protestors.
80
 When new elections were conducted in June 1948, the landed shaykhs and 
government officials demonstrated a notably greater level of cooperation and coordination that 
reflected a shared interest in maintaining the old political regime. The shaykhs sought out local 
governors “for fatherly advice” on which of them was most deserving of political office and 
began to contemplate the prospect of modern education for their sons so that they could 
participate in parliamentary debates.
81
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Peasant dissatisfaction with the rule of the tribal shaykhs, though, was by this point 
undeniable and forced British officials to reevaluate their own role in hindering the progress and 
development of the tribes. After noting that the vast majority of tribesmen lived and worked “in 
conditions which cannot be very different from those which obtained a century ago,” one British 
official surmised that colonial patronage and the preservation of the iltizam system had combined 
to preserve an antiquated social order.
82
 That antiquated social order, though, was sustained not 
only by feudal policies but also by policies that enforced a rigid cultural isolation between tribes 
and towns. 
Ideologies of Cultural Space: The Segregation of the Tribal Sphere 
Tribal policy in the post-war period was increasingly marked by an overarching 
opposition to the assimilation of tribal and national politics. As tensions between tribal 
cultivators and landowning shaykhs increased, both the British Embassy and the nation political 
elite took concrete steps to prevent the spread of subversive political ideologies among the 
peasantry. In addition to ending the cooperation between the erstwhile rebel shaykhs and the 
nationalist political parties and delegating electoral authority to the landed shaykhs, government 
authorities now moved to prevent the integration of subaltern tribal and urban political currents 
by restricting rural access to urban newspapers and crafting a new rural educational curriculum 
that minimized potentially subversive subjects like poetry and history. These processes coincided 
with a notable reorientation of political and intellectual interest in the rural tribes as prominent 
nationalist poets based in and around Najaf moved to Baghdad to participate in the new arenas of 
mass politics.
83
 Intellectual trends in the post-war period illustrated the stark reality of the new 
cultural isolation of the countryside as intellectual engagement with tribes and peasants was 
transformed into an intellectual discourse about the rural problem.
84
 
The impetus to segregate tribal and urban cultural spheres was a crucial element of 
British colonial policy, as Toby Dodge has shown in great detail.
85
 This impetus, however, was 
aided in a crucial respect by the efforts of many urban Iraqi intellectuals, whose scarcely veiled 
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contempt for tribal ignorance and backwardness served to undermine their stated goal of rural 
reform. These intellectual and literary constructions of tribal and rural space as ignorant and 
backward contributed to the further alienation of not only rural peasants and tribal leaders, but in 
fact the alienation of many peasants from rural society in general. At the same time that 
compulsory education and literacy were expanding across the countryside, the national cultural 
discourse was being transformed to promote an increasingly urbanized vision of national 
community where tribal and peasant issues were framed as problem and pathologies to be 
disciplined and reformed. While novelists and short story writers like Dhu al-Nun Ayyub, ʿAbd 
al-Majid Lufti, ʿAbd al-Malik Nuri, and Mahmud Ahmad al-Sayyid showed considerable 
sympathy for peasant trials and tribulations in dealing with these problems, their narratives 
nevertheless contributed to the growing construction of rural society as social pathology.
86
 Orit 
Bashkin has noted the angst and ambivalence of so many of these young intellectuals - and 
particularly those hailing from rural backgrounds - towards the backwardness of rural society 
and callousness of the city.
87
 Unmistakable here, though, is the fact that these intellectuals never 
returned to their villages and that while the city may have been constructed as an unfulfilled 
promise, the village always remained a corrupted and bygone utopia. It was no wonder, then, that 
many rural peasants came to see the city as their future. 
The initial impetus to “protect” tribal cultivators from the subversive influence of 
nationalist politics emerged in conjunction with the popularization of “communism” as a 
pejorative label collectively affixed to the ideologically diverse political parties. As one British 
official in ʿAmarah noted, “It appears that anybody lables [sic] any one whom he does not like as 
a Communist.” Noting that the southern tribes were predominately Shiʿa and that the leaders of 
the opposition parties were largely Sunni, the official conjectured that local shaykhs were taking 
advantage of sectarian tensions by spreading rumors “that Karl Marx is of greater importance 
than Muhammad” to the urban intellectuals.
88
 Intelligence reports indicated that the nationalist 
parties continued to court the shaykhs with attacks on British support for Zionism and that the 
leftist parties sought to build support among local peasants “along the usual Communistic 
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 The Iraqi Communist Party eventually gained a small but significant degree of peasant 
support, but the local shaykhs never demonstrated serious interest in the events in Palestine. 
When the opposition parties organized an Anti-Zionist national strike on May 10, 1946, several 
prominent shaykhs visited the British Consulate at ʿAmarah and “expressed bewilderment at the 
British Government ‘permitting’ this anti-British demonstration.”
90
 Fueled by fear of the rising 
political activism and steadfast opposition to proposed land reforms, the shaykhs proved 
instrumental in arranging for the liberal administration of Tawfiq al-Suwaydi to be replaced by 
the reactionary stalwart Arshad al-ʿUmari.
91
 When the crisis in Palestine reached its fever pitch 
at the end of 1947, several prominent shaykhs were forced, “much to their disgust,” to serve on 
national anti-Zionist committees, but most privately assured British officials that they would do 
nothing except pay “some lip service” to the nationalist cause.
92
  
As political and technological modernization facilitated the spread of ideas and 
institutions in the rural south, local officials and notables were forced to grapple with new 
realities of political awareness that extended beyond the domain of elite politics. The Public 
Relations Reading Rooms established during the war by Freya Stark and the Brotherhood of 
Freedom in order to distribute propaganda “which had a steadying effect on the populace” and to 
function as a “rallying point for the pro-British elements who in turn influenced large sections of 
the people” emerged as a potent target for both pro-British and anti-British forces in the post-war 
period.
93
 The British Embassy chose not to host the Reading Rooms at the local consulates in 
order to dispel suspicions that the cultural institutions were part of a coordinated political policy 
and to address concerns that many in the targeted population would prove unwilling to be 
publicly seen frequenting consulate grounds.
94
 The local population, though, initially viewed the 
Reading Rooms as scarcely disguised British spy outposts, leading one friendly shaykh to warn 
consular officials that espionage should be conducted more discreetly.
95
  
 As the local population grew more accustomed to presence of the Reading Rooms and 
more convinced that they were not functioning as bases for espionage, concern shifted towards 
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the content of the reading material made available. British officials in ʿAmarah, Nasiriyah, and 
the Muntafiq complained about the presence of “anti-British” newspapers published in Baghdad. 
One official noted that local students who frequented the Reading Rooms only appeared 
interested in the nationalist and anti-colonial politics of Baghdad and warned that Britain was 
unwittingly aiding the corruption of rural youth by providing them access to inflammatory 
reading material. He suggested replacing the popular nationalist papers with pro-British journals 
and attaching all newspaper to stands positioned in the middle of the room as a disciplinary 
measure: “One of the advantages here would be that the reader could not take a paper, sit in a 
chair and go to sleep.” Other British officials concluded that the political threat posed by literacy 
campaigns was too great and turned instead toward mobile cinema, which could be controlled 
much more effectively, as the dominant mode of public propaganda.
96
 Attendance dropped 
markedly after the changes were introduced and students attacked the local buildings with 
homemade fire bombs in several locations.
97
 By May 1949, the British Consul at ʿAmarah 
suggested closing down all of the local Reading Rooms, noting that “they do us much more harm 
than good.” He warned that the Reading Rooms in the countryside were frequented by “young 
fellows” who “appear to be much more unfriendly to the British than the vast majority one meets 
casually on the roads and elsewhere.” Efforts to educate the local population, he argued, could 
only be truly effective under war conditions, “when propaganda is much more affectively [sic] 
controlled.” He noted, furthermore, that local Communists tended to frequent the Reading 




The events of the Wathbah sparked new fears among British officials stationed in the 
rural south where they observed a “great fundamental change in the political attitude” of the 
peasants. Long dismissed as mere pawns of the landowning shaykhs, the peasants had now 
become “politically conscious” and the spread of communism in the countryside was regarded as 
a serious threat to the political stability of the Anglo-Iraqi alliance.
 99
 While street protests raged 
in Baghdad, schoolchildren and peasants in Nasiriyah organized huge demonstrations to protest 
Lieutenant-Colonel Berkeley’s tour of the tribal regions. Shaykh Zamil al-Mannaʿ of the Ajwad, 
                                                          
96
 Baghdad Embassy to Amara Consulate, April 1, 1947, FO 838/4. 
97
 Basra Consulate to Amara Consulate, March 10, 1948, FO 838/6. 
98
 Amara Consulate, Report for the Month of May 1949, FO 838/8. 
99
 Amara Consulate, Report for the Month of June 1948, FO 838/7. 
178 
 
who was in Baghdad at the time, later apologized privately to Berkley for the actions of “the 
ignorant children” and assuring him that he would have “taught them a good lesson” if he had 
been present.
100
 Nearly every major nationalist newspaper wrote in support of the children’s 
demonstration against the influence of imperialists on “the weak spirits of the tribal chiefs.”
101
 
The crowds, which included hundred of peasant sharecroppers, impoverished workers, 
disgruntled students, and nearly one hundred local women, chanted against colonialism, 
capitalism, and feudalism and denounced both British officials and prominent local shaykhs by 
name. More worrying to British officials was the fact that many reportedly chanted in support of 
communism and the Soviet Union. Frightened American officials at ʿAmarah requested an 
armed police guard and (inaccurate) local rumors quickly spread that the British Consul had fled 
the area in fear of the crowds.
102
 British officials at the ʿAmarah Consulate were likewise 
impressed by British Embassy reports that huge numbers of peasant migrants played a significant 
role in the mass uprisings that rocked the capital.
103
  
Peasant protests continued even after the suppression of street protests in the urban 
centers as the convocation of new elections prompted the disenfranchised rural masses to 
demand their right to vote. At one polling station in ʿAmarah, police sought to suppress voter 
turnout by drawing up the bridge that the local inhabitants used to cross the Chahala creek on 
their way to town. Only after securing the support of local students and the prominent leftwing 
lawyer ʿAbd al-Razzaq al-Zubayr were the peasants able to put together a crowd large enough to 
force the police to open the bridge, and the ensuing struggle outside of the station claimed the 
life of one peasant. Local intelligence reports claimed that ʿAbd al-Razzaq’s popularity among 
the local peasants was drawn from the fact that he had already privately drawn up plans for the 
redistribution of the large estates to the landless peasants.
104
  
British officials concluded that the expansion of education without concurrent 
modernization had produced a new class of disaffected youth alienated from agrarian traditions 
and increasingly drawn to the radical politics of the Iraqi Communist Party, which had now 
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gained “a firm hold” in several rural districts.
105
 As they turned their attention for the first time in 
decades to the economic problems of peasant life, British officials found that any reform 
initiatives were blocked by suspicious local officials. Provincial governors warned British 
officials on numerous occasions, either explicitly or implicitly, that they were not permitted to 
visit the tribes without prior authorization.
106
 The landowning shaykhs, on the other hand, were 
too closely associated with Britain to propose any reforms without provoking allegations of 
foreign conspiracy. One British official concluded that efforts to spread propaganda among the 
tribes were “pointless” and noted that “the tribes are all with us and our great difficulty is to 
avoid making officials jealous of our friendship with them.”
107
 Another official worried that the 
shaykhs’ relations with British officials “have been so friendly that they amount to treachery” in 
their total repudiation of local authority.
108
 Lacking faith in both the local shaykhs’ commitment 
to reform and the central government’s competence to properly institute economic reform, 
British officials now saw the creation of an independent development board staffed with British 
and American economists as the only real solution to the rural problem.  
Developing the Slums of Baghdad: Economic Development and Mass Migration 
Agrarian Problems and Theories of Economic Development 
 The spread of Communist influence and agrarian unrest across the tribal south in the late 
1940s forced British officials to reassess the historical legacy of colonial land reform and to 
explore new paths of economic reform that could simultaneously address peasant grievances and 
preserve the now crucial political alliance with the landowning shaykhs. British officials, 
convinced that the economic injustices of the entrenched social order had driven pre-war support 
for fascism, had begun to urge serious structural reforms immediately following the resumption 
of military occupation. The rising popularity of the Iraqi Communist Party during the war years 
only confirmed the impression that serious reforms were necessary to forestall further political 
radicalization. British pressure on ʿAbd al-Ilah and Nuri al-Saʿid helped to ensure the rise to 
power of successive liberal administrations led by Hamdi al-Pachachi and Tawfiq al-Suwaydi. 
While the liberals’ halfhearted commitment to serious economic reform was effectively blocked 
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by the parliamentary opposition of conservative shaykhs with vested interests in preserving the 
semi-feudal structures of rural power, Pachachi did manage to secure the passage of the Miri Sirf 
Development Law.
109
 The measure, which provided for the distribution of state land on the 
Dujayla settlement project to small farmers, would serve as the historical model for virtually all 
official development proposals over the coming decade. 
The Dujayla settlement scheme, though, was severely limited in scope and barely one 
thousand farmers had been settled on project lands by 1950. Conservative opposition blocked 
any effort to expand the project in other rural areas and effectively stalled the political impetus 
for land reform. Forced to admit that soil fertility and agricultural production had dramatically 
declined since the end of Ottoman rule, British officials initially concluded that the root of the 
agrarian problem was the fundamental instability of land tenure and the discouraging prospects 
for capital investment. As one official report asked: 
 
Who, on a three or five year lease granted by a known fickle and hostile 
[government], is going to spend money – dream and imagine, conceive and 
construct, beautify and fulfil [sic] the possibilities of the soil? It is a thousand 




Land leases were renewed in the middle of the harvest season, when the central government’s 
leverage over the landholders was at its peak.
111
 While some political administrations adopted 
lax attitudes in collecting land revenue in order to curry favor with the shaykhs, others moved 
quickly to arrest and imprison indebted leaseholders.
112
 Government pressure on the shaykhs led 
some to confiscate the entire tribal harvest, in addition to the tribe’s buffaloes and even the 
women’s jewelry, in order to avoid imprisonment.
113
 Structural deficiencies of rendered the 
shaykhs both victims and villains:  
 
The result of this practice is that because of insecurity of tenure not only are no 
improvements made to the land but also that in their hundreds cultivators flee… 
The shaikhs of Amarah should be very wealthy people but because of their 
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Without assurances that leases would be renewed by future administrations, landholders made 
little effort was made to improve the quality of soil and entirely abandoned crop rotation.
115
  
 The general instability of land tenure, British officials noted, was exacerbated by both 
official corruption and populist sympathies and inclinations. The necessity of continual lease 
renewal encouraged local officials to demand bribes from the landholding shaykhs, which 
siphoned off sizeable chunks of agricultural profits and further depressed peasant wages.
116
 An 
initial attempt at land reform promised to redistribute land to peasant sharecroppers by forcing 
leaseholders to either pay full taxes on the uncultivated portions of their lease holdings or to 
renounce their claims to the land. As the British Consul at ʿAmarah noted, however, the only 
plots of land actually renounced lacked access to irrigation: “If land was of no use to a shaikh 
who could command capital, it would be useless to a man with no capital at all.”
117
 On the other 
hand, government confiscation and redistribution of large estates enjoyed considerable 
popularity, not only from the standpoint of the rival landowners who benefitted from the policy 
shifts but also among the poor peasants and small landowners who were “always ready to 
applaud the detachment of wealth or its engines from any too favored individual.” This populist 
attitude, fueled by resentment at the growing disparities of wealth during the war years, only 
further encouraged new administrations to shore up flagging popular support with redistributive 
maneuvers that pitted rival tribal shaykhs against one another.
118
 Any lasting land reform 
initiative, British officials concluded, would have to come from within an independent institution 
subject to neither the tumultuous politics of the national scene nor the corrupt inclinations of 
local officials. 
 Concerted British pressure on influential Iraqi allies finally achieved firm commitments 
to the establishment of an Economic Development Board that could plan and implement a 
coordinated agenda of economic development and reform. The Development Board was 
officially approved by the liberal Prime Minister Tawfiq al-Suwaydi in April 1950 and began 
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work by the beginning of the following year.
119
 The tremendous economic impact of the 
Development Board over the course of the 1950s was shaped by three crucial factors. First, the 
political independence of the Development Board, ostensibly designed to insulate the 
development agenda from the conservative opposition of landed political interests, also ensured 
that development initiatives would remain overly determined by macroeconomic fixations on 
growth and productivity and relatively immune to social critiques of impact of development on 
the peasantry. Second, the allocation of the entirety of oil revenues – later reduced to seventy 
percent – to the Development Board at a time when oil production was dramatically increasing 
and the renegotiation of oil contracts provided the Iraqi government with a significantly greater 
proportion of oil revenues rendered financial concerns virtually irrelevant and allowed the 
Development Board to pursue extravagant initiatives designed to radically alter the productive 
capabilities of the Iraqi economy. Third, the remarkable decision to offer two of the six seats on 
the Development Board to British and American economic advisors “whose judgment would be 
unaffected by local political considerations” meant that the Western powers enjoyed 
unprecedented latitude and informal power over the entire national economy.
120
 These factors 
both ensured that economic development would leave a measurable impact on the lives of 
virtually every participant in the national economy and that Britain and the United States would 
be held publicly responsible for that impact. 
 An additional, often overlooked, implication of the establishment of the Development 
Board was the impact of rising American influence in economic policy. American interest and 
influence in Iraq, as in other areas of the Middle East, progressed in a somewhat contradictory 
manner over the course of the 1940s due to the simultaneous decline of the British Empire and 
emergence of the Anglo-American Cold War alliance. At the same time that American rhetorical 
support for national sovereignty was subordinated to the more pragmatic commitment to 
supporting British interests in the region, the British imperial retreat forced the United States to 
take on an ever greater role in the region.
121
 While American officials in Iraq in the early 1950s 
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were committed to supporting British policy and generally uninterested in advancing American 
interests at Britain’s expense, they were also encouraged to adopt a more vocal and active role in 
support of the Anglo-Iraqi alliance.
122
 American officials evinced a markedly more ambitious 
approach to economic development than their British counterparts, with one official confidently 
declaring that the development program in Iraq would “have influence on land reform and 
related programs throughout this area, and, indeed, throughout the world.” Conversely, American 
officials insisted on differentiating their own assistance from colonial interventions by asserting 
the “firm policy of not placing American personnel in operating posts.” This policy reflected the 
capitalist mantras that “development is a state of mind” and that foreign assistance should not 
constitute financial aid but rather “a program of can-do and know-how” that emphasized “the 
effectiveness of technical assistance and of the flow of private capital.”
123
 It also ensured that 
development initiatives would remain uncoordinated and sometimes contradictory as American 
advice was adapted to suit the needs of interested Iraqi parties.   
 American diplomatic officials and economic advisors looked to local informants to 
explain the cultural roots of rural poverty and agricultural inefficiency and to point out viable 
paths forward. ʿAbd al-Razzaq al-Hilali’s Theories of Rural Reform made a particularly strong 
impression on American officials, who had the book’s core arguments translated and distributed 
to American economic experts employed by the Point IV mission.
124
 Hilali advocated the 
development of a specialized rural educational curriculum and called for increased efforts to win 
over the shaykhs in supporting rural education by argument rather than coercion. He urged the 
creation of a Rural Board to organize communal life in the countryside as a separate culture 
sphere complete with its own local newspaper, rural radio station, and specialized entertainment. 
Most importantly, his plan for solving the land problem likewise rejected redistribution and 
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instead proposed the expansion of the Miri Sirf Land Development program as a market-based 
initiative to improve the peasant economic position. Far more than their British counterparts, 
who complained that the land settlement project was an economically inefficient “socially 
motivated policy,”
125
 American officials came to see the program as a panacea for the rural 
problem: “If successfully carried out, this land settlement program will be the pilot flame from 
which the great fire of social and economic reform will be ignited consuming the tangled jungle 




Circumscribing Rural Reform: Education, Reclamation, and Settlement 
 The Development Board’s first five year budget allocated over half of all revenue for 
agricultural development, with most of those funds earmarked for the Habbaniyah and Wadi 
Tharthar flood control and irrigation schemes recommended by British advisor F.F. Haigh
127
 
Haigh outlined a fifty year program to double the irrigated land area of the country and facilitate 
the conversion of peasant sharecroppers into small landowners.
128
 Economic experts from the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development argued that Haigh’s estimates were 
actually conservative, for the total area of cultivable land was well over twice the area of land 
presently cultivated. The reclamation and distribution of cultivable land was essential to alleviate 
the adverse social consequences of agricultural mechanization, which IBRD experts predicted 
would increase crop yields by nearly fifty percent but might displace thousands of peasant 
sharecroppers in the process. The IBRD declaration that its fundamental aim was “to increase 
production and standards of living and to diffuse the benefits therefrom as widely as possible 
among all classes and sections of the country” underscored this dual agenda of rural 
development. Foreign economists predicted that coordinated mechanization and reclamation 
efforts would simultaneously increase productivity and economic growth while dramatically 
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increasing peasant bargaining power by reducing the supply of cheap agricultural labor with the 
creation of a local class of small landowners.
129
   
The success of this agenda was contingent upon the actual reclamation and redistribution 
of land to the peasants. Salih Jabr convinced the American economist Dr. Ross Moore, who 
visited Iraq in February 1950 to explore the opportunities for Point IV intervention, that the 
introduction of a small land tax would supplement the settlement projects by forcing landowners 
to renounce their claims to vast tracts of uncultivated land.
130
 ʿAbd al-Jabbar al-Chalabi likewise 
argued that land reform rooted in an expansion of the Dujayla settlement scheme could 
effectively circumvent the political opposition of the landed shaykhs. Chalabi explained that 
market strategies could definitively solve the rural problem: 
 
“As an increasing number of landless cultivators are settled on newly-developed 
government land, farm labor will become scarce, and the tribal sheikhs (and urban 
landowners) will have to compete for it. They will thus ultimately be forced to 
offer better conditions to the farmers cultivating their land, and may, in the 
interests of self-preservation, become sympathetic to the introduction of health 




If, however, landowners managed to acquire titles to reclaimed land, the concurrent 
mechanization of agricultural labor would further depress peasant economic conditions. IBRD 
experts were well aware that prior land settlement initiatives had been exploited by the shaykhs 
and used to consolidate control over vast tracts of cultivable land but remained confident that the 
Miri Sirf Lands Development Law of 1951 would avoid a similar fate. They pointed to the 
Dujayla program, where peasant settlers were “conscious of their new-won independence and 
dignity,” as evidence of political responsibility and a precedent for future endeavors. Despite the 
shared belief that peasant welfare could be most effectively improved by abolishing feudal 
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conditions, this confidence led development experts to pursue a short-term agenda that relied on 
market reforms to induce landowning shaykhs to improve peasant working conditions.
132
 
American officials privately expressed an interest in radical reforms to the land tenure 
system that would encourage independent initiative. One American official responded 
incredulously to the feudal conditions stipulated by the land tenure law of 1933: “This law has to 
be read for one to believe that such a burden could be actually imposed upon the cultivators of 
the land by a modern government in the year 1933.”
133
 Subsequent conversations with British 
officials and Iraqi politicians, however, tended to affirm the necessity of maintaining the political 
independence and privileged social status of the tribal shaykhs. American experts employed 
through the Technical Cooperation Administration embraced the pilot projects of peasant 
resettlement on reclaimed state land as the logical solution to the impasse, noting that the 
projects would avoid a destabilizing confrontation with vested political interests while still 
ameliorating economic exploitation through “the example that they set to nearby landowners.”
134
 
The fact that new laws prohibited the renewal of land leases meant that “it will only be a matter 
of three or four years until there are millions of acres of miri sirf land occupied by cultivators 
under no tenancy rights.”
135
 For many American experts, the program’s success was virtually 
insured by the fortuitous convergence of the surplus land, plentiful cash and credit, a pro-
Western political elite, and American technical expertise. 
The land settlement schemes, however, proved far more difficult to implement than the 
foreign experts who endorsed them had reckoned. The Development Board’s obsession with 
capital intensive projects meant that while the reclamation of cultivable land for provisional 
settlement projects was the ostensible goal of the major irrigation schemes, board members 
tended to lose interest in the actual project of organizing settlement colonies. The Iraqi 
government was eventually convinced to establish a Ministry of Agriculture in the summer of 
1952 to address this problem, but in early years well over half of the ministry’s substantial 
budget was tied up in interminable research and survey projects that provided steady jobs to 
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foreign development experts but little else.
136
 In many areas, land surveys served primarily to 
line the pockets of governmental officials, as surveyors were instructed to map land in a 
confusing and imprecise manner that would encourage disputes and private settlements. The 
surveyors were paid salaries far below subsistence wages and expected to satisfy their financial 
needs by soliciting bribes from landholders.
137
 Most of the early settlement projects were located 
beyond the reach of irrigation, and as one American official noted, agrarian history “affords no 
instances of successful settlement of dry farming lands on a small holdings basis… Trends in dry 
land farming areas are toward mechanization, larger holdings, and reduced labor intensity.” The 
current settlement projects, he concluded, were “likely to lead to a discrediting of settlement 
projects in general at about the time when planned irrigation projects are completed and newly 
irrigated lands are available for settlement programs.”
138
 
When TCA officials finally visited the Dujayla project in July 1953, nearly three years 
after deciding that the project constituted an effective model for the entire development program, 
their confidence was shattered. The agricultural cooperative was a total failure, as retired civil 
servants used their political connections to monopolize access to communal tractors and the bulk 
of the cooperative dues had been embezzled by the appointed directors. The establishment of 
homesteads on individual plots signified a radical departure from the traditional patters of 
communal life in southern Iraq and made the provision of potable water and electricity virtually 
impossible. Virtually all of the settlers were in debt to the local merchants in Kut and many had 
“assumed the habitual attitudes of the landlords they so recently despised” by hiring an “assistant 
farmer” and utilizing the labor of his children and those of migratory families to farm the land. 
High levels of soil salination led to the abandonment of a significant number of plots that lacked 
access to drainage canals. TCA officials were forced to conclude that “the Dujaila settlement 
project after eight years of operation is thus by no means the prototype for future attempts to 
solve Iraq’s land tenure problems.”
 
Despite the fact that the subcontracting of labor was 
primarily confined to the retired civil servants, TCA officials concluded that “peasants were 
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more interested in becoming landlords or petty shaikhs than small farmers” and returned to the 
mantra that “development is a state of mind” by deciding to focus more attention on education.
139
 
 The situation on the new settlement projects at Sinjar, Sharazoor, and Hawija was 
perhaps even worse. Many of the new plots were merely demarcated with plow furrows and 
assigned to a roster of applicants approved by the Council of Ministers. The irrigation canals and 
wells essential had not yet been dug, and in some cases ground water exploration had not even 
begun. On many of the settlements, the decision to distribute land before providing proper 
irrigation left hundreds of displaced peasants with access to land but no viable means of growing 
crops. In other cases, drainage problems caused a dramatic increase in soil salination levels and 
left huge tracts of land uncultivable. Just as problematic was the fact that settlers were selected 
through a political process that earmarked a significant percentage of plots for civil servants and 
religious figures, who secured better plots than peasant applicants. One TCA official complained 
that settlers would be stranded “without irrigation or drinking water for human and animal 
consumption, without housing which they have been promised, without agricultural guidance 
and assistance, and without the other essential programs such as health and education” and 




 By late 1952, TCA officials began to realize that the land settlement program “does not 
appear to have a very good chance of achieving its objective” and to admit that several million 
peasants “must in the end remain as tenants on farms and villages of large land operators.”
141
 
The rate of population growth in the countryside was nearly forty times greater than the rate of 
settlement on the agricultural projects, which meant that settlement policies made virtually no 
impact on labor conditions.
142
 Self-help doctrines led American officials to conclude that “a 
program superimposed from the outside has little lasting value” and to work on implementing “a 
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cooperative process in which aid and stimulation from without are given so skillfully and 
effectively that the program is taken by all concerned to have been entirely a home-grown 
product.” This program was rooted in the “triple approach” of research, education, and extension 
characteristic of American land-grant institutions. Demonstration farms were developed at Hillah 
and Kut to educate peasants in the use of “new tools and techniques which will raise the peasant 
farmer step by step up the ladder towards the higher standards of the Western world.”
143
 
While settlement projects remained insignificant and ineffective, the TCA mission did 
make progress in reforming the rural educational curriculum. With the encouragement of 
Minister of Education Khalil Kannah, TCA officials adopted IBRD recommendations to 
introduce “more practical content” and emphasis on “manual skills and crafts” and “the dignity 
of manual labor” into a curriculum that was “too bookish and academic” and tended to 
“encourage a flight from the rural environment to the city.”
144
 By the beginning of 1953, 
American experts in technical education had already managed to “overhaul” the curriculum for 
rural schools. In this self-professed “radical educational reconstruction,” syllabi were “simplified 
and culled of traditional subjects” like poetry, literature, and history and replaced with technical 
courses “based upon studies of skills needed, job analyses, and upon advice and cooperation 
from employers.” These reforms were rooted in the twin desire to promote “a new orientation 
from ‘book schools’ to ‘work schools’” and to achieve “the realization and acceptance that 
development is a state of mind.”
145
 Some experts even expressed skepticism that expanded 
literacy was a worthwhile goal to pursue and worried that American methods might not “fit into 
the behavior patterns of an illiterate Moslem Arab rural or tribal community.”
146
 American 
experts, though, soon found that there was little support for these technical education reforms in 
the Iraqi countryside. Officials complained that the effort to train teachers in the new rural 
curriculum was self-defeating because the very act of “giving the trainees an introduction to and 
desire for city occupation” discouraged them from accepting rural posts. Parents, meanwhile, 
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demonstrated dissatisfaction with the new curriculum, for “a child, in their view, is to be 
educated so he can get out of, not stay in, farming.”
147
 This growing disenchantment with the 
modernization and development agenda was further compounded by the economic repercussions 
of agricultural mechanization. 
The Machinery of Politics and the Politics of Machinery 
 Agricultural mechanization in southern Iraq had long been associated with colonial 
policy and British financial interests. In the late 1940s, several prominent landowners begin to 
introduce the Massey Harris Harvester-Thresher to their rice plantations to recoup their 
investment by slashing peasant wages to a mere twenty percent of total crop yield.
148
 The new 
machines were first introduced on an estate near Shaykh Saʿd leased by an Iraqi Christian named 
Gorgis Yusuf in partnership with an ex-British military officer known as Major Grimley. 
Grimley quickly developed a reputation for licentious sexual behavior with local women, brutal 
treatment of the peasants who worked his land, and blatant manipulation of political connections 
to secure access to crucial water resources, and local peasants came to view mechanization as 
part and parcel of a colonial agenda that aimed to exploit Iraqi labor and resources for the benefit 
of Christians.
 149
 While Grimley was eventually forced out of Iraq, the association between 
colonialism and mechanism stuck, particularly after American TCA officials began coordinating 
mechanization efforts in the early 1950s.  
The initial IBRD report on economic development in Iraq warned that if mechanization 
efforts proceeded rapidly without complementary efforts toward land settlement, peasants would 
see their wages further depressed and might even be displaced from their land.
150
 TCA officials 
consequently pledged “to keep the program of mechanization in step with social and economic 
developments so that mechanization acts as a constructive, and not a destructive force in the Iraqi 
social economy.”
151
 Control over the importation and distribution of agricultural machinery, 
however, was entrusted to the Agricultural Machinery Board set up by the Ministry of 
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Economics. The board’s leadership reflected the political interests of the landed shaykhs in 
declaring that mechanization was the obvious solution to poor productivity levels and labor 
shortages and proceeded to quintuple the annual sale of tractors, plows, and harvesters between 
1950 and 1955.
152
 TCA officials compounded the problem by organizing projects to train 
machinery technicians and restock spare parts. Prominent American corporations like Caterpillar, 
International Harvester, and John Deere displayed “whole-hearted cooperation” with TCA 
efforts by providing excess spare parts, training manuals, and experienced technicians to train 
local operators and mechanics.
153
 Thus, at the same time that land settlement efforts ostensibly 
designed to create an artificial shortage of peasant labor were scaled back due to logistical 
obstacles, mechanization efforts proceeded towards a contradictory aim. Despite the fact that 
mechanization efforts almost immediately caused significant population displacement from the 
large southern estates, TCA officials nevertheless remained optimistic that “a proper 
coordination can be achieved between families leaving established villages to take up new homes 
and the displacement of men by machines.”
154
 
Peasants appeared to view all development projects through the lens of self-interest, 
assuming, for example, that American engineers surveying land for the construction of a 
highway linking Basra and Baghdad were delineating plots for imminent redistribution: “This 
makes some of them happy while others protest that the engineers are making lines in the wrong 
places.”
155
 Further TCA efforts to increase agricultural productivity by demonstrating the 
efficiency of irrigating larger plots of land in order to save time and labor provoked fierce 
resistance from peasant laborers, who feared that increased efficiency would further reduce their 
wages.
156
 American experts demonstrated that even with peasant labor costs averaging just 
twenty-three cents per day, mechanization could cut production costs to one third of their current 
level. TCA extension agents travelled to the major estates to illustrate these gains with small-
scale demonstrations involving tractors, two-bottom plows, and land levelers. The extension 
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agents reported significant opposition from the peasants, but they attributed this resistance to an 
obstinate reliance on “traditional practices which are deep-rooted” rather than material 
motivations.
157
 Landlords, on the other hand, were more than happy to allow TCA agents to plow 
their land, and the Cooperative Project on Agricultural Machinery had to be abandoned in July 
1953 after TCA officials discovered that their employees were “doing below-cost harvesting 
work for the large landlords.”
158
 
American officials, in fact, remained perpetually and naively optimistic about the 
political intentions of their local clients and allies, viewing the universal declarations of support 
for land support as “a healthy sign the land tenure problem is full recognized” rather than self-
serving obfuscations.
159
 Even the professed commitment to land reform by Nuri al-Saʿid’s 
Constitutional Union Party, which was by that point heavily dependent on the political power of 
the landowning shaykhs, was interpreted as evidence of good intentions and changing tides. 
When the CUP stalwart and leader of the al-Mayyah tribe Shaykh ʿAbdullah Muhammad al-
Yasin publicly announced his intention to distribute twelve thousand acres of land to his 
peasants, the U.S. Ambassador concluded that ʿAbdullah “saw the handwriting on the wall,” 
despite the fact that the offer consisted of uncultivated lazma grants that technically reverted to 
state control if left dormant for four years: 
 
 He wishes to forestall a violent and drastic change by giving away what he 
believes will be taken at a later date. In this way he makes his future position 
more secure because he will be known as an enlightened shaikh and will be 





A popular uprising three years later in Hayy, where ʿAbdullah and his brothers controlled more 
than a third of the cultivable land and gained a reputation for oppressive exploitation, prompted 
brutal reprisals from ʿAbdullah’s forces and underscored the severity of that misjudgment.
161
  
A similar misjudgment ensued when Shaykh ʿAbdullah Mahmud Majid offered to allow 
TCA to use five thousand acres of land for an experimental project that would offer “some sort 
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of demonstration of an idealized landlord-tenant arrangement,” provided that he still received the 
customary “landlord’s portion” of half the produce.
162
 TCA officials were eager to accept the 
offer as a means of “showing that land tenure reform within the framework of landlord-tenant 
system can be improved.”
163
 In a meeting with TCA officials, Shaykh ʿAbdullah complained that 
government bureaucrats would never advance beyond the planning stage and repeatedly invoked 
the axiom that “the Arab believes what he sees.” TCA officials reported enthusiastically that 
ʿAbdullah “quite understands the US viewpoint that the landowner has an incentive, the tenant 
does not” and that he was willing to sell his entire lazma holdings to TCA. The fact that 
ʿAbdullah had been attempting to sell the land for some time, offering it first to the Iraqi 
government and then to the foreign firm Murdock & Brooks, made little impression on TCA 
officials, who sought to make the land the basis for an experimental rural improvement 
project..
164
 ʿAbdullah made a significant profit on land that he feared would be confiscated at 
some point in the future and retained his claim to the far more profitable lands leased from the 
government. Likewise, when Shaykh Ahmad ʿAjil al-Yawir of the Shammar declared himself a 
“land use convert” and began to protest the settlement of his peasants on the Sinjar project, TCA 
officials congratulated themselves on the “good missionary work” and failed to consider that 
Ahmad may have been safeguarding his own access to cheap labor.
165
 
Political efforts to alleviate peasant misery and exploitation confronted opposition from 
the landowning shaykhs, who were coming to view Western military intervention in Latin 
America and Asia and the growing importance of Iraqi oil in the global economy as evidence 
that Britain and the United States would never permit a successful Communist revolution in 
Iraq.
166
 An effort by Fadhil al-Jamali to guarantee peasant sharecroppers half of their crop yields 
provoked a fury of outrage from the shaykhs in early 1954. Jamali’s initiative was designed to 
mollify public anger over the misuse of oil revenue before a planned crackdown on Communists 
and “those who try to fish in troubled waters.”
167
 The vocal opposition of the CUP shaykhs to the 
proposed reforms, however, forced Jamali to dramatically curtail the proposed reforms. Nuri al-
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Saʿid  argued that Iraq should “follow her own traditional way of arranging matters” and leave 
the ownership of land in the hands of shaykhs “who were better able to understand the problems 
of farming and marketing.” Despite Nuri’s constant obstruction of even moderate reform 
measures, some reformist politicians ironically came to see Nuri as the only possible solution to 
the problem. If electoral politics were suspended and Nuri entrusted with a platform of mild 
reform, they argued, Nuri’s sense of statesmanship and responsibility would compel him to 
“change his tune.” Nuri did in fact revive the ʿAmarah Land Law, which he had initially blocked 
as a means of dislodging Jamali, but political manipulations ensured that virtually no land was 
transferred from the shaykhs to the peasants.
168
  
The failure of the Economic Development Board to make any significant progress toward 
the alleviation of rural poverty fueled popular anger against the development initiative. TCA 
officials admitted that the Point IV program had accomplished virtually nothing and that Iraqis 
were now becoming aware of the immense gulf between the aid packages allocated for Europe 
and those designated for the Arabs.
169
 Prominent local informants in Basrah reported that it was 
“widely believed” that the entirety of oil revenues allocated to the Development Board was used 
to fund salaries and allowances for American Point IV officials.
170
 Conspiracy theories about an 
“imperialist agenda” that aimed to use schools as barracks, highways as military bases, and water 
reservoirs as airbases for foreign troops became so widespread that then Prime Minister Fadhil 
al-Jamil was forced to publicly refute the charges in a speech broadcast over Radio Baghdad.
171
 
Arshad al-ʿUmari, then Chairman of the Development Board, bitterly complained that political 
criticism of their efforts was so great that “if a woman fails to conceive she is likely to blame it 
on the Development Board.”
172
 
Some American officials began to realize that the conjunction of unimpeded progress 
towards mechanized agriculture and the obstacles confronting the settlement projects would have 
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devastating short-term effects on peasant economies. The tax expert Dr. Charles Donald Jackson 
recommended the immediate abolition of consumption taxes and the adoption of general land 
taxes assessed and collected by public employees to fund welfare and relief efforts, but his 
recommendations were ignored.
173
 Daniel Gaudin Jr. warned that development efforts would 
“make the lot of many [peasants] even worse that it is at present” and increase popular sympathy 
for communism. Gaudin proposed that some portion of oil revenues be used to provide family 
allowances for dependent children. While the plan would be publicly sold as an initiative to 
improve education and nutrition, Gaudin contended that it would it would stimulate the local 
economy that the funds would be spent internally and that “none of it would go to foreign 
engineering contractors or other agencies.” He admitted that the plan had a “socialist tinge” but 
argued that it would “help overcome our reputation as mechanized materialists, supporters in the 
Near East of the landlord-politician class, and builders of Israel only.” The proposal was 
dismissed out of hand as non-productive monetary redistribution would fail even as a stimulus 
measure because of the “lack of material goods and services” for peasants to purchase. State 
Department officials contended that he plan “would not be viewed by others as democratic” and 
would contradict the purpose of “self-help opportunities” designed to “not only initiate but 
perpetuate the creation of new resources and wealth.”
174
 
The Impact of Economic Development on the Tribes 
The net effect of the rural development projects – irrigation schemes without proper 
drainage that destroyed soil fertility with excessive levels of salination, settlement projects that 
failed to deliver on their considerable promises, mechanization efforts that further reduced the 
already negligible value of peasant labor, and education initiatives that eliminated opportunities 
for social advancement – was to provoke several dozen peasant rebellions and, ultimately, to 
drive hundreds of thousands of peasant laborers off the land and into urban slums. The failure of 
the 1952 Law for the Settlement of the Miri Sirf Land Problem in ʿAmarah to actually transfer 
any state land to peasant sharecroppers confirmed to many that there was no viable solution 
beyond violence or emigration. The law proposed to convert all miri sirf state land to lazma 
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grants and to transfer half of the land to the primary leaseholders and the other half to the 
secondary tenants and sharecroppers. In practice, the law allowed tribal shaykhs to claim nearly 
all cultivable in their own name and in the name of various relatives while leaving only the 
uncultivable plots for the peasants. When Gamal ʿAbd al-Nasser’s announced a comprehensive 




Minor peasant rebellions had in fact erupted in several areas before the impact of 
economic development was visible to the local population. Peasants at Fao rebelled in September 
1950, demanding a more equitable share of profits from the annual date harvest.
176
 More notable, 
though, were the Azairij revolt ʿAmarah and the Diza’i revolt in Arbil in late 1952 and early 
1953, which reflected an increasingly radical peasant consciousness and a more visible 
Communist influence.
177
 The Communist Party devoted significantly more attention to political 
mobilization campaigns in tribal regions after the collapse of the 1952 Intifadah, establishing 
peasant associations across southern Iraq and generally eschewing radical cultural stances in 
favor of a calculated endorsement of Nasserist land reform. Communist students from provincial 
towns now joined disgruntled peasants in protesting landlord exploitation, which helped to bring 
together rural and urban protest movements and to turn national attention to peasant grievances. 
When the Shamiyyah peasants demanded half of the crop yield and launched a violent uprising 
against their landlords in February 1954, for example, Communist students convinced the 
peasants to march in front of government buildings in the provincial capital. Police moved 
swiftly to arrest the protestors and endeavored to separate students and peasants, imprisoning the 
former in Shamiyyah and the latter at Ghamas, but Communist lawyers maintained 
communication with peasant prisoners and peasant sympathizers brought food to the student 
prisoners. By the time of the tripartite invasion of Egypt by Israel, Britain, and France in 1956, 
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Communist organization and peasant support for Nasserist land reform combined to bring tens of 
thousands of armed peasants into the streets of provincial towns.
178
 
At the same time as this emergence of peasant protest movements, a much greater 
number of disgruntled peasants abandoned farming altogether. The brutal police suppression of 
the protests likely played a role in accelerating this rural exodus, as both violent and non-violent 
efforts to improving living and working conditions were effectively foreclosed, leaving little 
option to peasants but to suffer or to endure or to pack up their belongings and leave. Some 
British experts, like Michael Ionides of the Development Board, continued to view labor 
displacement as a positive development for the rural population, “since the departure of slave-
labour will tend to put the relationship between Shaikh or landlord and his peasants on a better 
and more modern basis.” This theory, however, proved unsound as the introduction of 
agricultural machinery proceeded at such a rapid pace that wages were never seriously 
affected.
179
 Other officials grew concerned that the rural exodus was proceeding far too rapidly 
and threatened to simultaneously undermine agricultural productivity and fuel urban 
radicalization.
180
 One U.S. report warned that “the urban laborer, even when he cuts his ties with 
this paternalistic agricultural society and migrates to the city, is fundamentally unchanged and 
basically influenced by the semi-feudal traditions” and that the influx of peasant to the slums of 
the new “El Dorado” of Baghdad constituted “a potential source of dissatisfaction and unrest.”
181
 
Urban migration was not an even process but rather reflected underlying social conflict. 
The vast majority of peasant migrants in the early 1950s hailed from just eleven tribes: the Bani 
Lam, Albu Muhammad, al-Suwaydi, al-Sudan, Albu Darraj, al-Azairij, and al-Bahadil tribes of 
ʿAmarah, al-Mayyah of Kut, Albu Amir and Bani Malik of the Muntafiq, and the ʿUgail from 
north of Baghdad. The social significance of the predatory relationship between landlord and 
tenant in ʿAmarah was amplified by the introduction of irrigation pumps and machinery, which 
increased peasant debt and allowed shaykhs to slash wages. Shaykh ʿAbdullah Muhammad al-
Yasin of al-Mayyah employed virtually identically methods with his own peasants and the Albu 
Amir, Bani Malik, and ʿUgail tribes had all been disposed of traditional tribal lands over the 
previous century and forced to work as migrant laborers on the Bani Lam and Albu Muhammad 
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estates in ʿAmarah. The singularity of the ʿAmarah context is further magnified by analyses of 
population changes showing that nearly forty percent of the entire ʿAmarah population migrated 
between 1948 and 1958, compared to just twelve and sixteen percent in the Muntafiq and Kut. 
Well over ninety percent of the ʿAmarah migrants, furthermore, were born in tribal villages, 




Before the outbreak of the Wathbah in January 1948, there were reportedly thirty 
thousand tribesmen working in Basrah and Baghdad.
183
 These numbers increased significantly 
over the course of the following summer, when government efforts to mollify urban unrest by 
subsidizing bread and rice caused crop prices to tumble and forced peasants further into debt, but 
urban migration was not seen as a disruptive social process until the early 1950s.
184
 By 1955, 
migration “assumed proportions in parts of Amara Liwa which amounted to a mass evacuation” 
as nearly half of the remaining Azairij cultivators and a third of the Albu Muhammad cultivators 
left ʿAmarah during the summer months, with similar losses reported from smaller tribes like the 
Albu Darraj, al-Suwaydi, and al-Sudan.
185
 Majid al-Khalifa and Muhammad al-ʿAraybi, the two 
wealthiest Albu Muhammad shaykhs, each lost nearly a third of their hushiyyah armed guards, a 
particularly striking figure given that “one would expect these men to be the last to leave.” Majid 
privately admitted that eight hundred of his peasants left over the course of a three month period 
and resident British officials estimated that the true figures were much higher.
186
  
The old romantic Orientalist Wilfred Thesiger complained that “the towns have become a 
sort of El Dorado and the movement from the country to the towns a sort of gold rush” and that 
peasants were seduced by the “cinemas and brothels round the corner” in Baghdad. He argued 
without much evidence that the peasants were “probably a good deal better off than their fathers 
were” but contended that growing political consciousness “has taught them to demand more.” 
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Even comparatively wealthy peasant families with sufficient savings to weather the bad harvest, 
he noted, were selling off the animals and taking the savings to Baghdad. Those who left, he 
noted, “are becoming increasingly hostile to the shaikhs, as is shown by the songs which they are 
now singing in Baghdad and Basra, and which soon find their way back to Amara.” Thesiger 
blamed the education system for corrupting peasant youth: “For six or seven years they have 
spent their time sitting about in school. When they leave it they have neither the inclination nor 
possibly the physical capacity to work all day under a hot sun planting our rice or clearing out an 
irrigation ditch.” Despite the fact that the expansion of education was a relatively recent 
phenomenon, Thesiger contended that “many families have boys and young men in them who 
are urging their parents the whole time to leave for the towns.”
187
  
 Thesiger's analysis of the peasant migrations, though, moved well beyond this type of 
analysis of emerging peasant consciousness. He argued that the disintegration of tribal social 
structures was the single most important factor fueling the rural exodus. Noting that certain 
Muntafiq tribes suffered much more significant flood losses over the past two years without 
contributing a commensurate number of migrants, he argued that among the Albu Muhammad, 
Azairij, and other ʿAmarah tribes, “the shaikhs are no longer tribal shaikhs but landlords and 
their tribesmen are virtually serfs.” The peasants who worked Majid al-Khalifa’s land, for 
example, were no longer exclusively members of the Albu Muhammad but rather comprised a 
motley crew of those native to the soil and those fleeing from oppressive conditions elsewhere. 
He recalled Majid wailing at the funeral of his eldest son, “What will become of my land when I 
die?” The shaykh, he noted bitterly, “never wondered what would become of his tribe, for he 
could not care less.” Thesiger was stunned and appalled by the shocking dissolution of tribal 
practices, values, and mores:  
 
It is disconcerting for one who is used to traditional Arab ways to go to lunch with 
one of these shaikhs. Lunch is brought in for the Shaikh and his guest, and the 
remnants are then carried out. There may be a hundred or more of the shaikh’s 
retainers and tribesmen sitting in the guest house. None of them will even get a 
glass of tea. 
 
The Muntafiq shaykhs, by contrast, continued to “keep open house – anyone present at meal 
times gets fed and any tribesman can spend the night in the shaikh’s guest house” and continued 
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The mass migrations of peasants to urban slums, of course, created new problems for 
economic experts, and municipal officials. By 1951, there were nearly sixty thousand sarifa 
dwellers in Baghdad and an additional twenty thousand in Basrah. Urban residents worried that 
the slums would spread infectious disease, depress urban labor markets, overwhelm urban 
infrastructures and city services, and destroy the city’s beauty. As ʿAbd al-Razzaq al-Hilali 
pithily noted of the sarifa dwellers, “It is perhaps sufficient here to point to the very simple 
problem of toilets, for it is well known about those individuals that they defecate in the open 
air.”
189
 The IBRD Mission advocated various “self-help” measures – such as the state furnishing 
roof timbers or window frames for model houses in order to encourage completion – to address 
the health and aesthetic threats posed by urban slums. Municipal officials, on the other hand, 
attempted to rid themselves of the migrants by constructing new sarifa settlements outside of the 
city limits. One project to relocate thirty thousand sarifa dwellers outside of Baghdad was 
abandoned because the migrants refused to live so far outside of the city.
190
 In the provincial 
town of ʿAmarah, thousands of peasant migrants revolted when the local governor ordered police 
to pull down their reed huts.
191
 British and American officials grew increasingly concerned that 




Landlords in ʿAmarah and Samawah instructed police to stop trucks packed with 
migrants and to return them to the feudal estates, which only increased the sense of urgency to 
flee.
193
 Despite the squalid conditions of the sarifa settlements, the establishment of social 
networks of migrants removed psychological impediments to migration, as Thesiger noted, for 
peasants were now moving “not into the unknown but to places where Al Bu Muhammad and 
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Azairij communities were already established and flourishing.”
194
 ʿAbd al-Razzaq al-Hilali 
argued that the migrants were not fleeing an antiquated tribal past in search of an urban 
modernity, but rather sought to recreate tribal structures within the urban slums. Migrants from 
the Bani Lam and al-Sudan tribes created their own written contacts that reconstituted tribal 
political structures in the image of an idyllic past. Leaders were chosen by community consensus 
and financial penalties for various infractions against fellow tribesmen were carefully delineated. 
The documents illustrate the peculiar convergence of urban modernity and traditional culture, 
proscribing for example that if a tribesman ran over someone in a car that he owned, he would be 
responsible for the entire penalty, whereas if the accident occurred in a rented vehicle, the 
penalty would be divided equally among the members of the tribe. Hilali argued that the urban 




Cultural Alienation and the Poetics of Emigration 
Thesiger's observations about the disintegration of rural solidarities and the growing 
allure of the city are largely supported by the cultural artifacts of this era. The poetry produced 
by rural migrants in Baghdad, Basra, and Kirkuk in the early 1950s reflected the significance of 
cultural politics in conjunction with economic oppression in fueling peasant disenchantment with 
rural life. There were, in fact, two countervailing forces at work in providing both explanation 
and confirmation of the cultural alienation of Iraqi peasants in this period. On the one hand, the 
old tradition of Najafi poetry about peasant and tribal life was decisively broken by the 
transformation of the political landscape and the growing involvement of prominent poets in 
national politics. The four major Najafi poets of the 1930s, each of whom had played in 
important role in mobilizing rural support for revolution and reform, had moved on to urban 
centers and ceased to write about trials and tribulations of rural life. Ahmad al-Safi al-Najafi 
moved into exile in Syria and Lebanon, where he became a staunch supporter of various anti-
colonial national liberation movements, including the Rashid ʿAli movement of 1941.
196
 ʿAli al-
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Sharqi ceased writing poetry altogether and moved into nationalist politics in Baghdad, where he 
became one of the most prominent independent Shiʿi representatives in parliament.
197
 Most 
notably, Muhammad Salih Bahr al-ʿUlum and Muhammad Mahdi al-Jawahiri had moved on to 
Baghdad, where they helped to galvanize the street protest movement and lent their support to 
the burgeoning labor movement through their affiliation with the Peace Partisans.
198
 
On the other hand, the new generation of poets writing in Free Verse began to engage 
more directly with peasant experiences from the vantage point of migrants in the city. As Orit 
Bashkin incisively notes, ʿAbd al-Wahhab al-Bayati, who wrote about peasant life in greater 
depth and clarity than any other Iraqi poet in this era, was a native of Baghdad who came to an 
awareness of the subject through his encounters with rural migrants at the mosque of ʿAbd al-
Qadir al-Kaylani.
199
 While Bayati's painstaking collection of peasant stories and songs gave his 
poems about rural life an air of authority and authenticity to rival that of the Najafi poets, his 
identity as an outsider nevertheless reinforced perceptions that stories and sentiments of rural life 
were now merely documented and archived by Iraqi poets. This same dynamic is evident to a 
lesser extent in the writing of poets like Badr Shakir al-Sayyab and Buland al-Haydari, both of 
whom hailed from rural backgrounds but conveyed an amalgamation of bittersweet nostalgia for 
childhood memories and intellectual angst over their inability to either contemplate a return to 
the stifling oppression of the village or to find comfort, happiness, and a sense of belonging in 
the confines of the city.
200
 
Taken together, these two trends underscored a striking shift in the way peasant and 
countryside were represented in national cultural discourse. As the great neo-classical orators of 
Najaf moved onto Baghdad, they began to write about and for the urban working class, rather 
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than the rural peasantry. While peasants had once symbolized the Iraqi nation, with vivid 
descriptions of their oppression functioning as metaphors for the oppression of the nation by 
colonial forces and their local clients,
201
 workers now stood as the symbols of national resistance 
to colonial and neo-colonial domination.
202
 At the same time, the interest of the avant-garde 
modernist poets in rural life affirmed that peasant and tribal society were coming to be viewed as 
historical anathema. Unlike Bahr al-ʿUlum, Jawahiri, al-Safi, and al-Sharqi, who offered advice 
and solutions to what they saw as the "peasant problem" in southern Iraq, the younger poets 
merely catalogued the pulverization of peasant society by the social dislocations of colonial 
feudalism and agrarian capitalism and noted the overwhelming and irrepressible desire of the 
peasants to flee toward an urban modernity that, despite its apparent flaws, offered some 
semblance of hope for the future.  
ʿAbd al-Wahhab al-Bayati's collection of poetry Abariq Muhashshamah (Broken 
Pitchers), first published in 1954, included several poems that illustrated this new cultural 
dynamic. In "The South Wind," Bayati depicted a peasant unable to escape their oppressive 
conditions in the village for a better life in Baghdad: 
 
The eye of the prisoner 
From his earthen cellar, to the saddened star 




The young peasant desperately hopes for the means and opportunity to escape his life in the 
countryside and to join his comrades in the city. When a group of peasant migrants return to the 
village on a visit from the city and warmly greet their old friends and families, the trapped 
peasant can only think of his own sad fate to remain forever in the village: 
 
 Intimate conversations in the sad breeze 
 And from the eye of the prisoner escaped 
 Some tears 
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Bayati's audience in the countryside could not have failed to recognize in themselves these same 
emotions and this same longing to forever flee the oppressive conditions of agrarian life and to 
embrace the opportunities of the city. 
 A better known poem from the same collection, "The Village Market," captures in better 
detail the poverty and misery of rural life: 
 
 The sun, the gaunt donkeys, and the flies 
 And the boots of an old soldier 
 Pass between hands, as a peasant gazes into space 
 "At the beginning of the new year 
 My hands will surely be filled with coins 




Bayati's depiction of the peasant's financial woes echoes the reflections of Ahmad al-Safi al-
Najafi on the peasant's inability to pay his debts under the new system of colonial feudalism and 
underscores the extent to which an ordinary existence in the countryside has become a mere 
fancy. In a subsequent passage, the poet expands upon this imagery of rural poverty by depicting 
the inability of many peasants to attain sufficient food for themselves and their families from the 
harvest: 
 
 And the wearied croppers say: 
 "They sowed, and we have not eaten 
 And we sow, submissively, so that they can eat" 
 
The most memorable section of the poem, however, grapples directly with the problem of rural 
migration and the impact of the city on these rural migrants: 
 
 And those who return from the city: O what a blind beast! 
 Its victims are our dead, the bodies of women 
 And the affable dreamers 
 And the mooing of cows, and the sellers of bracelets and perfume 
 Like beetles crawling around: "My dear skylark, O Sodom! 
 The perfumer will not mask what this oppressive era has spoiled" 
 
While modernist poetry had grown less direct and less explicit - rejecting, for example, the 
contrapuntal discourse of the anti-colonial qasidah
205
 - Bayati's veiled indictment of the colonial 
regime and its tribal clients for the desecration of rural society is impossible to miss. 
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 Badr Shakir al-Sayyab, who wrote voluminously on the subject of city and village in 
heavily symbolic language that drew equally upon classical mythology and the modernism of 
T.S. Eliot, explored many of these same themes. In much of his poetic production, Sayyab's 
native village of Jaykur functioned as a metaphor for a utopian pre-colonial past and a contrast to 
the immoral modernity of urban landscapes.
206
 In "Jaykur and the City," a poem that Sayyab 
dated to March 18, 1958, just four months before ʿAbd al-Karim Qasim's coup d'état that brought 
down the Hashemite monarchy, Sayyab signaled his own complex understanding of the 
relationship between colonialism and the transformation of rural society: 
 
 And Jaykur surrounded now with walls 
  And a gate 
   And enveloped in silence 
 Who will breach the walls? Who will open the gate? His right hand bloodied on every  
  latch? 
 My right hand: It is no talon fit for the struggle, so I use it for my struggle in city streets 
 And it is not a fist that can resurrect life from the soil 
 Because it is itself a clump of clay 
 And Jaykur surrounded now with walls 
  And a gate 




As Terri DeYoung has explained, Sayyab was referencing in this passage a famous line from 
"The Tragedy of Damascus" by the famous Egyptian poet Ahmad Shawqi calling for armed 
resistance to the French bombardment of Damascus in 1925: 
 
 And freedom colored red has a gate 




Sayyab's appropriate of the imagery underscores his commitment to viewing the destruction of 
his own rural utopia (symbolized by Jaykur) as part and parcel of the colonial legacy. Like so 
many of the other modernist poets, however, Sayyab's own pessimism about his inability to 
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successful confront the forces of feudalism suffocating his beloved countryside leads to the 
inescapable conclusion that true resistance is now only possible in the city.  
Equally striking was the work of Buland al-Haydari, a Kurdish poet who wrote in both 
Arabic and Kurdish and who hailed from a peasant family in northern Iraq, where the 
disintegration of tribal life largely followed the patterns present in southern Iraq. Haydari moved 
to Baghdad toward the end of the 1930s and, like many of the other prominent pioneers and 
practitioners of Free Verse poetry, he quickly joined the Iraqi Communist Party. Haydari, who 
withdraw from university studies to concentrate on political activism in the 1940s, was 
particularly popular among both Arab and Kurdish peasant migrants in Baghdad due to his 
masterful depiction of the pull between urban and rural life.
209
 In his poem "A Lost Step," 
Haydari depicted a peasant preparing to leave his village for Baghdad: 
 
What will I do in the city..? 
 And she asked me 
What will you do in the city..!? 
Your foolish steps will be lost in the huge streets 
And you will be consumed by the blind allies 
Night will thrive in your numb and saddened depths 
What will you do there 
Without a friend 
No 




Despite the trepidation and foreboding of his village companion, however, the peasant finds 
himself invigorated by the new sensations of the urban landscape upon his arrival, vowing never 
to return to his place of birth: 
 
 For whom should I return?! 
 For my village 
 Or for the winter that torments the railway platform 
 Or for the little lanterns in which our frugal village quivers 
 Or for the women dying from this life 
 No 
 I will not return 
 For whom should I return when my village has become a city? 
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The peasant here expresses his utter detachment and disillusionment with rural life and confirms 
the allure of urban life, as the city has taken the place of his village as a place of communal 
belonging and a symbol of home. 
 It was the poem's conclusion, though, that best captured the depths of the new 
generation's alienation from rural life: 
 
 Nothing knows me here 
 And there is nothing that I know here 
 Nothing that I remember and nothing that remembers me here 
 I will shuffle along in small steps through these big streets 
 And the blind allies will consume me 
 No... 
 I will not return 
 For my village has become... a city 
 It has become a city. 
 
The sentiments expressed in these passages underscore the more universal aspects of angst and 
alienation in Iraq during this period, for Haydari is not only alluding to the peasant's 
disenchantment with rural life but also to the cultural and political dislocation of individuals in 
the expanding urban landscapes. While Haydari's depiction of urban life was certainly far from 
idealized, the allure of the city and the impossibility of a return to an antiquated rural existence 
emerges as the dominant thematic of much of his poetic production. 
Conclusion 
The peasant protests and tribal migrations provoked or accelerated by the economic 
development initiatives can be classified as anti-colonial movements only in a qualified sense. 
There is little available evidence to suggest that tribal peasants saw themselves as participants in 
a unified anti-colonial movement and, at least until the pro-Nasserist demonstrations of the early 
1950s, virtually no evidence that peasants were motivated by or even cognizant of British 
influence in national politics and Anglo-American support for Zionism. On the other hand, the 
rural development program shaped and guided by British and American economic experts deeply 
altered the lives of millions of Iraqi peasants over the course of the 1950s in ways that more 
explicitly political interventions could not. The growing influence of the Iraqi Communist Party 
during this period helped to confirm local suspicions that the development agenda was an 
imperialist ploy to funnel oil revenue and agricultural profits into the pockets of foreign 
contractors. In the Communist lexicon, “feudalism” and “imperialism” were virtually 
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synonymous and in any case consistently complementary terms that confirmed the shared 
interests of political and economic exploitation. Peasant migrants to urban areas, furthermore, 
eagerly joined anti-colonial protest movements and constituted an essential social base for the 
Iraqi Communist Party. The story of urban anti-colonialism, in short, cannot be told without 
reference to this history of tribal anti-colonialism and the structural transformations of the 
countryside. 
While foreign experts and advisors never possessed the necessary power and influence to 
force constructive progress on halfhearted land reform initiatives, their efforts to increase 
economic growth and production were extraordinarily counter-productive to the stated moral and 
humanitarian aims of economic development. The economist Doreen Warriner has argued that 
while engineers offered “a blue-print in land and water” for the economic development of the 
country, “except in so far as they provide labour, the people of Iraq do not enter into it.” The 
advice of foreign economists tended to overemphasize major projects and overlook essential 
measures like the provision of spare parts for tractors and drainage pumps for the new 
cooperative settlements. It was, Warriner argued, “an economist’s cloud-cuckoo land, in a 
Hayekian gap without a crisis, and building Keynesian pyramids without inflation or 
multipliers.” Contrary to the economists’ belief in the power of free markets to restore social 
equilibrium between peasant and shaykh by reducing the available supply of peasant labor, the 
mass migration of peasants merely propelled the landed shaykhs to increased investment in 
tractors and combines and agricultural production barely suffered. The true source of economic 
difficulties in Iraq, Warriner cogently argued, was the inequitable distribution of land: “Without 
[land reform], the big dams will be a succession of Keynesian pyramids, giving employment but 
not increasing production. The ‘resurrection of Babylonia’ was an engineer’s dream fifty years 
ago. In the meantime Iraq has acquired what an Iraqi jurist describes as ‘the feudalism of 
Hammurabi.’”
211
 What was perhaps most striking about Warriner's conclusions, however, was 
the fact that her initial diagnosis of the problem in the 1948 edition of Land Reform and Poverty 
in the Middle East had been so highly regarded and welcomed by American officials in Iraq.
212
 
The combination of domestic political impediments to land reform, the popularization of 
modernization and development discourse in the early 1950s, and the sheer incompetence of U.S. 
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efforts to coordinate incongruous reclamation and mechanization initiatives doomed the project 
to failure. 
The tremendously disruptive impact of rural development on peasant life had a 
repercussive impact on anti-colonial intellectuals, activists, and laborers in urban areas, which 
will be explored in the following chapter. The allocation of the vast majority of oil revenue to 
expensive development projects that actively depressed peasant wages while enriching feudal 
shaykhs and foreign companies fueled urban support for the nationalization of Iraqi oil and 
dedication to economic reforms that would transform the priorities of political officials from 
capitalist development to humanitarian relief. The influx of disgruntled peasant migrants to the 
cities likewise strengthened radical movements by providing a mass of alienated and 
unemployed laborers that magnified the surplus of unskilled urban labor and further depressed 
wages. These forces ensured that the anti-colonial movement of the 1950s would continue to 
progress from an intellectual and ideological current into a mass political movement that would 






'A HORIZON LIT WITH BLOOD' 
PUBLIC POETRY AND MASS POLITICS, 1946-1952 
 
 The purge of the military during the second British occupation profoundly transformed 
both the nature and the locus of political opposition in post-colonial Iraq. During the short-lived 
era of formal independence, the army formally intervened at least a half dozen times between 
1936 and 1941 to overthrow a sitting government, nearly always under the pretense of satisfying 
popular demands for political reform.
1
 After the public executions of the Four Colonels, the 
imprisonment and internment of dozens of sympathetic officers, and the forced retirement of 
scores more, it would take another seventeen years before military officers were again confident 
enough to launch a political revolution.
2
 The wholesale incorporation of the army into the 
institutional structures of what the novelist Ghaʾib Tuʿamah Farman has called the “Black 
Regime" in Iraq destroyed public faith in the possibilities of national salvation from above at the 
same time that the populist authoritarian model of military rule began to take shape in Egypt and 
Syria.
3
 While British troops had been gradually – though not completely – withdrawn from Iraq 
by the fall of 1947, the British Embassy retained effective influence, if not outright control, over 
the levels of power controlling economic policy, domestic security, and foreign policy and 
national sovereignty remained as circumscribed as it had been at any time since the end of the 
British Mandate in 1932. If the anti-colonial movement for national liberation was largely 
characterized by passive support for the revolutionary potential of the successive waves of 
military coup d'états during the pre-war years, the post-war period was increasingly characterized 
by the active interventions of the masses. 
As the locus of political opposition to the post-colonial regime shifted from the barracks 
to the streets, new developments in Iraqi culture and society dramatically expanded the realm of 
political action. Despite the clear entrenchment of a political dictatorship controlled formally or 
informally by Nuri al-Saʿid, the emergence of a social sphere for mass politics in Baghdad in the 
post-war period exposed the fundamental contradictions of the old regime. While the basic facts 
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of electoral fraud, political corruption, and illiberal rule of law remained remarkably stable 
between 1932 and 1958, the post-war years witnessed an abrupt erosion of the political 
legitimacy of the old regime. The emergence of political parties with mass followings laid bare 
the extent and scope of electoral maneuvering that regularly returned to power the followers and 
sycophants of Nuri al-Saʿid, easily the most unpopular political figure in the country. The 
myopic resort to fear and intimidation by successive administrations as a means of forcing 
unpalatable political agendas on an increasingly disaffected public served to cement the 
alienation of the politically conscious masses from the ruling class and to subordinate 
distinctions of class, sect, and ideology to an overarching commitment to popular revolution.  
 The rise of mass politics in Baghdad was made possible by five related developments that 
fundamentally alienated the politically conscious masses from the old politics of notables. First, 
the striking expansion of urban centers in the post-war period provided both the social space for 
political dialogue and debate and the crowds necessary to threaten governmental control of 
public space.
4
 Second, the notable increase in the number of university students and unionized 
workers provided a fertile ground for political mobilization and a structural base for partisan 
organization not subject to the same police surveillance and legal strictures that plagued the 
opposition political parties during this period.
5
 Third, the emergence of genuine opposition 
political parties organized on an ideological basis – rather than established to provide a political 
vehicle for enacting the parliamentary agenda of the new premier – shifted the national political 
debate from an antiquated approach predicated upon the competing interests of rival political 
elites towards a dialogue engineered to garner popular support.
6
 Fourth, the significant increase 
in the quantity and diversity of newspapers, coupled with the dramatic expansion of circulation 
made possible by notable improvements in urban literacy rates and the rise of a coffeehouse 
culture that opened the political sphere to the newly literate poor, helped to publicize regional 
and international political developments and forge imagined communities of national and global 
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 Fifth, the increasingly public stances of radical poets like Muhammad Mahdi al-
Jawahiri, Muhammad Salih Bahr al-ʿUlum, and later Badr Shakir al-Sayyab, decisively 
subverted a cultural tradition that connected artists and intellectuals to the state through networks 
of political patronage and literary praise and fashioned in its stead an organic relationship 




 Eric Davis has cogently argued that radical intellectuals failed to effectively demarcate 
their role in the Gramscian “war of position" during the late 1940s and 1950 because they could 
not "provide well-articulated counterhegemonic models to challenge existing forms of political 
praxis."
9
 This argument, though, is overly reductive in its efforts to explain the later descent into 
military dictatorship as a result of the radical intellectuals' unrequited celebration of ʿAbd al-
Karim Qasim's coup d'état of July 1958. The most impressive young Iraqi poets of the 1950s 
became increasingly indebted to the avant-garde aesthetics of European modernism, which 
paradoxically espoused the Sartrean ethos of literary commitment (iltizam) while undermining 
the traditional role of popular poetry in political revolution and effectively reifying an artificial 
distinction between mass culture and high culture that simultaneously privileged and alienated 
the poet from the masses. While it is certainly true, as Davis notes, that the Free Verse movement 
in Iraqi poetry contributed to a "broadening of political and intellectual culture," its leading 
practitioners also constricted the political possibilities of revolutionary art by privileging avant-
garde aesthetics over "cultural authenticity," embracing metaphor and symbolism over 
contrapuntal discourse, and choosing lyrical innovation over rhythmic repetition. As the literary 
critic Jabra Ibrahim Jabra has written of the committed poet, "His poetry, once reveling in 
oratory, became more and more of a soliloquy, a dramatic monologue, which soon gave its 
speaker the look and manner of a rather incomprehensible 'hero,' an outsider at variance with his 
society."
10
 Compounding the political drawbacks of the new artistic innovations, the 
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introspection of Free Verse pioneers like Badr Shakir al-Sayyab and ʿAbd al-Wahhab al-Bayati 
was coupled with a partisan devotion to the Stalinist line of the Iraqi Communist Party, which 
hampered their ability to articulate political visions independently of the party. 
 Ironically enough, the new political potential offered by the emergence of mass politics in 
Baghdad was most effectively exploited not by the young practitioners of the innovative Free 
Verse poetry but rather by the aging icons of a fading neo-classical tradition. The Wathbah 
uprising of 1948 erupted as an historical anomaly at the temporal intersection of an emergent 
popular politics and a declining tradition of public poetry. Neo-classical poets like Muhammad 
Salih Bahr al-ʿUlum and Muhammad Mahdi al-Jawahiri played pivotal roles in bringing radical 
politics into the streets and popularizing new visions of post-colonial revolution. Bahr al-ʿUlum, 
as Bahjat al-ʿAttiyah's secret police well understood, did more than anyone else to galvanize 
crowds of students and workers, stoke revolutionary fervor, and shape the public articulation of 
revolutionary demands. Jawahiri, for his part, was best able to articulate a new "horizon lit with 
blood" for the developing popular movement, as he put it in his historic public eulogy for his 
martyred brother Jaʿfar. Both poets used the anti-war rhetoric of the Peace Partisans movement 
to critically engage with the new technologies of state violence without seeking recourse to 
military intervention. In doing so, they reframed a traditional poetics of anti-colonial resistance 
as a popular struggle against terrorism and dictatorship that ceased to distinguish between 
foreign powers and the local ruling class as the source of domestic tyranny and oppression. 
 Several esteemed literary critics have argued that the eclipse of these neo-classical poets 
by the new practitioners of Free Verse revolutionized Arab and Iraqi political consciousness. Issa 
Boullata has argued that Free Verse poetry was necessary "in order to extricate Arab 
consciousness from the lethargy that had taken hold of it for centuries" and "to give expression to 
that society and its modernity."
11
 Terri DeYoung has likewise contended that "Jawahiri's poetry 
could move a crowd to act in the heat of the moment, but it seemingly could not provide a 
structure capable of informing sustained resistance to the threat of colonial discourses of power," 
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while the structural flexibility of Free Verse poetry offered "more effective strategies of 
resistance" and "new counter-discursive strategies."
12
 These arguments foreground the emerging 
intellectual avant-garde symbolized by the Free Verse movement as the vanguard of political 
modernity and the cultural pinnacle of revolutionary aesthetics. 
 While these arguments accurately underscore the importance of structural innovations in 
poetry in opening up new intellectual horizons for a post-colonial Arab modernity, however, they 
tend to minimize the critical social agency of the radical practitioners of traditional and popular 
poetry. These poets helped to forge a new cultural unity between the intellectual elite and 
disaffected masses and to establish a new precedent for public defiance and resistance. This new 
revolutionary horizon was as much about the transformation of society as of the transformation 
of cultural aesthetics. At the level of popular politics, the public interventions of Jawahiri and 
Bahr al-ʿUlum were far more significant in the development of revolutionary political 
movements and mentalities. As the mass politics of the public sphere emerged for the first time 
in popular consciousness as a contested spatial landscape, the subversive act of unauthorized 
infringement and intrusion by poets and crowds underscored the centrality of public acts of 
resistance to the new revolutionary currents.  
Politics & Society in Post-War Iraq 
 On January 4, 1946 at the Ghazi Cinema in downtown Baghdad, the central government 
held a memorial service commemorating the life of the nationalist icon Jaʿfar Abu al-Timman. 
The event signified the final rupture of the tenuous anti-fascist alliance formed between the pro-
British ruling class and the pro-Soviet leftist opposition and marked the resurgence of anti-
colonial politics in the public sphere. The radical poets Muhammad Salih Bahr al-ʿUlum and 
Muhammad Mahdi al-Jawahiri managed to offend Nuri al-Saʿid and his allies so severely with 
eulogies that castigated the appropriation and betrayal of the nationalist legacy that their entire 
entourage stormed out of the theater during each recitation. Bahr al-ʿUlum drew a sharp 
distinction between nationalist patriots and national traitors: 
 
 These are the palaces of traitors and their progeny 
  While reserved for loyal patriots are gallows and graves 
 These noble souls are led as scapegoats to slaughter 
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"Protection" here referred to the Law for the Protection of National Peace and Security passed in 
1941 in order to facilitate the trial and detention of nationalist supporters of the Rashid ʿAli 
movement. If the historical allusion was not clear enough, Bahr al-ʿUlum turned directly to Nuri 
and thundered: 
 
 Cowardly fugitives, drink down this accusation  
  For you will find for yourself a stinging rebuke 
 Linger a bit, for the people have issued a judgment 
  The verdict passed down upon you is excommunication 
 
As Nuri and his followers stormed angrily out of the theater, Bahr al-ʿUlum improvised a final 
couplet in conclusion: 
 
 So goodbye and farewell, for truly I say, 
  As threatening herald, until we meet another day 
 
Jawahiri's poem was scarcely less inflammatory in its condemnation of the hypocritical 
appropriation of the nationalist legacy by collaborationist politicians. Nuri and his followers 
again left the theater in humiliation when Jawahiri reached his climax: 
 
Twenty-five years have passed as if they were 
  With their personalities an item from the news 
We tired of them like a prisoner tires of his shackles 
  In excess of the burdens that they bore… 
Who could reckon that it would last so long 
  A government founded on such a flawed basis?! 
After all the atrocities that the people have faced 
  In the shadow of their constitution and slogans 
The captive is obliged to demand from his captor: 




The public assault on tyranny and dictatorship marked a watershed in the modern political 
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The enthusiastic popular reception to the public assaults prompted the resignation of 
Prime Minister Hamdi al-Pachachi and thwarted the efforts of Nuri to have the poets arrested. 
The liberal politician Tawfiq al-Suwaydi succeeded Pachachi and his Minister of Interior Saʿd 
Salih, a leading member of the leftist opposition, moved immediately to dismiss arrest warrants 
for the two poets.
16
 The new administration, however, would also fall victim to the force of 
political poetry after Jawahiri published the caustic poem "Tartarah," which satirized the ruling 
class. The poem – nearly untranslatable due to the abundance of original coinages and the 
centrality of alliteration – scandalized the political establishment by the directness of its frontal 
assault: 
 
What prattle is this chattering to me 
 Pushing me forward and holding me back 
Making me Shiʿi and then Sunni 
 Turning me Jewish and then Christian 
Fashioning me a Kurd and then an Arab 
 Flinging at me false charges of racism  
Internationalizing and then Anglicizing me 
 Portraying me first as rational and then delusional 
My very being, as their eminences desire, 
 From the front of my face to the seat of my ass 
Rendered suitable for Salih Jabr 




When Jabr and ʿUmari failed to convince Saʿd Salih to have the poet arrested, they rallied their 




The liberalization of the press that flourished under Pachachi and Suwaydi was abruptly 
and violently reversed by their successor, Arshad al-ʿUmari. Less than three months after taking 
power, Arshad had shut down at least six newspapers, including the principal organs of four out 
of the five national political parties, and had numerous journalists and editors arrested and tried 
on exaggerated charges of publishing false reports. Kamil al-Chadirchi, by this point the most 
prominent progressive politician in Iraq, was sentenced to six months hard labor. Even Nuri 
complained that Arshad had "gone mad" in his assault on what he saw as an all-pervasive 
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 Even more alarming was Arshad's willingness to sanction state violence 
against the public. At his command, police opened fire on a peaceful demonstration against 
Zionism and British imperialism in Baghdad on June 28, 1946, killing one protestor. Two weeks 
later, police opened fire on striking oil workers in Gawurpaghi, just west of Kirkuk, killing ten 
workers and further contributing to the public perceptions that the local government was 
primarily interested in protecting British political and financial interests inside the country.
20
 
 Despite Arshad's tenacity in silencing his critics, his policies were scarcely more effective 
than those of his predecessors. Suspended newspapers continued to reappear within weeks or 
even days under different names and occasionally different editors. Muhammad Mahdi al-
Jawahiri thus rechristened al-Raʿi al-ʿAmm as Sada al-Dustur and Nuri Din Daʾud transferred 
control of al-Nida to his friend Salim Naʿimi under the title al-Taqaddum. Jawahiri managed to 
circumvent further press censorship by seeking recourse with the Regent ʿAbd al-Ilah, who was 
happy to continue a long historical tradition of political patronage for illustrious poets.
21
 As 
before the war, newspapers continued to invite punishment from the Ministry of Interior when 
they publicly criticized British imperialism.
22
 Public pressure for liberal political reforms, 
though, was by this point too powerful for even Arshad al-ʿUmari and other reactionary 
politicians to resist.  
 While the renewed atmosphere of political repression under the rule of Arshad al-ʿUmari 
rolled back the advance of civil society under the liberal reforms of Pachachi and Suwaydi, the 
persistence of political dissent and the resilience of independent political parties attested to the 
reality of a new phenomenon of mass politics. The Istiqlal Party, led by Muhammad Mahdi 
Kubba and other erstwhile supporters of Rashid ʿAli, emerged as the leading nationalist party in 
the post-war period. The British Embassy, which took nearly five years to transition from an 
anti-fascist to an anti-Communist framework, kept dossiers on many of the Istiqlal Party leaders 
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in box at the embassy labeled "Bad Men."
23
 While the partisans of the Istiqlal Party were 
generally rightwing and anti-Communist, the editor of the party organ Liwa al-Istiqlal publicly 
proclaimed the party's  willingness to "hand ourselves over to communism" before surrendering 
to the forces of Zionism and imperialism. British officials read the declaration as a statement of 
principle rather than a rhetorical turn of phrase and embarked on an ill-fated propaganda 
campaign to portray the Istiqlal Party as stooges of the Soviet Union.
24
 Ironically, the efforts of 
the local government in coordination with the British Embassy to conflate nationalists and 
Communists in their efforts to marginalize all independent opposition only contributed to the 
consolidation of an ideologically diverse spectrum into a united popular front. 
The liberal National Democratic Party, lead by Kamil al-Chadirchi and the moderate 
wing of the old Ahali Group, emerged first as the natural rival to the Istiqlal Party and then as its 
unlikely collaborator. The transparent fraud of the new parliamentary elections conducted in 
early 1947 brought the two parties together in opposition to the government. While the British 
Embassy dismissed allegations of electoral corruption as "the natural consequence of the 
imposition of a democratic constitution on a society which has only partially and recently 
emerged from tribalism," the nationalist political parties proved willing to quickly push aside 
ideological divisions in the interests of a resurgent anti-colonial alliance. The Istiqlal Party grew 
gradually more receptive to the argument for economic reform advanced by the National 
Democratic Party, while the latter proved increasingly interested in the politics of anti-Zionism 
advanced by the Istiqlal leadership.
25
 The merger of the two popular demands in the slogans and 
mottos of a united popular front underscored the emergence of a new mass politics centered for 
the first time around a concrete set of political aims articulated by workers and intellectuals 
rather than the authority and charisma of the political elite. 
Perhaps most significant to the dramatic transformation of the political atmosphere, 
however, were the underground activities of the Iraqi Communist Party, which continued to 
build a base of popular support among the workers who suffered most severely from the 
deterioration of economic conditions. The price of food, clothing, rent, and other essential goods 
had increased nearly six-fold since the beginning of World War II and again jumped significantly 
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in late 1947. Under the leadership of Fahd, the Communists consolidated control of the nascent 
labor movement and succeeded in politicizing the working class through a series of highly 
visible strikes. Not even the arrest of Fahd in January 1947 and the subsequent power struggle 
between Yahuda Siddiq and Malik Sayf managed to diminish the Communist surge.
26
 Like the 
National Democratic Party, the Communists increasingly framed their economic agenda in the 
discourse of anti-colonial politics. One leaflet distributed in Basrah condemned the poor quality 
of local bread as the product of a conspiracy orchestrated by Nuri al-Saʿid and Salih Jabr to 
smuggle local wheat to Iran and Kuwait and substitute sand, seeds, and date stones in local 
supplies. The leaflet accused the assistant governor, the police inspector, the British Army 
Supply Officer, the notorious smuggler ʿAbd al-Majid, the dancing girl Salimah, and various 
Iranian officials of complicity in the plot, a potent amalgamation of corrupt officials, foreign 
imperialists, and moral degenerates.
27
 It was in this context of economic distress and resurgent 
anti-colonialism that Prime Minister Salih al-Jabr attempted to renegotiate the Anglo-Iraqi 
Treaty of 1930. 
The Portsmouth Negotiations and the Wathbah of 1948 
 The agitation of the political parties for the revision of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty in the 
spring of 1947 forced Salih Jabr to publicly announce his intention to open revision negotiations. 
While British officials were confident in Jabr's willingness to preserve essential British interests 
in the country, they worried that parliamentary deputies, the vast majority of whom did not 
belong to political parties and were therefore highly susceptible to fluctuations in popular 
opinion, might balk at the final moment and "irresponsibly" refuse to ratify the revisions.
 28
 
Given the extreme hesitance to participate in a political process whose outcome had not been 
determined in advance, the British Ambassador endeavored to ensure a favorable outcome. He 
urged the Foreign Office to exclude Tawfiq al-Suwaydi, a pro-British politician then at odds with 
Salih Jabr, from the negotiations on the grounds that "his legalistic mind would be tiresome." He 
argued for the exclusion of Nuri, on the other hand, because popular antipathy towards his "well 
known pro-British proclivities" led to the inescapable conclusion that his participation would 
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raise a public outcry against an obvious conspiracy.
29
 Even pro-British politicians like Nuri and 
Suwaydi, however, were far less pliant to colonial commands than was popularly assumed, and 
the ambassador's suggestion thus proved impossible to enact. 
 The negotiations opened in Britain under a shadow of recriminations and intimidations as 
British and Iraqi officials clashed over how the negotiations would be packaged and sold to the 
domestic audience. The British Ambassador expressed strong reservations over Salih Jabr's 
decision to inform a select majority of parliament – opposition figures were excluded – of his 
intention to travel to Britain for negotiations. Only after he received assurances that the Prime 
Minister would not acquaint parliament with the details of the negotiations did he finally accept 
that the Prime Minister knew best how to handle the local situation.
30
 Iraqi officials were 
impressed, if not explicitly instructed, on the fact that negotiations would revolve around formal 
adjustments of phrasing in the text prepared by the British Foreign Ministry. The poet 
Muhammad Mahdi al-Jawahiri, who was actually in London at the time of the negotiations as 
part of a delegation of journalists, later recounted his astonishment at the immense scope of 
power accorded to Britain in the draft treaty shown to him by ʿAbd al-Ilah, with whom the poet 
enjoyed close relations at the time, at his London hotel. ʿAbd al-Ilah explained to the poet that 
British diplomats were using the threat of Communist aggression to secure concessions: "What 
can we do? They frighten us, Jawahiri, by bringing up the bogey every now and then."
31
 
 British diplomats, well-versed in the art of negotiating colonial alliances with subordinate 
powers, managed to manipulate a process ostensibly designed to affirm local sovereignty in 
order to secure imperial interests in the region. While the revised treaty conceded ownership of 
military bases and installations in the name of local sovereignty, it remained riddled with 
language that ensured effective British control in times of crisis. The initial annexure to the 
treaty's first article, for example, read in part:  
 
"In the event of either High Contracting Party becoming involved in war, or of a 
menace of hostilities, His Majesty The King of Iraq will invite His Britannic 
Majesty to bring immediately to Iraq the force of all arms necessary for the 
effective defence of Iraq and of the Middle East as a whole, and will furnish to 
His Britannic Majesty on Iraqi territory all the facilities and assistance in his 
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Iraqi negotiators succeeded in striking the clause "necessary for the effective defence of Iraq and 
of the Middle East as a whole" from the final draft, but the net effect remained the same. Faced 
with even "the menace of hostilities" anywhere in the Middle East, Britain was entitled to occupy 
Iraqi military bases.
33
 Britain was given control of the technical staff, installations and equipment 
at the military bases of Habbaniyah and Shaybah, as well as perpetual "access to and use of" 
those bases. Furthermore, a secret annexure to the treaty obligated Iraq to maintain additional 
installations across the country for Britain in case of the necessity of "resuming occupation of 
them in the event of war."
34
 National sovereignty, in other words, was officially subordinated to 
the needs of the British Empire.  
 The British formula for diplomatic success was predicated upon a clear distinction 
between bilateral relations in war and peace. Britain would enjoy nearly unlimited access to Iraqi 
military bases in times of war, and British diplomats therefore sought to define "peace" in such 
an abstract manner that its advent would remain perpetually on the horizon while simultaneously 
insisting on complete clarity in the articulation of Iraqi obligations in the event that "peace" was 
threatened by the "menace of hostilities." Iraqi representatives naturally feared that the expansive 
language of the British draft revisions would permit foreign troops to remain indefinitely in the 
country and at first insisted on a defined timetable for the troop withdrawals, arguing that the 
local population required tangible changes to mark the official end of the wartime occupation.
35
 
The earliest British draft stipulated that the Iraqi government would grant the British Royal Air 
Force use of Iraqi airbases "until such times as the High Contracting Parties shall agree that the 
state of security in the Middle East no longer requires it." When the Iraqi delegation balked at the 
transparent British attempt to retain veto power over any effort to end the military occupation, 
Britain agreed to a new formulation that defined peace as "fully in force when the Allied Forces 
are withdrawn from the territories of all ex-enemy states." Convinced of the American intention 
to retain military bases in Germany for the foreseeable future, British officials were confident 
enough in the impossibility of such "peace" that they goaded the Iraqi delegation to waste their 
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own political capital securing meaningless concessions for a post-war peace forever delayed by 
the advent of the Cold War.
36
  
British diplomats managed to further divert the attention of the Iraqi delegation from the 
essential aspects of the military occupation by forcing their counterparts to haggle over 
numerous marginal issues. Nuri, in particular, was much more concerned with his government's 
ability to forcefully suppress popular uprisings than with his own ability to negotiate the 
departure of occupation forces and was consequently deeply troubled by draft language 
effectively limiting the military's access to British weapons by making such access contingent on 
"availability." Nuri warned his British counterparts that the military hierarchy in Iraq remained 
suspicious of British intentions because of previous transactions that forced obsolete equipment, 
like defunct Anson aircraft, onto the Iraqis and reminded them that the defection of the Four 
Colonels to the anti-British contingent led by Rashid ʿAli was partially a product of those 
resentments. British officials candidly explained that availability would depend on the domestic 
needs and economic exigencies but maintained that the British and Iraqi armies would "be as 
one." While the relevant articles were eventually revised to provide reassurance to the Iraqi 
delegation, the revisions reflected a difference only in the degree of opaqueness and assured 
plausible deniability in the future.
37
 
Further discussions were held over various economic and legal issues surrounding the 
official presence of British agents and representatives on Iraqi soil. The Iraqi delegation wished 
to abrogate the Anglo-Iraqi Agreement of March 1, 1936, which accorded virtual ownership of 
national railways to Britain and stipulated the employment of British officials at the highest 
levels of the Railway Directorate. As Fadhil al-Jamali argued, Iraqi officials wished to retain 
British advisers but wanted to mollify their domestic constituents by claiming the right to invite 
those advisers on their own accord, rather than as a condition of an imposed treaty. Britain 
insisted that railway negotiations were an entirely separate matter from the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty 
and could not be dealt with until after the present negotiations were concluded, relenting only 
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after the Iraqi delegation agreed to drop objections to more central treaty articles.
38
 Iraqi 
objections to the considerable legal privileges and immunities granted to foreign troops were 
defused by a practically meaningless British offer of parallel capitulations for Iraqi troops in 
Britain.
39
 On the other hand, both sides agreed that British assistance in guiding economic 
development and providing technical advisors was essential to preventing the spread of 
communism in the country.
40
  
After the two sides agreed on a final draft, British officials went to great lengths to 
trumpet their concessions to the Iraqis in official publicity statements as evidence of the final 
liquidation of colonial relations and the establishment of a bilateral partnership on an equal 
footing. As one official warned, Britain must avoid at all costs the appearance "that we have 
tricked the Iraqis into letting us continue our military occupation in practice at the expense of a 
few concession."
41
 Several weeks later, when the congratulatory spirit had been extinguished by 
the massive uprising and bloodshed in Baghdad, colonial officials adopted a more self-righteous 
pose. Britain had in fact "conceded almost every request made by the Iraqi negotiators and went 
very far to meet them on all others." The revised treaty was therefore a statement of "genuine 
equality which recognises on the one hand Iraq's desire for absolute sovereignty and on the other 
her desire for some security in the uncertain conditions of the world to-day."
42
 
The revised treaty was signed at Portsmouth on January 15, 1948 by the five members of 
the Iraqi delegation and their British counterparts. Despite the fact that nearly all parliamentary 
deputies owed their seats to the goodwill of the government, the announcement prompted an 
immediate revolt. Muhammad Mahdi al-Jawahiri, who had finally gained his long coveted 
parliamentary seat just weeks earlier, led with the opposition against Salih Jabr. When his 
cousin, the renowned poet ʿAli al-Sharqi, asked why Jawahiri did not simply abstain from the 
debate in order to preserve his seat, Jawahiri dismissed the suggestion as incompatible with his 
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commitment to anti-colonial politics: "I remain, dear cousin, as you have always known me, a 
bedouin in Paris."
43
 On January 19, the leftist poet Muhammad Salih Bahr al-ʿUlum published 
the defiant poem "The Colonial (Portsmouth) Treaty": 
 
O Portsmouth Covenant, we as a nation 
 Reject an alliance with the treacherous enemy 
Stay at your own border, for Iraq possesses 
 Tremendous volition to crush any reckless fool 
Have you forgotten the days of the Euphrates 
 And come to me disgraced to face another day? 
The Tigris will show you, with her tyranny 




Bahr al-ʿUlum's warning would prove prophetic as crowds surged through the streets of Baghdad 
in unprecedented numbers, though this time the Tigris would be filled with the bodies of dead 
Iraqis. 
The Wathbah 
 On January 5, 1948, while the Iraqi delegation haggled over the definition of "peace" 
with British officials in London, students from the College of Law organized spontaneous 
demonstrations in response to the leak of treaty details by Foreign Minister Jamil al-Midfaʿi. The 
students intended to march from campus to the Council of Ministers, the Royal Palace, and both 
the British and American Embassies but were prevented by police from leaving the university 
buildings. Police fired shots in the air while students hurled bottles and stones at police from 
their besieged location.
45
 Students shouted slogans against not only British imperialism, but also 
against the inaction of Arab governments toward the crisis in Palestine.
46
 The official regime 
mouthpiece al-Shaʿb alleged that the demonstration was organized by "persons with destructive 
principles" and declared the entire movement a "plot" intended to undermine the Iraqi 
government's hostility to Zionism and to enervate the negotiating standpoint of the Iraqi 
delegation in London.
47
 Nationalist papers, like Muhammad Mahdi al-Jawahiri's al-Raʿi al-
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 While the student protests soon subsided under the weight of political repression, the 
publication of the revised treaty thrust the independent political parties into open opposition. An 
editorial penned by Istiqlal Party leader Muhammad Mahdi Kubba in Liwa al-Istiqlal laid bare 
the nationalist critique. Kubba argued that the original treaty was only tolerated as the necessary 
price of national independence and charged that the revised treaty signified the formal 
annexation of Iraq by the British Empire. His editorial seized upon the vague phrasing of treaty 
provisions, carefully crafted by British officials to mask the scope of imperial privileges, in order 
to demonstrate the total absence of either temporal and spatial constraints on British rights to 
military bases and installations. Kubba argued that the revised treaty actually magnified British 
power in Iraq by sanctioning the right to maintain a standing army, whereas the original treaty 
had merely accorded ownership of the airbases at Habbaniyah and Shaybah. He presciently noted 
that the definition of "peace" as a contingency of third-party peace treaties was a "trick" that 
would sanction a permanent occupation while U.S. troops remained in Germany and Japan. 
Kubba sarcastically dismissed the reciprocal arrangement of capitulations for British and Iraqi 
troops as a "British propaganda trick" and an empty gesture based on the knowledge that Iraqi 
troops would never benefit from its provisions.
 
He concluded that the treaty was nothing short of 
a "national catastrophe" orchestrated by "an unrepresentative delegation" and handed off to "an 
unrepresentative parliament."
49
   
Kubba's chief complaint, though, focused on the Joint Defence Board tasked with 
enforcing the treaty provisions. Critics of the treaty were painfully aware of the implications of 
British rights in the country and the memory of the Rashid ʿAli movement, which most 
opposition figures remembered as a conflict between incompatible national and imperial 
interests, underlined fears that Iraq would again become involuntarily embroiled in the affairs of 
the British Empire. The Iraqi delegation's insistence on the de jure recognition of national 
sovereignty over military bases and installations was in many ways beside the point. Nationalists 
were not interested in title deeds, which they alleged merely transferred maintenance costs from 
Britain to Iraq, but rather demanded the recognition of the sovereign nation's right to dissent 
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from the imperial agenda. On that point, the Joint Defence Board was widely seen as a step 
backwards, enshrining the ambiguities of the previous version in explicit language that 
simultaneously mandated Iraqi involvement in British wars and lifted prior restrictions on the 
scope and extent of the mandated cooperation.
50
  
Popular demonstrations finally erupted on January 20 when students managed to evade 
police blockades by arriving at main streets in small numbers rather than large groups. Armed 
with sticks, they engaged local police in pitched battles when the latter attempted to disperse the 
crowds. At least two protestors were killed when the police opened fire on a group of students 
attempted to storm armored trucks with mounted machine guns. Police officials informed the 
government the following day that they would be unable to control the crowds unless they were 
authorized to open fire at their own discretion. By that point, the crowds were no longer chanting 
only against the administration of Salih Jabr and the Portsmouth Treaty but also against ʿAbd al-
Ilah and the monarchy. The Ministry of Interior responded to the public disorder by banning 
"irresponsible" newspapers like al-Yaqdha, which had criticized the absence of Salih Jabr from 
the country with a "scarcely veiled allusion" to the flight of ʿAbd al-Ilah and Nuri al-Saʿid to 
ʿAmman in 1941, but popular mobilization was now taking place in the streets rather than 
cafes.
51
 Muhammad Salih Bahr al-ʿUlum improvised a poem of defiance for the crowds on 
Rashid Street: 
 
A draft law sent to pave the path for the invader 
 The propositions of this bill sanctioned invasion 
Employing the language of bullets to impose itself 
 And compelling cooperation from the barking dogs 
While the people prepare for the tribulations of night 




The unprecedented size of the crowds quickly overwhelmed the local police force, whose 
inexperience in the logistics and tactics of crowd control allowed the protestors to take advantage 
of urban geography in staking their claim to public space. Police were not trained in the use of 
tear gas and the variability of pressure in the city's water mains precluded the use of hoses for 
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crowd control. The British Embassy urged officials at the Ministry of Interior to allow the 
crowds to demonstrate in peace during the day and then to move swiftly in the evening to defang 
the movement through mass arrests, but stubborn Iraqi officials were unwilling to concede any 
ground to the crowds. The crowds, meanwhile, succeeded in totally paralyzing the movement of 
people and commerce in the city by blocking the intersection of al-Maʾmun Bridge with Rashid 
Street and Ghazi Street, the two major thoroughfares parallel to the Tigris River upon which 
nearly all city traffic relied. Protestors targeted the offices of the pro-British Iraq Times, which 




 As the demonstrations intensified, acting Prime Minister Jamal Baban failed to convince 
allies in parliament to back a police assault on the protestors and advised ʿAbd al-Ilah to publicly 
disavow the treaty. British officials ignored the substantive complaints of the demonstrators and 
instead criticized Salih Jabr's failure to properly defend the treaty. Forgetting his previous 
complaint about Jabr's decision to brief a select group of parliamentary deputies on the treaty 
revisions, the British Ambassador now attacked Jabr for "not giving more details about the 
proposed treaty" to parliament. By the evening of January 21, Radio Baghdad announced that 
ʿAbd al-Ilah and a group of leading nationalist politicians had "unanimously agreed" that the 
revised treaty "does not realize the aspirations of the country" and decided against ratification. 
British officials branded the decision to negotiate with "enemies" as a public concession of 
weakness and even considered forcing the regent's abdication. One official, though, noted that 
crowds had totally overwhelmed an increasingly nervous police force and argued that Baban was 




ʿAbd al-Ilah's public repudiation of the treaty, though, did not dampen popular 
enthusiasm for the protest movement as intended. Poets seized the opportunity to publicly 
celebrate the achievement of the crowds and then to intensify popular demands for radical 
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political reform. Jawahiri eulogized the fallen martyrs before massive crowds on Rashid Street in 
his poem "Halt at the Graves of the Victims": 
 
 Halt at the graves of the victims and do not let fall 
  Your tears upon them nor cry extemporaneously 
 Do not dishonor the covenant of masculinities 
  That abhors weakness and rejects infirmity 
 Lay upon the wreath some budding flowers 
  Above that blossom of glistening conscience 
 Allow it fall to from your outstretched arms 
  And then narrate, if you wish, proclaiming: 
 O You who now rest from your wanderings 
  You made pleasant the abode and perfumed the area 
 Every one of us envies you, for you have indeed 




The protestors celebrated not only the collapse of the reviled treaty concessions, but also the 
imminent fall of the extraordinarily unpopular government, which could not be expected to 
endure in the face of ʿAbd al-Ilah's public repudiation. Acting upon British advice, however, the 




On January 22, crowds again turned out in central Baghdad in even larger numbers than 
on previous days, in order to demand further concessions. As many as one hundred and fifty 
thousand protestors marched through the streets behind the casket of Shamran ʿAlwan, a 
Communist student killed by police the previous day. The crowds hoisted Muhammad Salih 
Bahr al-ʿUlum on their shoulders as he regaled the procession with improvised poems of 
defiance like "O Believers in the People": 
 
 O Believers in the people and the revolution 
  Rise up and condemn the covenant of the slave 
 In struggle you are destined to liberate the people 
  And to obtain glory through the illustrious struggle 
 For we remain as in the past courageous and bold 
  In the face of tyranny and oppression in every age 
 We stand ready to wade into the deluge of death 
  As we sing to the people a melody of immortality
57
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In front of the trade union headquarters near the mosque of Sayyid Sultan ʿAli just off Rashid 
Street in central Baghdad, Bahr al-ʿUlum improvised the poem "Labor Unions, Preserve the 
Honorable People": 
 
 Labor Unions, preserve the honorable people 
   And erect for the workers some triumphal arches 
 The signs have begun and so their nobility proceeds 
  In this movement, the Wathbah, what a wonderful effect 
 Glory and honor to her, for she has united the nation 
  By decree of fate, and at her front, glory and honor to man 
 The scars of the June catastrophe had not healed 




While Iraqi officials justified their capitulations to the crowds by privately explaining to British 
officials that they feared an imminent massacre of Jews, Bahr al-ʿUlum publicly celebrated the 
diversity of the popular movement as a cathartic national reconciliation healing the wounds of 
the farhud of June 1941.  
 As the crowds wound their way through Rashid Street to the Ministry of Defense, Bahr 
al-ʿUlum serenaded military officials with the poem "Salutations from the People to the Army": 
 
 O Army of Iraq, if my heart composed 
  A verse for you it would scarcely be sufficient 
 You shaped your people's glory with righteousness 
  And so your creation has emerged so beautiful 
 Preserved in my mouth an anthem for you narrated 
  By the Land of the Two Rivers, generation after generation 
 You lived for the people, your power from their name 




In the evening, atop the shoulders of the ebullient crowds, the poet improvised his most 
memorable poem, "The People's Leap," which helped to immortalize the popular uprising as the 
Wathbah ("leap"): 
 
 O Wathbah of the People, rend apart 
  With your maledictions this stupid treaty 
 For the Portsmouth Treaty is a chain 
  The fetters of an unconditional occupation
60
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He drew upon the historical lineage of anti-colonial resistance to exhort the fury and the passions 
of the crowds against the oppressive treaty: 
 
 O Wathbah of the People, send away 
  The grief and sadness of sheer evil 
 That descends upon us, for Iraq 
  Is the death of every stuttering fool 
 The stronger logic lies in the struggle of the resisting people 
 So Bevin will be shut up just as the villain Churchill was muzzled 
 
The struggle against the treaty, though, had now been decisively won, and so the attention of the 
crowds would soon turn toward the treachery of national politicians. 
On January 23, Bahr al-ʿUlum increased the intensity of his attacks on the local regime, 
branding them now as national traitors in his poem "The People Curse the Rule of Traitors": 
 
The cunning colonizer prepares the snares of treason 
For the suspicious and idiotic to tumble in humiliation 
And everyone whose efforts contradict his tongue is disrobed 




The shift in tone from a purely anti-colonial critique to a direct attack on the old regime forced 
the government's hand, and Bahr al-ʿUlum was arrested that evening and severely tortured at the 
al-Bataween police station.
62
 While the brutal torture nearly killed him and left him bedridden 
for nearly a year and a half, his prison poetry reflected his pride in the accomplishments of the 
national uprising: 
 
 Bevin and Satan clapped their hands together 
  In delight at the thought that crossed Bevin's mind 
 To squander the dignity and honor held so dear 
  By the people of the valley with a camouflaged treaty 
 The band at Portsmouth envisioned in Baghdad 
  Exultation and jubilation at the sale of the nation 
 But the people exploded and hurled forth their reply 
  To the treaty and her leaches in the brothels of London
63
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 The state violence deployed against the protestors remained relatively sporadic until 
January 27, when massive crowds marched towards parliament to protest the return of Salih Jabr 
and Nuri al-Saʿid from London. When the working class crowds from al-Karkh attempted to 
cross al-Maʾmun Bridge to join the student protestors in al-Rusafa on the eastern bank of the 
Tigris River, police opened fire from armored cars and rooftops. The students then managed to 
drive away police from their side of the bridge and tried to cross over to al-Karkh, but they too 
were gunned down by the waiting police. Participants and eyewitnesses described a scene of 
unspeakable carnage, as bodies littered the bridge and surrounding streets, as well as the Tigris 
River. Official death tolls were rendered useless by the well-known fact that police had been 
arresting relatives of the Wathbah victims when they attempted to collect corpses at the hospital 
and thereby forced most families to bypass official channels for burial.
64
 While most historians 
have put the casualty figures somewhere between three and four hundred, the British Embassy 
stubbornly insisted weeks later that only eight protestors had been killed on the bridge. Three 




Aftermath of the Uprising 
The collapse of Salih Jabr's government threw the British Embassy and the Iraqi political 
establishment into disarray. ʿAbd al-Ilah, who wanted to make Salih Jabr a scapegoat for the 
political debacle in order to obscure the substantive claims of the crowds, recommended "a 
colourless Government under a respected non-partisan personality" which would allow the treaty 
to be considered "on its own merits."
66
 The British Embassy, on the other hand, wanted a strong 
administration capable of forcing the treaty through parliament in the face of popular opposition 
and supported the return to power of either Arshad al-ʿUmari, eager to resume his anti-
Communist campaign of 1946, or Tawfiq al-Suwaydi, who was tainted by his own role in the 
Portsmouth negotiations. Suwaydi proved uninterested, and even Nuri understood that "those 
who have been agitating against Saleh Jabr were not working to put [a] notorious reactionary like 
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Arshad into [the] premiership."
67
 In the end, they turned to Muhammad al-Sadr, the longtime 
President of the Senate and an old nationalist icon famed for his role in the anti-British uprising 
of 1920. 
Sadr privately assured the British Embassy that he did not oppose the revised treaty and 
promised to refrain from publicly criticizing its contents and consequences, but he argued that it 
could not possibly be ratified without reigniting popular fury and indicated that he only wished 
to remain in power until peace and order had been restored. Sadr moved quickly to secure an 
emergency shipment of wheat from Britain in order to alleviate the bread crisis and dampen 
popular enthusiasm for protests. When the British Ambassador attempted to use the wheat 
shipments as leverage to force Sadr to introduce the treaty to parliament for ratification, the 
Prime Minister responded by suspending parliament for fifty days in order to forestall the 
emergence of new political controversies that might further energize and politicize the daily 
funeral processions for martyrs during the forty day mourning period.
68
 
 The political opposition, though, scarcely needed additional cause to turn the funeral 
processions into an open denunciation of the old regime. Most notable in this regard was the 
funeral of Muhammad Mahdi al-Jawahiri's brother Jaʿfar, who was among those who fell on al-
Maʾmun Bridge. Just before he finally succumbed to his injuries on February 4, Jaʿfar pled with 
his older brother for "three lines of poetry in remembrance." The funeral procession the next 
morning brought forth tens of thousands of mourners, including significant delegations from 
Najaf and Karbala. While the procession remained peaceful, a massive presence of security 
forces stood watch in preparation to intervene at any moment of tension. Jawahiri later claimed 
that the supporters of Salih Jabr prevented mourners from approaching Jaʿfar's tomb and even 
climbed on top of the structure in order to cover the wreaths of condolence.
69
 More memorable, 
though, was the memorial ceremony held for Jaʿfar on February 14 at the Haydarkhanah Mosque 
on Rashid Street. After the ceremony, Jawahiri stood on the steps of the mosque and without 
warning took up a loudspeaker and began reciting the now iconic poem "My Brother Jaʿfar": 
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 Do you know or do you not know 
  That the wounds of the fallen are a mouth? 
  A mouth not like that of the charlatan 
  Nor like that of the one who solicits 
 It calls upon the hungry and wretched 
  To spill your blood to feed yourself 
 And shouts at the band of sycophants 




By the end of the fourth stanza, Rashid Street had filled with thousand of onlookers, grinding 
traffic to a complete and total halt. The crowds were reportedly to tears at the poem's memorable 
climax: 
 
 I see a horizon lit with blood 
  As the stars vanish from sight 
 A rope from the earth to ascend 
  As the stairs eject their climbers 
 If a hand reaches out it is in betrayal 
  Interfering to obstruct the conclusion 
 Piled around it is a pile of corpses 
  Whose size is eclipsed by its honor 
 A hand stretches from behind the veil 
  And draws on the horizon what is to be 
 One generation passes and another one rises 
  While the fire they face continues to burn 
 
The poem was carried on the front page of nearly every opposition paper the next day and 
contributed essentially, as Salma Khadra Jayyusi has suggested, to "preparing the Iraqi people 
emotionally for the advent and the eruption of revolution."
71
 While Bahr al-ʿUlum played a more 
significant role in actually leading the crowds in the heat of the uprising, Jawahiri's greater 
public stature assured an unprecedented degree of publicity for the public act of political 
defiance. 
While nationalist politics took on an increasingly mass character, with crowds failing to 
disperse despite the mass arrest of opposition party leaders, the British Embassy remained 
fixated on the partisan rivalries of elite politics. Ignoring entire weeks of public protest, the 
British Ambassador now contended that the situation spiraled out of control only when a faction 
of the "old gang" of elite politicians conspired to bring down the government of Salih Jabr by 
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convincing ʿAbd al-Ilah to publicly disavow the treaty. ʿAbd al-Ilah's concession, he argued, 
emboldened the leadership of the Istiqlal Party, who organized demonstrations that gained 
popular credence "because of the present bread crisis and the standing resentment against 
Palestine partition."
72
 Because the treaty had fallen victim to partisan disputes that were 
"scarcely at all" anti-British, as the ambassador lectured Foreign Minister Hamdi al-Pachachi, 
Iraqi politicians must make amends and "educate Iraqi public opinion" on the merits of the 
imperial alliance. This vertical conceptualization of political agency, which viewed the political 
elite as the driving force behind popular movements, undergirded imperial efforts to seek 




Efforts to rekindle ratification talks were complicated from the outset by the fact that the 
new government was overwhelmingly comprised of politicians from traditional backgrounds 
untainted by prior collaboration with Britain whose inability to speak English hindered 
communication with the British Embassy. While representatives of the new administration 
privately apologized to the British Embassy for publicly rejecting the treaty, they were unwilling 
to criticize specific provisions. Hamdi al-Pachachi, who "illogically enough" contended that the 
revised treaty did not go far enough insisted that the rejection of the treaty was merely "formal" 
and helpfully offered that British planes could land on the roof of his house in the event of war. 
Despite the confusion, the British Embassy remained optimistic that the treaty could be salvaged 
by strong leaders capable of "educating public opinion in the right way." One official argued that 
they ought to simply change the name of the "Joint Defence Board," insert abstract language 




Daily protests that commemorated the martyrs of the national uprising throughout 
February and March, however, precluded the possibility of pushing through such patently 
deceptive measures. While the processions were as a rule peaceful, the British Embassy 
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continued to view official tolerance of the public protests as a sign of weakness and humiliation. 
After the British Ambassador was forced to travel from the embassy to Iraqi government offices 
by a detour that "took ten or fifteen minutes longer" than usual by the crowds that gathered to 
listen to Jawahiri's eulogy for his martyred brother, he personally urged the government to put 
down the demonstrations with force. Muhammad al-Sadr, a long-time friend and patron of 
Jawahiri, refused the suggestion, arguing that the demonstrations would fade away if ignored and 
offering to resign if he were proven wrong. By the end of March, the announcement of a treaty 
concluded by Britain and Transjordan provoked new demonstrations that coincided with massive 
labor strikes. Sadr still steadfastly refused British exhortations to prohibit the demonstrations, 
clamp down on the press, and conduct mass arrests of political organizers and agitators.
75
  
The deterioration of the situation in Palestine in early April, though, pushed local 
officials beyond their breaking point as crowds continued to swell. Major demonstrations 
organized by both the Istiqlal Party and the Iraqi Communist Party erupted on April 13 and 
featured chants against both Zionism and the poor quality of bread in Baghdad. Nationalist 
newspapers now openly denounced Jewish influence in Iraq and carried reports of Iraqi Jews 
caught fighting with the Haganah forces, while crowds now began chanting against the Jews in 
general. Only the three leftists newspapers, al-Raʿi al-ʿAmm, Sawt al-Ahali, and al-Watan, 
mounted a serious defense of the Iraqi Jewish population, denouncing the new spirit of anarchy 
that threatened to derail the protest movement in tragic sectarian massacres. The radical 
nationalist papers, particularly al-Sijil and al-Nahda, struck back, branding Kamil al-Chadirchi 
the "saint of criminal Zionism" and printing a Haganah statement congratulating the Iraqi left for 
its defense of the Iraqi Jews. As tensions increased, Kamil Qazanchi and Muhammad Mahdi al-
Jawahiri, who were not members of the Iraqi Communist Party but were dedicated leftists 
generally sympathetic to the party line, personally led street demonstrations with slogans of, "We 
are friends of the Jews but enemies of the Zionists!"
 76
  
On April 14, Jawahiri recited his poem "Day of the Martyr," a grueling eulogy of nearly 
two hundred stanzas in commemoration of the martyrs of the Wathbah, in al-Sabaʿ Square in the 
Shaykh ʿUmar district of Baghdad not far from al-Maʾmun Bridge. Like "My Brother Jaʿfar," the 
poem evinced a sense of optimism in the national unity forged through public protests: 
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Day of the Martyr! Life would be sweet 
 If brotherhood and harmony were achieved 
If those who are feuding came to agreement 
 A kinship of their emotions and their concerns 
If after such a long separation there was a meeting 
 Between the shaykh, the rabbi, and the priest 
And if we agreed on how to raise our voice 




As one eyewitness recalled, the poem provoked "a sea of workers and peasants [to] raise their 
machetes and pitchforks while they roared in one voice."
78
 \ 
 By early May, however, the Istiqlal Party newspaper, Liwa al-Istiqlal, now joined the 
more radical nationalist papers in branding the Iraqi Jewish community as a "fifth column" and 
calling for a general purge of Zionists and Communists from the government and their detention 
at the old concentration camps. These press attacks on the Jews coincided with the arrest and 
deportation of at least nine Iraqi Jews, including two journalists, and physical assaults on Jews in 
the working class Karkh district of Baghdad, in which at least one Jew was beaten to death by an 
angry crowd.
79
 After a small demonstration of Iraqi Jews protested the arrest of several dozen of 
their friends and relatives as members of an "underground Zionist movement," Liwa al-Istiqlal 
came out in favor of ejecting all Jews from the country. Al-Ahd, a newspaper owned by Khalil 
Kannah, a relative and close political ally of Nuri al-Saʿid, likewise denounced the entire Jewish 
community for its alleged support for Zionism and efforts to undermine the national economy.
80
  
While the crisis in Palestine intensified both anti-colonial and anti-government sentiment, 
the opposition parties were ill-suited to coordinate public protests. The Communists, whose 
deference to Soviet policy had forced them to endorse the United Nations partition plan the 
previous fall and cost them a huge number of supporters and sympathizers, could not risk 
drawing further attention to that spectacularly unpopular decision by diverting attention from the 
local economy to Palestine.
81
 The Istiqlal Party, on the other hand, had always championed the 
Palestinian cause but was forced to restrain its members due to the fact that several party leaders 
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were now government ministers. The National Democratic Party was perhaps better placed to 
organize protests and demonstrations, but most of the impetus now came from below as crowds 
thronged in public squares to listen to anti-colonial orations by poets like Jawahiri. As the Arab 
armies in Palestine collapsed and popular anger at the Iraqi government's impotence spiraled out 
of control, the government moved to preserve order by declaring martial law on the evening of 
May 14, 1948. While the crisis in Palestine offered a convenient excuse for the declaration of 
martial law, however, it masked the secret collusion of the British Embassy and local 
government officials in exploiting the circumstance to launch an offensive against the 
Communists and to afford the government latitude in rigging the new elections.
82
  
Terrified by the prospect that the burgeoning national front in Baghdad would be swept to 
power on the back of popular support in the upcoming elections, the British Embassy desperately 
sought a solution that would suppress the increasingly radical popular demands. British officials 
clashed openly with members of Sadr's administration, who had been largely marginalized in the 
previous rigged elections and were therefore receptive to public calls for new elections. The 
British Embassy firmly opposed the idea, arguing that the opposition parties were in a position to 
exploit their new popularity and that the presence of notable opposition figures in parliament 
would make it difficult for the present administration to "act with the firmness that the situation 
demands." Equally concerned with escalating the protests by overreaching, British advisers 
began to privately encourage Nuri and ʿAbd al-Ilah to permit the election of "a smallish number" 
of pliable candidates from opposition parties – "provided that there was no chance of their 
securing a majority" – in order to "act as a kind of safety-valve for the constitutional expression 
of feelings which could otherwise only be expressed in the streets." The Iraqi Ambassador in 




The search for suitable opposition candidates provoked further ruptures between the 
British Embassy and the Iraqi political establishment. While Muhammad Mahdi Kubba and other 
Istiqlal Party leaders privately assured British officials that they were open to negotiating with 
Britain as part of an anti-Communist alliance, the British Embassy had not yet transitioned from 
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World War II to the Cold War and continued to view the Istiqlal Party members as "ex-Nazis." 
Some British officials, genuinely committed to economic reform as a means of forestalling 
popular revolution, sought an alliance with the National Democratic Party, which they hoped 
could be purged of its leftist faction and refashioned as a moderate liberal party. Others worried 
that the party had understood too well the importance of street demonstrations from the lessons 
of the Wathbah, and in any case, the party leadership showed no indication that they were willing 
to sacrifice popular support for access to power. The British Embassy eventually decided that "a 
few members" of both parties should be elected in the interest of making parliament "as 
representative as possible" and in the hope that "success might moderate their views."
84
  
Internal political disputes in Muhammad al-Sadr's cabinet, however, impeded the 
government's ability to properly rig the elections. Turnout was so uncharacteristically high in the 
first stage among working class voters in Baghdad and Basrah that some panicked tribal forces 
loyal to pro-British candidates opened fire on the voter queues, leaving at least four dead and 
injuring dozens. The staggering success of leftist candidates prompted an immediate 
reconciliation among rival factions of the political elite, and the declaration of martial law 
allowed the government to intervene more forcefully in the second stage of the electoral process 
"in order to make sure that the right people were elected." Early gains in Basrah were erased 
when the local governor had several NDP leaders court-martialed as a warning to secondary 
electors. In Hillah, the local governor complained when given a predetermined list of victors that 
Iraq "had travelled from free elections via 'direction' to selection." In Sulaymaniyah, the 
overwhelming victory of the National Liberation Party in the first stage was reversed by the 
decision to disband the "Communist front" party. In the end, the opposition parties won just eight 
out one hundred and thirty-seven seats – four for the Istiqlal Party and two each for the Liberal 
Party and the National Democratic Party. The British Ambassador reflected without a hint of 
sarcasm that "the Iraqi electorate had struck the death-blow of the hopes of democratic political 
life" and had instead demonstrated "that they preferred the existing type of government to the 
programmes of the political parties."
85
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 By the end of June, the "old gang" was once again firmly in control of the government 
and hundreds of leftist and nationalist opposition figures were behind bars. Jawahiri published 
"Disgraceful Conditions," a fierce attack on the counterrevolution in general and the Istiqlal 
Party leader Muhammad Mahdi Kubba in particular for exploiting the legacy of the martyrs in 
exchange for a path to power: 
 
 Go and tell the papers you are in control 
  Shamelessly claim you are the free leader 
 As for me – and my honor here is vast   
  I righteously abstain from all exploitation 
 I have amassed from tragedy only a moral 
  A treasure for the country and her people 
 That will enrich the generations and nourish 
  Them with fat, while I am tormented by hunger 
 No, I will not exploit, for you are a warning 




Bahr al-ʿUlum likewise condemned the Istiqlal Party and other opposition factions that had 
abandoned the national front and entered into a new anti-Communist alliance with the pro-
British political elite. His poem "An Anti-Colonial Rebel" defiantly attacked those who 
dismissed him as a godless Communist:  
 
 Some people will say after my liberation from them 
  In death, "That Unbeliever has finally died!" 
 But others will rise enthusiastically to defend me 
  From the charge of atheism and indeed refute it 
 And my truth, like the sun, will spread its light 
  Shining an eye upon the intentional concealment 
 For even the English see that I am a free poet 




Perhaps the most significant development of the Wathbah, however, was the total erosion 
of the old regime's popular legitimacy. Anti-colonial poets and intellectuals, who had always 
attempted to balance a critical stance towards the state with working alliances with select 
factions of the political establishment, now divorced themselves entirely from the regime and 
dedicated themselves to revolutionary activism. The near total marginalization of the opposition 
political parties from parliament increasingly propelled disaffected intellectuals towards the 
                                                          
86
Al-Hidarah and al-ʿUsur, July 24, 1948 and Jawahiri, Diwan al-Jawahiri, 3:189-90. 
87
 Bahr al-ʿUlum, Diwan Bahr al-ʿUlum, 2:152. 
240 
 
radical underground parties, particularly the Iraqi Communist Party. Jawahiri's militant stance on 
the poet's political duty to assume a public role in the struggle against colonialism and 
dictatorship was made most explicit in his lengthy poem "The Balcony," which denounced those 
poets who held court in cafes and refused to take on a public role: 
 
 Heedless of their persistence in the vacuum 
  The nooks and corners of cafes are to them a salon 
 They shout at one another in chatter and nonsense 
  The whooping of storks rained down upon with pebbles… 
 Their dishonor is in donning the robes of litterateurs 




Jawahiri's political poetry in the coming years would be characterized by an overwhelming 
interest in caustic criticism and public confrontation reflecting an almost self-destructive 
tendency to provoke national controversy and to court arrest. Despite the fact that ʿAbd al-Ilah 
personally assured Jawahiri that he would be reelected to parliament, the poet declined to stand 
for office in the new elections. The painful abdication of his coveted parliamentary seat, which 
had for so long symbolized the national recognition for his literary accomplishments denied to 
him by the opposition of both pan-Arabists like Satiʿ al-Husri, who resented his Persian heritage 
and Shiʿi background, and elite politicians like Salih Jabr, who resented his caustic public 
criticism, reflected a new public commitment to revolution. It was a painful decision for 
Jawahiri, who had enjoyed warm personal relations with the monarchy for decades, and his 
retrospective account reflects the disappointment that accompanied his pride in championing the 
legacy of the national martyrs: "It was not on account of my own future or the future of my 
family, but instead for the sake of the martyrs of the Wathbah, the revolutionary street, and the 
masses longing for rest. And yet… what a pity…"
89
 
Poetry and Public Confrontation, 1948-1952 
 In the aftermath of the Wathbah, Jawahiri's public stature stood unrivalled among the 
poets, intellectuals, and politicians affiliated with the national front opposition movement. Along 
with his comrade Muhammad Salih Bahr al-ʿUlum, Jawahiri emerged as a leader of the leftwing 
Peace Partisans movement and remained on excellent terms with the leadership of both the 
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bourgeois liberal National Democratic Party and the outlawed Iraqi Communist Party. Widely 
recognized as "the greatest Iraqi poet of his generation," Jawahiri's literary abilities helped to cut 
across the social and ideological divisions that bisected the opposition movement.
90
 Communists 
celebrated his uncompromisingly withering critique of capitalism and dictatorship while non-
Communists praised his political independence and strident anti-colonialism. His ability to blend 
classical and modern techniques won the praise and enthusiasm of both traditionalists and 
modernists. Most importantly, his public interventions in the political arena won him a mass 
following of unprecedented proportions. When he found himself penniless as a result of his self-
imposed political exile and unable to fund the publication of his newspaper, al-Raʿi al-ʿAmm, the 
workers at a cigarette factory in Baghdad stepped in and offered a loan – which Jawahiri would 
only accept after convincing their representative to accept the legal title to his printing press as 
collateral – to help keep the paper afloat.
91
  
Jawahiri now seemed to revel in his national fame and increasingly insisted on reciting 
his poems in public, preferably before audiences that included powerful political figures. His 
infamous reading of "Hashim al-Witri" at a public ceremony in Baghdad, which resulted in his 
arrest and imprisonment, created a major public scandal and further solidified the role of poetry 
as a transgressive political weapon.
92
 Jawahiri continued to compose inflammatory poems after 
his release from prison, and his palpable anger and longing for revolution is evident in the 
memorable poem "Descend, Darkness," which followed shortly after "Hashim al-Witri" in the 
summer of 1949 and called for violent retribution against the national traitors responsible for the 
Wathbah massacres: 
 
 Descend, darkness! Descend, fog! Descend, barren clouds! 
 Descend, smoke burning from the conscience! Descend, torture! 
 Descend, ruin upon your protectors! Descend, damnation! 
 Descend, punishment on the tomb builders! Descend retribution! 
 Descend, crowing and the owl will answer the echo! Descend destruction! 
 Descend upon the lazy whose sluggishness is scorned even by flies! 
 They have never known the color of the sky because their necks are too bowed! 
 Because their heads are trampled upon as one tramples upon dust! 
 Descend upon the hungry goats still yearning to be milked! 
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Literary critic M. M. Badawi has noted that the poem's "repetition and diction has an effect 
analogues to that of magical imprecation or curses."
94
 This poetic effect underscored the 
pessimism of a national opposition movement now fractured by the crackdown on the Iraqi 
Communist Party in late 1948 and early 1949 and the defection of leading members of the 
Istiqlal Party to the regime. 
Jawahiri's clear sympathy for the Communists, however, did not lead him to join the 
party or even coordinate with its leadership informally. While younger poets like Badr Shakir al-
Sayyab and ʿAbd al-Wahhab al-Bayati were swept up by the revolutionary fervor of the era and 
joined their comrades at the University of Baghdad in joining the Iraqi Communist Party, the 
older generation of intellectuals and poets, led by Jawahiri and Bahr al-ʿUlum, fit much more 
comfortably with the independent Peace Partisans, a leftwing movement dedicated to political 
neutrality and world peace. Jawahiri had traveled to Wroclaw for the World Congress of 
Intellectuals for Peace in 1948, where he met Pablo Picasso, Bertolt Brecht, Aldous Huxley, and 
other prominent leftwing intellectuals. The Peace Partisans have generally been branded as a 
"Communist front" by British and American officials because of their unwavering commitment 
to socialist domestic policies and adoption of consistently anti-American and anti-British stance 
unbalanced by any serious criticism of Soviet foreign policy.
95
  
Ideology aside, there were serious practical distinctions between membership in the Iraqi 
Communist Party and the Peace Partisans movement that help explain the significance of the 
poets' decision to adopt an independent political stance. Peace Partisan leaders were highly 
respected poets and lawyers and overwhelmingly hailed from Arab Muslim backgrounds, while 
ethnic and religious minorities were overrepresented in the Communist Party. More importantly, 
the anti-American themes emphasized by the Peace Partisans were consistent with a long 
tradition of anti-colonial nationalism in Iraq. The Peace Partisans publicly and consistently 
denied any affiliation with the Communist Party or loyalty to the Soviet Union and instead 
framed their opposition to Cold War defence treaties in a language of "national liberation" that 
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recalled the nationalist discourse of the Rashid ʿAli movement.
96
 Both Jawahiri and Bahr al-
ʿUlum valued their artistic independence and ability to determine their own political agenda 
rather than heeding the tactical and aesthetic advice of party leaders. While the young 
Communist poet Badr Shakir al-Sayyab chafed under the Communist aesthetics that encouraged 
him to mimic the style of radical poets like Pablo Neruda, Nazim Hikmat, and Konstantin 
Simonov instead of his preferred "reactionary" poets like T.S. Eliot and Edith Sitwell and to 
avoid nationalist tropes and symbols, Jawahiri continued to craft his political commentary in the 
neo-classical tradition that looked to ʿAbbasid era poets like al-Mutanabbi, Abu Tammam, and 
Abu al-ʿAla al-Maʿarri for aesthetic inspiration. 
The Peace Partisans' public campaign against the incorporation of Iraq and other Arab 
countries in an anti-Communist Cold War alliance with Britain and the United States was 
launched in the fall of 1949. In the poetry of Bahr al-ʿUlum, in particular, the campaign 
prompted a remarkable rhetorical shift as the poet used peace rather than violence as a metaphor 
for anti-colonial resistance. in "Peace is the Desire of the Peoples," he framed a sharp dichotomy 
between victims and aggressors: 
 
 They say "Peace," and I say what nation 
  Preserves its security without its peace 
 But the dregs of the two wars gather themselves 
  To complete the trilogy of their misdeeds 
 In the East and West, and in any home therein, we find 




The new rejection of violence – remarkable for a poet who once suggested that Britain could 
only be confronted with machine guns because they only comprehended Arab voices that spoke 
with a "rat-a-tat-tat" – was made more explicit in the poem "In Peace the Death of Tyranny": 
 
 Do not ask about the enemy and from whom we borrow the sword for his  extermination 
 I am acquainted with what was devised and hatched for this East and her occupation 
 But go and ask the occupiers how they can tyrannize the people reeling in shackles 
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The thematic transformations reflect the tremendous impact of the Wathbah on the national 
consciousness of the political opposition. While the anti-colonial poetry of 1920 yearned for the 
tribes to save the nation and that of 1941 looked to the military for national salvation, poets now 
put their faith in mass political action in the streets and factories as the greatest hope for breaking 
colonial hegemony. 
This rhetorical shift from an anti-colonial poetics of violence to a third world poetics of 
peace likewise reflected an increasingly apparent identification of the United States, rather than 
Great Britain, as the popular symbol of colonial exploitation in the context of the Cold War. Bahr 
al-ʿUlum responded enthusiastically to the Stockholm Appeal with "At Your Service, Peace 
Council": 
 
 At your service, Peace Council, with literary productions 
  Suitable for the appraisal and estimation of the conscious masses 
 So that all the legal codes of life may finally achieve 
  The prohibition of all weapons of violent annihilation 
 The old man so devoted to them did not reckon 
  That his own health would be struck by the stinger of wars 
 For the old man was driven mad by the Reich 




The depiction of President Truman as an "old man" driven mad by an obsession with Nazis 
reflected a striking reformulation of political discourse from the framework of World War II to 
the Cold War. Bahr al-ʿUlum, who spent several years in internment camps for supporting the 
Rashid ʿAli movement and repeatedly mocked British efforts to brand all local nationalists as 
"Nazis," now deployed the metaphor against the United States as evidence of colonial hypocrisy 
and irrationality. 
Perhaps paradoxically, the growing identification with the Communist national liberation 
movements of East Asia helped to solidify the national front politics in Iraq as vertical class 
rivalries were subsumed by the horizontal solidarities of international anti-Americanism. For the 
first time, poets began to openly condemn American imperialism in terms that rendered explicit 
the growing nexus of anti-colonialism and anti-capitalism. The first blow came in Bahr al-
ʿUlum's "The Triumph of the Revolution in China," written in July 1949 in celebration of the 
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Maoist victory over the forces of Chiang Kai-sheck that framed the victory of peasants over 
feudalist as a metaphor for the global anti-American struggle: 
 
 The revolution triumphed and crushed the palaces of treason  
  While the servants of America howled and implored for help 
 For their leaders in the United States it was the day of reckoning 




More explicit was his couplet "Come, Peace," which followed shortly afterwards and drew an 
even sharper equivalence between colonialism and capitalism: 
 
 Come, Peace, and counter the wars 
  Kindles for the interests of the colonizers 
 And steel yourself to salvage a region 




Both Bahr al-ʿUlum and Jawahiri composed lengthy poems denouncing American intervention 
in the Korean War as an imperialist war motivated by a desire for profit.
102
 Bahr al-ʿUlum was 
arrested in 1951 as part of coordinated campaign against the Peace Partisans and sentenced to 
one year in prison.
103
 
The Intifadah of 1952 
The continued evolution of social and political conditions necessary for the emergence of 
mass politics, coupled with the darkening atmosphere of political repression that exposed the 
abject fraud of the electoral process and the cynical hypocrisy of the political elite, set the stage 
for the eruption of new popular protests. Unlike the Wathbah of January 1948, the Intifadah of 
November 1952 was not provoked by a single event but rather emerged in reaction to shared 
national grievances of the previous four years. While the Intifadah ostensibly emerged from the 
conjunction of specific grievances of students at the College of Pharmacy and Chemistry at the 
University of Baghdad and national demands by the political opposition parties for electoral 
reform, minor developments quickly set off a chain reaction of street protests that reflected the 
suppressed rage of a nation still chafing from the state violence of the Wathbah. Beneath the 
calls for political reform, though, lay lingering anti-colonial resentments against the highly 
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public influence of the United States and Great Britain. The Iraqi public was galvanized by 
concurrent events in Lebanon, Egypt, and Iran that challenged imperial hegemony and provided 
a model for national resistance reflected in the slogans and actions of the crowds. 
While the nationalist opposition parties had continued to agitate for the abrogation of the 
Anglo-Iraqi Treaty left in place after the Wathbah demonstrations had forced the cancellation of 
the Portsmouth Treaty, efforts by Nuri al-Saʿid to arrange a Hashemite union between Jordan 
and Iraq and attempts by the United States and Britain to craft a Middle East Defense 
Organization provided a new impetus for anti-colonial mobilization. In the fall of 1952, an 
overreaching effort to criminalize any expression of support for Communist policies – 
transparently directed at the independent Peace Partisans – provoked fierce resistance from the 
National Democratic Party, which had grown more liberal and anti-Communist over the 
preceding years but remained committed to democratic political freedoms. On the pages of al-
Ahali, party leader Kamil al-Chadirchi contended that if it the amendment passed, it would mean 
that "cheers for peace, the desire of all nations, will result in seven year prison terms."
104
  
By the fall of 1952, regional political events had occupied the attention of the country and 
thrown a spotlight on the internal contradictions of political sovereignty in Iraq. The Free 
Officers Revolution in Egypt and the popular protests that forced the resignation of Bisharah al-
Khuri in Lebanon had a galvanizing effect on the Iraqi public. Teachers and principals reported 
that they had never seen their students so attuned to the political landscape and rumors were 
rampant over the identity of the "Iraqi Neguib." Salih Jabr, terrified that the prospect of popular 
disturbances would mean that "the old order would disappear forever in Iraq," urged immediate 
electoral reforms to mollify the disaffected political opposition.
105
 The Iraqi Left, on the other 
hand, took a cautious approach to the developments in Egypt, praising the mass uprising while 
warning against the dictatorial tendencies of the military regime.
106
 Kamil al-Chadirchi argued 
publicly that the imperialist powers had not intervened to prevent the nationalist uprisings in 
Egypt and Lebanon from displacing the corrupt ruling class and suggested that they were eager 
to see the new regimes enact popular reforms against political corruption in order to deflect 
attention from their simultaneous efforts to enlist the "new dictatorships" in anti-Communist 
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joint defence partnerships. Chadirchi contended that the public riots in Cairo and the massive 
protests in Beirut had convinced the western governments that those client regimes were beyond 
salvation, whereas the relative docility of the Iraqi public ensured continued imperialist support 
for Nuri al-Saʿid. The implication that only popular demonstrations could end imperialist support 
for Nuri's dictatorship helped to convince both the British and American Embassies that 
Chadirchi had "disappeared beyond the horizon as far as the West is concerned."
107
 
As in 1941 and 1948, the nationalist opposition was increasingly animated by a 
commitment to neutrality in foreign conflicts and fiercely resistant to any efforts to hamstring 
national sovereignty through the ratification of binding treaty agreements. When Foreign 
Minister Fadhil al-Jamali publicly argued in support of Iraqi cooperation with the United States 
on a joint defence treaty, he was publicly denounced by the nationalist press.
108
 In response to 
the affair, the British Ambassador complained to Prime Minister Mustafa al-ʿUmari that he could 
think of no country other than Russia with such a vocally anti-British tone, at which point 
Mustafa helpfully assured him that "if I had been in Iraq during the past 30 years I would have 
found little change in the Iraqi press." The ensuing debate about the nature of the Anglo-Iraqi 
alliance read almost verbatim for the arguments between the British Embassy and the Iraqi 
Foreign Ministry in the late 1930's. ʿUmari delineated the litany of colonial transgressions in 
Iraq, Syria, and Palestine while the British Ambassador complained that "Iraqis read only of 
evils of the British connection, and heard nothing of the benefits of it – how, for instance, it was 
Britain who had created the State of Iraq, how British experts had devoted their lives to the 
administration of the country."
109
 
It was in this context that an electoral crisis emerged in protest toward the relentless 
exploitation of constitutional politics by the small coterie of politicians who benefited from 
imperial patronage. While some of the old opposition figures had died and others had been co-
opted into the "old gang," the popular sentiment undergirding calls for political reform was 
scarcely different from that which had animated the supporters of the Bakr Sidqi coup d'état, the 
Rashid ʿAli movement, and the Wathbah demonstrations. As the Istiqlal Party leader Muhammad 
Mahdi Kubba later reflected in his appraisal of the push for electoral reform, "This was the 
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government that was established in the shadow of the mandate and brought to power in order to 
accommodate its principles… This government was forced to supply parliament with hand-
picked representatives in order to guarantee the ratification of the imperialist treaties."
110
 The 
Communists, for their part, were publicly denouncing parliament as the "Clayton-Sadr" 
parliament, a reference to the intelligence activities of British operative Iltad Clayton in 
coordination with the government of then-Prime Minister Muhammad al-Sadr that imprisoned 
numerous political dissidents and helped to orchestrate the rigging of the last parliamentary 
elections in June 1948.
111
 
Chastened by their experience in the 1948 elections, the National Democratic Party and 
the United Popular Front announced their intention to boycott the upcoming elections unless they 
were conducted on a direct basis free from governmental intervention. The Istiqlal Party soon 
joined the latter two parties in threatening an electoral boycott after their private entreaties to 
Prime Minister Mustafa al-ʿUmari for additional seats were rebuffed. As far as Britain and the 
United States were concerned, however, the scheduled elections were merely an opportunity to 
settle the personal rivalry between Nuri al-Saʿid and his erstwhile protégé Salih Jabr. While the 
National Democratic Party and the Istiqlal Party were dismissed as "not parties but bodies of 
gangsters," Salih Jabr's Popular Socialist Party, though in fact neither popular nor socialist, 
enjoyed both warm relations with the British Embassy and considerable support among the 
political and economic elite. Jabr consistently assured both foreign embassies that the total 
control of the tribal shaykhs over the electoral process in the countryside meant that direct 
elections would preclude the possibility of opposition victories outside of Baghdad and Basrah 
and instead force an ideological contest between his own party and Nuri's Constitutional Union 
Party. When Jabr appeared on the verge of joining the opposition boycott, several cabinet 
members considered resigning in order to avoid the public debacle of an election contested only 
by Nuri's Constitutional Union Party.
112
   
The British Embassy, desperate to prevent a united front of the opposition parties, tried 
first to have ʿAbd al-Ilah simply "order" Salih Jabr to participate and then sought a compromise 
solution based on an official promise that the government would not intervene in the upcoming 
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elections and would amend the electoral law at some point in the future. Jabr was not otherwise 
predisposed to cooperation with the opposition parties, which he considered composed of 
"rubbish people," but simply did not believe that Nuri would refrain from interfering. Nuri 
offered to permit direct elections in any district where literacy rates exceeded fifty percent, but 
the proposal was meaningless in a country where barely twelve percent of the population was 
literate.
113
 In any case, it was an open secret that Nuri had already guaranteed his own party at 
least hundred seats in the new parliament, with the remaining thirty to be divided between 
various opposition candidates. While Nuri averred that he "did not think dictatorship the right 
form of Government for Iraq" and insisted that carefully arranged elections would allow the 
opposition parties "to say all they wanted to say," Siddiq Shanshal publicly warned him that 
"Iraqis are fed up with your dictatorship, which you are using to force them to follow the 




As the national political elite grew increasingly concerned that electoral conflict would 
rekindle popular protests and provoke bloodshed, many urged the British Embassy to intervene 
and convince their local allies to accede to public demands for direct elections. The British 
Ambassador, fearful of "the probability was that things would get entirely out of hand" in direct 
elections, wondered aloud "why it was thought that direct elections would necessarily be more 
free than indirect."
115
 Embassy discussions with local politicians were characterized by a colonial 
schizophrenia throughout the course of the electoral crisis as British officials simultaneously 
professed their commitment to "free" elections and negotiated the "proper" distribution of seats 
between the various political parties behind the scenes. The inherent contradiction proved 
particularly troublesome in negotiations with Salih Jabr, for even though the British Ambassador 
desired to see the vast majority of parliamentary seats divided between the supports of Nuri and 
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Jabr, he could hardly suggest such an arrangement as a legitimate solution to Jabr's demand for 
"free and fair election" conducted on the British model.
116
  
The electoral crisis came to a head in early November when a meeting of senior 
politicians and prominent opposition figures convened by ʿAbd al-Ilah at the royal palace ended 
in failure. When Kamil al-Chadirchi of the National Democratic Party and Taha al-Hashimi of 
the pan-Arabist United Popular Front complained about the government's subservience to British 
and American interests, ʿAbd al-Ilah snapped back that they could leave the country if they 
weren't satisfied. The Regent then launched into a tirade against Taha's role in the Rashid ʿAli 
movement and his support for the Wathbah that ended with Taha and Chadirchi storming out of 
the palace. The debacle provoked Taha, who had previously expressed some willingness to 
support Nuri in exchange for a parliamentary seat, to join the electoral boycott declared by the 
National Democratic Party and the Istiqlal Party. Rumors that Tawfiq al-Suwaydi had dismissed 
the political opposition as "those who oppose throwing rubbish in the gutter" spread quickly 
among union workers and Communist students who rallied to defend the independent parties.
117
 
The demands for electoral reform now gave a political impetus to local grievances over 
rampant inflation that left many working class families unable to feed their families. Local 
informants warned the British Embassy that the conjunction of economic distress and political 
crisis resembled the state of affairs in January 1948 and that "one spark would set the country 
ablaze." The opposition parties now expanded their demands for electoral reform to include calls 
for the redistribution of land and an end to political corruption and martial law as a condition for 
ending their boycott.
118
 In his party newspaper, Chadirchi traced the current problems to the 
suspension of constitutional law during the British re-occupation and called for the restoration of 
the constitution, the abrogation of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, and the rejection of Cold War joint-
defence treaties.
119
 Even the rightwing Istiqlal Party was moving significantly to the left on 
economic matters in order to imbue their nationalist agenda with populist principles. Faʾiq al-
Samarraʾi blamed the deplorable social conditions in the country on colonial support for Nuri al-
Saʿid and the Hashemites, who were "making people into Communists" with their feudalist 
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politics and draconian repression and argued that only radical social reform could truly and 
effectively forestall the Communist threat.
120
 As the opposition parties dug in their heels in 
support of the electoral boycott, both the political radicals and the government prepared for 
public confrontation. 
The Intifadah 
In stark contrast to the spontaneity of the popular protests that characterized the Wathbah 
uprising, the inevitability of the Intifadah had been apparent for months. In anticipation of 
popular disturbances, Husam al-Din Jumaʿa took control of both the Ministry of Defence and the 
Ministry of Interior, thus centralizing authority over both the police and the army. While the 
poorly paid and publicly reviled police were ready for an open confrontation, many of the junior 
military officers openly declared their unwillingness to open fire on "their relatives" in the 
streets. Prime Minister Mustafa al-ʿUmari had already sought and received permission from the 
British Embassy to put down protests with violence if necessary. The British Ambassador only 
qualified his approval with a warning that the deployment of state violence not be followed by 
public concessions, pointing to the government's repudiation of the Portsmouth Treaty in 1948 as 
a display of political weakness that only emboldened the opposition.
121
 
 The spark that set off the conflagration of the Intifadah was lit by student organizers from 
the College of Pharmacy and Chemistry at the University of Baghdad who had announced a 
general strike at the beginning of November to protest a new university examination policy that 
required them to repeat an entire year of courses if they failed a single examination. The strike 
leaders announced to the local press their support for the national opposition party demands for 
electoral reform, the release of political prisoners, the abrogation of foreign oil concessions, the 
rejection of foreign defense treaties, and the introduction of economic reforms.
122
 After 
negotiations with the Ministry of Education resulted in the suspension of the new policy, the 
students cancelled their strike and returned to class on November 19. Trouble, however, resumed 
almost immediately when leftwing student leaders publicly denounced the niece of the college 
dean, who had crossed student picket lines during the strike, and were in turn assaulted by the 
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girl's male relatives. The student leaders immediately announced the resumption of their strike, 
now joined in solidarity by students from other colleges, and clashed with security forces on 
November 20. While the Ministry of Education again attempted to negotiate a settlement, the 




 On the morning of November 22, several thousand students gathered in front of the 
College of Literature with placards and signs articulating their positions. Among the slogans 
were demands for opposing colonialism, instituting social justice, and effecting democratic 
reforms: 
 
 Long Live World Peace and Down with Wars of Aggression! 
 Down with the Allies and the Colonial Confederation of Aggression! 
 Down with Colonialism and Its Treasonous Local Agents! 
 We Demand the Abrogation of the Treaty of 1930! 
 We Demand the Application of Democratic Freedoms! 
 We Demand the Release of Political Prisoners! 
 Down with the Sham Elections – There Are No Free Elections while Liberals Rot in Jail! 
 We Demand Free Elections on the Principle of Direct Elections! 
 We Demand Bread and Work for the Laborers! 
 
The students were soon joined by hundreds of workers and onlookers as the crowds began 
chanting, "By God and by the people, the Wathbah has been renewed!" Police first used clubs 
and tear gas to disperse the crowds, but opened fire when other tactics failed. On the first day of 
the uprising, the crowds were led by the student leader Hamdi Ayyub, who directed them across 
al-Maʾmun Bridge toward the British Embassy, where they stopped and chanted against 
colonialism. The huge contingent of police forces managed to keep the protestors from storming 




The following morning, the students were joined by workers from the major textile and 
tobacco factories who had announced their own solidarity strike in reaction to the political 
developments. When the chief of police dispatched two armored cars filled with helmets and 
clubs in the earlier morning hours to disperse the crowds gathered in front of the College of 
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Literature for the new day's protests, bands of protestors attacked the cars, seizing the helmets 
and clubs and chasing off the police before setting the cars on fire. Police again opened fire on 
the crowds, and many of the protestors painted their clothes and signs with the blood of their 
fallen comrades. The Iraqi Communist Party had not planned the protests or coordinated with 
student leaders, but the party leader Baha al-Din Nuri capitalized on the opportunity and ordered 
party members into the streets. While the crowds on the first day of the demonstrations had 
chanted for democratic reform, they now called for the collapse of the monarchy and the 
establishment of a popular republic.
125
  
The chaos and violence in the streets forced the resignation of Mustafa al-ʿUmari and the 
radio soon broadcast the news that Jamil al-Midfaʿi, an extremely conservative pro-British 
politician, had been tapped as his replacement. The enraged crowds, who felt that "the people did 
not sacrifice themselves in order to replace al-ʿUmari with al-Midfaʿi," now chanted in the 
streets against his nomination: "Down with the Administration of the Mole Midfaʿi!" Midfaʿi 
arranged meetings with leaders from the Istiqlal Party and the Popular Socialist Party, offering 
cabinet positions in exchange for their efforts to end the protests, but quickly discovered that the 
opposition parties were not controlling the crowds and could thus not offer any assurances. 
Seizing the opportunity to preempt the regime, the Communists scrambled to mobilize popular 
support behind an acceptable alternative. They put forward Kamil al-Chadirchi as the figurehead 
of a national salvation government that would include prominent independent leftists like the 
poet Muhammad Mahdi al-Jawahiri and the politician ʿAbd al-Razzaq al-Shaykhli, as well as 
secret Communists Salim al-Fakhri and Tawfiq Munir as Minister of Defence and Minister of 
Interior as a guarantee against counterrevolutionary attempts to use the army and police against 
the Communists. Baha al-Din Nuri compiled a list of the proposed cabinet, made copies, and 
distributed them among the protestors, while at the same time sending emissaries to meet with 
Chadirchi. The latter protested that he ought to have the right to form his own cabinet and called 
his own meeting of the opposition parties but was quickly brought by Fa'iq al-Samarra'i of the 
Istiqlal Party to the realization that the crowds were now controlled by the Communists and that 
the composition proposed cabinet was not up for debate.
126
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By the afternoon of November 23, the police had retreated in defeat, and for a few hours, 
the crowds controlled the streets of Baghdad. At the direction of Baha al-Din Nuri, a huge group 
of Communist workers from Kadhimayn descended upon the United States Information Services 
office on Rashid Street, which had been closed for several days. Communist activists smashed 
the glass windows and stormed the building while onlookers shouted slogans against American 
imperialism. Baha al-Din Nuri would later proudly recall that the poor workers who ransacked 
the offices, tossing pricey Parker pens and handcrafted clocks from balconies into the fire 
blazing in the street below were interested only in destruction and refused to pocket any of the 
items.
127
 The Communist poet Badr Shakir al-Sayyab later recalled rushing from his work post to 
join his comrades "They burned and looted and destroyed, as if they were destroying colonialism 
itself and not tape recorders and burning exploitation rather than cinema reels." Sayyab climbed 
an electrical pole outside and recited a violent poem that he had composed the night before to the 
crowd: 
 
The martyr grew hungry and opened his mouth for blood 
So wring out your heart or the heart of the criminal 
The martyr grew hungry and so too did you as you were surrounded 




When U.S. Embassy officials arrived at the scene to inspect the damage the following morning, 
the looting was still in progress. The officials' efforts to recover classified documents were 
thwarted by verbal and physical assaults from the mob, and when the officials found their pleas 
for help ignored by both the police and army, they decided to flee the scene.
129
 
Sayyab was lifted onto the shoulders of protestors, as the radical poet Muhammad Salih 
Bahr al-ʿUlum had been during the days of the Wathbah, and paraded through the streets as he 
recited more revolutionary poems. Unlike Bahr al-ʿUlum, though, Sayyab exercised no great 
leadership role and claimed no ability to lead the crowds. While the former had articulated the 
demands of the masses in short and fiery poems, Sayyab articulated and encouraged their anger 
and would later recall his horror as the crowds descended into violence. Near the mosque of 
Shaykh ʿAbd al-Qadir al-Kaylani on Ghazi Street, the protestors faced a volley of gunfire from 
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the Bab al-Shaykh police station. Sayyab stood by as his comrades retreated to a side street and 
then crept across the mosque cemetery and scaled the wall of the police station, killing a poor 
sentry and then setting the station on fire. They carried the bodies of two of the slain police 
officers into the street outside, dragged them to the South Gate, doused the corpsse with gasoline, 
and then lit them on fire.
130
  
As public calls for the end of the monarchy intensified, ʿAbd al-Ilah was forced to turn to 
General Nur al-Din Mahmud to head an emergency government. The decision to bring the 
military back into the political arena for the first time since the Rashid ʿAli movement contrasted 
sharply with the efforts to appease the public with the appointment of Muhammad al-Sadr in the 
wake of the Wathbah massacres and underscored the total collapse of the regime's political 
legitimacy. Mahmud immediately declared martial law and ordered the dissolution of all political 
parties and newspapers. The Communists, who thought that the old regime was on the verge of 
total collapse, saw the resort to the army as a last ditch effort to prevent the destruction of the old 
regime. There were at that time no Communist cells within the Iraqi Army, and so the 
Communists instead endeavored to win over the junior officers and conscripts by deploying 
slogans of unity and brotherhood between the military and people: "Long Live the Brotherhood 
of the Army and the People!" and "Long Live the Partnership of the Army and the People against 
Colonialism and Reactionaryism!" Police forces were unable to prevent the crowds from 
attacking various foreign companies and institutions, but when the violence reached its peak, 




Mahmud moved immediately to arrest prominent opposition figures, most notably Peace 
Partisan leaders Muhammad Mahdi al-Jawahiri and ʿAbd al-Wahhab Mahmud, National 
Democratic Party leader Kamil al-Chadirchi, and Istiqlal Party leaders Faʾiq al-Samarraʾi and 
Sadiq Shanshal. United Popular Front Taha al-Hashimi and Popular Socialist Party leader Salih 
Jabr were protected by their relations with the military and the British Embassy. Despite the fact 
that Mahmud immediately announced his intention to amend the electoral law and institute direct 
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elections once order was restored, to ease the burden of taxation on the poor, and to root out 
political corruption, protests continued in the following days. The crowds now chanted "Down 
with Nur al-Din Mahmud" and "We want a popular government under Kamil al-Chadirchi!" 
Demonstrations spread south of Baghdad to Basrah, Najaf, Karbala, Kut, and ʿAmarah in the 
following days. In Basrah, crowds of students chanting "Down with America!" and "Down with 
England!" stormed the British Institute before police repelled them. In Diwaniyah, crowds stoned 
American cinema vans while shouting, "Down with the King!" By November 26, however, the 
situation in Baghdad was returning to normal and Americans and Englishmen were finally 
permitted to return to their business downtown.
 132
 
One of the more striking features of the Intifadah in comparison to prior moments of 
national crisis and popular mobilization was the relatively marginal role assumed by the 
nationalist poets. Most of the poets who had played leading roles in supporting the Bakr Sidqi 
coup and the Rashid ʿAli movement had passed from the national cultural landscape. Maʿruf al-
Rusafi had died, ʿAbd al-Husayn al-Huwayzi and Muhammad ʿAli al-Yaʿqubi had sacrificed 
their nationalist reputations when they publicly apologized for supporting the Rashid ʿAli 
movement and turned to composing poems of flattery for ʿAbd al-Ilah and Nuri al-Saʿid, ʿAli al-
Sharqi had given up political poetry in order to satisfy his political ambitions, Nuʿman Mahir al-
Kanʿani had gone to work for Bahjat ʿAttiyah's secret police, and Muhammad Bahjat al-ʿAthari 
was occupied with the Islamist movement. The two great poets of the Wathbah, Muhammad 
Salih Bahr al-ʿUlum and Muhammad Mahdi al-Jawahiri, remained as prolific and politically 
defiant as ever, but Bahr al-ʿUlum was already in jail and Jawahiri was the first opposition figure 
arrested after Nuri al-Din Mahmud came to power.
133
  
By the time of the Intifadah, only the younger generation of poets led by free verse 
pioneers Nazik al-Malaʾikah, Badr Shakir al-Sayyab, and ʿAbd al-Wahhab al-Bayati could 
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challenge the culture hegemony of Jawahiri and Bahr al-ʿUlum. Despite the imprisonment of the 
latter two poets, however, the young poets faced a series of political, cultural, and literary 
constraints that prevented their stewardship of the popular protest movement. While Bahr al-
ʿUlum and Jawahiri enjoyed public reputations magnified by their personal suffering for their 
courageous political stands, the young poets had not yet suffered publicly for the sake of their 
art. Malaʾikahh was handicapped, if not disqualified, by her gender, and in any case, her poetry 
was distinguished by her stylistic innovations and social criticisms rather than political 
commitments. Both Sayyab and Bayati, committed members of the Communist Party at the time, 
participated directly in the Intifadah, but they did not assume leading roles. While the formless 
crowds of the Wathbah took their cues from Bahr al-ʿUlum and Jawahiri, the crowds of the 
Intifadah drew their slogans and chants distributed from handbills and placards distributed by the 
Communists. As junior members of the Iraqi Communist Party during Baha al-Din Nuri's "anti-
intelligentsia" period, Sayyab and Bayati were permitted to recite poems in support of the 
Communist political agenda but not to stake any claim of political leadership.
134
  
Perhaps more importantly, the cultural and linguistic dynamics of the new free verse 
poetry militated against the younger poets' ability to lead popular demonstrations. Where the 
poetry of Bahr al-ʿUlum was characterized by pithy brevity and striking bluntness and that of 
Jawahiri was characterized by rhythmic repetition and intimately familiar rhetorical allusions, 
Sayyab and Bayati composed lengthy poems marked by references to Greek mythology and 
Islamic mysticism and an avant-garde aesthetic influenced by Western modernists like T.S. Eliot. 
Where the former two poets reveled in the neo-classical "poetry of occasion" that offered a 
contrapuntal engagement with contemporary political events, the latter two were far more 
deliberate in their composition and tended to shroud their political message in romantic and epic 
allegories. The practitioners of free verse poetry were thus ill-equipped for an engagement with 
mass political movements. While those poets remained a political threat to the regime, their 
intellectual innovations began to transform the qasidah from a product of traditional and popular 
culture to an avant-garde symbol of literary modernity and to turn the poet from a political actor 
into a political critic.  
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Aftermath of the Uprising 
The Iraqi Communist Party's postmortem of the Intifadah, written by Baha al-Din Nuri 
and published in the December edition of the underground party newspaper al-Qaʿidah, 
underscored the anti-colonial nature of the uprising. Nuri argued that the Intifadah was an 
explosion of popular anger, inspired by the popular uprisings in Iran, Egypt, and Lebanon and 
the need to release the pressure built up during the four years of dictatorship and repression that 
followed the Wathbah. He argued that the uprising was a spontaneous mass movement inspired 
by opposition to colonialism and not confined to the revolutionary working class. He criticized 
efforts by local officials to categorize the Intifadah as a "Communist movement," arguing that 
while the Iraqi Communist Party took a leading role in organizing the movements and slogans of 
the protestors once they filled the streets, they did so out of necessity to fill the void created by 
the "aloofness" and "bankruptcy" of the bourgeois political parties.
135
 Nuri noted the striking 
difference between the leading role taken by poets, intellectuals, and students in the Wathbah 
demonstrations and proudly contrasted it with the role played by the working class in the 
Intifadah. He argued that the experience of the Intifadah illustrated the fecklessness of the 
bourgeois opposition parties and taught the masses that the "true national front" needed to 




This Communist vision of a "true national front," however, differed sharply from that 
envisioned by the independent political parties. Many on the left complained that Communist 
overreach was threatening to destroy the entire opposition movement. Jawahiri contended that 
the Intifadah was "merely a student insurrection" that had been used by certain "opportunists" to 
appropriate the political discourse of anti-colonial resistance.
137
 Chadirchi complained about 
Communist attacks on the "the revolutionary strata of the petty bourgeoisie" and privately urged 
the Communist leadership to renew their commitment to popular front politics, warning that 
British and American plans for an anti-Communist joint-defence pact would succeed unless mass 
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protests could continue to shake colonial confidence.
138
 Sadiq al-Bassam, an anti-colonial 
nationalist politician, reminded his followers of the Communist political alliance with Britain 
and the United States after the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union and warned that Communist 
loyalties lay first to the Soviet Union and that their opposition to imperialism was contingent on 
Soviet interests.
139
 The fracturing of the political consensus among the opposition parties and 
ended whatever hope had previously existed of popular protests providing a path for political 
reform and the emergence of a democratic civil society.  
Unbeknownst to the Iraqi opposition, however, the confidence of the U.S. Embassy in the 
local regime was severely shaken by the assault on the United States Information Service offices. 
Senior American officials now worried that political instability in Iraq would leave the country 
unable to assume a leading role in the creation of the proposed Middle East Defense 
Organization. While the British Embassy, which had "known for years the difficulty of getting 
sense out of any Arab country," was more sanguine in the assessment that the uprising might 
prove a "blessing in disguise" by exposing "the opponents of stability," the U.S. Ambassador was 
cognizant enough of the strength of anti-colonial sentiment in Iraq that he cautioned the State 
Department against issuing any public statement of support for the monarchy. Still, he noted 
gloomily, the maintenance of an official distance between the U.S. Embassy and the Iraqi 
government was unlikely to fool the Iraqi public: "Whether the mobs shouted 'Down with Nuri' 
more than they shouted 'Down with the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty' seems to this Embassy to be a minor 




More troubling to the U.S. Embassy than the breadth of anti-American sentiment, though, 
was the fact that police refused to fire on the crowds looting the USIS offices and that some 
soldiers even cheered the looting. As the U.S. Ambassador noted, the fact that the crowds 
targeted symbols of American sent a message that was not likely to be lost on future 
governments as they considered the public consequences of forging closer relations with the 
United States. Despite American frustrations with the hesitance to open fire indiscriminately on 
the "Communist crowds," senior embassy officials reserved most of the blame for stalwarts of 
                                                          
138
 Batatu, The Old Social Classes, 679-89. 
139
 Al-Difaʿ, April 2, 1953. 
140
 John M. Troutbeck to Foreign Office, November 28, 1952, FO 371/98736 E 1016/78, C. Steel to Foreign Office, 




the old regime who adamantly refused to address the social grievances that gave currency to 
communism. The Intifadah, warned the U.S. Ambassador, was "merely one symptom that the 
Iraqi body politic is diseased" and suffering from the "lopsided political, economic, and social 
structure of this country with its ruling oligarchy, frustrated middle-class, primitive tribes and 
depressed peasantry." He blamed the "lack of tact and imagination" of Nuri al-Saʿid and ʿAbd al-
Ilah in dealing with the "responsible" opposition parties for creating the circumstances that 
allowed for Communist exploitation of popular grievances. One senior military officer 
acquainted the ambassador with the level of dissatisfaction in the army: "They all expect the day 
to come when new leadership will arise and a government which has the interest of the common 
soldiers and the common people at heart will come to power."
141
  
The uprising provided the regime with a new impetus for political repression, which now 
extended beyond the Communists and their fellow travelers in the Peace Partisans to encompass 
the social democrats of the National Democratic Party and the left flank of the Istiqlal Party, and 
a new excuse for rigging elections. The historical transition to a system of direct elections in 
January 1953 did not put an end to electoral fraud and corruption but rather magnified the fact 
that the democratic charade was a systemic and not a structural problem. The government did 
release most of the opposition political prisoners by the middle of December, but Kamal al-
Chadirchi and several other National Democratic Party figures remained in jail, with the full 
support of British and American officials who had been duped by the crowds into thinking that 
Chadirchi was a Communist stooge. ʿAbd al-Ilah sent official instructions to regional governors 
to distinguish between "good" and "bad" candidates and to "help the good ones and refrain from 
helping bad ones" and colluded privately with tribal shaykhs to determine the appropriate 
proportion of shaykhs and effendis elected from tribal districts. The National Democratic Party, 
the Istiqlal Party, and even Salih Jabr's Popular Socialist Party boycotted the elections, leaving 
only Taha al-Hashimi's United Popular Front and Nuri's Constitutional Union Party to contest 
elections. The flurry of withdrawals from the ballot meant that by the time that election day 
rolled around, nearly half of the candidates had already "won" their seats.
142
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At least ninety of the one hundred and thirty victorious candidates were either members 
of Nuri's Constitutional Union Party or otherwise loyal to him personally, and even the 
victorious opposition candidates were drawn from United Popular Front members known to be 
"in [Nuri's] pocket" and tribal shaykhs with similar material interests.
143
 While the government 
tried to avoid flagrant violations of the law that might ignite new popular demonstrations, the 
process of fixing elections was generally completed long before election day. Undesirable 
candidates were first advised to withdraw in order to avoid a futile expense of money and time 
and then threatened with arrest if they persisted. In the countryside, the landed tribal shaykhs 
intimidated candidates and voters by threatening mass arrests, tax hikes, and the deprivation of 
water rights. Some voting stations were deliberately situated at formidable distances from the 
district inhabitants. In the impoverished district of Muntafiq, for example, the polling station was 
located twenty miles across the foreboding marshes from the location of one village. Voters had 
to fill out their ballots while government monitors hovered over their shoulders and illiterate 
voters had to allow government officials to fill out their ballots. In at least one district, the 
number of votes cast was markedly higher than the number of voters checked off of the 
registration rolls. Voter turnout in most districts was less than ten percent of those registered, and 
did not exceed five percent in many southern districts. Even those who did vote were 
overwhelmingly government employees and peasant sharecroppers escorted to the polls en 
masse by their employers or landlords.  
U.S. Embassy representatives described the attitudes of Iraqis to the conduct of the 
elections as alternately amused, angry, and ashamed, depending on their political affiliations. 
While the ambassador was extremely disappointed by Salih Jabr's decision to boycott the 
elections and annoyed by Nuri's apparent glee in seeing his rival marginalized, at least one 
American official noted a more common refrain from "the poorer type of Iraqi" in reaction to the 
absurd political theater: "Besides, things would be no better even if Saleh Jabr people assumed 
power: what did he do for us when he was in control?" While the British Ambassador celebrated 
Nuri's victory through the "time-tested methods" perfected under colonial tutelage, his American 
counterpart privately feared the inevitable product of the charade. Britain, he warned, was 
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overlooking the fact that the blatant electoral fraud would only "give further support to 
Communist propaganda that Iraq has a 'fake' government' which survives by 'fake' elections of a 
'fake' Parliament." Attention, he argued, must be paid to the cultivation of a younger generation 
of "pro-Western leadership" that took actual strength from popular politics to avoid the eruption 




 The events of 1946-1952 had fundamentally altered the political and cultural landscape in 
Iraq. The development of mass politics without corresponding democratization brought the 
newly politicized public into the streets and forced the state to rely on progressively more 
repressive and violent measures of control. As political repression extended to the 
criminalization of political dissent, poets were forced to explore new strategies of resistance. The 
older models of contrapuntal engagement with the colonial metropolis and the local state were 
rendered obsolete by the extension of state control over the press. Dissident poets like Badr 
Shakir al-Sayyab and ʿAbd al-Wahhab al-Bayati now turned toward more insular artistic 
expression of isolation and despair. Epic poems like Sayyab's "The Blind Whore" became the 
new model for committed poetic achievement, shrouding a message of post-colonial angst and 
defiant resistance in layers of mythology and avant-garde aesthetics. While the modernist turn in 
Iraqi poetry was hailed across the Arab world as a monumental artistic achievement, it 
contributed to the erosion of the political link between the masses and the purveyors of 
traditional and popular culture by removing poetry from the public sphere at precisely the 
moment when the masses were entering it.  
 It was nevertheless undeniable that radical poets like Muhammad Mahdi al-Jawahiri and 
Muhammad Salih Bahr al-ʿUlum had played a crucial role in guiding the emergence of mass 
politics through their public interventions in the political arena. The state's critical awareness of 
this fact underscored the political threat posed by popular poetry and the subsequent effort to 
suppress popular poets forced many into exile in the following years. While the Intifadah spelled 
the end of public political poetry for the duration of the monarchial period, it certainly did not 
signal a retreat from the "horizon lit with blood" that propelled revolutionary political action. 
Poets continued to challenge the fundamental legitimacy of the state and its subservience to 
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imperialist demands in exile, in underground publications, or in the veiled language of 
symbolism and metaphor. After the July 1958 Revolution, poets would once again return to the 
public sphere and lay claim to the mantle of social leadership for which they had struggled, 






"THIS IS THE CROWING OF THE ROOSTERS" 
NATIONAL FRONT POLITICS, 1952-1960 
 
 The movement of the Iraqi political opposition toward a cultural politics of national 
unity, already evident in the waning years of World War II, accelerated dramatically after the 
Intifadah of November 1952. The brutal suppression of political dissent by Nuri al-Saʿid, 
paradoxically, brought the nationalist and leftist factions of the political opposition closer 
together by providing them with shared experiences and languages of imprisonment and exile.
1
 
While the politics of national unity in this period where characterized by an overarching 
commitment to the anti-colonial politics of the past three decades, this was not merely an alliance 
of convenience dedicated to ending British (and now, to a lesser extent, American) hegemony in 
Iraq. The leftist activists, artists, and intellectuals who worked to undermine the regime of Nuri 
al-Saʿid were now far more committed to the Arab national liberation movements than their 
counterparts of 1936 had been. The radical nationalists, in turn, no longer denounced their leftist 
counterparts as Communist infidels bent on destroying the cultural and religious national fabric 
as they had done in 1936, but now denounced the oppressive structures of capitalism and 
feudalism and endorsed leftist demands for social and cultural revolution. All of these details 
make the sudden and violent rupture between the leftists and radical nationalists in the months 
that followed the revolution of July 14, 1958 particularly confounding.  
 Historians in recent years have effectively rebutted monocausal explanations attributing 
the political violence of the Qasim period to sectarian, structural, or ideological factors. While 
noting the unmistakable correlation between the urban locales of Communist resistance to 
Baʿthist violence in Baghdad and the concentration of Shiʿi Arabs in those quarters, Hannah 
Batatu offered two compelling arguments to challenge the reductive resort to sectarian 
explanations as an explanation for communal violence in these "bitterest of years." On the one 
hand, Batatu provides profuse historical data to demonstrate that the upper echelons of leadership 
in both the Baʿth Party and the Communist Party contradicted the superficial sectarian narrative. 
Five of the eight members of the Command of the Baʿth Party in the Iraqi Region at the time of 
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the February 8, 1963 coup d'état were Shiʿa, while only nine of the twenty-six members of the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party at that time were Shiʿa. The disparity in these 
numbers was even more striking in light of the fact that the Shiʿa constituted nearly 45% of the 
of the Iraqi urban population according to data from the 1951 census.
2
 On the other hand, Batatu 
argues convincingly that the Shiʿa strongholds of greater Baghdad were overwhelmingly the 
poorest sections of the city and that class consciousness offers a far more convincing historical 
explanation for ideological opwposition than primordial sectarian strife.
3
 If the Iraqi Shiʿa were 
disproportionately attracted to the Communist Party, he argues, it was not because of any 
ideological affinity between Shiʿism and Communism or any Shiʿi predisposition to fear Baʿthist 
pan-Arabism, as some scholars have argued,
4
 but rather because they suffered disproportionately 
from feudalist and capitalist exploitation. 
 Batatu's argument has been challenged on the basis of its casual dismissal of ideological 
conflict and the persistence of traditional communalist politics. Sami Zubaida, for example, has 
argued that Batatu's reliance on class as a causal explanation for the disproportionate Shiʿi 
support for the Communist Party is only applicable to greater Baghdad. In the traditional Shiʿi 
centers of Najaf and Kadhimiyyah, Zubaida argues, Communist partisanship was particularly 
notable among the children of prominent religious and mercantile families. Zubaida contends 
that the class politics of the Qasim era must be analyzed in conjunction with the shifting 
ideological terrain of the nationalist struggles.
5
 While those "traditional forces" most threatened 
by land reform and class politics reluctantly embraced the Baʿth Party as the only hope for 
stemming the "red tide" of the Communist Party, the communalist politics of religious and ethnic 
minorities began to view Communism as the sole means of combating the dual threats of pan-
Arabism and Sunni Islam. Zubaida thus highlights the complex interplay between economic and 
sectarian interests as the central determinant in the new communal politics. Eric Davis goes even 
further than Zubaida in arguing that violence and brutality of the Qasim era "makes any effort to 
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reduce the regime's 1963 demise to a simple dynamic of class conflict or ethnic strife untenable." 
Davis points to popular contestations over history and culture as the most important struggles 
shaping the political conflict between pan-Arabist (qawmi) and Iraqist (watani) forces.
6
 
 Other scholars have challenged this superficial dichotomy between Iraqist proponents of 
a cosmopolitan and Mesopotamian national identity and pan-Arabist proponents of an exclusive 
and chauvinist brand of ethnic nationalism. Long before Davis developed this thesis, Abdul-
Salaam Yousif argued convincingly that the cultural hegemony of the Iraqi Left was so complete 
that even after the Baʿthist coup d'état of February 1963, the pan-Arabist poet Badr Shakir al-
Sayyab was complaining that "although Communism was crushed in Iraq, its outlook on 
literature is still predominant: it has been adopted unconsciously by qawmi elements."
7
 Amatzia 
Baram has likewise shown that the cultural tropes of qawmi and watani nationalism could not 
easily be mapped onto the political division between the Baʿth Party and the Communist Party, 
noting, for example, that the pan-Arabist poet Badr Shakir al-Sayyab pioneered the use of 
Mesopotamian imagery and themes in modern Iraqi poetry.
8
 In his own reflections on his 
seminal work of history in the wake of the Iran-Iraq war, Hanna Batatu has argued that the 
communalist movements of the Qasim era and their echoes in Saddam Hussein's Iraq, should be 




 Taken together, these historiographical interventions underscore the complexity of 
cultural politics in revolutionary Iraq. Economic interests, communal loyalties, ideological 
commitments, and cultural affinities were each integral to shaping the political discourse and 
violence of this period. Taking to heart Peter Sluglett's suggestion that we build upon Batatu's 
analysis of the link between poverty and revolutionary consciousness with more attention to the 
ways Communists merged the national and social question, I analyze the production and 
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reception of political poetry between 1952 and 1960 in this chapter.
10
 I begin by analyzing the 
construction of national front politics between the November 1952 Intifadah and the revolution 
of July 14, 1958 in order to illustrate both the scope and limitations of leftist cultural hegemony 
in this period. I then turn to the revolutionary period to analyze how and why popular front 
politics fell apart after the revolution. The chronological endpoints of this chapter are critical to 
the thrust of my argument; because most historical analyses of the political violence of 1959 are 
situated within the temporal framework of the Qasim era (1958-1963), they fail to adequately 
convey the gravity of political transformations and the dynamic contestations of cultural politics 
in the first two years of the Iraqi Republic. I argue in this chapter that cultural constructions of 
popular front politics in the waning years of the Hashemite monarchy represented a genuine 
convergence of interests and that the eruption of violence between Baʿthist and Communist 
partisans was not pre-ordained in July 1958. While divergent economic interests and attitudes 
toward integration with the United Arab Republic certainly present obstacles to political 
cooperation between the two blocs, the final descent into violence was the product of the far 
more complex processes of cultural politics through which the radical nationalists constructed 
popular visions of Communism as a new form of colonialism, imported from abroad, dedicated 
to the interests of the Soviet Union, and based upon the depraved immorality of infidels. 
The Construction of National Front Politics 
Anti-Zionism and the Petroleum Problem 
 The anti-colonial politics of the interwar period were constrained to a considerable extent 
by class cleavages and the enduring tension between traditional and modern politics. While 
select individuals, like the poet Muhammad Salih Bahr al-ʿUlum supported both the radical and 
traditional revolutionary currents as preferable to the current regime, most parties and factions 
remained unable or unwilling to contemplate that tactical compromise. This stratification of 
political opposition began to weaken with the collapse of the Rashid ʿAli movement in 1941, as 
the total decimation of the movement's leadership, organization, and institutions allowed the 
leftist parties, who took full advantage of the political latitude offered by the anti-fascist policies 
of British officials, to rapidly consolidate their base of support among students and workers. The 
younger generation of pan-Arabists reconstituted their movement under the banner of the Istiqlal 
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Party in the post-war period, but that party now increasingly adopted the rhetoric of social justice 
and cultural revolution as a core component of the national liberation movement. As the leftist 
and radical nationalist parties drew ever closer together on both rhetorical and ideological 
grounds, the model of traditionalist pan-Arabism endorsed by Yasin al-Hashimi and Rashid ʿAli 
ceased to function as a viable political option. Now that the new cultural politics of anti-
colonialism insisted on social revolution as an integral part of the liberation agenda, the 
traditionalists were forced to choose between collaboration with the regime or an alliance with 
the radicals. 
 The historical conjunction of the Arab catastrophe in Palestine and the exponential 
increase in Iraqi oil production underscored the emerging opposition consensus on social and 
political revolution. As older critiques of colonialism as an obstacle to Arab unity gave way to 
more nuanced denunciations of imperialism as a monolithic and totalizing system of cultural, 
economic, and political exploitation, Iraqi oil emerged as both the potent symbol of colonial 
control and the potential apparatus of national liberation. Iraqis, of course, had been well aware 
of the particular importance of oil as both national treasure and object of colonial desire, as 
Ahmad al-Safi al-Najafi's 1927 poem "Iraq's Complaint" lays bare: 
 
 Why should the Euphrates flow freshly and savory 
  While the people of the Euphrates have only salty water? 
 Poverty stares in the face of these people and indeed 
  The waters of the Euphrates are glowing with gold 
 From the ocean came a whale crying of thirst 
  And what could satiate her in this terrible heat? 
 Our oil burst forth before her like a volcano 
  Could our flowing water really extinguish her thirst? 
 Oil flows through Iraq and yet our own wealth 




As Najafi's poem indicates, the central complaint of many Iraqi critics was that the country 
should suffer poverty and dictatorship for the sake of the colonial lust for oil. The situation in 
Palestine suddenly and dramatically changed this narrative, particularly after the port of Haifa 
fell to the Israeli forces. Oil suddenly emerged as a viable political weapon that could be 
harnessed to the broader discourses of Arab nationalism and anti-colonialism.   
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The dramatic expansion of oil production in the post-war years was largely a product of 
Nuri al-Saʿid's efforts to involve the United States in the Iraqi oil industry. Nuri, frustrated that 
significant Iraqi oil fields at Basra and Mosul were barely being exploited, convinced State 
Department officials that the British shareholders in the Iraq Petroleum Company were 
deliberately depriving their American counterparts of dividends and revenue in the interest of 
avoiding direct competition with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Since the AIOC was the single 
largest shareholder in the IPC consortium, Nuri argued, the Brits would continue to pocket their 
profits while keeping global oil prices artificially high. Under considerable pressure from the 
State Department, the consortium partners struck an agreement in the summer of 1947 to 
construct three additional pipelines from Kirkuk to the Mediterranean. Over an eighteen month 
period beginning in January 1947, the Iraq Petroleum Company doubled the size of its labor 
force and increased oil production by a factor of six.
12
  
The establishment of the state of Israel in May 1948, however, abruptly upended plans to 
turn Haifa into the transportation hub of the Middle East oil industry. Iraqi politicians, driven 
partly by fear of domestic opposition and partly by sincere opposition to any engagement with 
Israel, adamantly refused to approve the flow of oil from Kirkuk to Haifa. More importantly 
from the standpoint of the AIOC officials, the Iraqis now refused to countenance the construction 
of pipelines from Abadan and Kuwait through Iraqi territory to Haifa. Company officials 
desperately pled with Iraqi officials to "listen to reason" and to separate commercial interests 
from nationalist political causes. While British officials offered private assurances that the IPC 
would see all Iraqi oil pumped to the Haifa refinery to Jordan and Lebanon, the administration of 
Muzahim al-Pachachi remained convinced that Western sympathy for Zionism would inevitably 
facilitate Israel's acquisition of Iraqi oil on the black market. Nuri privately acknowledged his 
own satisfaction with the IPC terms but contended that the agreement would have to be delayed 
indefinitely in order to forestall "serious political repercussions."
13
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The Haifa affair illustrated the new leverage of the Iraqi government over the oil 
companies at a crucial moment in Iraqi history. The Wathbah protests of January 1948 had 
underscored the depth of social unrest in the country and the government desperately needed an 
infusion of capital to fund an ambitious development agenda. Increased oil production provided 
more revenue, but the government was still collecting a mere twenty-five percent of company 
profits under the terms of the IPC concession. Nuri sought to revise the terms of the concession, 
apparently under the impression that the British government would support his requests in the 
interest of internal stability. The government opened negotiations with the IPC in London in late 
1948, but as one U.S. official noted with obvious frustration, the failure of negotiations was 
already predetermined, "since London has no doubt already decided how far it would go in 
granting Iraq’s requests." U.S. officials, who were by that point deep in negotiations to facilitate 
mutually beneficial revisions with ARAMCO and Saʿudi Arabia, acknowledged that the IPC 
consortium had taken on far greater risks at the time of the original concession but nevertheless 
contended that the company ought to offer concessions in the interest of "greater stability."
14
 
In the arena of popular politics, the debacle in Palestine completely reframed the 
discourse and demands of anti-colonialism. Denunciations of the presence of foreign troops 
turned into denunciations of the oil concession as the opposition parties competed with one 
another to propose the most sweeping reforms.
15
 Muhammad Hadid, a leftist economist and 
representative of the National Democratic Party argued that Nuri was personally responsible for 
the "raw deal" given to Iraq under the terms of the initial concession and urged profit sharing 
provisions on the model agreed to by ARAMCO in Saʿudi Arabia.
16
 The moderate nationalist 
paper al-Zaman argued that royalty payments were a fraction of what the government would 
otherwise collect from the IPC in corporate taxes and customs duties and urged the government 
to call the company's bluff and offer to swap tax and custom duties for royalty payments.
17
 Even 
the staunchly pro-British Salih Jabr, who was at the time trying to deflect attention from his 
prominent role in the Portsmouth Treaty negotiations, publicly declared that Britain was 
exploiting the financial crisis in Iraq in order to pressure the government to resume pumping oil 
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 Most worrying to Britain, however, was the growing popularity among junior army 
officers of the radical nationalist Istiqlal Party. Sadiq al-Bassam, then Minister of Defence and 
close associate of the Istiqlali leadership, was now publicly denouncing the "conspiracy of our 




While British officials fulminated against Bassam's public denunciations of British 
policy, they were far more ambivalent about his repressive measures against the Iraqi Jews. The 
Iraq parliament quickly amended the penal code law criminalizing any sympathetic expression of 
communism to include Zionism, and Bassam, who enjoyed near dictatorial powers under the 
provisions of martial law used the measure to dismiss all Jewish employees of the Basrah Port 
Authority, the Iraqi State Railways, and the Posts and Telegraphs Department. While liberal 
politicians like the Prime Minister Muzahim al-Pachachi protested that "injustice was never an 
instrument of good government," British officials saw an opportunity to deflect anti-British 
sentiment onto the Iraqi Jews and the United States. When rightwing Iraqi politicians pled with 
Britain to circumvent the arms embargo in order to fulfill their treaty obligations and disarm the 
rising tide of Communist opposition, British officials responded bluntly that the United States 
would just supply the Zionists with better weapons.
20
 The British Embassy likewise rebuffed 
American requests to intercede on behalf of Shafiq Ades, a prominent Jewish merchant in Basra 
sentenced to death for smuggling weapons to Zionist forces after a hasty show trial. The British 
Ambassador argued that he could "hardly blame" Crown Prince ʿAbd al-Ilah for approving the 
execution, since he was "in no stronger position to stand up against the Army here than the State 
Department is against the New York Jews."
21
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The sudden British shift toward an implicit endorsement of Iraqi anti-Zionism and even 
anti-Semitism had broader ramifications for the structure of political alliances in the country. 
Embassy officials ceased urging Nuri to cooperate with moderate reformist factions like the 
National Democratic Party, sanctioned the marginalization of liberal critics of the government's 
anti-Jewish policies like Muzahim al-Pachachi, and over the coming years gradually approved 
the political rehabilitation of several of the Rashid ʿAli movement's most prominent "ex-Nazis." 
Former internees ʿAbd al-Rahman Khidr, Musa Shahbandar, Sami Shawkat, ʿAli Mahmud al-
Shaykh ʿAli, ʿAli Haydar Sulayman, and Musa Shahbandar were all permitted to return to 
political life after the collapse of the Wathbah. Shahbandar, who had served as Minister of 
Foreign Affairs in the Rashid ʿAli administration of 1941, earned British favor by offering to 
organize a "movement from below" to recognize Israel in order to rid Iraq of its Jewish 
population. ʿAli Mahmud al-Shaykh ʿAli returned to public life after Crown Prince ʿAbd al-Ilah 
assured the British Embassy that he "had greatly changed his views since 1941, largely owing to 
[the] fact that he was violently anti-communist." While he continued to maintain his staunch 
opposition to the presence of "the Jews" in both Palestine and Iraq, ʿAli Mahmud privately 
apologized to British officials for his past actions and declared that he now understood the 
importance of a firm Anglo-Iraqi alliance in order to stave off the communist threat. After 
publicly defending the efforts of Nuri al-Saʿid to revise the terms of the IPC concession, ʿAli 
Mahmud became Minister of Finance, an office that he used to obstruct significant economic 
reform.
22
 By the time that the November 1952 Intifadah erupted, the transformation of national 
political alliances was complete. The old guard of traditionalist nationalists were now staunch 
advocates of the Anglo-Iraqi alliance, while socialism emerged as an integral component of anti-
colonial ideology and discourse.  
The Anti-Colonial Context of Labor Radicalism 
 While the rapid transformation of the Iraqi petroleum industry into the backbone of the 
national economy and the symbol of imperial exploitation was reshaping the landscape of anti-
colonial politics in Baghdad, oil workers were simultaneously emerging as the vanguard of the 
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national labor movement. Unionization efforts in Iraq were galvanized by the efforts of Iranian 
oil workers at the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company camps in Abadan. While AIOC successfully 
suppressed unionization efforts in the pre-war period, Tudeh Party activists managed to enroll 
nearly ninety-five percent of the Iranian workface in the Council of the Trade Unions of Workers 
during the summer of 1946. Unionization and the subsequent wave of labor strikes produced 
immediate results for the Iranian workers. By the end of the summer, some classes of workers 
could claim wage increases of one hundred and seventy-five percent, and most workers were 
now earning double the rate paid to the counterparts in Basra.
23
 When reports of dramatic 
concessions to oil workers at Abadan and Haifa, Iraqi oil workers demanded similar wage 
increases. IPC management was eventually forced to offer significant wage increases, but these 
offers still paled in comparison to the gains won by Iranian and Palestinian workers.
 24
  
 In response to the apparent injustice of denying Iraqi workers wage increases comparable 
to their counterparts in Iran and Palestine,  nearly five thousand IPC workers struck at Kirkuk on 
July 6, 1946. Six days later, Iraqi police opened fire on the striking workers, killing between ten 
and eighteen and wounding between twenty-seven and fifty. While the IPC quickly agreed to 
daily wage increases of fifty-five to seventy-five percent in order to end the strike, the massacre 
further strengthened public perceptions of the oil industry as the newest manifestation of colonial 
oppression and exploitation.
25
 The radical poet Muhammad Salih Bahr al-ʿUlum addressed 
company leadership in his poem, "The Massacre of Workers at Gawurpaghi": 
 
 In the tragedy of Gawurpaghi injustice has struck my gut 
 The slaughter of my sons and bothers caused me to bleed 
 The victims cleansed not with water but their own pure blood 




The following day, a demonstration of nearly a thousand workers and hundreds of local women 
carried placard with such slogans as "We salute the souls of our martyrs, victims of imperialist 
interference in our affairs." Rumors of broad sympathy for the strikers among local army 
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conscripts led the workers to protest in front of army headquarters, where one worker recited a 
speech declaring, "These murdered persons were the victims of foreign influence and the 
intervention of imperialism." Government officials sought to mitigate popular sympathy for the 
workers by publicly describing them as "Armenians, Jews, Assyrians and foreigners."
27
 While 
obviously unavailable to Iraqis at the time, British and American records confirm the popular 
suspicions that IPC officials had orchestrated the police assault. The British Vice-Consul at 
Kirkuk admitted to advising the local governor to fire upon the workers because "the situation 
was becoming dangerous" and "force is the only language these people understand." His only 
regret was the incompetence displayed by Iraqi police: "In India only twelve shots would have 
been needed and the right men would have been killed. Instead, the Police had fired between 
three hundred and four hundred rounds and had not knocked out a single important striker."
28
 
The public uproar over the events at Gawurpaghi was stoked by the diligent efforts of the 
opposition parties to counter government propaganda about the events. Musa al-Shaykh Radi of 
the leftist National Union Party published an explosive report on the massacre based on 
extensive interviews with workers, eyewitnesses, police officials, medical personnel, provincial 
officials, and military officers. Radi noted that the daily worker assemblies at the gardens of 
Gawurpaghi could not have constituted a threat to public safety because of the substantial 
distance between the gardens and the city limits of Kirkuk and that the workers were shouting 
that they could not hear police instructions when police forces opened fire. The most shocking 
detail of the report, however, was the fact that police continued to pursue and fire upon the 
fleeing workers for nearly twenty-two minutes and that nearly all of the victims were shot from 
behind. Two workers were killed as they climbed trees to escape, another was executed after 
entering a local house in search of refuge, and several of the corpses were mutilated and robbed 
of their possessions.
29
 While Radi refrained from offering policy conclusions in his report, the 
Iraqi Communist Party made the logical conclusions for him. Leaflets distributed around Kirkuk 
condemned British imperialism and the reactionary administration of Arshad al-ʿUmari for the 
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assault and argued that in the massacre, Arshad "proved his greediness for blood and desperate 
capabilities for defending the interests of British imperialism."
30
 
Arshad al-ʿUmari responded to the fierce press attacks on his administration's culpability 
in the Gawurpaghi massacre by shutting down every prominent opposition newspaper in Iraq, 
which frustrated U.S. officials complained only magnified the influence of the underground 
communist papers. While government assaults on the press usually involved short suspensions 
and small fines, Arshad now suspended most papers for at least one year, fined leftist editors like 
ʿAziz Sharif substantial sums, and put the editors of both al-Siyasah and al-Ahali on trial in 
retaliation for their publication of the Musa al-Shaykh Radi report. The declaration of a national 
press strike on September 5 left just two newspapers in circulation.
31
 These harsh measures 
against the press only further magnified labor opposition to Arshad's government, and workers at 
the Ahliyah National Tobacco Factory struck in solidarity with the press syndicate on September 
20, 1946. While the company's management immediately replaced the striking workers and 
continued production, the workers organized a national boycott of Ahliyah cigarettes, the most 
popular brand in the country, that was supported by eleven distinct trade unions representing 
tobacco workers, tailors, compositors, shoemakers, taxi drivers, carpenters, port workers, postal, 
telegraph, and telephone workers, machinists, textile workers, and railway workers. The boycott 
was relatively successful in strengthening labor solidarity inside the country, but the financial 
vulnerabilities of both wage laborers and the trade unions forced the strikers to cave after thirty-
nine days and to return to work on October 19.
32
 
Muhammad Salih Bahr al-ʿUlum, who was himself a factory worker and labor organizer 
at the Ahliyah factory, attempted to rally the spirits of striking government workers in a poem 
delivered at a National Union Party meeting in Baghdad. Bahr al-ʿUlum sought to draw clear 
connections between the tobacco strikes, the police assault on the anti-Zionist demonstration in 
Baghdad earlier that summer, the Gawurpaghi massacre, the Cold War struggles for Kurdistan, 
and the continuing British dominance of Iraqi political affairs: 
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Shame on us and our patience under the yoke of power 
 While the claimants fall under the barrage of bullets 
For Baghdad was preceded by Kirkuk in sorrow 
 And the tragedy of Sinjar foreshadowed all else 
The tyrants of this age keeps running their race 
 To gratify John Bull with this grand competition 
Dallying with the subversion of truths held dear 
 The lesson of truth replaced by that of destruction 
And the people became in this era of the tyrants  




Bahr al-ʿUlum's fluid conflation of labor politics and anti-imperialism foreshadowed the integral 
role of workers in the protest movements of 1948 and 1952. 
While the revolutionary tenor of political discourse during the 1948 Wathbah integrated 
the rhetoric of national liberation and social justice, the chronological and geographical 
trajectory of the labor strikes that erupted in March and April illustrate that the former was the 
driving factor of working class radicalism. Workers certainly participated in the mass protests of 
January and February, but organized labor disruptions did not erupt until Iraqi workers employed 
at the British Royal Air Force base at Shaybah struck for higher wages on March 3. Additional 
strikes erupted at the British controlled Basra Port Directorate in late March and the British 
owned firm Gray Mackenzie and Company Limited in early April. Company management at the 
Iraqi Petroleum Company, Basra Petroleum Company, and Rafidain Oil Company managed to 
forestall labor disturbances only by offering preemptive concessions to workers. Notably, 
virtually no locally owned firms in the private sector were affected by the strikes.
34
  
The declaration of martial law on May 15, 1948 allowed the government to suppress the 
labor movement for two full years, but strikes resumed as soon as it was lifted. The first two 
labor disruptions occurred at the British firms Gray Mackenzie and Company and the Basra 
Petroleum Company in May and June of 1950, which surprised American officials due to the fact  
that British firms were "usually regarded as paying higher wages and granting workers more 
amenities, privileges and better working conditions than Iraqi concerns." When another strike 
erupted at the Basra Petroleum Company in March of the following year, the U.S. Ambassador 
concluded that given the high wages paid by the oil companies, "there appears to be a certain 
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amount of xenophobia involved."
35
 Iraqi oil workers, though, had real grievances with foreign 
management. Among the eight hundred contracted IPC employees, a mere five were Iraqis, the 
highest-ranking of whom was an administrative assistant. IPC management found it "not 
necessary or desirable" to promote Iraqis to higher positions and refused to employ technically 
qualified Iraqis trained at their own expense in Europe and the United States. The company 
relied on paid informants to ferret out instigators among the local workers, which created an 
extremely hostile working environment. Unlike many of the oil companies in neighboring 
countries, the IPC offered no plan or provision for pensions or social security even for those 
workers employed for more than twenty years. Housing conditions for Iraqi laborers were 
extremely poor and dozens of workers were infected with tuberculosis at any given time.
36
 
 While both the leftist and radical nationalist parties now strongly backed the labor strikes, 
the conservative parties were torn on how to respond to the tremendously popular attacks on 
foreign economic interests. Salih Jabr, who had by that point fallen out of favor with Nuri and 
was trying to resurrect his political career as a populist reformist, condemned the unwillingness 
of the foreign firms to train Iraqi workers for high wage positions but refrained from offering an 
explicit endorsement of the labor strikes so as not to alienate the tribal shaykhs and business 
owners who controlled secondary elector votes. Jabr gave space in his newspaper to Sami 
Shawkat, perhaps the leading ideologue of the "ex-Nazis" of the Rashid ʿAli movement, to argue 
that planned economic development projects would stem the tide of peasant migrations and raise 
urban wages. The official paper of Nuri's Constitutional Union Party, on the other hand, simple 




 While the rightwing parties recycled xenophobic tropes in an effort to divert attention 
from real labor grievances, both the socialist and radical nationalist parties refused to blame the 
systemic exploitation of Iraqi industrial workers on nefarious foreign plots. The National 
Democratic Party newspaper Sada al-Ahali denounced the government's duplicity in espousing 
the rhetoric of economic reform in front of foreign audiences while continually ignoring the 
plight of workers in domestic politics and contended that the government's defense of anti-labor 
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policies "reveals the obstinacy of the reactionary ruling clique."
38
 Siddiq Shanshal, a prominent 
supporter of the Rashid ʿAli movement, illustrated the radical nationalists' new endorsement of 
socialist economics in his attack on the government's blanket denunciation of the labor unions as 
"communist" organizations in the Istiqlal Party newspaper Liwa al-Istiqlal. Since the government 
took no steps to improve worker conditions, Shanshal argued, "it is inevitable that workers 
should embrace certain doctrines that seem to give a better promise for the future."
39
  
Mosaddeq and the Global Politics of Anti-Colonialism 
The gradual convergence of the nationalist parties on questions of domestic economic 
policy had broader ramifications for their understandings of global politics. Before 1952, the 
radical nationalists had shown little interest in non-Arab politics and tended to dismiss leftist 
expressions of solidarity with African and Asian anti-colonial movements as unwelcome 
diversions from the more pressing demands of Arab liberation. Muhammad Mosaddeq's 
nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, however galvanized all factions of the 
political opposition in Iraq and inspired scores of approving newspaper editorials and laudatory 
popular poems. Radical nationalists, for the first time since Muhammad Bahjat al-ʿAthari and 
Yunis al-Sabʿawi had lionized Adolf Hitler in 1941, celebrated a non-Arab political figure as a 
model for the Iraqi opposition. This development was particularly striking given the virulent 
anti-Iranian sentiment of many of the most prominent Rashid ʿAli supporters. While the 
immediate impetus for the pro-Mosaddeq movement in Iraqi politics may have been grounded in 
superficial identifications with anti-British politics, the fall-out from the C.I.A. orchestrated coup 
d'état of 1953 would prove to have far more reaching consequences. 
The opposition parties, which at the time enjoyed a limited minority presence in 
parliament, began developing their own nationalization legislation as soon as the Iranian Majlis 
passed Mosaddeq's legislation in March 1951. Eighteen opposition deputies, representing both 
the moderate nationalists and moderate leftists, crafted a nationalization bill that denounced the 
IPC oil concession as a product of colonial exploitation that allowed foreigners to profit from 
precious national resources while the Iraqi government was forced to beg for loans from foreign 
banks in order to fund crucial development projects. The draft bill echoed the complaints of U.S. 
officials that IPC management was utterly neglecting the task of training Iraqis to take on 
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leadership roles within the company in accordance with the terms of the concession. Nuri, 
however, blocked discussion of the proposed legislation and instead proposed his own initiative 
to revise the terms of the concession.
40
 While Nuri managed to negotiate a new concession in 
August 1951 that was modeled on the profit sharing agreement concluded between Saʿudi Arabia 
and ARAMCO the year before, the Iraqi opposition was wholly unsatisfied with the outcome. 
Muhammad Hadid, an economist affiliated with the leftist National Democratic Party argued that 
the new arrangement left crucial national resources in the hands of foreign powers and would 
permit a foreign company to wield considerable leverage over the Iraqi government by 
threatening to curtail oil production, as the IPC had done in the past, unless certain political 
conditions were met.
41
 Virtually all of the independent opposition political parties – including the 




Frightened by the prospect that the oil nationalization campaign would turn NDP leader 
Kamil al-Chadirchi into an Iraqi version of Mosaddeq, Nuri and his allies moved to undermine 
Mosaddeq. The Iraqi government provided facilities for the expelled representatives of the 
British Embassy in Teheran to continue working to undermine Mosaddeq, and Nuri argued 
forcefully for Anglo-American intervention in Iran to counteract the effects of the evacuation 
from South Asia. The proper balance of power in the region, Nuri contended, could only be 
restored by stationing American troops in Pakistan to cow Mosaddeq into submission.
 
Nuri made 
every effort to convince both British and American officials that political dissent should be dealt 
with only through strength, dismissing the nationalist press as inconsequential and arguing that 
the government need only inform the opposition parties that "no nonsense" would be tolerated by 
"irresponsible elements" and they would fall in line. While it is unlikely that Nuri's analysis and 
accusations played any real role in shaping Anglo-American perceptions of Mosaddeq as a 
Communist, he was far more successful in convincing British and American officials that 
Chadirchi's earnest endorsement of social democracy was an act to lend the Communists some 
legitimacy. When the crowds of the November 1952 Intifadah chanted for a republican 
government headed by Chadirchi, Nuri pointed triumphantly to the Communist role in 
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orchestrating the protests as proof that the National Democratic Party was a Communist front 
organization. U.S. officials, who had once seen Chadirchi as the great hope for domestic political 
reform in Iraq, bought the argument and ceased urging the government to accept the reforms 
advocated by Chadirchi and the NDP. It was not until after the July 1958 revolution that they 
would come to realize their mistake and to once again look to Chadirchi as the voice of reason 
and moderation in Iraqi politics.
43
  
 While Iraqi intellectuals and political activists were now united in their support for 
Mosaddeq, the efforts of the Iranian government to curtail Mosaddeq and his supporters posed 
new challenges to the fragile unity of political opposition in Iraq. Both leftist and radical 
nationalist poets responded with passionate indignation to the events of July 1952, when 
Mosaddeq resigned to protest restrictions on his constitutional powers. As his supporters took to 
the streets to demand that the Shah respect the constitution and restore Mosaddeq to office, the 
new Prime Minister Ahmad Qavam ordered troops to open fire on the demonstrators, killing and 
wounded several hundred Iranians.
44
 The leftist poet Muhammad Mahdi al-Jawahiri glorified the 
heroic resistance of the protestors in his short poem "Day of the Martyrs in Iran": 
 
 Their blood flowed to impose what they willed 
  Their martyrs fell in order to raise their concern 
 And their bloody submission served to implant 
  Their banner among the banners of the peoples 
 Shining with the blood that nourishes their land 




The obvious parallels between this poem and Jawahiri's widely celebrated Wathbah poems 
underscored the globalist dimensions of the new leftist political discourse. Solidarity with the 
Iranian masses in their struggle against imperialism and dictatorship was part of a broader social 
and cultural movement to realign the Iraqi political opposition with the socialist bloc. 
 It was not only the leftist poets and intellectuals, however, who contributed to this 
reshaping of international commitments. Baʿthist intellectuals like the poet ʿAli al-Hilli 
expressed their solidarity with Mosaddeq and the Iranian National Front in strikingly similar 
terms as those employed by Jawahiri and the leftists. Hilli dedicated his July 1952 poem "O 
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Guard of the Fire" to "the martyrs of the Qavam al-Sultanah massacre in Iran" and celebrated the 
martyrdom of the Iranian protestors with familiar language: 
 
 Pierce the mob with the partisanship of terror and strife 
  And supplicate the horror that drives the burning and blazing 
 Pierce the mob through the eternal heart... A graveyard 
  Embracing her mortals, martyred in action by the coterie 
 Beg for rain to quench the burning corpse of sacrifice  
  Across this wall, and pierce this gloomy vengeance 
 Draw back the cover from the still discarded corpse 
  For we bestow upon it the sweet fragrance of freedom 
 Hide and seek help from the strength of the blind 
  For blood surges between the veins crying in hunger 
 And bless the exuberant and frenzied rebels 




More notable than these apparent similarities with Jawahiri's poetry, however, was Hilli's 
effusive lionization of Mosaddeq, which resembled the traditional panegyrics composed by Iraqi 
poets like Maʿruf al-Rusafi and Muhammad Bahjat al-ʿAthari in praise of Yasin al-Hashimi and 
Rashid ʿAli: 
 
 Mosaddeq, O Leader of the People, indeed my mouth 
  Has become a vocalist enthralling the exuberant musicians 
 My poetry pours down like the tunes of the chanteuse 
  It flows forth with inspiration, and it glimmers ablaze 
 Blessed with victory, so long as the Most High is vigilant 
  With sacrifices stretched before the compassionate rescuer 
 An offering to the star of the redeemers of this carnage 
  So as to avoid oppression until it is torn limb from limb 
 Do not feel safe from barbarity for betrayal is their goal 
  From the corner of their mouth evil flows like poison and ruin 
 
As a symbol of anti-imperialist resistance, of course, Mosaddeq would soon be displaced by 
Gamal ʿAbd al-Nasser in pan-Arabist literature and rhetoric, but the passionate response that 
Mosaddeq inspired from the Iraqi radical nationalists suggested that the younger generation of 
nationalists was now moving beyond the superficial chauvinism of earlier historical moments 
and engaging more deeply with the global dimensions of the anti-colonial movement. 
 The sudden overthrow of Mosaddeq in August 1953 shattered the hopes of the Iraqi 
opposition that Mosaddeq might provide a new model for anti-colonial republicanism in the 
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Middle East. While no one doubted the role of the United States and Britain in the coup, Iraqi 
artists and intellectuals were still left to grapple with the apparent disinterest of the Iranian 
population in defending their beloved leader. The process of assigning blame to the various  
Iranian factions who failed to defend Mosaddeq would have important ramifications for Iraqi 
perceptions of their own national liberation movement. The socialist poet Talib al-Haydari 
castigated the liberal contingents of the Iranian National Front for their refusal to participate in 
the street battles in his poem "To Mosaddeq": 
 
 There is no disgrace in your fate, O Mosaddeq 
  Your honor remains while the liberals ran away 
 Be easy upon yourself, for you are the first rebel 
  From the East to cry out in the name of the revolutionaries 
 Iran, shame upon you for how you followed 
  That first glorious step, shame upon you Iran 
 O, for the resurrection of a new living soul 
  In which your star will be an exalted planet! 
 The oil is for the people and not the usurper 




For Haydari and the Iraqi Left, including the Peace Partisans and especially the Iraqi Communist 
Party, Mosaddeq's National Front stood as an obvious parallel to Kamal Chadirchi's National 
Democratic Party. The Communists had already broken with Chadirchi after the collapse of the 
November 1952 Intifadah and rejected his advice to cease their attacks on the rightwing 
nationalist Istiqlal Party and Popular Front Party in the interests of national unity. Communist 
publications now denounced Chadirchi and the NDP, declaring that "the liberal national 
bourgeoisie now fears the people's revolution more than the feudal-imperialist dominance and 
has, therefore, become a class hostile to the revolutionary aims and interests of the people."
48
 
 The socialist poet Kazim Jawad expanded upon Haydari's critique of the Iranian liberals 
in his own poem, "News from Tehran," which opened with the caustic imagery of Iranian cafe 
patrons passively listening to the tragedy unfold over the radio: 
 
 The yawning of the sluggish, the specters of sorrow, and the spies 
 Watching every subtle step of the open minded 
 And the breeze, the radio set, and the slain dawn 
 The silence of the cafe patrons, the cigarettes, and the spittle 
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 Floating above the marble, and the attentive loiterers 
 Waiting for the final outcome, and the tone of the sad dispatch: 
 "The dead, 
 There are one thousand, and the mighty soldiers remain 




Jawad made clear that he viewed the collapse of the Mosaddeq regime as part of a coordinated 
global assault on the liberty of the East, using a complex historical metaphor that connected 
Anglo-American intervention to Mongol invasions of the Middle Ages: 
 
 And the blood of wounded Iran, in mourning, Chief of the Old East 
 The ignoble, the mercenaries, they remain the puppets of the foreigner 
  And the grandsons of Hulagu remain in our beautiful East 
 The savagery of the blind follows the flocks through the pastures: 
 "Grandsons of Hulagu, we will begin again 
 Through the battles, where the caravan of peoples 
 With its leaping throngs, yearning in this night of life 
 For light, for virginal freedom, for the great hope 
 Indeed, we will begin again 
 Our suppressed movement, if it resounds, shall wash away the castles 
 And fortresses of the occupation 
 For the Great Wall of China was razed, the ribs of the invaders taken apart 
 And so the everlasting hurricanes shall sweep away the tyrants 
 Even if the troops of colonial legions lie down 
 In the bloody East, for in the castles remaining as curiosities 
 Are the whips of Indian rajas inlayed with pearls" 
 
Jawad closed his poem with a lengthy passage castigating the Iranian traitors who collaborated 
with the Anglo-American agents, mentioning by name ʿAli Razmara, who preceded Mosaddeq in 
office and was assassinated by the Fedayan-e Islam in retaliation for his efforts to ratify a new 
agreement with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company on highly unfavorable terms.
50
 This political 
critique was magnified by Jawad's striking contrast between the radical workers leading the 
revolution as the idle bourgeois listened to the news: 
 
 The pistols manufactured by foreigners, the blood, and the bayonets 
 Rushing feverishly through the streets, where the piles of flesh 
 Lie exposed, barren, above the pools of blood 
 And the oil, the foreigners, and the conspirators 
 Agents of Chicago, sultans of war, disfiguring 
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 Our wealth from green to red, and the newborn dawn 
 And the bereaved widows, the moans of sullen virgins 
 Like the brides of the tents, weary, where the horizons of spring 
 And the playgrounds of gentle innocence polluted with grief 
 And the processions of workers marching on the tyrants 
 Eternally seeking to crush their debauchery, toward the tyrants: 
 "Orphans of Razmara, we have our tomorrow of laughter 
 And copious oil wells, spikes of grain, and the spring..." 
 And the throats of the rebels ignite the flame of the masses: 
 "Riffraff, illiterates, imbeciles 
 The ignorant have decided 
 The fate of our new world..." 
 And the unhappy East, and the tone of the sad dispatch, "The dead 
 There are one thousand, and the mighty soldiers remain 
 While the company of wounded - fortifying the house of their leader" 
 And the warm blood of Shiraz, where Hafez remains 
 An intoxicated anthem for the stained visions of the blood of vineyards 
 And the night, the radio, and the slain dawn 
 And the horrified star of Tehran dyed with shame 
 And the fear and embarrassed silence 
 In that night wrapped in crime and prisons 
 Filled with them, who are they? Men chanting 
 In their shackles, in the chains of tyranny, a song takes flight 
 Across the blackened nights, crying out, "From here 
 The star of morning 
 Must rush to the horizon of the people." 
 
 While most Iraqi responses to the coup against Mosaddeq centered around the treasonous 
acts of the Anglo-American clients and the cowardice of the Iranian liberals, others pointed to 
the hypocrisy of the Tudeh Party. The avant-garde poet Badr Shakir al-Sayyab, who was then a 
member of the Iraqi Communist Party and enjoying increasing popularity among Iraqi students 
and the younger generation of intellectuals, fled to Iran after the Iraqi government issued a 
warrant for his arrest due to his prominent participation in the November 1952 Intifadah. While 
in Iran, Sayyab was harbored by the Tudeh Party and became heavily involved in the party's 
activism and demonstrations. He later recalled his stunned disillusionment with the Iranian 
communists after they refused to intervene against the "reactionary revolution" of rightwing 
soldiers and street thugs sponsored by Britain and the United States.
51
 Sayyab recounted 
engaging in heated argument with an Iranian communist leader after the latter informed him that 
they would stand aside in order to avoid causing complications for the Soviet Union by 
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provoking American intervention. Sayyab yelled back, "But you are Iranians and not Soviets, 
and your duty is to defend the interests of your people, the Iranian people, and not the interests of 
the Soviet Union and her people!" According to Sayyab, his Iranian colleague laughed and 
responded, "As a communist you must learn that the first duty of every communist party in the 
world, in this period, is to defend the peace before defending national interests."
52
 While 
Sayyab's account, written six years later and in the context of a horrific wave of violence 
between Baʿthists and Communists, cannot simply be taken at face value, it does help to explain 
his sudden and unexpected defection from the Communist Party. 
 Popular anger over the fall of Mosaddeq helped to inspire Iraqi oil workers to wage their 
own assault on foreign oil interests in the country. Led by young Communist labor activists, 
workers at the Basra Petroleum Company in Zubayr went on strike on December 5, 1953 to 
protest low wages and the constant humiliation of Iraqi workers by insults from British 
management. Though initially only a minor labor disturbance, the situation quickly escalated 
after one a British official opened fire on the striking workers. Minister of Interior Saʿid al-
Qazzaz ordered the strikers to return to work and, when they refused, ordered the police to open 
fire on the workers, leading to the death of at least one worker and serious injuries to a dozen 
more.
53
 Massive crowds in Basra, enraged by rumors that the British director of the company, 
known simply as "Mr. Tissot," had personally ordered Iraqi troops to fire on the workers 
circulated, chanted against both Tissot and Britain. The socialist poet Kazim Jawad composed 
the poem "To Mister Tissot" in response to the events: 
  
 The Tissot-ians, O Tissot, cannot be counted 
 So push your nose up higher as you plunder the country's wealth 
 And fiddle around with it, for you are the messenger of death, or rather destiny 
 He inspires and implores for violence from his new followers 
 Or are you not the one who said, with the news as a witness: 
 "The people, the oil, and the law are under my hand" 
 What an evil article! The comfort of the people is not a hand 
 In this land held back in unhappiness 
 Her wealth remains stained red with blood 
 And the wound is still under the surveillance of the thieves 
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 Ask the people about November, ask about January, ask about their blood 
 Ask the people about their victims, ask about their eternal glory 
 And ask your blackened gang about their tomorrow 




Jawad's reference to November and January, an invocation of the Intifadah of November 1952 
and to the Wathbah of January 1948, underscored the commitment of the Iraqi Left to rewriting 
the history of those popular uprisings as driven by opposition to the economic exploitation of 
imperialism. 
National Unity and Popular Front Politics 
 Recent historiography on the cultural discourses of political opposition in the waning 
years of the Hashemite monarchy have emphasized the rigid dichotomy between the insularity of 
pan-Arab nationalism and the globalist dimensions of Iraqist nationalism.
55
 While radical 
nationalist poets like ʿAli al-Hilli and ʿAdnan al-Rawi focused their attention on Arab national 
liberation movements in Algeria and Palestine and celebrated the early steps toward national 
unity between Egypt and Syria, leftist poets like ʿAbd al-Wahhab al-Bayati, Muhammad Salih 
Bahr al-ʿUlum, and Muhammad Mahdi al-Jawahiri looked to the anti-colonial movements of 
Asia and Africa and celebrated their integration of nationalism and social justice. As Bashkin has 
noted, the convergence of radical nationalist and leftist artists and intellectuals in support of the 
Mosaddeq movement in Iran stood as a noteworthy exception to this discursive stratification.
56
 A 
deeper reading of the poetic archives from the period of popular front politics (1952-1958), 
however, suggests that the affinities between the two ideological camps were far deeper than has 
been recognized. Young radical poets like Badr Shakir al-Sayyab and Kazim Jawad could 
comfortably identify with both the Baʿthist and Communist blocs in this period, and the eventual 
allegiance of Sayyab to the Baʿth Party and Jawad to the Communist Party during the traumatic 
social violence of 1959 was certainly not predetermined.
57
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 Kazim Jawad, whose poetry was heavily influenced by the writing of the Turkish 
socialist poet Nazim Hikmet, reoriented his poetry to reflect the new cultural politics of national 
unity.
58
 Along with ʿAbd al-Wahhab al-Bayati and Muhammad Salih Bahr al-ʿUlum, Jawad was 
one of the earliest Iraqi poets to compose verses celebrating the communist liberation 
movements in Asia and Africa. Jawad's 1952 poem "A Song for Asia" signified his political 
commitment to socialist internationalism: 
  
 O Asia, O Lands of Temples... How beautiful 
 Driven away to the harbors, to the forest, to the valleys 
 Cast upon the sands of Jaffa, bloody and disfigured 
 Abandoned on the soil of Korea, tattered and naked 
 And your surviving ruins moaning in Hiroshima  
 But still across the seas, upon the departing ships 
 Piled with plunder, you are crucified in the gloomy dusk 
 ... 
 The glory of the soil has dyed the dawn with bountiful gifts 
 So do you notice the breezes overwhelming the pavilions of hell 
 So do you observe the castles falling into shattered ruins 




By the middle of the 1950s, however, Jawad had concluded that the interests of popular front 
politics in Iraq necessitated an increased focus on Arab national liberation movements. His 1955 
poem "The Sun Rises Over the Maghreb," written in support of the Algerian revolution, drew 
heavily upon the historical imagery of the pan-Arab struggle: 
 
 Do you not behold the star of morning, Maysalun 
 Bursting forth before the dew, the light, and the eyes 
 Upon the horizon, where the shining stars upon the graves 
 Encircling from the heights of dawn in reverence 
 O Yusuf al-ʿAzmah 
 O Commander of Armies, O Poetry of Refuge 




Jawad's invocation of the Battle of Maysalun, where Yusuf al-ʿAzmah led the Syrians' last stand 
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 In 1956, Jawad joined the radical nationalists in celebrating Egyptian heroism against 
British, French, and Israeli forces during the Suez Crisis in his poem "Port Saʿid." Notably 
absent in his poem, though, was any indication of support for Nasser's vision of pan-Arab 
national unity: 
  
 Who is Port Saʿid? 
 A century of fires on the horizon 
 As the wicks of dawns burn 
 ... 
 Who is Port Saʿid? 
 And these bells across death and ice 
 For whom, for whom do they toll at dawn? 
 Is it for absent spring hidden in the trees 
 And in the fragrance of flowers? 
 ... 
 Indeed, indeed, from the blood of Port Saʿid 
 From her torn and martyred people 




While Jawad's contribution to the nationalist cannon of Suez Crisis poetry was celebrated by 
radical nationalist poets and critics, the poem is notable for its celebration of Egyptian popular 
resistance.
63
 While most of the radical nationalist poetry glorified the role of ʿAbd al-Nasser in 
confronting and resisting imperialism, Jawad pointedly refrained from mentioning either ʿAbd 
al-Nasser or the pan-Arab cause. 
 The increasingly popular Free Verse poets ʿAbd al-Wahhab al-Bayati and Badr Shakir al-
Sayyab made similar poetic adjustments over the course of the 1950s. The fact that Bayati 
remained a loyal member of the Iraqi Communist Party throughout his life and Sayyab publicly 
left the party in June 1954 only further magnifies the significance of their political and aesthetic 
convergence. Bayati's internationalist commitments were readily apparent in poems like 
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"Vietnam" and "Mau Mau" published in his 1954 collection Abariq Muhashshamah.
64
 Just two 
years later, Bayati published al-Majd li al-Atfal wa al-Zaytun, which included a number of 
poems that engaged explicitly with cherished pan-Arab themes, including "A Song from Iraq to 
Gamal ʿAbd al-Nasser," "Odes to Jaffa," and "A Song of Victory for Marrakesh, Tunisia, and 
Algeria."
65
 Sayyab, on the other hand, never engaged contemporary political issues with the 
direct immediacy of Jawad or Bayati - and especially not of the older generation of poets like 
Bahr al-ʿUlum and Jawahiri who specialized in the "poetry of occasion" - but his work in this 
period nevertheless underwent a remarkable shift from the socialist realism of poems like "The 
Gravedigger," "Arms and Children," and "The Blind Whore" composed between 1952 and 1954 
and poem like "In the Arab Maghreb" and "Port Saʿid" composed in 1956.
66
 
 Even Muhammad Mahdi al-Jawahiri, who would emerge after the July 1958 Revolution 
as the primary spokesman of the Communist bloc and the principle enemy of the Baʿthists in 
their struggle for cultural hegemony, now eagerly embraced a political alliance with the 
Baʿthists. While in political exile in Damascus in 1956, Jawahiri delivered the poem "I Left the 
Stupor of Servility" to a massive crowd gathered to commemorate the assassination of the Syrian 
Baʿthist leader ʿAdnan al-Maliki by a fellow military officer affiliated with the Syrian Social 
Nationalist Party.
67
 In the poem, Jawahiri promoted the rampant suspicions that the SSNP had 
acted on behalf of Western powers because of Maliki's opposition to the Baghdad Pact: 
 
 The sacrifice to this wretched pact is a premonition 
  For you in exposing the evil of these base and lowly men 
 The fable of "The Signatories" will be spit from 
  The mouth of history just like the legend of "The Allies" 
 And how quickly will you sigh after the ardor 
  Will blind the eyes like the coal of the tamarisk 
 They said "Enter into our contract," and I said 
  Let them enjoy this  utter obscenity and hyper-stupidity 
 The laughingstock of the Signatories between the oppressed 
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  And his oppressors, between the master and his slave girls 
 Whoever saw a pact so extraordinary in its dictates 




Jawahiri's passionate eulogy for Maliki underscored the new solidarities forged between 
Communists and Baʿthists in this period. The poet had planned to return to Iraq after the event 
but was moved to remain in Syria until after the July 1958 Revolution by the fervor of the 
Baʿthist crowds chanting in unison, "Don't return! Don't return!"
69
 
 Kazim Jawad, who was also living in political exile in Syria composed the well-known 
poem "An Iraqi in Aleppo," which became an anthem for the Iraqi activists, artists, and 
intellectuals banished from their country. The poem was notable for its expression of solidarity 
with Baʿthist radicals in Aleppo and its denunciation of the Baghdad Pact: 
 
 I am in the north, with the comrades, with the plains, with the morning 
 Among the ditches, under the rain of spring, along the riverbed 
 The earth beckons to the stars, to the irises, and to the chamomiles 
 And continues to protect the peace of the forests from the rifles on all sides 
 And on your borders, O my homeland, roaring in a flight of fancy 
 While the colonizers lurk in anticipation of feeding from the wound 
 And from your blood if it should flow from the spring of the offerings 
 Of thousands upon thousands, and the tyrants filled with blackened aspirations 
 Of bloody and sinful deeds, and the confiscated conscience  
 And I can almost hear a bereaved voice groaning in the wind 
 Baghdad crying in my blood: "Raise the wounded around Aleppo 
 And unfurl your bloodstained flags above the plaza of the struggle 
 For I have learned that I am a victim of the Pact, they have clipped my wings" 
 At your service! 
  I am in the north 
   Responding 
    From behind my guns
70
 
     
While Jawad's poem was widely praised by pan-Arabist poets and critics, the clear longing for 
his Iraqi homeland underscores the persistence of quintessentially Iraqist imagery and themes in 
the new poetry of national unity. 
 The new affinities expressed by the leftist poets and intellectuals for the pan-Arabist 
cause earned the approval and respect of the radical nationalists. The Baʿthist poet ʿAdnan al-
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Rawi, who would emerge after the July 1958 Revolution as the most violent critic of the Iraqi 
Communist Party and its affiliated artists and intellectuals, praised the role of leftist poets 
Muhammad Salih Bahr al-ʿUlum, ʿAbd al-Wahhab al-Bayati, Kazim Jawad, and Muhammad 
Mahdi al-Jawahiri along with the pan-Arabist poets ʿAli al-Hilli and Badr Shakir al-Sayyab in 
resisting colonialism and dictatorship in the introduction to his 1957 collection al-Naft al-
Multahib [Blazing Oil]. His comparison of the political tribulations of Maʿruf al-Rusafi in his 
long battle against colonialism in Iraq to the government's campaign against the radical leftist 
poet Muhammad Salih Bahr al-ʿUlum was particularly striking.
71
 Rawi dedicated one of the 
poems in the collection, "A Wall... In Iraq" to the Iraqi poets silenced by the regime:  
  
 If the spokesmen here grow quiet 
  There will be no voice or paper to exclaim 
 Misfortunes clouding over the two rivers 
  And spiteful hands will grasp their instruction 
 And our free sons will continue to wander 
  And to distract the people with trivial verses 
 And in the name of the Pact and its signatories 
  The old prisons will quarrel with those newly built 
 But I turned and spoke to the despotic wall 
  I spoke of truth and certitude in the name of faith 




Rawi's willingness to ignore ideological differences between the resistance factions was a 
testament to the spirit of national unity in this period. For both the leftists and the radical 
nationalist, Britain, France, Israel, the United States, and the pro-Western Arab regimes 
represented tyranny and oppressions, while the leftists and radical nationalists embraced one 
another as comrades in the anti-colonial struggle.  
 This is not to suggest that the differences between the two sides had been totally cast 
aside. Rawi's anti-Zionist poetry, for example, was marked by caustic anti-Semitism that was 
notably absent in the anti-Zionist poetry of the Iraqi leftists.
73
 More significant was the striking 
difference between the utopian visions of post-revolutionary society articulated by leftists and 
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radical nationalists. For the radical nationalists, Arab unity remained the ultimate goal of the 
political struggle against imperialism. This commitment is evident in Rawi's jubilant celebration 
of the United Arab Republic in his February 1958 poem "An Arab Reunion": 
 
 How long was this era of separation 
 But today is the day of lost brotherhood 
 One thousand years 
 And all of them longing 
 How long since the banks of Iraq have called out 
 To the Khufu ships at the foot of the pyramid 
 How long since the edges of pines have called out 
 From the tips of the cedars of Lebanon 
 To the desert breezes of Oman 
 The era of separation lasted so long 




In sharp contrast to this vision of pan-Arab unity, leftists proposed far more universalist visions  
of revolutionary utopia. This is particularly evident in the socialist poet Talib al-Haydari's 
August 1957 poem "The Eternal Song": 
  
 For indeed peace is the song of all peoples 
  Without it the masses could not raise their voice 
 And indeed equality is the right of everyone 
  For those with white skin as well as those with black 
 And indeed the fables of centuries past 
  Have vanished before the eternal promise 
 And indeed the truth is that there is no place 
  On the land for the slave and the master 
 The people are equal and no one group 




While each side refrained from attacking the ideological visions of the other in the interest of 
national unity, the obvious difference in goals and objectives foreshadowed the coming divisions 
of the post-revolutionary era. 
 The differences between the leftists and radical nationalists on the questions of social 
reform underwent a similarly impressive, though incomplete, evolution toward national 
consensus. While leftist poets made a concerted effort to mirror the language and interests of 
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their nationalist counterparts on foreign policy discussions, they resolutely maintained their 
commitment to labor radicalism and social revolution in the domestic arena and, in fact, drew the 
radical nationalist poets toward their position. In his new 1952 poem "The Battle of Freedom," 
the socialist poet Kazim Jawad glorified the role of the workers in both the Wathbah of 1948 and 
the Intifadah of 1952: 
 
 I still dream of the struggle, of that relentless voice 
 The voice of the masses moved to wade into that battle of life 
 With a drawn out yell, gazing into their eyes and crying: 
 "I will perish so that my country may live, I will perish so that sorrows are driven away 
 From my plague-stricken people, from my country shackled in chains 
 My blood singing in my veins, burning with reckless exuberance 




Jawad's ability to connect the workers' struggle to the broader questions of anti-colonialism and 
anti-Zionism was particularly influential in garnering the support of the radical nationalists: 
 
 A voice answered in a tone overflowing with buried malice: 
 "Woe to the scoundrels, for the necks of the tyrants shall be trampled 
 Those who sell the blood of men, like thieves of the people's nourishment 
 As hunger persists in chewing the lacerated linings of their stomachs" 
 And like the luminous sun of March, like the irises, and the fires 
 Friends of every people who announce their liberation 
  Intending to declare 
 To the rulers of America, those masters of war, gods of destruction, 
 Whose wealth supports the Zionist wolves: 
 "O Fall, you agents and colonizers 
 O Fall 
 O Fall..." 
 
Jawad's sentiment was echoed by ʿAbd al-Wahhab al-Bayati in "The Illuminated Door," his own 
poem about the Wathbah published in 1952: 
 
 "O Fall, you colonizers 
 And the contractors who defend them, O Fall" 
 And in the whiz of gunfire: "O unhappy soldier" 
 I am your comrade, O unhappy soldier 
 I am your comrade in this fate 
 In this poverty, and in this damned malady
77
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Bayati's appeal to the Iraqi soldiers signaled the obvious influence of the Free Officers 
Revolution in Egypt on the Iraqi political opposition, including the leftists. 
 By the middle of the decade, Iraqi leftists still connected the political struggle against 
dictatorship to capitalist and feudalist oppression and exploitation. The influence of social 
realism on Iraqi novelists and short story writers like Ghaʾib Tuʿamah Farman, ʿAbd al-Malik 
Nuri, and Fuʾad al-Takarli was also apparent in the work of both the radical nationalist and the 
leftist poets.
78
 While the poets' interest in both rural and urban poverty was not necessarily an 
innovation inspired by socialist currents emanating from Europe but rather an integral extension 
of an historical legacy dating back to the verses of poets like Muhammad Salih Bahr al-ʿUlum, 
Maʿruf al-Rusafi, and Ahmad al-Safi al-Najafi in the 1930s, the resurgence of poetic interest in 
questions of poverty in the mid-1950s was nevertheless a striking phenomenon.
79
 The Baʿthist 
poet ʿAli al-Hilli, for example, yearned for working class revolution in his 1957 poem "The 
Proletariat": 
 
 From the sweat and nakedness of the peasant 
  And from the tears of the poor disabled worker 
 From the bloodied quill and ink of the artist 
  And from the remnants of trembling hands 
 From the beams of the hut, from its scent 
  Cut from the shabby saplings of the reeds 
 From the shackled wrist, from the lesion 
  And from the anguish of banished resistors 
 From the swish of the hoe across the village 




On the level of domestic politics and social revolution, Hilli's poetry was scarcely 
distinguishable from that produced by the Communist poets. His December 1952 poem "The 
Martyr Farhat Hached" celebrated the radical Tunisian labor activist assassinated by Red Hand 
terrorists and his March 1956 poem "Blood on the Shores of Pearls," celebrated the anti-British 
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demonstrations orchestrated by the leftist National Union Committee in Bahrain in support of an 
anti-sectarian politics of national liberation.
81
 
 The most memorable of these poems, however was Muhammad Mahdi al-Jawahiri's 
famous 1951 poem "Lullaby for the Hungry," a caustic satire of elite political discourse and its 
inattention to mass poverty in Iraq: 
 
 Sleep, You hungry people, sleep! 
  So that you are free from vice and blame 
 Sleep, for the unity of the most precious demands that you sleep 
 Sleep, You hungry people, sleep! 
  For sleep is one of the blessings of peace 
 The parties have united in sleep and taken shelter from the danger of the clash 
 The crowd has weakened in sleep and the ranks have no need for division 




Jawahiri's mockery of calls for national unity was meant to satirize the discourse of 
reconciliation promulgated by Nuri al-Saʿid and Salih Jabr. 
 Jawahiri's denunciation of the government's cynical exploitation of poverty and misery to 
strengthen the stability of the regime was echoed by the radical nationalists. Badr Shakir al-
Sayyab's well-known poem "The Informant," composed near the end of the Hashemite era, 




 I am what you will: I am despicable 
 Shoe shiner of the invaders, merchant of blood and conscience 
 For the tyrants. I am a crow 




In the poem's depiction of the radical students and intellectuals monitored by the informant, 
Sayyab clearly emphasized the conjunction of anti-colonial nationalism and the struggle for 
social reform: 
 
 For what reason do they read? Because Tunisia wakes up to the struggle? 
 Because the rebels of Algeria weave from sand 
 And from storms, floods, and gasps of the hungry 
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 The funeral shrouds of tyrants? All while the bombs of volunteers 
 Hiss in the dusk of the canal? 
 For what reason do they read and then glance at me time after time 
 As if we are rejoicing at one another's misfortune? 
 
It was the concluding lions of the poem, however, that most clearly echoed Jawahiri's language 
in "Lullaby for the Hungry" and underscored the enduring affinities between both the poets and 
their respective political ideologies: 
 
 Away with all of this existence, let destruction unravel it! 
 My money and what for the people? I am not the father of all of these hungry mouths 
 I want to quench my thirst and sate my hunger just like the others 
 So let them shower me with curses and contempt as they wish 
 For I have a fistful of grain in my hand and in the coming years 
 Five or more... Or less... It will be the spring of life 
 So let them dream of their illusive tomorrow stirring in the wilderness 
 The spirit of growth, threshing floors, and the victory of the proletariat 
 Let them dream, if dreams can sate the hungry 
 
 Dreams, of course, could not sate either the literal or the metaphorical hunger of the Iraqi 
opposition, but the verses of Jawahiri and Sayyab indicated the depth of popular opposition to 
the Iraqi regime. While this opposition certainly intensified over the course of the 1950s, partly 
in response to external developments in Egypt and Syria and partly in response to the 
government's increasingly heavy-handed repression of domestic dissent, the popular euphoria 
that erupted when the Hashemite monarchy finally fell on July 14, 1958 must be seen as the 
culmination of a long social and cultural revolution that dated back to the termination of the 
British Mandate in 1932. While several scholars have pointed to the intensification of political 
repression and the consolidation of the socialist opposition in Iraq after the collapse of the 
November 1952 Intifadah as the true basis for the July 1958 Revolution, this view tends to 
dismiss the radical nationalists as mere reactionaries in the struggle for cultural hegemony in the 
post-revolutionary period.
85
 In fact, while Baʿthist intellectuals may have appealed to reactionary 
and traditionalist communalist forces as a bulwark against the spread of communism, radical 
nationalists were deeply committed to their own interpretation of the previous twenty-six years 
of Iraqi history.
86
 Lingering pan-Arabist suspicions of the partisans of the Bakr Sidqi coup d'état 
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of 1936 and entrenched idolization of the Rashid ʿAli movement of 1941 would play a more 
prominent role in the unraveling of popular front politics than simple disputes over social reform 
and Arab unity in the post-revolutionary period. 
The July 14 Revolution 
 The events of July 14, 1958 and their aftermath have been exhaustively covered by 
numerous historians. In a matter of hours, nearly a dozen members of the Hashemite royal 
family, including the Crown Prince ʿAbd al-Ilah and King Faysal II, were executed and Colonel 
ʿAbd al-Salam ʿArif announced the birth of the independent Republic of Iraq over the radio. The 
capture and execution of Nuri al-Saʿid, caught trying to escape in Baghdad in women's clothing, 
on July 15 offered an air of finality to the events that was notably absent during the Bakr Sidqi 
and Rashid ʿAli coup d'états.
87
 While the earliest historical accounts of the revolution focused on 
the secret planning and coordination of military movements, more recent studies have focused on  
popular participation as a crucial aspect in distinguishing the events July 14, 1958 from earlier 
military interventions that failed to evolve into true revolutions.
88
 Considerably less attention has 
been devoted to the detailed analysis of cultural politics in the post-revolutionary period.
89
 
 A deeper analysis of cultural production in the first two years of Republic Iraq, when 
both radical nationalists and leftists enjoyed relative freedom from government censorship, helps 
to illuminate historical discussions of ideological and political conflict in this period. The gradual 
unraveling of popular front politics between November 1958 and April 1959 was painstakingly 
catalogued and articulated by Iraqi poets affiliated with the Baʿth Party and the Communist 
Party. The emotive dimensions of this archive underscore the cultural conflicts and debates that 
lay at the heart of the wave of bitter and brutal violence typically ascribed to purely social and 
ideological conflict. The earliest poems composed to commemorate the revolution were 
universally euphoric in nature. Muhammad Mahdi al-Jawahiri serenaded Staff Brigadier ʿAbd al-
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Karim al-Qasim and the army for their actions in his poem, "The Iraqi Army (July 14)," which 
ran in almost every major Iraqi newspaper: 
 
 My footsteps have guided me to say to you, "How Splendid" 
  For what you have done far exceeds my mere words of praise 
 Indeed you have printed what my poetic talent has composed 
  You have concluded what  is spoken in the prose of eloquence 
 You struck the blow and so I have no hope of striking 
  And you thrust the sword and so I have no hope of thrusting 
 What you had with you was a final  and decisive declaration 
  That captivated the mind, and so what declaration is left for us? 
 The crowns of the tyrants are hanging upon vagabonds 




The socialist poet Kazim Jawad offered a similar sentiment of hope and thanksgiving in his 
poem "A Song for the Republic," written in the wake of the revolution: 
 
 I am returning on a long road, singing the praises of spring 
 For I was born in the pastures of the steppes amidst the flocks 
 Here the dawn slumbers behind the hills like a gentle child 
 Here the earth is a hymn that inspires the liberation of the masses 
 To a horizon stained by its victims in the shade of their blood 




From his exile in Moscow, the Communist poet ʿAbd al-Wahhab al-Bayati offered his own 
panegyric for the revolution, "July 14": 
 
 The sun in my town 
 Shines 
 And the bells 
 Ring for the heroes 
 So wake up, my beloved 
 For we are free 
 Like the fire 
 Like the sparrow 
 Like the fire  
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 While the effusive leftist support for the revolution is often taken for granted, the radical 
nationalists were no less enthusiastic in their celebratory verses. Iraqis knew little of Qasim's 
politics in the immediate aftermath of the revolution, and poets from both camps tended to see 
the events as the culmination of their own political agenda. The Baʿthist poet ʿAli al-Hilli, for 
example, infused his verses with the symbolism of resurrection (baʿth) to valorize the Baʿth 
Party in his poem "Nuptials of the Revolution," composed on August 2, 1958: 
 
 A revolution of resurrection, drawn from our blood and fire, our shimmering dawn!! 
 From the forearms of the proud who cast off their chains and prevailed over torture 
 From the guests of the prison, enflamed by the whip, in every heart an insistence 
 From the perseverance of the hungry, the cry of the shackled, the mutiny spread within us 
 From here... My free and generous people 
  Resurrected and we are here soldiers and arms 
 And from this East the new life rises 
  Upon our liberal and generous land 
 On each and every patch of our soil 




On the other hand, leftist poets saw no contradiction between their yearning for social revolution 
and their support for pan-Arab political ideals. Thus, the socialist Kazim Jawad echoed Hilli's 
rhetoric with his own calls to the neighboring Arab nations to celebrate the Iraqi revolution with 
their own uprisings in his 1958 poem "Song to the Republic": 
 
 I dwell upon the aroma of the sun above the spring of the struggle 
 And sing to the lilies so that they grow proud in the hills and the valleys 
 The Tigris declares her astonishment in this wilderness of insomnia 
 To ʿAmman where the blood that has been shed will remain an ink 
 With which to write the bloody fables of the executioner 




Jawad's invocation of the Palestinian struggle was particularly significant as a marker of his 
commitment to the pan-Arab agenda. 
 Muhammad Mahdi al-Jawahiri would quickly forge an extremely close personal 
relationship with Qasim, who assumed the post of Prime Minister after the revolution. Qasim 
quickly revived the old tradition of political patronage of poetry as a means of establishing 
cultural legitimacy. Jawahiri was invited to return to Baghdad from his internal exile at ʿAli al-
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Gharbi, and Qasim arranged for Baghdad Radio to interrupt regular broadcasts with 
announcements of Jawahiri's return on July 24. The poet was immediately shuttled to a banquet 
in his honor at the Ministry of Defence, where the leading Free Officers, including Nasserists 
like ʿAbd al-Salam ʿArif, praised his poetry as an inspiration for the national liberation 
movement. He would later recall with considerable pride the he was the only poet whom Qasim 
ever addressed with the honorific "ustadh" and that Qasim had remarked upon visiting Jawahiri's 
humble home in Baghdad, "Now I have visited the home that ripened the revolution!"
95
 
Jawahiri's personal devotion to Qasim was already apparent in his November 1958 poem "In the 
Name of the People": 
 
 ʿAbd al-Karim you are a law for the crowds 
  Peerless, you facilitate and sanction their path 
 The peace of the nations hangs upon you 
  Without you our souls would surely perish 
 God in His Eminence will obliterate any offense 




Jawahiri's language was particularly striking given his principled opposition to the lionization of 
political figures, except in death, after his embarrassing experience with the Bakr Sidqi coup 
d'état. The leftist poet Muhammad Salih Bahr al-ʿUlum, who had no such compunctions, 
eagerly joined the chorus:  
 
 He took up the sword and embraced this glory 
  Between his arms and then kissed the triumph 
 And the new moon of his feast blessed the people 
  With his triumphant army and his loyal sons 
 A new spirit emerged from the army and in this splendor  
  Of resurrection the name of righteousness circulated 
 An era of darkness vanished in the night 
  And a new era of justice appeared in the dawn 
 The army of the people cried with such force 




Jawahiri played a crucial role in supporting the efforts of the National Unity Front, an alliance of 
the Communist Party, National Democratic Party, Istiqlal Party, and Baʿth Party, to maintain 
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unity between the revolutionary factions while adhering to democratic goals. He was frequently 
called upon to recite some of his most popular political verses at the massive National Unity 
Front rallies in Baghdad in November and December.
98
 
 Already by later November, however, early signs of contention between Baʿthist and 
Communist partisans emerged over the question of political leadership of the new republic. The 
Communists distributed pamphlets accusing the Baʿthists of undermining national unity with 
their frequent calls for immediate integration with the United Arab Republic, which the 
Communists derided as a primary example of the failed "system of One Party." They accused the 
Baʿthists of glorifying the Iraqi resistance in the Rashid ʿAli movement of 1941 while ignoring 
the success of the masses in the Wathbah of 1948 and argued that post-colonial nations that 
excluded and suppressed Communism invariably found themselves rekindling old alliances with 
both the imperialist West and local reactionary forces.
99
 Other Communist pamphlets made the 
case against immediate integration with the UAR in more explicit terms by arguing that the 
Baʿthists were "working in isolation from the people in order to take the nationalist forces and 
the masses by surprise." The Communists contended that they did not oppose the idea of pan-
Arab unity, but warned that immediate integration with the UAR would marginalize the Kurds 
and jeopardize the development of the Iraqi national economy. They nevertheless endorsed the 
idea of a federal union of anti-colonial Arab states in which the relationship between Iraq and the 
UAR would mirror that between Yemen and the UAR.
100
 
 The suggestion, of course, failed to mollify radical nationalists who were growing 
impatient in their desire to realize the long-awaited goal of pan-Arab unity. In August 1958, the 
Baʿthist poet ʿAdnan al-Rawi composed "The Long Absentee" as a call for Rashid ʿAli to return 
to Iraq: 
  
 The English over there... They have remained over there 
 And the traitors... And you know them well... Over there 
 And those who dally with our people are remaining over there 
 And your hand knows how to harvest them... Your hand 
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 O Leader of Liberation, our people's misfortune has lasted so long 
 And the story of expulsion is anticipating its conclusion 
 So when are you returning? 
 ... 
 The glory... the covenant... and the ancient oath 
 In every heart under the sun... O Hero of the Land 
 On every sign you rise above the heads of the rest 
 In every voice in these glorious acclamations 
 In every revolution of Iraq 
 These days the people march... To say: No 
 No... We do not want the English in our land 
 The glory... and the longing for you 
 O Absentee, the days anticipate your rendezvous 




Rawi's verse should have served as a warning to Qasim and his supporters, particularly given the 
prominent space accorded to Rashid ʿAli and the Four Colonels of the Golden Square on 
placards alongside Qasim and ʿAbd al-Salam ʿArif in the public squares of Baghdad. Rawi was 
in fact deeply involved in a plot to overthrow Qasim's government and anoint Rashid ʿAli as 
Prime Minister after his return to Baghdad from his Cairo exile.
102
 
 The discovery of the Rashid ʿAli plot in early December 1958 unleashed both a new 
wave of anti-colonial suspicion and anger and vigilante justice. The Popular Resistance Forces, a 
volunteer militia authorized by Qasim in August, engaged in non-training activities for the first 
time, manning checkpoints on bridges and main roads in Baghdad.
103
 Official government 
communiqués declared that the plot was sponsored by "foreigners," an obvious indication of 
Egyptian involvement that had the added benefit of promoting Qasim's anti-colonial credentials. 
The largely Communist crowds, in fact, assumed that Britain and the U.S. were behind the plot 
and beat several British and American civilians in Baghdad and Basra before Iraqi soldiers were 
sent to their rescue.
104
 Popular suspicions of U.S. involvement were amplified by the fact that the 
plot was uncovered just before the visit to Baghdad of U.S. Assistant Secretary of State William 
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Rountree, whose motorcade was pelted with garbage and by angry crowds shouting "American 
Donkey!" and "Go Home, Rountree!"
105
 Muhammad Mahdi al-Jawahiri composed the poem, 
"Messenger of Evil (The American Envoy Rountree)," to mark the occasion: 
 
 O Messenger of Evil and Squalor 
  O Raven of Discord in the darkness 
 O Herald of Misfortune bearing 
  Within his very spirit and his breath 
 O Son of the Tribe whose shaykh is Dulles 




Official statements aided the paranoia by drawing implicit connections between the landing of 
British troops in Jordan and U.S. troops in Lebanon and the plots against the Qasim regime. The 
government specifically implicated feudalists, reactionaries, and imperialists working alongside 
those who "fraudulently speak for Arab unity,"
107
 
 After the arrest of ʿAdnan al-Rawi for his role in the Rashid ʿAli plot, he composed the 
poem "In a Baghdadi Prison," which adopted a rather credulous attitude toward the criminal 
conspiracy in its opening lines: 
 
 Because they are free men in my homeland? 
 And because they do not have a mouth... 
 To narrate their story from the past? 
 They left to fashion a new life in blood 
 In prison at the sides of preachers 
 The fable of history has lead them astray 
 O You, O Miserable One... O My Homeland 
 ... 
 Is it because they did not have for tomorrow 
 Bread in the shadow of alliances and war? 
 And because they did not extend a hand 
 To the English... and the demons of the West 
 Is it because they are Arabs until the Day of Ransom 
 And vengeance pushes them together on the path 
 O Miserable One... O Arab Unity 
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 Is it because they rebelled against their tribulation 
 And rose up in mutiny... And faced the shackles 
 Neither prison nor fetters will frighten them 
 No slave remains in their history 
 And the tales of masters has been laid to rest 
 The two are eternal... The people and the homeland 
 ... 
 And those who knead bread in their blood 
 For the gluttonous... Over there they have grown hungry 
 The loaf of bread gave up the ghost in their fingers 
 So they divided it... And feudalism persists 
 Is it because they stole the bread, in that case 
 The whip falls upon them in perpetuity 
 And God knows that they have grown hungry 
 ... 
 And because they are free men in my homeland 
 al-Karkh will recognize them if they rebel 




Rawi's appeal to the workers and peasants in his long verse against feudalism signifies, at the 
very least, the persistent rhetorical commitment of the Baʿthists to social revolution. While many 
scholars have suggested that Baʿthist ideology appealed to the privileged social classes as a 
bulwark against Communist expansion, Rawi's language indicates that the Baʿthists were not 
challenging the Communists on social questions, but rather attempting to beat them at their own 
game. Equally significant is Rawi's invocation of "the bridge," an obvious reference to the 
massacre of leftist students on al-Maʾmun Bridge during the Wathbah of January 1948. Rawi's 
efforts to recast the uprising as a radical nationalist enterprise, echoed frequently over the 




 By January 1959, Rawi was taking a different approach from his cell in the Abu Ghraib 
prison. His poem "The Six Month" expressed his gave frustrations with the course of the July 14 
Revolution: 
  
 Here the sixth month has come 
 After the revolution  
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 A month like the Sixth Fleet 
 Spitting out its evil 
 No, rather like the Red Fleet 
 Bathing in blood 
 Long live, long live the sixth month 
 Nuri... O Symbol of Tyranny 
 Your spirit has returned 
 In another body, O Nuri 
 The body of the revolution 
 For I am in the prison of the revolution 
 The soldiers have come... Indeed they came 
 And at the door of the house they queued  
 They are your soldiers... your soldiers... O Nuri 
 Terror queued at my house 
 Like the bygone terror, O Nuri 
 Like the bygone era, O Nuri 
 They came... They came... And they led me 
 To prison... And to the red death 
 O Nuri, in the sixth month 
 We returned to prison... We have returned 
 In the shadow of the red terror 
 So let your soul enter and be glad 
 For we have returned 
 To prison and to the red death 
 For perhaps death for us was greener 
 In your era, your era, O Nuri 
 And today we have a red death 
 O Nuri... In the sixth month 




Rawi's language again significantly alters conventional historical understandings of the conflict 
between Baʿthists and Communists in this period. He is challenging neither Communist 
economics nor Communist internationalism but rather connecting Communist authoritarianism 
to the old regime. The invocation of the Sixth Fleet, a reference to the dispatch of fourteen 
thousand U.S. troops in Lebanon in during Operation Blue Bat in July 1958, and the repeated 




 Rawi's critiques of the Qasim regime were echoed in pamphlets distributed in early 
January by a group called "The Movement of Arab Nationalists in Iraq." Linguistic similarities 
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between the "Sixth Month" and the pamphlets suggest that Rawi was the author: "[The people] 
feel that the breath of freedom blown by the eternal July 14 has quickly been stilled and that the 
joy with which they were filled during the first few months of the revolution has quickly ebbed 
as if the era of the detestable Nuri had returned again to this country." The pamphlet denounced 
several isolated incidents against faithful nationalists perpetrated by "lorry loads of Peace 
Partisans who fired shots and brandished sticks as if they were bound for a foray on Tel Aviv," 
and, if the point wasn't clear enough, declared that "the character of the communists is like that 
of their brethren the Jews." This was only natural, the author alleged, given Lenin's instruction to 
"Lie, lie, lie until the people believe you." The author also shared Rawi's interest in the history of 
the Rashid ʿAli movement, contending that Fadhil ʿAbbas Mahdawi was the first military officer 
to embrace the "Enemy of God" - a popular pun describing ʿAbd al-Ilah as ʿAdu Allah - upon his 
return from exile in ʿAmman and that he was personally responsible for carrying out the 
executions of Yunis al-Sabʿawi and three of the four colonels of the "Golden Square."
112
 
 Mahdawi, dubbed by one observer as the Marat of the Iraqi Revolution, in the televised 
court proceedings popularly known as the People's Court or the Mahdawi Court, fought back 
against these charges with a fury.
113
 While the earliest show trials focused on the crimes 
perpetrated by leading figures of the old regime against the Arab nation, particularly Iraqi 
collusion with Britain during the Suez Crisis and efforts to undermine nationalist movements in 
Syria and Lebanon, the December trials began explicitly addressing Communist concerns. The 
trial of Bahjat al-ʿAttiyah, the notorious former Director-General of Security, offered Mahdawi 
the opportunity to denounce the brutal torture and execution of Communist students and workers 
in the waning years of the monarchy. One witness testified that American officers monitored the 
torture of Iraqi prisoners and that he had heard at least one remark, "That's how we used to do it 
in Korea," and Mahdawi at one angrily exclaimed, "I am a butcher of traitors!"
114
 More notably, 
however, Mahdawi now openly mocked the pan-Arabists, first denouncing the Muthanna Club, 
the center of cultural and intellectual support for Rashid ʿAli and the pan-Arabists in the late 
1930s, as the servant of Fritz Grobba and the German Embassy and engaging in lengthy diatribes 
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against the fascist dictatorships of Mussolini and Franco.
115
 More scandalous was the widely 
publicized speech to students at the University of Baghdad on January 3, where Mahdawi 
declared that Arab unity was used as "opium for the masses" by the old regime and that 
reactionary forces were still working to exploit pan-Arabism for political gain.
116
 The court later 
submitted "evidence" that ʿAbd al-Salam ʿArif had complained to his fellow conspirators, "I 
prefer instead of the Communists taking power in Iraq to have imperialism. I wish instead of 
taking part in the revolt I had continued in my journey on the road to Fallujah. I am now regretful 
and feel sorry that Nuri Said is dead."
117
 
 The descent into political violence between Baʿthist and Communist partisans was 
certainly not preordained in the early months of the revolution. While certain factions of 
Baʿthists followed the lead of ʿAdnan al-Rawi in backing the lost cause of Rashid ʿAli, other 
pan-Arabists saw Qasim as a potentially moderating influence on the revolutionary demands of 
the leftists and radical nationalists. Siddiq Shanshal, who had served as Director of Propaganda 
in the Rashid ʿAli administration in 1941 and was appointed as Qasim's Minister of Information 
in recognition of his diplomatic initiatives to ensure ʿAbd al-Nasser's support of the July 14 
Revolution, emerged as one of the few non-radicals of the Qasim regime.
118
 Despite his public 
support of the pan-Arabist political agenda and personal devotion to ʿAbd al-Nasser and idea of 
an Arab political union, Shanshal feared social revolution more than revolution and actively 
collaborated with both the British and American embassies in Baghdad. Shanshal was appalled 
by the domestic platform of ʿAbd al-Salam ʿArif, who "had preached the doctrine that everyone 
in Iraq was equal after the revolution, soldier and officer, manager and worker, and so on," and 
dismissed his demands for the immediate nationalization of the Iraqi Petroleum Company and 
limitation of land holdings to 60 dunums - compared to the 1000 dunums proposed by Qasim - as 
"complete nonsense." Shanshal loathed the Baʿthist leader Fuʾad al-Rikabi and worried about the 
impact of immediate unity with the United Arab Republic on the Iraqi economy but warned 
British officials that Iraq "was between the devil of Nasser and the deep blue sea of 
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Communism" and that if nothing changed, he would " choose the former without hesitation, as 
there was no third choice."
119
 
 Still, despite the defection of ʿAdnan al-Rawi and certain factions of the Baʿth Party to 
conspiratorial plots involving Rashid ʿAli and ʿAbd al-Salam al-ʿArif, the final descent into 
violence was not preordained even by January 1959. Muhammad Mahdi al-Jawahiri, whom 
Qasim had deputized to head the Iraqi Writers Union, earned broad approval from both the 
Baʿthist and Communist camps when he publicly attacked the Kuwait and Saʿudi governments  
after the Arab Writers Conference in Kuwait in January 1959. Upon his return to Iraq, Jawahiri 
issued a public statement warning of imperialist efforts to create dissension within the Arab 
ranks. The statement was laced with rhetorical support for Arab nationalism, particularly for the 
national liberation movements in Algeria, Oman, Palestine, and Yemen, and angry denunciations 
of the role of imperialists and their local clients in spreading lies about the young Iraqi Republic 
in order to pit pan-Arab nationalists against their Iraqi brethren. Anticipating Fanon's critique of 
superficial anti-colonial nationalism, Jawahiri argued eloquently that the reliance of empty 
nationalist slogans devoid of social meaning could never produce true revolutionary change.
120
 
Noting that both Nuri al-Saʿid and Fadhil al-Jamali had utilized the rhetoric of Arab nationalism 
to cloak their collusion with their imperialist masters, Jawahiri pleaded: "We must give these 
expressions clear meanings derived from our aspirations and hopes, and to link them precisely 
with the aspirations of the Arab people in unity, liberation, independence, democracy, and 
prosperous life."
121
 As late as January 27, 1959, Baʿthist and Communist partisans reportedly 
fought over front row seats to witness Jawahiri recite selections from his Wathbah verses, most 
notably "My Brother Jaʿfar," at a massive rally of nearly fifty thousand to commemorate the 
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Mosul and Kirkuk 
 The tenuous peace between the leftists and radical nationalists was shattered in the 
violence that engulfed Mosul in early March. The radical nationalists deeply resented extensive 
press coverage given to the massive Peace Partisans rallies organized in Baʿqubah, Diwaniyah, 
Jalawla, Karbala, Najaf, and Shamiyah in January and February, and particularly to the 
prominently featured slogans "No to Partisanship!" and "Down with the Baʿthists!"
123
  The final 
straw, though, was the mass convergence of nearly two hundred and fifty thousand Communist 
partisans, many of them travelling from Baghdad, on Mosul for a Peace Partisans rally on March 
6. Colonel ʿAbd al-Wahhab al-Shawwaf and sympathetic pan-Arabist officers detained and 
executed Kamil Qazanchi and other prominent Peace Partisans leaders in an attempted coup 
d'état. At least five hundred Communist and Baʿthist partisans were killed in the Mosul clashes, 
including soldiers loyal to either Shawwaf or Qasim, Peace Partisans militia members, Shammar 
tribesmen who back Shawwaf, and ordinary citizens on both sides.
124
 Massive rallies in support 
of Qasim erupted in Baghdad and Basra, as leftist crowds burned effigies of Gamal ʿAbd al-
Nasser to signal their displeasure with the pan-Arabists. In one particularly gruesome case in 
Basra, Communist youths dragged the bloody corpse of a dog they had named Nasser up and 
down the wharves, and when a Baʿthist partisan challenged him, they beat him to death and 
dragged his corpse through the streets.
125
  
 More shocking than the sheer number of casualties, however, was the brutal mutilation of 
corpses strung up on lampposts and dragged through the streets. This horrific and callous 
violence was highlighted by the radical national poets to underscore the moral depravity of the 
Communists. Thus the Baʿthist poet Hilal Naji thundered, "Four full days after abortive Revolt 
neither satisfied their avidity for tearing corpses limb from limb, nor did they quench their thirst 
for blood or vengeance on the innocent citizens."
126
 Muhammad Naji al-Qashtini compared the 
violence to the historical massacres perpetrated by Yazid and Hulagu Khan: 
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 The captives every day are given to Yazid 
  And the victims entrusted to the new Hulagu 
 The world has never seen such blood spilled 




The invocation of Yazid, infamous among both Sunnis and Shiʿa for slaughtering Husayn at 
Karbala in 681, was particularly significant as an obvious appeal to the cross-sectarian solidarity 
in the face of attacks by the "godless Communists." ʿAbd al-Hadi al-Fakiki offered a more 
notably chauvinist interpretation of the violence: 
 
 For the sake of what is right we rebelled 
  And challenged the tyrants 
 We raised up the banner of justice 
  Above the corpses of the despots 
 We challenged death 
  And avenged ourselves with blood 
 The torches that we carried 
  Burned with the blood of the martyrs 
 We, the free sons of Iraq 




Still, despite Fakiki's invocation of pan-Arabist rhetoric, it is notable that he explicitly refrained 
from framing the conflict as an attack on the Iraqists. While the call for Arab unity remained a 
slogan, the radical nationalists viewed the conflict as a fundamentally moral crusade. 
 The efforts of the radical nationalists to portray the Communist partisans as moral 
degenerates was more readily apparent in ʿAdnan al-Rawi's poem "March... and the Peace 
Partisans," which described the violence from the Communist perspective: 
 
 The voice of death roared, from Baghdad, calling out for peace 
 O Partisans... Partisans of Peace 
 Remove the little knives from your pockets 
 And content yourselves with these new guns 
 And tomorrow our convoy marches to the north 
 March, and the fragrant roses, and the dew 
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The poem contributed to popular constructions of Communism as moral depravity by conjuring 
brutal images of the massacre of children: 
  
 Do not leave the suckling child 
 For tomorrow he will grow bigger and shout the hymns of the faithful 
 For tomorrow he will grow bigger and have faith in the aspirations of Arabism  
 Do not leave the suckling child 
 For in his heart is the filth of the aspiration of Arabism 
 Before Jerusalem comes calling 
 O Child of Babylon, O Foolish One 
 I shall crush your skull with rocks 
 So Forward! 
 O Partisans... Partisans of Peace 
 Let us crush the skull of the child in March, in the bosom of spring 
 Forward! 
 
The poem also underscored the new fixation of the radical nationalists on sexual transgressions 
with images of young virgins and old women raped by the Communists:  
 
 Do not leave the woman, over there, do not leave those pure virgins 
 Do not leave the fertile among them, do not leave the sterile 
 For perhaps the sterile will give birth 
 For bosoms in March nurse their child upon the milk of exploits 
 The milk of the struggle, for the great union, and the liberation of Algeria 
 And from the ocean to the sea!! 
 O Foolishness, O Comrades!  
 Forward! 
 
 Even after the Mosul violence, though, the Baʿthists showed no intention of ceding 
ideological ground to the Communists among the working classes. While they attacked 
Communists as national traitors and sexual deviants, Baʿthist supporters not only accepted the 
social justice rhetoric of the Communists but actively claimed ownership of labor radicalism. 
The Baʿthist poet ʿAli al-Hilli argued in his poem "The Opportunists" that the Baʿth Party was 
trying to salvage the interests of peasants and workers from communist exploitation: 
  
 We did not slink away... wherever we were 
 We did not slink away from our heritage of generosity 
 We did not slink away, do not slink away from our dead yesterday in the heart of sin 
 Yesterday?! Yesterday slept in the coffin of whores 
 Repel the illusion and the silly dreams 
 For you still have today 
312 
 
 And tomorrow we live to see our nascent dream 
 And the new legends 
 We shrouded and buried our yesterday, and what of the languid race? 
 We are singing the songs of youths 
 The songs of shepherds 
 Whenever the humble throngs pass by on the path 
 The atmosphere splintered and pierced by the roar of the proletariat! 
 And we sing and we clap  
 To the tormented people, they were always... Hirelings 
 And feeble-minded men! 
 They buy the hunger, the terror, and the torment of the tyrants 
 And the chains of the captors! 
 And they peddle sterility as a mirage of happiness! 
 We did not slip away, wherever we were 
 We did not slip away from the steadfastness of the emancipated or the secret of heroism 
 We did not slip away from the meanings of patriotism 
 We are your partisans in every issue 
 And the mounts of the faithful 
 We are this cup, so fill it with pus or blood 
 Or the sap of shame or zeal 
 We do not care about the color or flavor of life 




The total absence of political ideology in this poem, whether in relation to the foreign policy of 
Arab unity or the domestic policy of land reform and nationalization, is striking. Hilli's argument 
for the Baʿthist cause rests entirely on the tropes of masculinity and patriotism. 
 As Iraqis were pushed to back one camp or the other in the wake of the Mosul violence, 
National Democratic Party leader Kamil al-Chadirchi worked diligently to preserve the fragile 
national unity of the early post-revolutionary period. Chadirchi exerted whatever influence he 
still held over the Popular Resistance Forces and the National Unity Front to steer a middle 
course in support of Qasim. In the face of blistering attacks on the radical nationalists by the 
Communist partisans, Chadirchi persuaded the Istiqlal Party and the moderate wing of the Baʿth 
Party to join the National Democratic Party in a last ditch effort to forestall civil war. The merger 
highlighted the striking affinities of bourgeois politicians from both the nationalist and leftist 
camps on the question of Arab unity. While the social democrats feared that immediate 
integration with the United Arab Republic would lead to Nasserist dictatorship, the middle class 
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nationalists worried that Iraqi resources would be funneled to Egypt and Syria.
131
 The Federation 
of Democratic Youth, formerly viewed as an appendage of the Iraqi Communist Party, now split 
into two factions, with the newly christened National Democratic Youth organization now 
professing its loyalty to Chadirchi and openly clashing with the Communists at public rallies. 
Communists no longer participated in the Popular Resistance Force and National Unity Front 
rallies and at times openly disrupted those events. While Chadirchi and the NDP had never been 
able to claim any significant popular support in the rural provinces, the party now encouraged the 
National Democratic Youth to proselytize among the peasants in a desperate effort to increase 
the base of popular support for the moderate nationalist factions.
132 
 
 While most of the leftist poets remained silent in the wake of the Mosul violence in order 
to avoid stoking radical nationalist anger, Kazim Jawad composed an emotional tribute to his 
close friend Kamil Qazanchi, the most prominent Peace Partisans leader killed in Mosul, in his 
poem "The Martyr of the Battle": 
  
 The evening and the hills were listening to the bullets 
 As the wailing reverberated in the vortex of echoes 
 Across the plains of Mosul tinted with shadows 
 And the breeze ululated as a cloak of darkness cast down 
 Upon the village, the river, the valleys, and the mountains 
 ...And his eyes sparkled like a star on the horizon 
 Cognizant that the vengeance of morning from its darkness 
 Must come, and that the earth remained 
 The cradle of the millions who must be roused 
 The produce of the earth must pour forth 
 So that the masses might eat - and might drink 
 From the cup of love and joy 
 ...And so it came to pass that he walked behind the prison in darkness 
 Across the limits of dawn, of happiness, and of peace 
 Two shots resounded: 
  He fell upon the ground 
 Tumbling upon the soil, the dream poured forth 
 And love, and fire, from his heavy tears 
 He died, and behind his eyes 
 The new day rose
133
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Jawad's commitment to ensuring that the Mosul violence contribute to the reconstruction of 
national unity was echoed by Muhammad Mahdi al-Jawahiri in his poem "A Song of Peace" 





 An army of peace building the arches of victory 
  And a procession spreading like the streaks of dawn 
 A gift sent down by the heavens of truth 
  The beauty of angels from whom people seek guidance 
 That whoever bears evil shall be felled by righteousness 
  And injustice shall meet defeat from the strength of the free 
 That the deluge of freshly spilled blood shall be lapped 
  By the tongues of roving and cornered predatory beasts 
 And even the rich in presumption furnish the blood sacrifice 
  So that an olive branch for peace might flower and flourish 
 And that the apparitions of flickering souls 
  Given wings from their summits by the lively falcon 
 The doves of peace returned to prostrate in fear 




Jawahiri's poetry, though, was now haunted by the same specters of cultural violence and trauma 
that marked the work of the radical nationalist poets in the wake of the Mosul violence: 
 
 I saw an untamed and desolate wasteland 
  Without life, without water, without vegetation 
 Without graves, without heads, without corpses 
  But it was said metaphorically: Over there they buried 
 It was said to me as news that yesterday over there 
  The haughty sons of treaties vanished it seems without trace 
 Over there was a playground and youths 
  Illuminated in the lights and the blazes 
 Under every flowing strand of hair a stone 
  And dangling above every forehead a stone 
 Their crime was that they and their people wasted away 
  And that they and their heritage melted away 
 And that they swore an oath to repel injury 
  From every inch of their ground even if they were butchered 
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 And that this and that from their heroic exploits 
  Could not be forgiven by the filthy victor 
 
Still, at this early stage of the struggle between the two camps, Jawahiri remained optimistic in 
his concluding verses about the eventual victory of the leftists: 
 
 An army of peace, Iraq trembles before it 
  The bedouin and the townsmen circle around it 
 Taken on their detour  by the lessons of the past 
  From the wars, and the ill omens that they brought 
 And the world looks with favor upon it because 
  In the Land of Two Rivers we have a bit of heritage 
 And army of peace greets the outstretched wings 
  Of the valiant falcon of Iraq, confident and cautious 
 
 Whatever fragile unity remained between the moderate wings of each camp was 
definitely shattered by the second round of violence, which erupted at Kirkuk in July. Over a 
three day period, at least thirty-one Iraqis were killed and at least one hundred and thirty injured. 
There is little doubt the overwhelming majority of casualties were inflicted by Kurdish 
Communists on Iraqi Turkmen, though Batatu argues that "blame falls clearly upon fanatic 
Kurds of differing tendencies" and that "the ends they sought were not Communist but Kurdish 
ends."
136
 While the Kirkuk violence, unlike the Mosul Rebellion, lacked any connection to the 
ideological conflict between Iraqists and pan-Arabists, the two events were accorded similar 
significance in radical nationalist cultural production. Hilal Naji, a Baʿthist poet later convicted 
for his role in the August 1959 plot to assassinate Qasim, composed fourteen poems about the 
Kirkuk events that mostly condemned the leftist discourse of peace and democracy and echoed 
earlier critiques of Communist depravity.
137
 Walid al-Aʿzami poem "Dove of Peace" mocked 
the symbolism of peace employed by the Communists: 
 
 Flutter above the graves 
  Hover over corpses of birds 
 Call out to death so you may live 
  The slogans of the defender 
 Dance upon the cheeks 
  And the eyes and the throats 
 Make your nest upon the rope 
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  Around the neck of the criminal 
 What sort of collar is this 
  Have you thought of this fate 
 Have you heard the rattle of death 
  From an old and blind man 
 With his right leg dangling 




Other Baʿthist poems about Kirkuk simply recycled imagery of the slaughter of children, rape of 
women, and desecration of bodies, signaling a new emphasis on communist immorality and a 
further move away from ideological disputes about pan-Arab unity. 
 The public execution of Staff Brigadier Nadhim al-Tabaqchali, Colonel Rifʿat al-Hajj 
Sirri, and eleven other military officers convicted for their role in the Mosul Revolt in the public 
square in front of Um al-Tabul mosque on September 20, 1959, however, provided one final 
spark for the radical nationalist opposition. As Batatu has commented, "this, to borrow from 
Talleyrand, was worse than a judicial slaying, it was a political blunder."
139
 As a new wave of 
anti-Qasim demonstrations erupted, the Baʿthist poets circulated new poems to rally support for 
their new martyrs. Rawi opened his poem "Um al-Tabul" by mocking Qasim's popular 
appellation "The Sole Leader": 
 
 Say to the sole leader, say to the one and only Karim 
 Say to the police tyrants trembling in fear of tomorrow 
 Kneading the blood of the youth: Here is the clay of restitution 
 Clingers to the truth, a declaration from one who does not praise 




Cognizant that Qasim and the Communists had effectively portrayed the December Rashid ʿAli 
plot as the lost cause of fascists and reactionaries, Rawi now invoked the longer history of Iraqi 
anti-colonialism to justify the anti-Communist stance: 
  
 O Great Revolution of 1920 
  O Symbol of the Eternal Struggle 
 The nights of the traitors have returned 
  To their country... So let us bear witness 
 The tyrant has returned to his refuge 
  And in this return there is nothing commendable 
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 The land of Rumaytha still remains 
  Thirsty for that most precious well 
 For blood to dye the river valley in a ravine of sovereignty 
 
Rawi ended the poem with a seamless conflation of the 1920 anti-British struggle, the Rashid 
ʿAli Movement of 1941, the July 1958 Revolution, the ʿAbd al-Salam al-ʿArif plot, and the 
Mosul Rebellion: 
  
 July... O July... Return... Return to your refuge... And renew 
 Wash away the tears of the forty victims with your burning light 
 ʿAbd al-Salam... Over there... O July... Under fetters 
 And Rashid, the prisons are compressing him in their spiritless shadows 
 And the remained of the free men trapped between confinement and exile 
 Untie the hostages... O Iraq... With your just army 
 And bring a resolution for those worthier like their forbearers, pave the way 
 For the great revolution shall topple the reckless and the rogues  
  
The Um al-Tabul episode marked the end of political debates over the meaning of the anti-
colonial struggle, at least until the Baʿthist coup d'état of February 1963. Rawi and fellow 
Baʿthist poet Hilal Naji were implicated in the October attempt on Qasim's life and fled to exile 
in Cairo. Qasim now fully embraced the title "Sole Leader" and suppressed both Communist and 
Baʿthist opposition to his rule and forced open political discussions underground once again.
141
 
Badr Shakir al-Sayyab and the Struggle for Cultural Hegemony 
 As the political parties were driven underground or into exile in the wake of the October 
1959 attempt to assassinate Qasim, Badr Shakir al-Sayyab emerged as the most prominent and 
articulate spokesman of the nationalist cause. Sayyab boasted of his ability to elude Qasim's 
censors with caustic political commentaries cloaked in abstract symbolism and mythological 
references.
142
 His 1960 poem "Cerberus in Babylon," used the mythical figure of Cerberus as an 
obvious metaphor for Qasim. The poem opened with a nostalgic depiction of a past destroyed by 
tyranny, particularly notable for the obvious religious implications: 
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 Did not life 
 Wish to live, and the little ones to be safe? 
 Did the fields not blossom? 
 Did the skies not rain? 
 Did women and men not believe 
 That in the skies there was a force contemplating 
 Feeling, listening to complaints, meditating 
 Commiserating, pitying the weak, forgiving sins 
 Were not hearts 




Against this idyllic backdrop appears the wicked Cerberus, descending upon his young victim, 
who was not coincidentally female: 
 
 But Cerberus in the hell of Babylon 
 Loves to run behind her through the trails 
 Tearing her shoes with his claws, biting 
 Her supple legs, snapping at her hands, or tearing her gown 
 Staining her scarf with dried blood 
 And mixing fresh blood with his howl 
 Shall Cerberus howl on the trails 
 Shall he bite the grieving goddess, the terrified goddess 
 So that her blood will stain the seeds 
 That shall bring forth the deity, when the apportioned sections 
 Have gathered? She is restless. Light will be born 
 From a womb seeped in blood 
 
This imagery of sexual violence would dominate Sayyab's poetry in the post-Mosul period, 
marking the struggle between Communists and Baʿthists as a fundamentally moral crusade. 
 A similarly caustic political message is apparent in Sayyab's poem "The City of Sinbad," 
also intended as a metaphor for Communist violence and terror in Qasim's Iraq.
144
 While this 
poetry obviously lacked the political immediacy that characterized the older tradition of "poetry 
of occasion" perfected by poets like Bahr al-ʿUlum, Jawahiri, and Rusafi, the parallels with news 
accounts of the Mosul and Kirkuk violence, widely circulated in nationalist newspapers, were 
obvious: 
 
 Death in the streets, 
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 Sterility in the fields, 
 And everything that we love dies 
 They have restricted water in houses 
 And the dry creeks pant 
 They, the Tartars, have drawn near with bloody knives 
 Our sun is blood, our provisions are blood upon platters 
 They set fire to the orphan Muhammad and now the sky 
 Glows with his flames, the boiling blood 
 Bubbling from his feet, his hands, and his eyes 
 And God is burning in his eyelids 
 They have chained the Prophet Muhammad in Hira... 
 Tomorrow the Messiah will be crucified in Iraq 




Sayyab used historical metaphors to echo the Baʿthist poet ʿAdnan al-Rawi in relating these 
dystopian landscapes of Qasim's Iraq to the regime of Nuri al-Saʿid: 
 
 It is as if the old walled city of Babylon 
 Has returned again 
 With her towering domes of iron 
 With bells ringing as if they were moaning 
 In a graveyard, and the sky a courtyard of a slaughterhouse 
 With hanging gardens sown with heads 
 Lopped off with sharp axes 
 And crows pecking out the eyes 
 
 While the hellish and nightmarish landscapes of "The City of Sinbad" underscored 
Sayyab's understanding of Qasim's Iraq, his poem "Return to Jaykur" presented a romantic 
nostalgia for the prior harmony of the national front period. The poem's final stanza, however, 
illustrated the poet's obvious apprehension about that history: 
 
 Jaykur, your past has returned 
 This is the crowing of the roosters: The slumber has thawed 
 I have returned from my great nocturnal journey 
 The sun is the mother of the green spikes of grain 
 Behind the buildings, a loaf of bread 
 But it lies on the sidewalk 
 More precious than gems 
 And Love: Have you heard 
 This volcanic cheer? 
 What is upon us? ʿAbd al-Latif  
 Knows that we... What are you all so wary about?
146
 
                                                          
145




The reference to ʿAbd al-Latif was footnoted with the instruction to consult his serialized articles 
on his defection from the Communist Party published in the Baʿthist paper al-Hurriyah in the 
fall of 1959. ʿAbd al-Latif was a rival of Sayyab for the leadership of his local party branch and 




 Perhaps the most notable feature of Sayyab's poetry in this period was his obsession with 
sexuality. The poem "A Vision of 1956" depicted the rape and crucifixion of ʿIshtar, the 
Babylonian goddess of fertility, which he explicitly connected to the story of Hafsah, a young 
girl from a nationalist family in Mosul whom the Communists reportedly raped, tortured, and 




 ʿIshtar at the trunk of the tree 
 They crucified her, hammered the nails 
 In the home of the birth womb 
 ʿIshtar is concealing Hafsah 
 Inviting her to drink the rains 




Sayyab also resurrected the controversy surrounding his classic 1954 poem "The Blind Whore" 
in his diatribes of Communism in al-Hurriyah. This five hundred line poem details the tragic life 
story of Salima, an impoverished peasant girl who is forced into prostitution, poverty, and 
physical debilitation after her father is murdered by their tribal shaykh and landlord. The poem 
included the following satirical verses expressing Salima's desperate attempts to maintain her 
dignity in the face of degradation: 
 
 However makes love to a dark Arab girl will not die a loser 
 Your skin is like the color of wheat, O Daughter of the Arabs 
 Like the dawn between the grape arbors 
 Like the surface of the Euphrates reflecting 
 The mildness of the earth and rapacity of gold 
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 Do not leave me, for the morning reveals my lineage: 
 Descended from a conqueror, a holy warrior, and a prophet! 
 I am an Arab: My nation is their blood 
 The best of all blood, as my father used to say 
 In the filthy parts of my body, in my revealing breasts 
 Flows the blood of the conquerors. So come and defile it, O Men 
 Ah, the sex of men.. For yesterday the soldiers ravaged it 
 Crawling from the seas like a herd of squirming worms 




Sayyab now recounted that when the poem was published, the Iranian Communists who were 
sheltering him in exile voiced their pleasure at the violation of Arab honor in his poem. 
Infuriated by their laughter, Sayyab concluded that Communism and nationalism were 
irreconcilable and definitively abandoned Communism: 
 
Our understanding of nationalism (al-qawmiyyah) has been lost between the 
internationalists (al-shuʿubiyyin) and the chauvinists (al-shufiniyyin), but 
nationalism ought to be populist (shaʿbiyyah) and populism ought to be 
nationalist. The grandsons of Muhammad, ʿUmar, ʿAli, Abu Dharr, the Kharijites, 
the first Shiʿa, and the Muʿatazilites ought to be made to live a life suitable for 
them as the offspring and heirs to the glory of the Arab nation. For is not a 
disgrace upon us, the Arabs, that our daughters have become whores who sleep 




 Sayyab's diatribe underscored the inherent problems of dealing with Arab nationalism as 
what Eric Davis calls "the chauvinist version [of pan-Arabism] propounded by the Takriti 
Baʿth." on the one hand, the virulent racism of Sayyab's nationalism undercuts Davis' claim that 
Baʿthist critics have retrospectively and reductively transformed Sayyab's poem, which was "a 
complex work filled with stylistic and political ambiguities" into an endorsement of "a parochial 
pan-Arabism." Davis sarcastically rebuffs the claim of the Baʿthist critic Majid Ahmad al-
Samarraʾi that Sayyab's commitment to the Palestinian cause after his defection from the 
Communist Party sets him apart from the his erstwhile Communist comrades by noting 
Samarraʾi's reductive description of the Communist stance on Palestine to the 1948 chant, "We 
are the brothers of the Jews!"
152
 The problem is that while Samarraʾi's footnotes are sloppy, 
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Sayyab really did make this claim in the second installment of his serialized account.
153
 Sayyab, 
in fact, also engaged in a lengthy attack on Jewish Iraqi Communists like Yahuda Siddiq and 
Shlomo Dallal as Zionist agents intent on expelling the Arabs of Palestine from their homeland 
behind the Communist slogans of bi-nationalism.
154
 
 On the other hand, even accepting the fact that Sayyab was a principle proponent of 
Baʿthist pan-Arabism in 1959 and not simply thrust into that role retroactively to provide some 
semblance of cultural legitimacy to the Baʿthist political project, his writing nevertheless 
challenges the simple reduction of this ideology to chauvinist sectarianism. Sayyab explicitly 
rejects "chauvinism" as the mirror image of shuʿubiyyah internationalism and instead envisions 
an inclusive national community on the sectarian and ideological levels, though obviously not on 
racial grounds. While Eric Davis is right to note the frequent invocations of shuʿubiyyah 
discourse as a cover for more explicit attacks on the Iraqi Shiʿa, Sayyab's writings indicate that 
the term held some meaning for its proponents outside of the sectarian context.
155
 When Sayyab, 
who himself came from a Shiʿi family, talks about "grandsons of Muhammad, ʿUmar, ʿAli, Abu 
Dharr, the Kharijites, the first Shiʿa, and the Muʿatazilites," he draws upon the framework of 
Islamic history to underscore his commitment to Arab equality across diverse religious and 
ideological backgrounds. ʿUmar and ʿAli represent, respectively, the Sunni and Shiʿa 
communities in Iraq, while the Kharijites and the Muʿatazilites represent fundamentalists and 
rationalists. Perhaps more importantly, Abu Dharr, one of the first converts to Islam was at that 
time celebrated by many leftists in both Iran and the Arab world as the "first socialist," and 
Sayyab's invocation of his legacy thus signifies an attempt to ensure space for the Iraqi leftists in 
his own imagined national community.
156
 In a similar vein, Sayyab's declaration that 
"nationalism must be populist and populism must be nationalist" signified an obvious appeal to 
the Kamal al-Chadirchi, Muhammad Hadid, and the National Democratic Party, heirs to the 
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shaʿbiyyah movement of the Ahali Group in the 1930s and currently caught between the 
Baʿthists and the Communists in their struggle for social democracy.
157
 
 Finally, Davis' contention that in "The Blind Whore" Sayyab "explores sexual 
oppression, which is caused by domestic culture and society and not just colonial rule" warrants 
further investigation.
158
 However critics may interpret the meaning and significance of sex in the 
poem, Sayyab was certainly not "exploring" sexual oppression by 1959. His discussions of 
sexuality and sexual oppression rather reflected a cultural bludgeon to be used against the 
Communists. Sayyab's crude complaint that "our daughters have become whores who sleep with 
people from every race and color" was directed at the intermingling of young Arabs, Kurds, and 
Jews involved in the Communist Party. While Communist poets and intellectuals analyzed the 
cultural and social origins of prostitution and sexual oppression in universalist language, Sayyab 
was merely outraged by the fact that an Arab girl should sell her body to non-Arabs.
159
 His 
serialized editorials about his defection from the Communist Party offered a litany of accusations 
of sexual depravity and perversion by both party leaders and members. In one submission, 
Sayyab accused the Communist leader Baha al-Din Nuri of raping Madeleine Mir, a young 
Jewish party member who sought refuge at the party safe house where Nuri was staying.
160
 
Another installment recounted the tale of a poor young girl from a Communist family 
impregnated by a much older party member. The girl's father and brother tried to persuade the 
father of the unborn child to marry his lover, but were forced to bring the matter to Comrade 
Fahd when he refused, pleading that they would be unable to face their conservative neighbors if 
the matter wasn't resolved. Fahd counseled the young man to marry the girl, but he again refused 
and ridiculed the religious beliefs of the community members whom the family feared. The 
father and brother, according to Sayyab, ultimately despaired of a proper resolution and killed 
the poor young girl in order to prevent a public scandal.
161
 
 Sayyab's concern with Communist violations of female honor were echoed by other pan-
Arabist poets, who seized upon the government's treatment of Yusra Saʿid Thabit, a female pan-
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Arabist poet implicated in the attempt on Qasim's life, to portray themselves as guardians of 
female honor. Mahdawi ridiculed Yusra's appearance in the publicly televised trial, mocking the 
quantity of make-up on her face as she stood in the defendant's cage. ʿAdnan al-Rawi composed 
the poem "Yusra" in her honor, transforming her tribulation into yet another symbol of 
Communist depravity: 
 
  By God, our little sister 
  We will furnish a brilliant star 
  To light your path, O Yusra 
 And on the morrow the great unity... 
 And although the torture and treachery of the gloomy night grow long 
 We have the people, we have the defiant army, we have the era 
 We have the anger to triumph over tyranny and evil 
 We have our past July, O Yusra, with the dawn 
  By God, our little sister 
  We will furnish a brilliant star 
  To light your path, O Yusra 
 And on the morrow, the great unity... 
 The covenant will remain, and we shall not forget the victims in memoriam 
 We will not abandon the blood of our free sons squandered in public squares 
 Tomorrow, upon our ascendant dawn, we will construct a free homeland 
 And announce a great revolution after "The Great Revolution" 
  By God, our little sister 
  We will furnish a brilliant star 




Rawi's fellow Baʿthist poet ʿAli al-Hilli went even further and accused the Communists of raping 
Yusra in prison in his poem "Yusra Saʿid Thabit": 
 
 Yusra... My sister! 
 A lamp in the night of death 
 The arctic wind challenges 
 And the flame remains... for vengeance 
 Behind the desert walls 
 The prison deflowers, without a whisper 




 Iraqi women, of course, participated in these new debates about the position of women in 
post-revolutionary Iraq, but they were largely confined to supporting roles. In addition to Yusra 
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Saʿid Thabit, a number of other female poets, including Lamiʿah al-ʿAbbas ʿAmarah, ʿAtikah al-
Khazraji, and Nazik al-Malaʾikah, openly identified with the radical nationalist cause in this 
period.
164
 These women, though, generally refrained from entering the polemical domain of 
explicitly political and ideological poetry. One notable exception was Malaʾikah, who wrote 
"Three Communist Songs," an anti-Communist poem that stand out as one of her few political 
works, in early 1960.
165
 The poem satirized Communist discourses of conspiracy, treason, and 
vengeance: 
  
 When night descends over these hills, stand up, O Comrade 
 We can watch it through dark slits in this deep silence 
 For perhaps the dusk is plotting in secrecy 
 Perhaps it is joined by the star light and silence of night 
 For these hills and that path 
 And this darkness, all of them are agents! 
 We shall investigate even the scents and the rains 
 We shall scrutinize even the beams of light and color of flowers 
 We shall expose what all of these spying irises have plotted 
 And what the birds have propagated in their dancing and chirping 
 For indeed we know that the moon 




Malaʾikah's invocation of nature as a metaphor for the Iraqi nationalists underscored the critique 
of Communism as an invasive foreign ideology and mirrored Sayyab's own attitude toward the 
Communists. Still, while the most prominent female poets rallied to the radical nationalist cause, 
the League for the Defense of Women's Rights strongly backed Qasim and the Communists as 
the most vocal defenders of radical gender liberation.
167
 As Noga Efrati has warned, any attempt 
to draw comprehensive conclusions about women's participation in revolutionary politics must 
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 While the leftist poet Muhammad Mahdi al-Jawahiri never wavered in his commitment to 
the Communists, he was clearly stung by the bitter denunciations of the Iraqi Left by the radical 
nationalists. After nearly a quarter century of devotion to the cause of national liberation, 
Jawahiri was astonished that the nationalists would so quickly turn against their erstwhile 
comrades. Particularly galling to the poet was the fact that he and his fellow leftists were 
disparaged as infidels, foreigners, and traitors in their homeland.  Jawahiri's bitterly defiant poem 
"You Became an Infidel," composed in the autumn of 1959, in the wake of the Mosul and 
Kirkuk violence, challenged the nationalists justification in claiming cultural authenticity for 
themselves: 
 
 They said you became an infidel and perhaps 
  You wondered, for example, who are the believers? 
 And in whom did you lose your faith? 




While the radical nationalists denounced the Communists as Soviet agents, bent on destroying 
Iraq's cultural and religious identity, Jawahiri warned that the nationalists were serving both 
colonial and personal interests in destroying the country in their lust for power: 
 
 But do you dream of what I saw? 
  For I saw something that galls the eyes 
 Worshippers of partisan idols 
  And around them those who buy 
 The owners of wagging tongues 
  To the liars they chatter and prattle 
 Colonized by those who deceive 
  And seek more victims to colonize 
 One timber supported by another 
  And held together by their nails 
 Rising from the corpses of youths 
  While they sit in the seat of honor 
 They behold the redness of their blood 
  And in its reddish glow they are illuminated 
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 For they have faith in the hungry 
  Starving for what they have hoarded 
 So do you really blame those with faith 
  In their people for becoming infidels?  
 
Jawahiri's sad and bitter conclusion may as well have sounded the death knell of the old anti-
colonial movement. While the Communists continued to disparage ʿAbd al-Nasser and the 
Baʿthists as servants of the United States, and the Baʿthists continued to denounce the 
Communists as Soviet stooges and agents, both sides seemed to understand that anti-colonialism 
had become a cultural bludgeon in their battle against domestic opponents. In 1961, Qasim shut 
down Jawahiri's newspaper, al-Raʿi al-ʿAmm, and the poet once again left his homeland, this 
time bound for exile in Prague. 







'WE ARE WHAT FLOWS IN EVERY SOUL AND SPIRIT' 
 
 In 1965, four years after leaving Baghdad for exile in Prague, Muhammad Mahdi al-
Jawahiri was invited to recite some verses in commemoration of the Wathbah of January 1948. 
Jawahiri addressed his poem to his old friend and comrade Muhammad Salih Bahr al-ʿUlum 
(Abu Nazim), who had led the massive crowds in poetic chants and cheers against Britain and 
Nuri al-Saʿid before his brutal arrest and torture. Imprisoned for most of the following decade, 
Bahr al-ʿUlum had rejoiced at the liberation of his country in the revolution of July 14, 1958, but 
he was once again imprisoned at the notorious Nuqrat al-Salman facility after the Baʿthist coup 
d'état of February 8, 1963. Jawahiri, alienated and isolated in Prague, longed for the days when 
he and Bahr al-ʿUlum had stood at the forefront of the Iraq resistance movement: 
  
 O Abu Nazim, your imprisonment is my own 
  For I belong to you just as you belong to me... 
 O Abu Nazim, greetings from a distance 
  The end of misfortunes is both farther and nearer... 
 O Abu Nazim, we are the leaders of a generation 
  We guide it along the path of life and we chant 
 As dearest partners we commence the journey 
  Whose terrors we know and yet suffer again... 
 We will demolish the era constructed by tyrants 
  And herald that what they destroyed we shall rebuild... 
 O Abu Nazim, we are assuredly the insomnia of the people and the slaves of art 
 We are what flows in every soul and spirit 
  Expelling the drowsiness from every eyelid...
1
   
 
Jawahiri and Bahr al-ʿUlum were indeed the leaders of a generation, two of the very few Iraqis 
capable of uniting countrymen from disparate sectarian, social, and cultural backgrounds. Their 
generation, though, had been swept aside by the violence of the young partisans of the Baʿth 
Party and the Communist Party. 
 The  sordid history of the February 8, 1963 coup d'état has been exhaustively documented 
by Hanna Batatu. After a fierce battle between rebel troops and loyalists, including several 
thousand workers armed only with canes, ʿAbd al-Karim Qasim surrendered unconditionally just 
after midnight. He and his closest aides were given a drumhead trial and summarily executed 
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within a span of three hours. The Revolutionary Command Council, a loose coalition of Baʿthist 
and allied pan-Arabist officers, were authorized the next morning "to annihilate anyone that 
disturbs the peace" and "to cooperate with the authorities by informing against these criminals 
and exterminating them." Several thousand Communist Party members and sympathizers, 
compared to just eighty Baʿthists, were slaughtered in three days of brutal violence. The rapid 
and methodical nature of the house-to-house search for Communists indicated that the Baʿthists 
were working from detailed lists, and  Batatu and others have offered circumstantial evidence 
implicating the C.I.A. in the preparation and distribution of these lists.
2
 There is no doubt, 
however, that whatever assistance they may have received from the United States, the Baʿthists 
were settling their own scores. 
 The Baʿthist coup had a devastating effect on the Iraqi cultural scene, and the leftist poets 
suffered as much as anyone. Jawahiri and ʿAbd al-Wahhab al-Bayati were already living in exile 
in Prague and Moscow, respectively. Saʿdi Yusuf, Ghaʾib Tuʿamah Farman, and several others 
soon joined them.
3
 The Kurdish Communist poet Buland al-Haydari, was actually sentenced to 
death but was saved by the intervention of a Kurdish politician on good terms with the pan-
Arabists and fled to exile in Beirut.
4
 Those who remained, like Bahr al-ʿUlum, suffered severely 
in the prisons, just as they had done under the old regime. The most talented of the pan-Arabist 
poets, Badr Shakir al-Sayyab, finally succumbed to the ravages of ALS at the age of 38 in 1964, 
just over a year after Qasim's fall. Baʿthist poets like Hilal Naji and ʿAdnan al-Rawi returned to 
Iraq from their own exiles, but their political poetry was so bitterly partisan and vindictively 
violent that it cannot be considered anything more than cultural propaganda. While the exiled 
poets continued to write poetry, the obstacles of censorship and dictatorship had removed them 
from the political debates within Iraq. Under the new nationalist regimes, particularly after the 
rise of Saddam Hussein and the Takriti Baʿthists, dissident and disaffected poets could not dare 
to publicly challenge the state as Bahr al-ʿUlum, Jawahiri, and so many others had done during 
the Hashemite era. 
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Poetry, Politics, and History 
 Iraq, of course, was not the only part of the world where poets continued to pose a critical 
threat to the stability of the political establishment long after the decline of poetry in Western 
Europe and the United States. A robust body of scholarship produced by historians and literary 
critiques in recent years has highlighted the vitality of political poetry as a mode of dissent in 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, particularly during the Stalinist period.
5
 Collectively, these 
works have challenged both historical generalizations from the Anglo-American experience 
about the decline of poetry as a condition of modernity and the theoretical assumption that 
modern poetry is distinctively anti-social, apolitical, and ahistorical.
6
 Recent historical 
scholarship on the relationship between poetry, national identity, and cultural politics in both 
colonial and post-colonial South Asia has further advanced academic understandings of the 
crucial nexus between poetry, politics, and history in the modern era.
7
 While historians of the 
modern Middle East have been somewhat slower to engage in critical dialogue with their literary 
critic counterparts and to take poetry seriously as an historical archive, several scholars have 
taken preliminary steps to advance this agenda.
8
 My own intervention builds upon these recent 
developments not only by proposing that modern Iraqi poetry is a critical historical archive that 
ought to be mined to broaden our understand of the cultural politics of both global and regional 
geopolitical conflicts, ideological contestations, and the social dislocations and transformations 
of modernity, but in fact that modern Iraqi history told without reference to poets and poetry 
offers a necessary constricted vision of popular culture and politics. 
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 The fundamental challenge for any historical study that seeks to salvage poetic archives 
from the wastelands of bourgeois cultural critiques is to counter theoretical generalizations about 
the increasing marginality of poetry after the Romantic revolution. In the United States and 
Western Europe, these critiques of poetry paralleled the gradual marginalization of poetry in 
popular culture, while in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe they have benefited from 
their utility to official cultural ideology. Literary critics grounded in critical theory and the logic 
of New Historicism have overwhelmingly concluded that poetry was transformed by the 
Romanticists into a reactionary medium that seeks to sever art from both politics and history.
9
 
Mikhail Bakhtin's critique of modern poetry informed an entire generation of scholars who now 
decried poetry as apolitical and ahistorical.
10
 Theodor Adorno went even further than Bakhtin in 
his blanket declaration that the poetic voice "defines and expresses itself as something opposed 
to the collective, to objectivity."
11
 Even Marx himself famously declared in The Eighteenth 
Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte  that "the social revolution of the nineteenth century cannot draw 
its poetry from the past, but only from the future," and his demand that poetry be reconstituted as 
revolutionary art was fervently echoed by Trotsky.
12
 While Marxist critics assailed poetry for its 
anti-collectivist individualism and resistance to the demands of historical materialism, indignant 
poets and critics have at times compounded the confusion by embracing the charge as a badge of 
honor. Thus, the renowned Mexican poet and critic Octavio Paz proudly declared that although 
poetry "is the product of a definite history and a definite society," it nevertheless remains "a 
device which produces anti-history."
13
 
 Of course, not all poets and critics have accepted the critical parameters outlined by 
Adorno and Paz. As Clare Cavanagh has noted, the famed Polish poet and critic Czesław Miłosz 
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fiercely resisted interpretations of poetry as anti-social and anti-historical, arguing instead in "A 
Poet Between East and West" that "the problem of [his] time should be defined as Poetry and 
History."
14
 Cavanagh and others have explicated the extent to which lyric poetry was capable of 
undermining the grand historical narratives promulgated by the Soviet Union. The British poet 
and critic Donald Davie's celebration of Miłosz's revolutionary poetics highlights the capacity of 
poets to transcend traditional stereotypes about poetic frivolity: 
 
So long as the poet, East or West, appears before the public only as a lyricist, 
banking on the irresponsibilities traditionally associated with that role, he will be 
tolerated by the governing class and allowed to communicate with his readers. It 




The Irish poet and critic Tom Paulin has likewise championed Eastern European poetry as a 
political foil for the ahistorical and apolitical universalizing aspirations of poetry in the Western 
democracies. Paulin points to dual commitment to art and society in the work of Polish poets 
Zbigniew Herbert and Tadeusz Różewicz and the Czech poet Miroslav Holub as evidence of the 
extraordinary achievements of political poetry in Eastern Europe.
16
 Cavanagh likewise 
complicates Adorno's reading of poetry as self-absorbed detachment from society by arguing that 




 If historians have largely ignored or overlooked the contributions of their literary critic 
counterparts to our understanding of the relationship between poetry and politics in Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union, literary critics have been quite hostile or critical to the nascent 
attempts of historians to read poetry as an historical archive. This critique has been most 
apparent in recent scholarship on poetry in South Asia, largely driven by the ambitious efforts of 
historians to incorporate poetic verse and voices into revisionist historical narratives. Jill Didur's 
critique of Gyan Pandey's approach to literary sources offers the most instructive and most 
troubling corrective to those interested in historical interventions.
18
 While praising Pandey's 
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openness and innovation in using poetry and other literary texts to challenge state narratives of 
Hindu-Muslim violence, Didur argues that "Pandy's analysis is concerned more with what he 
characterizes as the 'authenticity' of Harganvi's representation of the 'riots' than with the 
critical/imaginative relation this fragment has with the discursive and material conditions that 
produced the rioting."
19
 This concern with the evidence of "experience" and "authenticity," she 
argues, obscures broader questions about "how this transparency is constructed and the power 
relations that constructions makes visible in the sociocultural context."
20
 Pandey, in other words, 
is guilty of reading poetry like an historian who has not fully grasped the theoretical lessons of 
the cultural turn. 
 Didur's critique of this type of instrumental reading of literary narratives provides an 
important reminder that interdisciplinary historical approaches require not only openness to new 
source material, but also critical attention to the theoretical and methodological approaches of 
scholars working in different fields. Her own invocation of feminist and labor historians like 
Kathleen Canning, Alf Lüdtke, and Joan W. Scott offers a desperately needed theoretical 
grounding for historical readings of literary archives.
21
 Nevertheless, this demand for self-
reflexive and deconstructive readings of literary narratives should not obscure the tremendous 
utility and vitality of particular categories of literature as historical archives of experience. Clare 
Cavanagh's comparison of political poetry and photography, as artistic genres that strive to 
capture a particularly moment in time while calling our attention to the futility of such endeavors 
any more than and thus illustrate the inherent tension between the artist's pretense to objectivity 
and the reality of subjective experience, provides one path toward the reconciliation of these 
critical demands. Poetic and other forms of literary narratives must not be read as mere 
representations of reality and experience, just as reports and documents in the colonial archives 
must not be read as impartial statements of fact. The poet, like any other agent, not only 
documents historical facts and experiences, social transformations, and cultural attitudes, but also 
helps to construct the cultural meaning and understanding of these events and the experiences. 
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Historical readings of poetry narratives must devote adequate attention to both the social context 
in which poetry is produce and consumed and the cultural context that shapes and is shaped by 
poetic verse and interventions. 
 These theoretical interventions ought to shape new critical readings of poetic 
contributions to modern Arab history by prompting historians and other critics to move beyond 
parochial understandings of poetry as either literary text or social document and toward an 
interdisciplinary reading of poetry as both productive and documentary historical archive. While 
the social, political, and historical dimensions of modern Arabic poetry have rarely been called 
into question by area scholars, an explication of these dimensions nevertheless offers a useful 
and much-needed corrective to theoretical generalizations about the limitations and 
insufficiencies of modern poetry. As in Eastern Europe and South Asia, Arabic poetry has long 
enjoyed a considerable advantage in both prestige and popularity over all rival forms of cultural 
production. Perhaps even more distinctive, though, is the peculiar relationship between poetry 
and history in the Arab world. In his incisive study of historical memory and contestation among 
the tribes of Jordan, the anthropologist Andrew Shryock details an exchange with Shaykh Saʿud 
Abu al-ʿAmash of the ʿAdwani tribe on the comparative reluctance of the rival ʿAbbadi tribe to 
have their oral history recorded: 
The ʿAbbad have no history. Why? First, no famous shaykhs rose up among them. 
Shaykhs of mighty deeds. So they composed no poetry to remember them by... 




In this remarkable passage, Shryock's tribal interlocutor underscores the mutual dependence of 
poetry and history in Jordanian bedouin society; without history there is no poetry, and without 
poetry there is no history.  
 Shaykh Saʿud's striking formulation calls to mind Hayden White's contention that 
narrative history requires moralizing judgments to produce meaning.
23
 In the contemporary Arab 
world, poets offer more than just another voice or perspective to be considered and analyzed 
alongside the myriad of alternative historical agents catalogued and documented in archives and 
libraries. Rather, poetry simultaneously lends cultural authority to the significance of particular 
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historical events and perspectives and ensures that this authority will be preserved, contested, or 
overthrown, but certainly not ignored and forgotten. Roland Bleiker's assessment of Pablo 
Neruda's historical legacy offers a useful model for thinking through the unique contributions of 
poetry and poets to the modern historical experience: 
 
One may or may not agree with the content of Neruda's politics, but one can 
hardly deny that his influential poetry fulfils the function of a historical memory. 
It testifies to the controversies and complexities of an epoch gone, to the political 
contingencies that have rendered some elements of the past into what we call the 
present. Neruda's poems hold on to faint voices and perspectives that may 
otherwise have vanished into the dark holes of historical narratives. For better or 
worse, Neruda's poetic testimonies are part of today's collective consciousness. 
They have entered the canons of Western thought. That is why even those 
commentators who are hostile to his politics readily accept the central role Neruda 




I could scarcely offer a more fitting analysis of the importance of figures like Maʿruf al-Rusafi, 
Muhammad Mahdi al-Jawahiri, and Badr Shakir al-Sayyab as poets and chroniclers of the 
modern Iraqi historical experience. I would, in fact, argue that the historical significance of the 
Iraqi poets far outstrips that of Neruda due to the comparatively broader resonance of poetry and 
poetic cannons in Iraqi society.
25
 
 Finally, we must note that the historical significance and utility of poetry extends far 
beyond its contribution to and preservation in the literary cannons of the modern era. Poetry is 
significant not only because of its prima facie position as the hegemonic domain of cultural 
production in places like Iraq and Jordan, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, and Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, and Russia, but also because its specific forms of production and methods of 
transmission have proven resistant to the repressive capacities of the modern nation-state. The 
rhythm and rhyme of poetry produce a mnemonic effect that aids memorization and transmission 
and enables what had always been, at least in the Arab world, an oral tradition to undermine the 
stultifying effects of official censorship. Even where the poet cannot evade punishment for the 
transgressions of his political dissent, he can rest assured that his contribution to the political 
culture of dissidence while survive in a way that the novelist's will not. Equally significant is the 
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incomprehensibility or inscrutability of poetry to government officials not fully versed in the 
cultural discourses of poetry. This protective valence is particularly apparent in colonial contexts 
where colonial officials are incapable of distinguishing the transgressive nature of political 
attacks beyond the shrouds of poetic metaphor, verse, and vocabulary.  
 Even beyond the context of colonial domination and repression, though, poetry maintains 
a critical political function as the dominant discursive medium for countering official political 
and cultural narratives. Poetry remains an integral component of the "dual culture" dynamic 
articulated by James C. Scott in his analysis of power relations between dominate and 
subordinate classes: 
 
The official cultures is filled with bright euphemisms, silences, and platitudes and 
an unofficial culture that has its own history, its own literature and poetry, its own 
biting slang, its own music and poetry, its own humor, its own knowledge of 
shortages, corruption, and inequalities that may, once again, be widely known but 




Badr Shakir al-Sayyab famously boasted that in poems like "Cerberus in Babylon" and "City of 
Sinbad," both composed in the wake of the 1959 violence between Communist and Baʿthist 
partisans, he "satirized Qasim and his regime severely and his myrmidons did not realize that."
27
 
Sayyab's boast is difficult to take seriously as an impartial analysis of the parameters of cultural 
dissent in the Qasim period, given Qasim's well-known celebration of Jawahiri's poetry and the 
regime's crackdown on opposition poets like Baʿthist ideologue ʿAdnan al-Rawi. After all, if 
even passionate admirers of poetry like Qasim could not comprehend the thinly veiled political 
attacks in Sayyab's poems, how effective could such poetry really be in shaping popular opinion? 
More likely, following Scott's formulation, is the probability that the Qasim regime was forced to 
tolerate the subtle expressions of cultural dissent from the opposition so long as they refrained 
from making their political commentary explicit.
28
 ʿAdnan al-Rawi's ham-fisted attacks on 
Qasim and transparent allusions to Rashid ʿAli simply violated this covenant in a way that 
Sayyab's allusions to Greek mythology did not. 
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The Historical Contributions of Iraqi Poetry 
 The historical analysis of modern Iraqi poetry dramatically alters academic 
understandings of ideological contestations, social mobilizations, and cultural conflicts. Popular 
Iraqi poetry from this period provides a critical historical archive of local cultural representations 
of revolutionary politics. Poets occupied a unique position within Iraqi society and both the size 
and the composition of their audiences distinguished them from other artists and intellectuals. As 
an alternative to political memoirs, poetry offers a more immediate and more accurate reflection 
to popular attitudes at particular historical moments and remains insulated from the problematic 
intrusions of historical memory and the temptation to read history backwards. This distinction 
has significant consequences for contemporary understandings of Iraqi constructions of nation 
and community in the Hashemite period. Perhaps more importantly, though, popular poetry 
cannot and should not be read as mere representation of political attitudes and actions. Rather, 
public poetry served as a crucial cultural domain in which political attitudes were constructed 
and contested, political dissent was composed and articulated, and political action was given 
rhythm, history, and meaning. As I have argued throughout this dissertation, poets like Bahr al-
ʿUlum, Jawahiri, Rusafi, and Sayyab ought to be seen more properly as political agents rather 
than mere political critics. 
 The crucial role of poetry in shaping the discourse and dynamics of cultural politics in the 
modern Iraqi state is evident across several thematic domains explored in this dissertation. The 
poetry of the Bakr Sidqi period underscores the extent to which the partisan struggle over the 
post-mandatory state was shaped by poetic contestations over the historical legacy of colonialism 
in Iraq. The public recitation of poetry in support of Bakr Sidqi's coup d'état by poets like 
Jawahiri and Bahr al-ʿUlum and the poets' organization of massive crowds of workers mobilized 
to support radical political reform highlights the significance and resonance of these poetic 
efforts to construct historical meaning from the mire of political turmoil. It was only after the 
leftist poets who initially supported the coup d'état of 196 had been marginalized and silenced 
that the events be could reframed as an assault on the pan-Arab nationalist agenda. The striking 
resilience and effectiveness of these revisionist narratives constructed and reinforced by 
nationalist poets - consider that even perpetually defiant and proudly rebellious poets like 
Jawahiri and Bahr al-ʿUlum were cowed into recanting their support for the coup - demands a 
deeper investigation into the political poetry of the mandatory period. While an analysis of these 
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political contestations framed by the historical context of immediate political events foregrounds 
the partisan dynamics of the struggle, a wider historical lens might capture the transgressive 
qualities of this so-called "populist poetry" and their broader historical significance to better 
effect. 
 In sharp contrast to the Bakr Sidqi poetry, the poetic archive that frames the Rashid ʿAli 
movement of 1941 suggests the ability of poetry to provide some respite from the bitter rivalries 
of partisan politics in the interest of forging national unity. The popular poetry of these period 
provides an essential corrective to historical readings of colonial archives and prominent (though 
hardly influential) ideological treatises that draw clear connections between Nazi and fascist 
ideology and the Iraqi anti-colonial movement. Wartime poetry, though was not merely a vehicle 
for asserting allegiance and rallying public opinion behind a renegade political and military 
leadership. Poets instead challenged and corrected the chauvinism and bigotry of fascist politics 
in subtle but important ways and helped to prevent the devolution of total anti-colonialism into 
pro-Nazi anti-Semitism. Just as importantly, the sudden emergence and rapid advance of secular 
and progressive political ideologies in the 1940s and 1950s is scarcely comprehensible without 
understanding the thawing of partisan tensions between poets, intellectuals, and students from 
variant backgrounds in the wartime internment camps. The cultural labor of leftist poets in the 
local construction of the Soviet Union as a utopian symbol of anti-colonial liberation similarly 
helps to explain the rapid public backlash against any manifestation of pro-Nazi sympathy. This 
analysis points to the need for comparative studies on anti-colonial and anti-fascist poetry in 
other parts of the Arab world - particularly Libya, Palestine, and Syria - to determine the extent 
to which the Iraqi historical experience might be used to generalize about Arab interpretations of 
and responses to shifting trends in global politics. 
 It is more difficult, but no less important, to adequately assess the relationship between 
poetry and the cultural crisis of the Iraqi countryside in this period. While the poetry considered 
in this study unquestionably documents both the sense of social oppression and cultural malaise 
experienced by rural Iraqis, the limitations of the project's scope have ensured a necessarily 
restricted documentation of local attitudes and experiences. While this dissertation aims to 
capture the contribution of the national poetic discourse to the historical experience of modern 
Iraq, rather than to document only the reaction of poets to national political issues arising from 
Baghdad, the trajectory of social transformations in the 1940s and 1950s ensures that rural and 
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tribal voices are gradually marginalized or objectified in the national poetic discourse. Poets like 
Jawahiri, Bahr al-ʿUlum, and al-Safi al-Najafi grew up in southern Iraq and were deeply 
acquainted with and passionately interested in the struggles of rural Iraqi peasant farmers, but 
their movement into the cities and immersion into partisan politics over the course of the 1940s 
parallels the social migrations of so many rural Iraqis and ensures that the experiences of those 
left behind are only discussed from distant vantage points. A more complete assessment of rural 
historical experiences of political transformations in this period requires a broader examination 
of poetic archives, including both poetry publishes in regional newspapers and unpublished tribal 
poetry.
29
 Still, whatever questions and obscurities remain, the contribution of these poets to the 
production of a new sense of national identity that drew its inspiration from the street protests, 
communal life, and cosmopolitan exchanges of urban centers in the 1940s and 1950s clearly 
appealed to the cultural aspirations of many young Iraqis disenchanted with the restrictive and 
oppressive conditions of life in the countryside. 
 The production of radical politics by Iraqi poets is perhaps most evident in my analysis of 
the protest movements of the post-war period. The role of popular poets like Jawahiri and Bahr 
al-ʿUlum in bringing the discourse of cultural politics into the public sphere had broad 
implications for Iraqi society. Poets helped to evade the restriction of speech and movement 
enforced by the state through rigid regimes of censorship, systematic electoral fraud, and the 
criminalization of certain domains of political expression by transforming the basic dynamics of 
political discourse and demands While prior moments of political upheaval were characterized 
by clandestine negotiations and elite cultivation of popular support, the emergence of genuine 
popular politics brought the Iraqi public into the political arena as active participants for the first 
time. In the 1948 protests, Jawahiri and Bahr al-ʿUlum emerged as popular heroes, and poets and 
crowds celebrated one another in euphoric expressions of lyric verse. It is perhaps not so 
surprising, then, that the crowds of the 1952 uprising were reputed to have chanted for a 
government led by Kamil al-Chadirchi and Muhammad Mahdi al-Jawahiri. No less surprising is 
the fact that statues of popular poets like Jawahiri, Rusafi, and Sayyab are among the only public 
monuments of prominent Iraqi figures that survived the upheaval of the U.S. occupation. The 
                                                          
29
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broader theoretic relevance of poetic interventions in the public sphere is evident in the renewed 
attention to the historical tradition of particular forms of "poetry of revolution" from scholars in 
the wake of the "Arab Spring" uprisings of 2011.
30
 
 Finally, the last chapter of this dissertation illustrates the role of poetry in forging 
political alliances between the leftist and radical nationalist factions of the Iraqi anti-colonial 
undercurrent. The poetic archive illustrates the often forgotten fact that the Communist Party and 
Baʿthist Party appeared to converge toward a broad ideological consensus in the 1950s in which 
the Communists embraced significant aspects of the nationalist political agenda promulgated by 
the Baʿth Party and the Baʿthists accepted the need for radical structural reforms to ameliorate 
the oppressive condition of peasant and worker life in Iraq. The chapter closes by showing how 
this tentative consensus unraveled as the euphoria of revolution and national liberation began to 
fade away. While poets like Badr Shakir al-Sayyab cannot be held responsible for the fateful 
introduction of sectarian strife into the discourse of cultural politics, the construction of 
Communism as cultural pathology in his and others' poetry would later be appropriated by 
cynical politicians looking to benefit from sectarian strife. As this analysis indicates, the new 
cultural politics of anti-colonialism forged by popular poets in the Iraqi public sphere ultimately 
failed to provide a new model of community, nation, and modernity capable of withstanding the 
pressures of the post-revolutionary period. Some scholars, like Eric Davis, have articulated this 
failure in Gramscian terminology, arguing that the Iraqi Left "failed to provide well-articulated 
counterhegemonic models to challenge existing forms of political praxis."
31
 I argue against this 
analysis and assert the cultural discourse of public poetry offered a truly alternative vision of 
post-colonial modernity that brought subaltern classes into politics in a way that the intellectual 
discourses of nationalist ideologues never could. How, then, can we explain the obvious fact that 
this vision failed to take root amidst the spiraling descent of polemical denunciations and 
political violence chronicled by Batatu and Davis? This is indeed a serious problem, but I would 
suggest that we look for a resolution by exploring in greater detail the unraveling of Iraqi society 
and the emergence of sectarian politics in the 1960s and 1970s, rather than simply transposing 
the cruel fate of history onto the distant past. 
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